Thinking Space: Adapting narrative cinema for installation art

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Ph.D. Thesis 2022

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Abstract

Gallery film and video installation have been figured within a discourse on the phenomenological subject, the avant-garde and its relation to the gallery as a site of political and cultural activity, and with respect to medium specificity. A question about video and film installation has been posed by, amongst others, Kate Mondloch (2007): how to reconcile a preoccupation with object and site, that embraces the spectator in a phenomenological relationship with the art object, largely situated within a modernist framework or postmodern coda, and a distinct type of image, the film image, with its narrative, and 'illusionism'.

An alternative position is provided, informed by a Deleuzian transcendental empiricism that locates the phenomenological distinctions between art object and spectator as a form of tracing, to reposition the subject as a synthesis of time and therefore in experience rather than related to experience. The phenomenological position prioritises a transcendental subject in a certain relationship with the screen and concomitant artistic work *stag*es the event of experience.

A theoretical stance that repositions the spectator in relation to the artwork, in which the completion of the work is not premised on the pre-existence of the spectator, is established. Subsequently, a detailed exposition is provided, of a studio practice methodology applied to a film production process, that adapts fiction cinema and moving image with respect to form and space as constituent compositional elements of gallery film installation. The adaptive manoeuvres identified through practice outcomes are applied to existing gallery film installation works to develop the position, that the conjunction of the moving image with form and space constitutes a unique or specific instance of movement and time images. An aesthetics of gallery film and video installation, as a discrete field of cultural and arts practice with its own history, sets of formalistic devices and concerns, but that has affinities also with cinema, rather than in opposition to it, is therefore provided.

It has been suggested that the destabilizing impacts of placing screens within unfamiliar contexts privileges work of this kind with a critical function. Given the repositioning of the spectator with respect to the artwork made here, it is further explored whether the transformation of the cinematic constitutes its own kind of analytic. The process, to relate the spatial configuration of screens and cinematic form, and the addition of physical space to cinematic movement and time is identified with praxis, and which affords gallery film and video installation an analytic function.

Key terms: cinema, video installation, gallery film

Introduction

The impetus for this study turned on an intuition or sense, that some error was being committed. Video and film as part of a visual art tradition has a relatively established history and from the 1950s and 60s onwards gathered some momentum across various disciplines. At the same time, the film production industry has its own well-established history and associated artefacts, from the earliest days of film exhibition, the studios, development of a sign system, and of distinct schools and movements. It is this fact from which the sense developed, that to appropriate a technology, to what I will simply refer to as *art*, seemed to signal something relatively new on the one hand but at a cost, or more precisely in direct conflict with, both the endeavours of the arts and the advances of the cinema. We hear echoes of the historicized collapse of the distinctions between 'high' and 'low' culture within the arts.

In the search for understanding, there are all kinds of distinctions, high/low, pure/applied, commercial/not-for-profit. The designation 'artist' is equally problematic, for what or whom does the title 'artist', or the signifier 'art' designate an activity or referent; it is not possible that everything is possible, for if it were then there would be the possibility of nothing being possible… The optical device, the lens, has a very long association with the visual arts but the camera heralded a historic turn and made possible film. The ideas of the gallery or museum and their equivalents, the collection, and the avant-garde, are allied to our concept of the artist, but to what ends? If it is not the institution or industrial contexts that determine the concept, then how else might we understand the practice of an idea? What distinctions are to be made between one discipline and another, gathered under the concept, and might this be the reason for the sensation of unease previously described? At a time then within the arts, when distinctions of all kinds have been challenged, it seems relevant to revisit this historical problematic and place it once more under scrutiny, through practice. On the one hand we have an idea of medium specificity, although as will be discussed this is itself a historically contingent concept. On the other hand, medium specificity has been contrasted with practices that prioritise the concept or idea over and above the medium of expression but, relative to the kind of work under discussion here have been labelled as 'theatrical'.

We may trace a certain trajectory or idea back to a particular point in history, and to Dada, it is widely accepted that from this time certain conventions of art were radically reconsidered. The idea or concept gains some priority, whilst materiality and authorship are second to this principle, notwithstanding the progression of the modernist tendency, especially in America. It is from this time that performance assumes a new status in practice, so too photography, graphics

and the printed word. It is now also that film is first considered a part of the substance of the art object, for want of a better designation. It is notable that D.W. Griffith's *Birth of a Nation* is released a year prior to the first publication of a Dada manifesto in 1916.

To designate an origin may also be seen as an error, and of course there are lineages, for example from expressionism, to Dada, and subsequently to the Surrealist movements. There are complex influences that may be traced and hopefully a very brief acknowledgement of what is a fairly complex development is sufficient here to provide some context for the discussion. We can also consider in detail, historically, what happens subsequently. Although the use of film in art or by artists has a long history, much of the artistic work that foregrounded contemporary practice was developed in the 1950s and 1960s and issued from movements such as Pop, Fluxus, and the developing New York and London schools of artist film. It is from this time that artist film and video begin to acquire something of a distinct territory of its own, as a form of arts practice and theory, separate from, what will have to suffice as to be labelled for the moment, *mainstream* film and cinema.

We can identify different approaches to practice and production although different artists appropriate the medium in a variety of ways: film, and later video and television, as document, sculptural process, as spatial-temporal rather than pictorial, as a mechanism and technology, film allied to performance, both physical and spoken, film imbued with expressive potential and divulged of its qualities as a medium.

In a critique of Richard Serra's *Hand Catching Lead*, (1968), in which small pieces of lead fall from the top of frame whilst a hand, centre frame, attempts to catch them, Rosalind Krauss aligns the use of film with the modernist tradition, 'medium-specificity, even where it is produced as hybrid from a compound structure, is adduced as a strategy for the eradication of narrative and the flattening out of representational space, that is, for modernist ends' (cited in Trodd, 2008, p.368).

Krauss observes, when considering the modernist notion of medium specificity, in the face of a deconstructionist analytic, the 'self-identical was revealed as, and thus dissolved into, the self-different' (1999, p.32). This critique paved the way for 'practices of rampant impurity - like Fluxus or Situationist détournement (subversive appropriation)' (1999, p.33). Krauss' argument is in defence of a medium specificity and critiques the political potential of the 'rampantly impure hybrid' form, the difficulty according to Krauss being that, 'Any theory, even if it is issued as a critique of the culture industry, will end up only as a form of promotion for that very industry. In this way, the ultimate master of détournement turns out to be capitalism itself, which can appropriate and reprogram anything to serve its own ends' (1999, p.33).

The commitments of this time are not always clear, as will be shown later. The art was being made in a contested space, that of high modernism. This is evident when considering the artists and the work, for example, Andy Warhol (alongside filmmaker Paul Morrisey) is notable for having made films, e.g. *Chelsea Girls*, 1966, whilst Michael Snow is perhaps best known for his work as an experimental filmmaker, although is an artist who has worked with installation and other mediums, and the work of Nam June Paik is associated with Fluxus, that is seen as a development from, or at the very least having a genesis relative to Dada, but also has a connection to the musical arts. On the other hand, experimental film makers such as Stan Brakhage and Kenneth Anger have worked almost exclusively in film, notwithstanding the types of experiments that were undertaken. We may be forgiven if it is hard to distinguish at times which standpoint a piece of film or video art may stem from, especially during the formative period, post-WWII, of the 1950s, 1960s and into the 70s.

We can also distinguish between different kinds of film, for example, there are single channel films, multi-channel films, video, both single and multi-channel, video relays, works in which the technology remains largely discrete and works where the technology takes a significant place within the artistic construction, and work that also includes live performance, and work which may embrace the viewer as a constituent element.

If there is one constant across all this diverse output then, largely speaking, it is the way in which one form or another of practice and production is contrasted to what has been labelled as 'mainstream cinema', or narrative cinema, and possibly characterised by, as Krauss puts it, 'the flattening out of representational space'. Once again, the picture is not so straight forward, narrative films are a feature of some of the artists working within the territory being described, and there are sufficient examples of film that are difficult to posit as strictly narrative, many designated as art-film, and this discussion will be further developed. It is also the case that by virtue of the experimental tone that these works endeavour to represent that they are by definition in some contrast to the 'mainstream'.

We have then these overall histories: artists associated with a mode of arts practice for whom the medium has ceased to be a priority, or rather, their practice is not bound by a dedication to one medium or another; filmmakers whose practice may be described as experimental and designated as art, and those that occupy a space between one or the other position, for example Snow, whose practice is wider than filmmaking alone but who is closely associated with the experimental film tradition. Lastly, and by association of negation, we may append this list with mainstream cinema, and with art-film in a hinterland between the two provinces.

During the 1980s and 90s video became a widely used medium for artist expression, partially stemming from the simple ease with which the technology could be made available and adapted to artistic purposes. It is also a time when much of the work being outlined here tended towards 'protest' forms of expression, especially throughout the 1980s. The materialist or 'structural' concerns of much of the work of the preceding decades gave way to 'content'. This shift perhaps marked a wider shift taking place and progressively narrative cinema, both fictional and factual, has increasingly pervaded the gallery. There are seminal exhibitions that surveyed cinema directly and there is the work of artists who have increasingly embraced the 'other' tradition that was explicitly eschewed by the materialist film movement, and that is largely absent from much of the work from the early and mid to late twentieth century; there have been calls for alternative histories to this period.

The shift since, and over the past two decades, might be characterised as *convergent*. Increasingly, artist filmmakers such as Doug Aitken, Eija-Liisa Ahtila, Isaac Julien, Yang Fudong, Sutapa Biswas, John Akomfrah, Keren Cytter… have made gallery films that employ or play with cinematic approaches. In many instances these are multi-channel displays although works may be repurposed for single channel distribution. Increasingly the gallery space, or equivalent, has become a space for the moving image and this begs the question, what opportunities are there, creatively, for the filmmaker to make work for gallery spaces and audiences? What are the challenges, points of conflict, rupture and continuity? Beyond or prior to the industrial, and commercial contexts, there is a creative question, which leads us to the central imperative of the research: what considerations need to be made when adapting cinema for the gallery and installation art?

Artist film will conventionally be produced as a limited series of prints, there may only be in existence several copies of the film and these are usually tightly managed, loaned, sold, and distributed, in much the same way that a painting or sculpture may, unlike commercial cinematic distribution where the aim is to maximise its audience, through a variety of mechanisms including promotion, theatrical release, on demand services, and DVD, and relies on ticket sales, subscription or pay per view, sales and rentals. For some independent filmmakers the gallery approach may be seen as favourable both artistically and commercially.

Audiences are also distinct between the two spheres of production/reception. Gallery audiences are not the same as for commercial cinema, although of course there are plenty of gallery goers who equally enjoy watching cinema or cinema goers who also enjoy visiting galleries. It is no longer unusual to find black box spaces within galleries, with seating, and sophisticated audio systems but the architecture of viewing in galleries remains essentially that of

the mobile and 'intermittent' spectator or viewer, unlike that of the immobile and scheduled film viewing experience. The existence of certain forms of screen events within gallery spaces remains a challenge to filmmakers, audiences and institutions, and asks further questions of all, regardless of whether it is commonly accepted to find a screen within a gallery.

The cinematic turn is implicated more widely than by simply the use of certain technologies, and methods of display. In a significant exhibition, *Le Musée qui n'existait pas*, (directly translated as, *The Museum that Did Not Exist*) Paris, June 26–September 23, 2002, the painter and installation artist Daniel Buren transformed a number of the spaces of the Pompidou Centre, Paris. Using many of the techniques that we have come to associate with his work, blocks of colour, stripes, simple geometries, that work with and against the space of exhibition itself, Buren challenged the viewer to rethink the gallery.

One room stood out amongst all the others, a smallish space in which Buren had installed a bank of monitors on one wall in a grid arrangement. Each monitor displayed a view of one of the rooms of the exhibition in which had been installed a CCTV camera, the existence of which had been subsumed within the administrative functions of the cultural space, or simply to go unnoticed, and with a camera in each of the rooms of the exhibition. On entering this particular room the viewer was confronted with a perspective on the whole exhibition, across all of the various spaces, on the bank of monitors.

What was most striking about this particular installation, or part thereof, was that as a set of live feeds, the viewer was able to see not just the spaces themselves but the other visitors as they walked through these spaces, spaces that previously the viewer of the monitors had themselves walked through, and that had possibly been watched by someone else as they had stood before the monitors. It is suggested here that it was time and movement that were signified in the monitor room, over space, and this was the most striking element of this room and why it stood alone within the exhibition, whilst being wholly reliant on the exhibition.

Much of the work, such as the Buren monitor room, that may seem to exist separately from more direct versions of 'experimental' cinema, and work that has been understood from a phenomenological position, may be considered as meditations on 'presence' of the subject, or as appeals to the more specific temporal present of the subject, and call to attention the consciousness of the viewer at the moment of viewing; Mondloch comments on the 'radical potential for certain media arts configurations to productively destabilize our conventional relationships to screen spaces' (2007, p.20). As such, the frame of the gallery, or the frame of the monitor, is turned towards the viewer, but it is no less a frame as a result. In many ways this tendency, to implicate audiences within the art work is one that has been explored across many

different cultural forms, including screen media and cinema; we may be here reminded of the work of Alfred Hitchcock, amongst others.

It is the implication of time and movement, and therefore of consciousness ('phenomenological subject'), within the gallery or equivalent space, that is notable. The screen seems to occupy a privileged place in this expansion of the arts. Movement has been figured within sculpture, for example the work of the Futurists and artists such as Umberto Boccioni, or directly employed in the form, for example the mobiles of Alexander Calder, and has been located within compositional devices, the movement of form (and the eye) around the canvas for example. Movement and time are also the realities of earth works and 'natural' sculpture, whether this be the vast earthworks of Robert Smithson, the documented journeys of Richard Long, or the ephemeral qualities of the sculptures by Andy Goldsworthy. In many respects there is a history of art that has, since the advent of the camera, progressively embraced the temporal, and transient, and the film arts are perhaps primarily the art of movement and time. From this respect, whether a work of art is in film or made with ice, leaves, and earth, it may all be described as 'cinematic'. Nancy Holt and Robert Smithson were aware of this.

It is with these preoccupations that an attempt has been made to explore the cinematic proper, within the gallery context. The questions were originally sketched from the perspective of the 'fine artist': how can we apply cinema to arts practice? Over the course of the process it became increasingly apparent that the question might be reversed: it is from the perspective of movement and time that we begin, and not the other way around. What can the space of the gallery offer the cinematic image? How can we make (cinematic) images of movement and time for the gallery, and in doing so, can we say something, through the process, about the cinema? The research subjects a production process to a studio practice methodology, underpinned by the aesthetics and philosophical method of Gilles Deleuze. In these aims, the research contests the idea of a distinct experimental film which may be contrasted to 'the mainstream', rather to locate a single 'cinema' of which there are notable examples, whether this be the work of Hitchcock, Luis Buñuel, Charlie Chaplin, Andrei Tarkovsky, Ingmar Bergman, or Snow, Brakhage, Maya Deren, etc. Or even perhaps, Goldsworthy, Smithson, etc. The distinctions have been industrial, historical and discursive rather than necessarily aesthetic. As Pier Paolo Pasolini (1965) says,

> … *historically, in practice, after several abortive attempts, the cinematic tradition which was formed seems to be that of a "language of prose," or, at least, of a "language of narrative prose."*

> *But in fact, as we shall see, this is an altogether peculiar and ambiguous prose, insofar as the irrational component of cinema cannot be eliminated. In truth, at the very moment when it was established as a new "technique" or "genre" of expression, cinema was also proposed as a new technique or genre of escape-spectacle, profiting from a number of consumers unimaginable for any other medium of expression. This means that cinema has undergone a violation which was moreover rather foreseeable and unavoidable: everything in it that was irrational, oniric, elementary and barbarous has been kept this side of consciousness, has been exploited as an unconscious factor of shock and glamour, and upon this naturally hypnotic monstrum which a film always is, there was quickly constructed a whole narrative convention which has authorized useless and fallaciously critical comparisons with the theatre and the novel.*
>
> *This narrative convention relies upon a mystic and embryonic film, a "sub-film" which, from the very nature of cinema, unwinds behind every commercial film, even a decent one, even a socially and esthetically rather adult one.*

What Pasolini calls the 'art-film' is recast in Deleuze as simply a tendency towards a different kind of film image after the second world war. In this, Deleuze acknowledges the historical, economic and social forces at play but this does not detract from the creation of particular types of image, nor does it fully explain them. This position is not to ignore the relevance of socio-cultural-economic contexts but rather to posit the simple possibility of a positive and productive engagement with the aesthetic, and for the further potential for analysis in this vein, to generate new taxonomies and new understanding.

Here, the gallery, or museum, is afforded a specific quality, not priority, as a site to make a contribution to this endeavour. More specifically, the spatial affords novel configurations of duration exemplified by a number of relatively recent works that have embraced the cinematic, in all its variety. Krauss signals the possibility of escaping the capitalist trap for detournement, in a discussion of the work of Marcel Broodthaers, employing Walter Benjamin's idea of the personal collector, 'the true collector' Benjamin says, liberates 'things from the bondage of utility' (cited in Krauss, 1999, p.38).

Andrew V. Uroskie also invokes Benjamin's account of the collector in *Windows in the White Cube* (2011). Uroskie describes the collected object as a kind of screen of 'spatial and temporal displacement' (p.147). The screen here retains its objective sense but also alludes to a similar kind of rupture that takes place when the literal screen is placed within 'unfamiliar' contexts, which is also an act of displacement or relocation. The significances of the collected object and the collection are of different orders; the collection is virtuous because its value is in and for

itself, the collected or displaced object is virtuous because of its powers of signification, beyond its use value. Both find their expression within the museum, as 'mobilised architectonics of scenic space in an aesthetics of fractured, sequential and shifting views' (Bruno, 2007 p.239). In these respects, the 'value' of the employment of screens within an arts context may be less associated with artistic appropriation and détournement than it is with displacement and collection: screen images have a value in and of themselves, beyond any attempt to formulate a position either on artistic practice or on capitalist production: the cinematic is a 'site' of fascination.

There are some parallels to be found between the propositions being made and with the film essay or video essay forms. The film essay has a long tradition and the term can be traced back to Hans Richter's *Der Film Essay, Eine Neue Form de Dokumentarfilms* (1940) although examples of the form are cited from much earlier and it has been noted that Sergei Eisenstein refers to the 'essay' in reference to his work on *The Capital*, "October presents a new form of cinematographic work – a collection of 'Essays' on the series of themes that form October" (cited in Rascaroli, 2008, p.27).

Critical distinctions have been made between the video essay and the film essay; this is a discussion that is developed later in the report. The video essay is a form of critical and scholarly activity that has developed over the past forty years or so, gaining impetus more recently as access to technology has enabled both scholars and critics to access and manipulate film footage. There are distinct advantages to the video essay; before video was widely available much scholarship relied on the reproduction of film stills and sequences of still frame images to develop and support critical accounts, the still frame sequence losing all of its force as a moving image.

The manoeuvre then, adds a dimension to the cinematic. This will be illuminated, discussed, and presented in the later chapters on the practice, findings, and in the conclusions to the research. The question demands more than a simple affirmation of the possibility, we only need look at the work already in existence for this. We can place screens in gallery spaces, we can transform gallery spaces into screening spaces, pop-up cinemas, but this is only to relocate the cinema. We can change the scale of screens, and of the proximity of the viewer to these screens. We can multiply the numbers of screens, although examples of this exist with the cinema so this is not wholly specific to the gallery. Indeed, here the exploration has begun but in order to fully explore the question, we must begin with the cinematic and then consider how this might work in the specific instance. The imperative indicates the essential method, activate an understanding of cinema, as images of movement and time, within a film production process

and subject this to a studio practice methodology, to consider at every stage of production what is being done cinematically, and how this might be variously maintained, developed or adapted for a gallery space.

There are certain demands on this process, the foremost being that whatever the outcome of the process, there must be an insistence on the specificity of the mode of exhibition: if the 'film' works as well for the cinema screen as it does for the gallery then this is not sufficient, actual space must be a constituent element of the image, even if the image is essentially one that does not concern itself directly with that same space. This is a simple qualifying manoeuvre rather than a strictly artistic one.

Prior to a discussion on the practice then it is useful also to provide some account of the theory that underpins the practice. The theory employed identifies film as pre-linguistic, whilst positing film and cinema as a system of signs, that is, the cinematic image is a collection of *signaletic* material but that it does not amount to an utterance, it is not (primarily) representational, and so it is not the ability for the image to *say* something that qualifies it as being cinematic, the cinematic *is* already something. The principal exponent of this theory is Deleuze, although there are strong echoes of the thoughts of Pasolini, and specifically his essay *The Cinema of Poetry* (1965). Deleuze's approach is also a development from, or perhaps more accurately a demonstration of his overall philosophical project, of which a reasonably detailed account is provided, and that provides something of a derivation and explanation for the position.

Alongside an exposition on the theoretical underpinning of the research, a brief account of selected works to date will provide some necessary additional context. At this point in history there is now a substantial body of work that is categorised as video art, film installation, artist film, expanded cinema, *other* cinema, projected image, and so forth. As it has already been established there is no easy, or even necessary, distinction and it is the view that the films of Orson Welles are no less a form of art than the kind of work discussed in this section and it is difficult therefore to characterise one sphere of practice as 'artist film' and another as simply 'film', or 'art-film' etc. Of the ways that we might develop this discussion it may still be useful to consider the institutional circumstances of 'artist film' production and distribution, and to consider some of the work itself.

There is some assertion that gallery film and video installation have a creative analytical function, which an attempt to locate and describe is also made here. The manoeuvre involves more than a simple mediation between cinema and gallery, although this can be one of the available actions. All art may be construed as belonging to ways of thinking; for Deleuze, all

forms of art are seen as phenomena with which to generate (philosophical) concepts but he also identifies arts practise as a mode of thought. Deleuze insists that we must be forced to think, and gallery film and video installation is afforded something of its status as analytical because of its destabilising aesthetic. The reimagining of the cinematic in the context of the cultural space of the gallery intervenes in the form of cinematic presentation; David Joselit highlights the disruptive potential of the spatial experience to conventional and 'idealised identifications' between viewers and fictional characters of fiction film (2000, p.48); Raymond Bellour, discussing the work of Tony Oursler, characterises the 'dissolved, fragmented, shaken, intermittent spectator' in an aesthetic of confusion (2008, p.408). This holds true potentially as much for the practitioner as for the viewer; the artist engaging with the cinematic confronts a subject with different materials.

The objective here then is to develop gallery film and video practice that says something about narrative cinema, or perhaps more precisely, considers a particular class of image with respect to arts practice, site and mode of spectatorship. Informed by a Deleuzian philosophical project, one which does not necessarily seek to locate some meaning in a given work of literature, art, or film but to consider the creative gestures, movements and developments of works in their productive capacities. The research as such is not concerned with interpretations, with meaning; this is not hermeneutics but ontology, where the outcomes are viewed on one level as 'matter of fact', in itself and of itself, the outcome of a process of engagement that will be described and through which a position reached. A commentary on the process, alongside practice elements presented here, allied to the idea that practice can contribute to the generation of knowledge through the reconfigurations, ruptures, and events, of the reimagining of cinematic form in gallery film and video installation, considers the situation under which it possible to make new work and provide an insight on film form:

What are the specific challenges, points of conflict, rupture and continuity when adapting cinema works for a gallery context?
What strategies can be proposed as solutions to these problems and what does this tell us about gallery film installation, as a discrete field of cultural and arts practice, with its own history, formalistic devices and by implication, aesthetics?
How can gallery film installation say something about the moving image and fiction cinema?
In the process of answering these questions it will be necessary to ask how a production process can be subjected to a studio practice.

Literature Review

The questions, addressed by the research, and that place the idea of medium specificity under scrutiny once more, stem from a proposition that unifies aesthetics, with modes of expression, and with functionality, that amounts to a *folding* of the thing back upon itself: an aesthetics of aesthetics, if you will. This is not a simple doubling of the thing, holding of a mirror, this implies some direction, from one discrete entity to another, that is its double. The proposition is that this folding operation, across the field of expression, signals an event through which we develop understanding. In more straightforward terms, rather than simply adding space to the cinematic, space is already part of an expressive material of which the cinematic image also forms a part. We take points from the same field and bring them together, in so doing, we develop understanding through the imaginative leaps necessary. Here though we are considering the operation, and the method.

As we will see, medium specificity is a historical concept and subject to revision, but the case is not being made for, or counter to, the concept and certainly there is some acknowledgement that film is distinct from video, is distinct from sculpture or painting. The essence of film indeed is the photographic image in (mechanical) movement. What this affords however is a way of seeing or more precisely, a way of thinking: it is possible to think movement, to think time, and create an image of this. What the medium offers is a new way of thinking that can then be allied with or to other forms of expression.

The imminent analysis of the cinema, exemplified by the writing of Deleuze, is the same position that is applied to a reading across the various forms and which, in the view taken, dissolves the historic distinctions between 'artist film', art-film, 'mainstream' cinema, and even art that does not employ moving image technologies but are nonetheless cinematic, although the latter is a specific case, as we shall see. The work begins with an attempt to understand the cinematic, necessary for the method and objectives of the research, but in the process this understanding has come to represent a lot more than one amongst many 'takes' on what the cinematic is.

Artist film, gallery film, and video installation can be understood as synonymous, alongside terms such as video art, but are distinct from 'art film' which is a category of cinema. 'Projected image' art may employ still images, photography, slides, etc. and so is wider in scope in certain respects and a broader category overall. Alan L. Rees applies the term 'experimental film and video' but makes a distinction in terms of context, between cinema and moving-image culture and modern art. The manoeuvre, to make a distinction between these contexts, is one that

acknowledges cinema as an art form but "assumes that artists' film and video is a distinct form of cultural practice, with its own autonomy in relation to the mainstream cinema" (Rees, 2011, xi).

Tamara Trodd (2011) theorises on 'projected-image' art and observes that the designation 'installation' for much of the work under discussion, in the collected essays of *Screen/Space,* has lost favour since the 1990s; the term installation arguably has its own specific albeit related object of analysis and has some relevance here. Trodd observes that the works under discussion 'are typically designed to be shown in a gallery and not a cinema; awareness of which space often importantly structures the work' (2011, p.6). *Gallery film* 'broadly describes the category of works' (p.6) but is specific to the medium of film. Further categories such as 'expanded cinema' and 'Other cinema' add to the range of theoretical constructs but the overall designation of *gallery film* is applied here to refer to works that are primarily created for the gallery or similar exhibition spaces, that employ moving image technologies such as 16mm film or digital video, and that arise from a distinct form of cultural practice that exists outside the institution of the cinema but may nonetheless engage with cinematic form.

We can add to this list, independent cinema, artist film, new film or new cinema, avant-garde film and cinema and these are terms closely associated with the New York and London cooperatives, and the Anthology Film Archives, but these terms are equally not without issue. With such a variety of possible designations applying to a large amount of diverse work, terms such as these will only be used for the sake of accuracy when talking about specific institutions or in reference to existing published works otherwise, the designation of *gallery film* will be used.

The terms art, visual art, fine art, cinematic arts, film arts, plastic art, etc. are also not without associated issues, for example the term fine art, although widely associated with art school, as opposed to film school or school of music, and the disciplines of painting, sculpture and printmaking, also extends to architecture, music, and poetry, and has historical connotations. The term visual art is widely understood to refer to painting, sculpture, graphics, photography and film and to be perhaps more representative of contemporary arts practice, although this presents its own challenges for analysis. What is relevant here in the discussion is to make some distinction, for the sake of discussion, of the contexts and spheres of cultural practice that enable certain discourse, although of course the reverse may be said, that the discourse activates discrete categories of practice and production, and of which this discussion forms a part. These distinctions can be viewed as industrial and economic as much as they are cultural. To make a distinction between film and the cinematic arts, the term *fine arts* will be used when referring to the sphere of cultural practice associated with the 'art school', academies, the gallery

and institutions such as MOMA and where necessary, the term *cinema* or *cinematic arts* will be used to clarify some distinction.

The various critical discourses that frame experimental and gallery film are defined as much by their relation to the critical discourses of film, screen and cinema studies, as they are to that of the fine arts. Much of the critical work of the 60s and 70s on experimental and gallery film, principally that of the structural filmmakers, may be cast in this light[1]. Contemporary criticism develops the same position however, rather than define its critical object in contrast to the cinema and within a strict modernist framework, contemporary criticism has attempted a more conciliatory approach. Film, media and the fine arts have been uneasy bedfellows, in terms of practice but notably also, in terms of the critical approaches to understanding the phenomena, that at times has seemingly been as much about staking claims and constructing territories as it has been about developing understanding.

Calls for a counter history of experimental and gallery film locates a matrix for the prevailing accounts, and proposes a corrective to the dominant (male) modernist narrative, and to the prevailing canon of Structural film of the 1960s; the call is for a revised history that strives to position and relocate representation and narrative within a discourse that has until relatively recently been dominated by anti-illusionistic and materialist strategies. A case has been made for a history of work that embraces story and narrative structures and that aligns more closely perhaps with the 'illusion' of the cinema.

The appeal for a corrective view is balanced by a history of the avant-garde; in his monograph, *A History of Experimental Film and Video* (2011), Rees provides a historical account. Rees' central project is to distinguish between two avant-gardes premised on two distinct contexts for practice, 'the cinema and moving image culture on the one hand, and modern art with its post-modern coda or extension on the other' (x). Notably, Rees identifies the artists' movement in film and video as an 'independent, living and vital force which has its own internal development and aesthetics' (x). Rees' approach is developed in a series of what may be described as essays in *Fields of View: Film art and spectatorship* (2020), edited by Simon Payne.

Space and *site* are figured as a means by which to locate the object and subject, at times identified for the materially specific instantiations of the work, and as a distinct discourse and strategy being, by account, a defining characteristic of 'installation'. More recent work attempts to reconcile the modernist critical traditions associated with minimalism and sculpture, and the subjective identification of screen (cinematic) viewing. The viewer is variously located

[1] For an exemplary example see Gidal, P., ed., (1978), Structural Film Anthology, BFI. First Published in 1976; Gidal's opening chapter establishes a position in direct contrast to that of the 'dominant cinema'.

throughout the literature as object and subject of an apparatus: the gallery, and installation. The viewer is subsequently made visible, sometimes literally and at others more indirectly through the work in question.

Beyond the frame of the gallery, *The Indexical and the Concept of Medium Specificity*, (Doane, 2007), applies Charles S. Peirce's *semeiotic*: index, icon, and symbol. In this instance, it is the indexical and specifically discussion around *deixis*, that the (film) frame acts like a pointing finger, 'this', that distinguishes the medium but time is also inscribed, by the degradation of a chemical process, and the challenge to the digital realm is that of 'resisting not only a pervasive commodification of the virtual but also the digital's subsumption within the dream of dematerialization and the timelessness of information, returning history to representation and reviving the idea of a medium' (p.148). The ideology of the digital is, strictly speaking, outside the scope of this project, although there is an implied resistance to this point of view in some respects, but not all, and the concept of medium specificity has remained, like an undercurrent, since the outset of the investigation.

Deleuze also seeks recourse to the semeiotic of Peirce in his consideration of the cinema but in the two treatise, *Cinema 1: The movement image,* (1992) and *Cinema 2: The time image*, (2005) Deleuze seeks to extend Peirce's system of classification of signs for taxonomic purposes, not for a semiotic analysis, to 'provide new words for an account of the range of time-signs' (Colman, 2011, p.15). Deleuze's project here is a development of his overall philosophical project that 'shows us the immanent constitution of things...' (2011, p.17) and that progresses his overall post-structuralist position. The review will be concluded with consecutive sections that consider in some detail Deleuze's philosophy, principally exemplified by a review of what is considered to be a significant event in his writing and development of thought, *Difference and Repetition,* (1994). A more detailed consideration of the two books on cinema in which Deleuze applies his philosophy and method to the arts, *Cinema 1: The movement-image* and *Cinema 2: The time image* is outlined in the methodology. Deleuze also wrote on literature, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, (1997) and painting, *The Logic of Sensation*, (2003) and some discussion of these works is also provided. The *Cinema…* books are the two treatise most rigorously navigated as the ones that most closely align with the project here however, *The Logic of Sensation* is a detailed consideration of a corner stone in Deleuze's thinking in relation to the arts and *Essays Critical and Clinical*, and the work on literature, provide detail of the notion of 'becoming' and the pure image of time, also central to the philosophy.

The Deleuzian approach is an important one here because of the positions that the philosophy develops: different fields of practice are discrete even if related by a developed view

and theory of mind. The philosophy and concepts provide a map or methodology for conceptualising thinking within both an arts context and within a philosophical or theoretical context. Subsequently the approach provides a reference with which to develop an analytical account of the process undertaken.

The discourses on gallery film and video installation are varied but certain themes of critique are notable: the avant-garde, narrative, space/place, subject and viewer, and medium, describe ostensibly two discrete disciplines. The frame: institutional, cultural, and technological accounts for much of the positioning with respect to the critical object. The discussion navigated throughout the following review sets the context, and the ground for the research questions and together provide the critical framework for the research.

The Avant-garde: Presence, time and the subject

The New York and London Filmmakers cooperatives are instrumental to the development of discrete collections of work that fall within the outlined category. The New American Cinema Group Inc./ Filmmakers cooperative was established in 1961 by a group of New York artists including, Jonas Mekas, Shirley Clarke, Ken and Flo Jacobs, Andy Warhol and Jack Smith. Having established a not-for-profit status in 1993, the NACG began the process of archiving and preservation of film and video works and has now over 5000 films from over 1000 artists/media makers in its collection[2]. The NACG "promotes non-commercial artists' cinema" and is 'devoted to the dissemination of moving image art'. The London Filmmakers cooperative was established in 1966 and was modelled on the New York version. Founded by, amongst others, Stephen Dwoskin and Bob Cobbing, it was distinct from NYFC in that it was established as an egalitarian cooperative that assisted in production alongside distribution. Early Filmmakers associated with the group include Malcolm Le Grice, Peter Gidal, Lis Rhodes, Carolee Schneemann, Annabel Nicolson, Gill Eatherley, Roger Hammond, Sandra Lahire, David Crosswaite, and William Raban.

London Video Arts, (LVA) initiated by David Hall in 1976 and founded by a group of artists including, Roger Barnard, David Critchley, Tamara Krikorian, Brian Hoey, Pete Livingstone, Stuart Marshall, and John Turpie, was in response to an influential Serpentine Gallery show in 1975 that brought together the work of a number of international video artists, and the perceived need for a dedicated platform to support homegrown video art and artists. *The Video Show* (Serpentine Gallery, May, 1975) represented work from a number of British artists alongside

[2] https://film-makerscoop.com/

international names but also featured work from community video practitioners. Much of the work focussed on the live qualities of video, and closed-circuit installations and performance, and the show was intended as a kind of critical reassessment of the role of community video and of the relationship between this and video art. Hall makes the distinction between the two arenas of practice, 'Video Artists are, by inference, undoubtedly equally aware of the potential of the Popular Medium as independent political and community organisations yet their methods and objectives are usually quite different. Such work takes on two forms, though the two often overlap. One is the production of videotapes, the other live performances and closed circuit installations.' (Hall, cited in Webb-Ingall, 2015)

The kinds of groups included in the *The Video Show* were diverse and ranged from Bolton Women's Liberation Group and Delves Junior School, Walsall, to videos featuring local residents of Hammersmith borough, London, and videos about squatters and housing issues. Key to this kind of intervention was the accessibility of video technology to these groups and people. The diversity on show was also mirrored by the content and the ways in which the technology was applied, whether as research or teaching tool, community building exercise, political intervention, or for entertainment. The spirit of the exhibition, which was generated from an open call to artists and makers across the board, had its impact on the formation of London Video Arts. The London Filmmakers Cooperative merged with London Video Arts after both organisations moved to the LUX centre in 1997, eventually to form LUX.

The diversity of commitments at the time also presented an issue, especially to secure funding and support, and the 'priorities of video artists and community video practitioners were to be pitted against one another' (Webb-Ingall, 2015). The influence of artists such as David Hall was significant to establish 'a tradition of video that was pure, formal and rigorous' (Meigh-Andrews cited in Webb-Ingall, 2015) whilst the efforts of Sue Hall and John Hopkins were insistent towards establishing open access community video practices and who sought funding from the Community Arts Committee and BFI production fund, the latter of which was tentative in its support of such activities. The BFI commitment was threefold: equipment loan scheme, project funding and formal consultation. Project funding was further divided into three categories: 'documentation by television of aspects of urban community life', fiction and drama, and lastly, 'experimental use of television for the production of abstract imagery and sound in a colour-equipped studio' (2015). One of the funded projects, *Song of Long Ago* (Hall, S.,1974), 'tells the story of West Kensington through the eyes of local elderly residents' and was the 'first British local history videotape.' (2015) The model that was established during this time continued to have its impact.

There are now numbers of galleries and institutions nationally, in the UK, and internationally that house collections of gallery film and video. A brief look at the catalogues of NYFC, LUX, or other national and international organisations with similar focus, such as LIMA or that of the EAI (Electronic Arts Intermix) is sufficient to indicate the breadth and scale of the work involved. The existence of the institutions themselves are also some testament to the area of practice, the EAI was established in 1971 and has over 200 artists work represented in its collection. LUX was formally established in 2002 and the collection hosts over 1000 artists' work. LIMA houses over 'three thousand works by more than 500 artists' (LIMA catalogue), and the NYFC has over 5000 films from over 1000 makers.

In the first issue of the LFC publication, *Cinim* (ed. Philip Crick), in 'Open Letter to Filmmakers of the World', Mekas writes,

> *Yes, there are other, and truly new films to take to Cannes. But what's the use even suggesting? What's the use telling you that Andy Warhol has taken Cinéma Vérité into completely new areas and has produced some of the most important contemporary cinema? Or Brakhage's SONGS? Cannes wouldn't even consider 8mm films. Or Gerd Stern, or Robert Whitman, or Nam June Paik? – They can't even be previewed! You still think in old terms. You still think, that everything that is really good and new in American cinema can be packed up, wrapped up and shipped to you like any other movie, for previewing. This is no longer true. Very often, you have to bring the film-maker, and one or two technicians, and even equipment. For what they are doing, very often, are film evenings, cinema evenings, but no films in the usual, conventional sense. These evenings, like some of the evenings of Gerd Stern (USCO), or Andy Warhol, or Jerry Joffen, or Stan Vanderbeek – with multiple projections and multiple sound systems, and with live participation, would shock Cannes into new visual, kinesthetic perceptions and into the cinema of the future.*

The overriding concerns were for an independent, non-commercial, avant-garde, cinema and film practice. At the outset there was an alignment with the avant-garde, Warhol is conspicuous in this respect, as is Jean-Luc Godard and the French New Wave, there are two essays on Jean Luc Godard in the first edition of *Cinim*. The avant-garde was therefore a necessary idea in the identification of work and artists, despite the appeal, in Open Letter… that LFC, 'do not divide films into any budget, length, or subject categories. We take cinema as a whole'. This is true in some respects.

The distinctions are further made clear in the manifesto to the Anthology Film Archives. Established in 1970 by Jerome Hill, P. Adams Sitney, Peter Kubelka, Stan Brakhage, and Mekas, the Anthology Film Archives was created as a museum dedicated to the vision of the art of

cinema as guided by the avant-garde sensibility, 'The cinematheques of the world generally collect and show the multiple manifestations of film: as document, history, industry, mass communication. Anthology Film Archives is the first film museum exclusively devoted to the film as an art' (Anthology Film Archives, Manifesto).

There is therefore an explicit positioning from a fairly discrete group of film practitioners and makers for an avant-garde film practice that is aligned with an art tradition against the prevailing commercial and industrial structures of cinema. This movement can be seen to coincide with the continued exploration of the moving image from makers more closely associated with the fine arts, Warhol is a good example of an artist known for working in sculptural form and print, who embraces the mass medium of film and cinema. We can identify many such artists, but this overall development is one that sees the rarefication of certain films, modelled on gallery distribution and the collection.

The work itself, represented by collections such as LUX, the Anthology Film Archives, and the New York and London Film Cooperatives, is diverse in form, and content, and is therefore difficult to categorise. There are factual, documentary pieces, for example from the likes of the Berwick Street Collective (e.g. *Nightcleaners*, 1975) and Thom Anderson (*Los Angeles Plays Itself*, 2003); fictions, such as *The Deadman* (Ahwesh, 1989) or *Peripeteia* (Akomfrah, 2012); film essays, collages and found footage films, political statements and manifestos, pure and abstract, video, 8mm, 16 and 35mm, black and white, colour, animated.

The artists herald from a diverse range of backgrounds and often work across more than one medium, for example, Schneemann began her career as a painter but developed her practice also into performance, and film, and she was associated from an early stage with the London co-op. In her film, *Fuses* (1964 – 67), Schneemann filmed herself and her partner, James Tenney, over a period of time and focussing on their sexual relationship. The film is a mixture of these images, cut with images of their cat, the home, a shoreline, abstract, almost graphical shapes. The frames invert at times such that there is no centre (of gravity). The footage is scratched, 'soiled', and shifts in a rapid succession. Sometimes the images are overlaid or superimposed, frames upon frames, and at others the scratching, marked or 'soiled' image gives a sense of simultaneity. The impression is almost of two plates, one sliding over the other, each plate constituted by a series of images. Most of the images are taken in close-up, we can recognise a face, or part of the body, but there are few mid-shots or long-shots. This is not so much 'of' something as it is the thing itself, the image sliding against and over itself. Sometimes the frame tends towards blackness and at one notable moment towards a completely white frame and in this way the image expands and contracts. The components therefore provide an

organic whole that whilst not progressing in any discernible direction, or with any specific regularity of pace or tempo, nonetheless pulsate, with a sense of friction, and with moments of emptiness. The work may be described as poetic and a form of autobiography.

Schneemann said of *Fuses* that it was in reaction to *Window Water Baby Moving* by Brakhage (1959), that shows the birth of his first child, and that *Fuses* was an attempt to 'see what "the fuck" is and locate that in terms of a lived sense of equity' (Schneemann, in an interview with Kate Haug, 1997). *Window Water Baby Moving* (Brakhage, 1959), which features the birth of his and his partner's, Mary Collom's, first child, can be contrasted with the object of Brakhage's later film, *Thigh Line Lyre Triangular* (1961), which now features the birth of his third child. The first film consists of essentially documentary footage. The hospital had refused Brakhage's request to film the birth there so, Brakhage arranged for the birth to take place at his and Collom's home. The piece consists of Collom in a water tub, shots of the window, shots of Brakhage, taken by Collom, and essentially charts the progress of the birth. The film is intimate in its recording of the event, which takes place in the film with handheld footage, the belly, genitals, faces, gestures, waters and amniotic fluid, the emergence of the head of the child, cutting of the umbilical cord, the infant child, intercut in at times rapid phrases, and throughout. In the second film, we see something of Brakhage's painting and scratch technique, there are still images of Collom, and of the birth, but the frames are now subject to overpainting, and manipulation. What might be described as a flurry of marks, sometimes like scratches and sometimes like growths of pigment, and cellular, flicker across the screen in a rapid succession. These passages of marks and forms pass in waves, and are interspersed with the images of Collom, or tend towards a completely white frame, before starting again. The approach is much more reminiscent of Brakhage's later work and may be designated alongside other films as 'poetic'. Indeed, the term, film-poem has been applied to this body of work from a number of artists, for example see, Mekas, J., (2005), *Brakhage. Breer. Menken. The Pure Poets of Cinema*.

Some care must be taken, not to place too much emphasis on the structural/materialist filmmakers and the early collectives, there is much more out there and that has happened since. It is also necessary to acknowledge the importance that the 'movement' represents in the development of practice and discourse relative to the 'avant-garde' and the development thereafter of a supposedly distinct art form. For example, it is difficult to ignore Gidal's sentiments in the chapter, *Theory and Definition of Structural/Materialist Film*, (1978, pp.1-21) in which much is done to deride narrative cinema, "What some of the more self-defined 'left-wing' directors would rationalise in terms of dialectic are merely cover-ups for identification, selling the same old wares, viz Antonioni and the much less talented Bertolucci, Pasolini, Losey,

not to mention committed right-wing directors", Gidal elevates and prioritises instead the modernism of Abstract Expressionism and Minimalism. There is a clear appeal for a kind of film that positions itself through discourse as much as through practice with a fine art tradition, both painting and sculpture. We can consider the various categories on which the 'formula' for such a stance is posited, these are listed for us: devices, production, content and representation, the viewer, film as a material, dialectics, identification, narrative, duration, distance, time… We can confront each of these 'categories' one-by-one and there is some merit in doing so, it is sufficient nonetheless to identify the problem using one or more of the determinate ideas. What is significant is that there is here a clear statement of an alternative avant-garde to that of the dominant cinema and that this is premised on three fundamental aspects, narrative and representation, the viewer (or spectator), and time. This is not to suggest that the other categories are not in some way distinct but rather that the case is made, which intervenes in a passive and receptive audience to thinly disguised ideological content, and that the corrective is to engage more directly with that same audience, in the here and now of its existence, and without any recourse to the representational.

In so many ways that same narrative has persisted to the present day in certain criticism but now also informs much commercial activity and turned towards 'capitalist ends' ('user journeys'). It is the claims on audience, and more specifically on the subject and time, against which these claims are made, that the concept of a particular avant-garde exists, and without which there is only a purported and self-conscious film genre. This formula has been repeated and we have seen it elsewhere. The category is reliant on the position it takes and is wholly of its time, because without it then the question becomes, what criteria are applied to its analysis. The views expounded can be seen as an extension of Screen theory in some respects, without a critical recourse to the psychoanalytic. There is explicit appreciation of Derridean deconstruction and a stance that can be seen to compliment the prevailing critiques of Hollywood, especially in such publications as *Screen*. Prior to invoking Althusser's challenge to theory, "a spontaneous (technical) practice produces only the 'theory' it needs as a means to produce the ends assigned to it" Gidal writes, "Partaking of the primal scene and 'work on the signifier' seem to be the dominant current malpractices" (p.12). In this respect, the thinking is a departure from *Screen* theory. Gidal speaks as much for practice as he does for theory here and the account is more nuanced than is being represented. The direction we are taking is not so much in conflict with the views expressed by Gidal, the separation between the poetics of, for example, a Michelangelo Antonioni film and a materialist/structuralist film is perhaps not so distinct as the methodological invocation, outlined in Gidal's chapter, claims.

The tensions between frames of signification distinguishes the discourse and literature on artist film and video installation of which story and narrative are largely conspicuous by their absence or circumscription. In her article, *Expanded Cinema and Narrative*, (2003) Jackie Hatfield questions the received histories of expanded cinema, artists film and video installation, although focussing principally on what Hatfield describes as expanded cinema, that have prioritised materialist, non-representational and non-narrative forms within the received canon of work. Making reference to a number of key texts and positions associated with the London and New York Filmmaker Cooperatives, notably those expounded by Gidal and Peter Wollen, Hatfield considers how a narrative was itself constructed around practice which formulated a rift or fissure between artists film and film art as two alternative avant-gardes. Wollen identified the distinctions by 'aesthetic assumptions, institutional framework, type of financial support, type of critical backing, historical and cultural origin' (Wollen, cited in Hatfield, 2003) and that to be considered representative of the 'first avant-garde' work 'had to be non-narrative and anti-illusionist' (Hatfield, 2003). Hatfield contends *this* narrative to be a historical and critical 'whitewash' and presents a call for a revised history that acknowledges the place of narrative within the body of work that has otherwise been written out of the history.

Despite some attempts to redress this position through a comprehensive history of the avant-garde in *A History of Experimental Film and Video* (2011), Rees may be subject to a similar criticism. In the preface to *A History*… Rees notes that 'by and large, this is film-making without story, characters and plot' (x). The avant-garde represents a formulation around which the history of artist film and video installation itself can be written, and one that undercuts the distinctions between and across the different kinds of practice. Rees acknowledges that there are more than one avant-garde and that cinema has its own movements and the distinction between is not always clear. The formulation tends to be against a certain 'mainstream entertainment cinema and audience responses that flow from it' (p.1) and is characterised by a reaction to 'the major codes of dramatic realism which determine meaning and response in the commercial fiction film' (p.1). It is notable that Rees, early on in the consideration of the particular formulation of an avant-garde asks, 'what replaces the authority of the image, an authority on which film's realism is based?' The answer to this is given, 'instead of the visual image, experimental film centres itself on the passage of time' (p.6). As a point of reference to this a 'structural film' perspective is offered:

> *The language or discourse of cinema is fundamentally altered – philosophically and in the socio/cultural arena – by emerging forms which first establish the screen as surface then reverse the symbolic space from behind to before the screen. Even more fundamentally, the*

> *relationship of the spectator to the work is transformed when the time of the action is reversed from being the 'once-upon-a-time' of the mythic past to the critical arena of the present. This becomes the time in which the spectators individually live – it is their time, their present based on a material experience of the presentation event.* (Le Grice, cited in Rees, p.149)

Again, the distinction being made is not wholly definitive, because it is also acknowledged that 'the shaping of time is common to all cinema' (p.6). Subsequently, the avant-garde is considered as an expression and development of a particular extension of modernism.

In *Fields of View* (2020), posthumously published and edited by Simon Payne, Rees progresses a project to develop a site of 'change and innovation', in a collection of essays organised around a central term, *field*, 'These relations between film and art make an overlapping set of fields, or sites of change and innovation, that resist fixity and favour process' (p.2). There is here in the construction of a theoretical approach some resemblance to Deleuze's *virtual*, or 'plane of immanence', which Deleuze characterises as a field, and will be discussed in more depth later in the report. In this respect, Rees' thinking aligns with the notion of the fold, and that points across the field can be brought into communication. For Rees however, ''the 'field' is a pervasive idea throughout cultural theory'' (p.2), and is employed variously as a concept, at one time allied with an idea of the frame, or even snapshot, 'the flash time of the photographer or the lightning' (Madge, cited in Rees, 2020, p.3), that 'caught various figures and movements… in the same frame or field' (Rees, 2020, p.3), and then again allied with the technical means to produce the video frame, or within the digital realm and to the 'matrix', and of the order of a system or organisation. Rees comes closest to evoking a plane (of imminence) when he considers the 'metaphor' as a 'principle of underlying order' (p.3), but this has the 'unremarkable' characteristic of a pervasive and common metaphor. Essentially, the field is 'the locus of boundaries, the frame which demarcates its territory. It is the edge that counts in defining the field, not its internal space, which is variable' (p.4).

In terms of the cinematic, it is the 'visibility' of the medium through which the notion of the field operates (field of view). Cinema's visibility is paradoxical, it is in a state of 'ordered flux', the stability of the individual image 'underpinned by a mechanism of intermittent motion' and 'the passage from shot to shot', which is 'not made visible as such' (p.4). The specificity of film is constructed around the criticism of Michael Fried[3] and specifically the notions of 'absorption' and 'theatricality'. Fried's central critique of minimalism was that it ''turned art into objects, confused the distinctiveness of media, appealed illegitimately to the spectator's 'completion' of

[3] See Fried, M., (1967), Art and Objecthood

the art work – or worse, the 'art event' – and inevitably led to 'theatre', cast here in opposition to an art of self-contained immediacy. Crucially, the opposition is a time-based one" (p.5). The concerns are distinguished, according to Rees, between these two tendencies, on the one hand from the 'image' outwards, towards the viewer (theatrical), and on the other, inwards, in which the 'activity' is self-enclosed, contemplative; the former says, "look at me" and the latter asks (of itself) "what am I?". Rees' contention here is perhaps simply that the film image, for all its paradoxical nature, does not present itself as an object to be looked at but rather as something to be absorbed within, and this is the nature of the cinematic 'visible' or field. It is also the reverse of that which Fried objected to in certain minimalist art.

The various subsequent chapters of *Fields of View* each approach the numerous intersections, across the fields of artist film and moving image, and the cinema. In 'Film as Optic and Idea' the 'act of thinking is marked in the editing or duration of the film' (p.25). The image, under Peirce's system of signs, as icon, acts as picture and diagram, and in the latter case functions as an index that attests to the 'presence of the film' (p.23). This, according to Rees, entails a thought process but one that cannot be reduced to 'acts of pure consciousness, because each insists that a percept must pass through a medium' (p.31). Invoking Husserl, that perception is 'to the things themselves' constitutes the thought (cited in Rees, 2020, p.32).

In the chapter on expanded cinema Rees considers the screen in its multiplication and significantly notes that, in reference to *Light Music* (Rhodes, 1975), 'The film can be shown on two screens side by side… Alternatively, the films can be projected on two opposite sides of the gallery space so that the viewer looks from one to the other: a dispersion of the fixed gaze which is latent in most multi-screen work of the period' (Rees, 2020, p.42). The film carries with it the potential then, 'at the limits of cinema' when the screens are displayed adjacent to one another and 'beyond' the limit of cinematic spectatorship when displayed on opposite walls. The expanded frame 'resists' language and demands something new of the spectator. The notion of a *limit* and a *beyond the limit* is evocative of the sense of field that Rees navigates.

In 'Projection Space', Rees confronts what he views as two distinct traditions of gallery and artists film, and expressed when he says, "In disavowing its own history in the film and avant-gardes, current video installation recycles the Hollywood film myth. This perhaps is the heart of the difference between the majority of film and video artists discussed here", for example Le Grice, Nicky Hamlyn, Rhodes, Chris Welsby, and Deren, "and 'cinema for the gallery' in which the language of mainstream film and TV is more a datum than a problem" (p.66). The progression of digital media has only served to confound this perceived problem, 'divided between these different expectations' of gallery visitors and curators, 'many gallery film artists

have responded with cinematically coded and hyper-emotive work that plays to the same sense of spectacle as its distorting mirror – the mainstream cinema itself' (p.67). The distinctions are premised on a view of the cinematic first and foremost, although the problem is no less, necessarily, when the cinematic ceases to be understood as something to be resisted, and which is the problematic around which this research is focussed. In as much as Pasolini identifies a cinema of poetry behind even the most commercial of films then, if Rees' view may be described as discerning, it is because of the characterisation that, 'the fantasy factories of the gallery system have little space for the kinds of materialist cinema that challenge fantasy itself as a mode for art.' (p.69). Rather, it is a certain commitment to a specific avant-garde practice that circumscribes the overall trajectory of the discussion however, Rees moves between these two intersecting *fields* to develop an understanding of how one implicates itself within the other.

The 'fantasy' of the cinematic is extended to the realism of the frame in the chapter 'Time Frames'. In opposition to the view that privileges Euclidean geometry, and that 'informed the construction of the camera obscura' is the assertion that Renaissance perspective and realism is premised on projective geometry. Joan Copjec asserts, 'Plainly, and contrary to what Crary and film theory have argued, this method operates without referring to any point outside the picture plane; it does not depend on the eye of some external observer, placed at a measurable distance from it. Instead, the field is organised around an internal point, the point of infinity' (Copjec, cited in Rees, 2020, p.73). The projective geometry 'associated with the Renaissance… prompts certain questions about the representation of space' that are expressed by a paradox mooted by Blaise Pascal, space can be 'infinitely extended' and 'infinitely reduced'. This paradox, Rees asserts, "suggests an 'application' to… film space" that in certain experimental film, and in contrast to narrative cinema emphasize and constitutes the 'apparatus and the process' of creation; the reverse side of Jean-Louis Baudry's apparatus, as 'the invisible motor of film realism' (Rees, 2020, p.73).

Realisms 'weak spot' is "to identify reality with 'everyday perception', crossing a phenomenology of lived experience with the dramatic framework of cinema. It relates a seeing subject to a perceived object in a given framework of knowledge" (p.86). The asymptote conveys the idea of the partial and the unfinished in the context of cinema, suspending any final coincidence between object and screen, and similarly the notion of closure,

> *At the same time, the asymptote's lack of final identity between the image and the referent also lends it a degree of abstraction… For the avant-garde cinema, it is this abstract non-identical gap that opens up a path to a critique and questioning of realism. In this way, the same concept of the asymptote – first expressed culturally in a theory of marionettes and*

> *imitation 'at a distance' from its human source – can also be used to close the gap between them.* (p.86)

There is at work, in *Fields of View*, a genealogy of a kind that seeks to chart the trajectories of cinema on the one hand and its counterpart in materialist-structural film. In 'Digital Dialectic' Rees compares Lev Manovich's view, that links the avant-garde with digital media, to that of Jonathan Crary, in which cinema is derived from animated art, and not from painting. For Manovich, the avant-garde are the non-contradictory forerunners of the digital age, film is a 'record' and indexical, whereas digital (cinema) is 'a sub-genre of painting'. According to Rees, Manovich 'approves' of the machines of early animation that are linked to the indexical photographic tradition, typified by Eadweard Muybridge's repainting of photographs for the purposes of animation.

The genealogy is developed further in 'Classic Film Theory and the spectator'. According to Erwin Panovsky, cinema involves the 'dynamization of space and, accordingly, spatialization of time' (Panovsky, cited in Rees, 2020, p.101). Rees isolates one half, the former part of this equation, when he says that for Panofsky, 'film is a new mode of vision in which space is constructed in and through time' (p.101). Thomas Y. Levin's analysis of Panovsky's view points to the optics of the photograph and the construction of perspectival space (cited in Rees, 2020, p.101). Rees contends that in 1936 the 'model' for cinema is not the photograph but 'representational painting' and that in Panofsky's view this is 'carried over into the popular cinema' (p.101). The 'focus of film' has been variously identified as 'the documentation of the everyday' (Siegfried Kracauer), the 'optical unconscious' (Surrealists and Walter Benjamin), the general form or appearance 'of the surface or face of things' (Béla Balázs), and the 'viewer's scanning of deep space' (André Bazin) (p.102). For Panofsky 'the photographic image is a matter of its iconographic content' and is 'objective and mechanical' and 'directly linked to its content' (p.102). According to Rees, Panofsky made a case against film as an abstract art. The content or signified is therefore 'materialist', and not the apparatus, or signifier, however, this depends on how 'content is specified', and the character of the relationship between the cinema and photography, whether that be 'objective', 'phantasmagorical' or 'illusionistic'. Rees notes that Le Grice and Gidal, who issue from the abstract movements in painting, argue that materiality includes the 'physical substrate of film as well as its lens-based representation' (p.102). This is a perspective that acknowledges the later position of these artists but does not seek to fully negotiate the position asserted by Panofsky, nor is it explained what the implications of the various relationships between cinema and the photograph outlined are for Panofsky's view, rather simply to present these as alternative perspectives.

Image as gestalt, totality that is more than the sum of its parts; Monet, Lumière and cinematic time; realism; film as sculpture, where according to George Baker, no film 'could escape the condition of the medium's dedication to the production of "illusion", no matter how directly it might analyse the condition's illusion' because it relies on 'the persistence of vision' (cited in Rees, 2020, p.125); the construction of movement by a 'privileged instant', referred to by Goethe in reference to *Laocoön and His Sons* (c.200BC) as the 'fugitive moment', and equated by Wollen to cinema, all are ways in which Rees progresses the analysis of *fields* and their points of connection and overlap. Across the numerous essays of *Fields of View*, what we find is a commitment and derivation of the points of intersection, between avant-garde and materialist-structural film, and cinema, whether this be in the construction of time, a notion of the image, the medium, realisms, the boundaries of viewing, and so on. What we also find is Rees' continued commitment to an avant-garde and structural-materialist film practice.

The 'transformation' of the 'relationship of the spectator to the work' is constitutive of a discourse on space and place, in relation to the work that is situated and central to much of the discussion around gallery film and video installation practice. In *From Screen to Site*, (2001) Anna McCarthy considers an ontological and geographical approach to understanding television with respect to 'place'. The discussion challenges ways of thinking about televisual 'taking place' and modernist tendencies to eradicate space, to favour a view where place 'takes television' and 'the screen interlaces with the relations of power and everyday practices that define its place' (p.105). Mikon Kwon develops similar concerns in, *One Place After Another: Notes on Site Specificity*, (1997), with a more specific concern for 'site' as a concept and the effects or otherwise on 'site' by critical interventions such as site-specific artworks. Site, in the ontological sense, is superseded by an idea that is more malleable, 'It seems inevitable that we should leave behind the nostalgic notions of a site as being essentially bound to the physical and empirical realities of a place. Such a conception, if not ideologically suspect, often seems out of synch with the prevalent description of contemporary life as a network of unanchored flows' (p.108). From this respect, and in the context of McCarthy's discussion, screens are merely one element within this network, rather than constitutive of the network itself, and video installation and artist film within the gallery may be considered from this perspective, as being subsumed by 'the relations of power and everyday practices that define (its) place' (McCarthy, 2001). As such, artist film and video installation can be figured within a discourse on the avant-garde and its relationship to the gallery as site of political and cultural activity rather than being defined as a set of formalistic devices.

The anachronism of identity and origin in language, at times presents an impasse for the

critical account of artist film and video installation. In the introduction to her book *Screens: Viewing Media Installation Art*, Mondloch 'side steps' the issue, 'I employ the term "spectator" as a way to signal the unresolved difficulty of separating the subject from actual individuals' (2010, xiv). The difficulty of analysing the event of screen encounter is itself subject to a 'trilogy of unsatisfactory metaphors – the model of the picture frame, the realist model of the window, and the post-structuralist model of the mirror…' (xv). Despite this, the analysis takes 'into account the ways in which contemporary viewing subjects are themselves defined by interactions with screens'.

To accommodate a repositioning of the activity of viewing, in the chapter 'Be Here (and There) Now', Mondloch focuses on 'environmental and experiential' works that 'flourished amidst widespread artistic experimentation with spatial and temporal phenomena' (2007, p.21), and the criteria for evaluation, 'space, materials, embodiment, duration, site, and so on…' (p.22)[4]. In the chapter 'Installing Time: Spatialized Time and Exploratory Duration', (2010) focus is on the analysis of works by Aitken, Douglas Gordon, Bruce Nauman, and Ahtila. Gordon's *24 Hour Psycho* (1993) relates 'the duration of the actual film footage' to 'the ideal viewer's experience generically, but not specifically' (p.45). In this way, the film is intended to engage the spectator mnemonically, and in the course of their daily lives, 'to engage Gordon's work on their own timelines and for the duration of their choosing' (p.45). In response to Nauman's description of his own work, *Mapping the Studio I (Fat Chance John Cage)* (2001), an ideal or virtual spectator is constituted in the construction of the work, 'Nauman notes the *anticipated* duration of the spectator's experience' and of the 'audience's (potentially divergent) *idea* of the work's duration' (p.47, italics and parenthesis original). The crucial insistence of the formations of these two works is that 'the choice' of the amount of time a spectator engages with the work is 'understood to be one that the *spectator*, not the artist, artwork, or institution, will make' (p.47). Aitken's *Electric Earth* (1999) is a 'quasinarrative' consisting of eight short loops on eight screens across three or four gallery spaces, and that charts the voyage of a man in an urban landscape, in which 'viewers are rather unsettlingly remade into the protagonist himself' (p.48). Aitken's intentions for the work are 'to contest the linearity seemingly intrinsic' to the technology (p.48). As will be shown, the characterisation here, how Aitken attempts to 'make time somehow collapse or expand so it no longer unfolds in this one narrow form' (Aitken cited in Mondloch, p.49) can be seen as a limited conception of the (cinematic) image.

In what is labelled, 'cinema of exhibition' by Jean-Christophe Royoux, the 'structure in which

[4] The chapter, 'Be Here (and There) Now', from Mondloch's book, *Screens* (2010) was originally published in Art Journal, 66, no.3 (2007), pp. 20-33

the experience of temporality can no longer be separated from a subjective reconstruction of duration' demonstrates 'the possibility of an alternative to the kind of relationship to time inherent in cinematic sequentiality' (Royoux, cited in Mondloch, 2010, p.52). Daniel Birnbaum 'assigns a pragmatic status' to these images, "if cinema could produce what Deleuze called crystal-images capturing for an instant the inner workings of time itself, then the temporal possibilities of this 'other cinema', exploring more intricate forms of parallelism and synchronicity, are even greater" (cited in Mondloch, 2010, p.53). The afforded importance of this is that 'by challenging the spectator's conventional notion of linearity, these artworks inspire an awareness that the construction of subjectivity is itself an open-ended, durational process' (p.53). In a development of the discussion the conclusion is that 'the viewer's phenomenological experience' has the potential to 'reveal something about the nature of time itself' (p.53/54). Dominique Païni offers a counter perspective, the independence of the spectator in the gallery 'institutes a tension' because it is contradictory to the unitary flow of consciousness, between the cinematic image and the spectator (in Mondloch, 2010, p.54). There is ultimately an acknowledgement that the 'alleged disconnect between a given media installation and the museological or institutional durational conventions for this art form' warrants 'further exploration' (p.55).

By focussing upon the specific works in the chapter 'Be Here (and There) Now', the argument is exemplified by the 'theoretical attention to the subject, discourse, and textual and ideological analysis' exemplified as such by positions developed by Baudry, Jean-Louis Comolli, Christian Metz, Laura Mulvey, and Wollen, amongst others, and a concern with the 'apparatus' (2007, p.23). What follows is a meditation on *doubleness*, characterised by theatricality,

> *By dispersing focus across screen spaces that coexist and indeed sometimes compete with the actual exhibition space, certain screen reliant installations generate a forceful critical effect that hinges precisely on this tension between virtual screen space and actual space… This model of spectatorship proposes that viewers be both 'here' (embodied subjects in the material exhibition space) and 'there' (observers looking into screen spaces) now.* (2007, pp.23-24)

The article makes a specific typological distinction between a purely screen based viewing activity, exemplified by an 'architectural' criticism of the screen as a virtual window that 'informs and reflects an architecture of viewing' (p.24) and another typology proposed by Manovich[5] that determines an altogether different set of qualitative differences between viewing static illusionistic images of painting and the dynamic moving image of film. Always implicit in these

[5] See Manovich, L., (2001), *The Language of New Media*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts

alternative propositions is reference to a privileged and idealised viewer derived from the construction of Renaissance perspective, and its analogous experience offered by cinema.

The attempt to reconcile the 'doubleness' of the phenomenological subject is exposed as a 'radical potential for certain media-art configurations to productively destabilize our conventional relationships to screen spaces… provocative models for thinking about contemporary subjectivity' (2007, p.32/33). The ideological narrative is difficult to ignore - what subjectivity is proposed if not a politicized one, and how differently politicized? The pleasure of viewing and the *event* of the encounter are figured within a discourse on subjectivity, and a 'call to action' of the mobility of bodies ensues, paradoxically.

In *Screens: Viewing Media Installation Art*, Mondloch calls forth a variety of structural and post-structural strategies with recourse to phenomenology, psychoanalysis, and semiotics, with reference to an apparatus, as the dominant theoretical milieu with which artist film and more specifically, video installation, can be understood, and subsumes a particular film theorization to a distinct critical object. The key assertion that 'doubleness' exists within the encounter is symptomatic of an overall attempt to reconcile the subject with the 'real', and whilst Mondloch acknowledges the difficulty ascribed at the outset to this task, the critical account struggles to close the gap. Apparatus sits on one side of a divide that Mondloch attempts to reconcile in the image of a communion perhaps, an image whereby the subject at one and the same time recognises their objective relation to the Other and in negotiation between, 'neither here nor there'.

There is here a layered conception of the subject, of an unstable subject, in the face of what may be characterised as, frame, window or mirror. The question then is, how the subject, unstable as it is, is oriented towards the screen, and how this orientation may then impact on the subject and subjectivity? It would seem that the issue of 'separating the subject from actual individuals' arises under the perceived difficulty of 'communication', or mode of address. Mondloch makes a distinction in order to render reading unproblematic. 'Spectator' designates an object (subject) but not peopled as such, not actualised subjects. The effect then is to claim a critical faculty based upon a virtual subject (spectator). The virtual spectator as such is already in the work prior to any actual viewing person. In this light, screens (as parts of a composition) in the work considered by Mondloch are legible irrespective of the individuated events of their encounter by real individuals, for which in Mondloch's view we cannot account. The neither 'here' or 'there' is constituted by the *virtuality* of the spectator prior to their actualisation in each individuated viewing event; the spectator (subject) is a figure of the virtual encounter. The question thereafter is how the conjunction of the actual and spatial configuration or

composition within works is seen to figure contemporary subjectivity.

When Deleuze invokes the subject, it is that 'the imagination, having been a collection, becomes now a faculty; the distributed collection becomes now a system. The given is reprised in a movement that transcends it. The mind becomes human nature. The subject invents and believes; *it is synthesis, a synthesis of the mind*' (Deleuze, cited in Roffe, 2016, p.120). The subject is constituted by 'duration, custom, habit, and anticipation. Anticipation is habit, and habit is anticipation [. . .] Habit is the constitutive root of the subject, and the subject, at root, is the synthesis of time – the synthesis of the present and the past in light of the future' (ibid.). Habit is a means with which to deal with the future through the (habituated) 'capacity to assimilate new experiences' (Roffe, 2016, p.121) and in this way substance is afforded to subjectivity. This capacity also constitutes an opportunity, for reflection to take place, the assimilation of past and present experience in relation to a future engenders subjectivity, 'Whatever particularities belong to this or that subject, at the most general formal level, the subject is the habitual synthesis of time' (p.121).

The body, that is, the subject-body is a unified object (image), unified under the '*spontaneity of relation*' between ideas, 'the subject in its spontaneity makes use of the category of the body to explain the presupposed origins of unified phenomena' (p.122). The body is also defined, through the impression of reflection, by *disposition*. The body is referred to as the source of the spontaneity, and *disposition* (passion) as biological source, 'we grasp the body in the image of an active, desiring subject, where its activities consist in the set of tendencies that we associate with it, tendencies that are the elements of the moral subject' (p.122). Disposition may be better understood as simply inherent qualities that can be arranged in relation to other things and hence elements of the moral subject. The spontaneity of relation unifies phenomenon and the spontaneity of disposition provides the subject its singular content. The latter function as 'the principle for the individuation of the subject' (Deleuze, cited in Roffe, 2016, p.123). It may be the case that here we also find an account of the ways in which individual subjects are not defined by their 'differences' as much as by the way in which one to another they are alike. Circumstances are 'the variables that define our passions and our interests', and 'a set of circumstances always individuates a subject, since it represents a state of its passions and needs, an allocation of its interests, a distribution of its beliefs and exhilarations' (ibid.).

The material moments of subjectivity are described in *Cinema 1* (Deleuze, 1992). There are three such material moments that are related to the *movement-image*:
The first material moment of subjectivity (perception-image)-

> *The perception of the thing is the same image related to another special image which frames it, and only reacts to it mediately. In perception thus defined, there is never anything else or anything more than there is in the thing: on the contrary, there is 'less'. We perceive the thing, minus that which does not interest us as a function of our needs. By need or interest we mean the lines and points that we retain from the thing as a function of our receptive facet, and the actions that we select as a function of the delayed reactions of which we are capable. Which is a way of defining the first material moment of subjectivity: it is subtractive.* (p.63)

The second material moment of subjectivity (action-image): 'When the universe of movement-images is related to one of these special images which forms a centre in it, the universe is incurved and organised to surround it' (p.64). The special image is the subject pre-formation as object/image, the receptive plate as it were are the specific functions and capacities of the senses, 'If the world is incurved around a perceptive centre, this is already from the point of view of action, from which perception is inseparable. By incurving, perceived things tender their unstable facet towards me, at the same time as my delayed reaction, which has become action, learns to use them' (pp.64-65). The subject is therefore a centre (of 'indetermination') around which the world is drawn and that forms a 'periphery to the centre: perceiving things here where they are, I grasp the 'virtual action' that they have on me, and simultaneously the 'possible action' that I have on them, in order to associate me with them or to avoid them, by diminishing or increasing the distance' (pp.64-65). The second material moment of subjectivity has moved beyond selection and framing to shaping and relating which 'causes the virtual action of things on us and our possible action on things' (p.65).

The third material moment of subjectivity (the affection-image):

> *Is not merely defined by the specialisation of the two limit-facets, perceptive and active. There is an in-between. Affection is what occupies the interval, what occupies it without filling it in or filling it up. It surges in the centre of indetermination, that is to say in the subject, between a perception which is troubling in certain respects and a hesitant action. It is a coincidence of subject and object, or the way in which the subject perceives itself, or rather experiences itself or feels itself 'from the inside'.* (p.65)

The screen space, according to Mondloch, is a virtual space, that is, an apparition or sketch (an almost space): frame, window or mirror. Screen space is also an image. The 'there' in Mondloch's analysis is a projected virtual subject, whether this is through identification with another or with the self. The 'here' is the virtual subject in its unified (spontaneous) and

objectified (body) sense. In contrast, we can posit the idea that there is no 'here' and 'there' but that this repeats (traces) a particular phenomenological formulation[6].

The *event*, described by Deleuze, is significant to position experience as the basis for knowledge. Deleuze's relationship to phenomenology is nuanced but nonetheless finds as its point of departure the formulation that the *source* of knowledge is located in the subject; this is a form of *tracing*. What phenomenology contributes is to locate the transcendental within experience, by a reversal of Platonism, ''through the epoché, phenomenology reduces a transcendent world or transcendent thing in itself to a phenomenon; anything transcendent comes to be located within experience. Second, through the preposition 'within,' we see that a reversal of Platonism amounts to a reduction to immanence […]'' Lastly, ''the grounding relation in both Phenomenology and Deleuze's thought is paradoxical'' (Lawlor, 2012, p.103). The ground, that is the condition for experience, must 'remain within experience', but at the same time the ground 'must not resemble what it grounds', it must be different from what it grounds. In phenomenology however, the immanence of the ground, experience itself as the condition of experience, is 'to' something, 'a subject or consciousness that constitutes the given', the ground is reproduced in the grounded (p.104).

Deleuze strives for a *pure* plain of immanence, that is, not in (dative) relation to something (identity). To pursue this a little further, meaning, or what is expressed by, for example, a proposition or sentence, must not be placed to exist outside of itself (to something) – the existence of the one is not explained by the existence of the other, which would seem congruent with structuralist thought. This, for Deleuze, is a 'principle of genesis' (p.106). Deleuze's criticism of phenomenology comes in the form of a critique of Husserl's genesis that 'is a kind of copying' (p.109). The intentionality of genesis (in Husserl) does not constitute an event (of sense). Deleuze locates sense (events) between two series (e.g. signifier and signified) between which floats a further term, the *Paradoxical agency*, for example, Lévi-Strauss' floating signifier. The paradoxical agency 'lacks a determinate signified' (p.111) and includes non-sense.

A floating signifier can be exemplified by, for example, the shark in Steven Spielberg's *Jaws*, (1975), which is a receptacle for competing and sometimes contradictory representations. Levi-Strauss gives the example of the Polynesian term 'mana' which does not possess a determinate signified, and in Lacan the paradoxical agency 'is a phantasm, that is, a child's real or unreal representation of the parental coitus' (Deleuze in Lawlor, 2012, p.111). The paradoxical agency is then, something real but separated from the reality and is also imaginary; 'art' in this respect

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[6] 'All consciousness is consciousness of something' (Merleau-Ponty, 2006, p.6)

may act as a paradoxical agency, it is at the one time real but also subject to the imaginary, a signifier to be filled, one with no determinate meaning. The paradoxical agency produces sense as an event; endlessly circulating between series of signifiers and signified it provides a structure around which sense happens. When formalised in expression (by language), 'the event becomes repeatable. It is a caused, factual, by chance accident, and, at the same time, something that can be repeated' (Lawlor, 2012, p.115). The event is, as Deleuze describes, 'the identity of form and emptiness' (1993, p. 136). The event may also be taken as a moment, of crisis, or change, where something shifts indeed, what defines the event is its singularity, constituted by "turning points or points of inflection; bottlenecks, knots, foyers, and centers; points of fusion, condensation and boiling; points of tears and joy, sickness and health, hope and anxiety, 'sensitive' points" (1993, p.52).

Returning to Mondloch's 'here and there', the 'here', otherwise understood as the coalescence of the imagination, under an image (body), within experience, is constituted by identity (spectator), and the 'there' is a virtual spectator, sometimes mirror, sometimes reproduction: virtual occupant, and also one element in experience. Identity (subject) is constituted in the image of a viewing subject and the event of the encounter is of the event of the spectator viewing themselves spectating. The appeal, it would seem, is to make spectatorship an event such that we might begin to think ourselves as 'spectators', an ideologically loaded and rhetorical appeal to the embodied subject.

In her article, *The Indexical and the Concept of Medium Specificity*, (2007) Mary Ann Doane asserts that, '(despite its essentialist connotations), medium specificity is a resolutely historical notion, its definition incessantly mutating in various sociohistorical contexts' (p.129). The indexicality of the photographic image, central to the medium at its conception ("life itself"), displaced by montage as the principal organizing property of film, contended by the long take and depth of field, and in the hands of the film-artists of the structural movement, celluloid and its specific material plastic properties, amongst other equally plastic attributes, and finally the apparatus of the institution, have variously contended for an understanding of the medium specificity of film.

'Enabling impediment' describes the productive qualities of a medium and the necessary gaps or limitations that a medium imposes. Doane concludes that 'Proper to the aesthetic, then, would be a continual reinvention of the medium through a resistance to resistance, a transgression of what are given as material limitations, which nevertheless requires those material constraints as its field of operations' (p.131). This may seem straightforward when considered in respect of painting or sculpture but what of film? The response is 'less assured'

because the object of study moves 'asymptotically toward immateriality, generating images through light and electricity' (p.131). The analogical image or indexical 'footprint' distinguishes film from other media (Manovich, 2001, p.295); it is the indexicality of the photographic image, over and above the digital image, that is 'confirmation of the existence of a world prior to and outside of power' (Doane, 2007, p.133). There are two aspects to the indexical sign: the trace or footprint ('there', 'that'), and as deixis (a pointing finger or 'this').

The indexicality of the cinematic image is closely aligned with the trace, as evidence of something that has been, (or possibly may be, as potential), as a record of an event, and therefore carries with it the historical, whereas the deictic sign is present in spoken language and can only 'achieve its referent, in relation to a specific and unique situation of discourse, the here and now of speech' (p.136). Deixis would not seem to be compatible with cinematic signification (because of its analogous mechanisms) but the frame 'coordinates and necessitates the dialectic of Pierce's[7] two, seemingly incompatible, definitions of the index, as trace and deixis. The frame directs the spectator to look here, now, while the trace reconfirms that something exists to be looked at' (p.140).

According to the analysis Doane sets forth, the 'here and now', 'there and then', finds its coexistence already in the cinematic image as a function of its signifying systems. It may be reasonable to reconsider the approaches of Mondloch, to recast the gallery and works under scrutiny, in this light. The phenomenological encounter resides within a set of 'signifying' practices that prioritizes deixis – the frame – as the principal constituent of the medium within the gallery. According to Uroskie in *Siting Cinema* (2008), themes of location and dislocation in gallery film are a consequence of its (film) dislocation from the cinema. Abstracted from the cinematic institution the deictic potential of the moving image is manifest.

The gallery, museum or site of the work is a malleable entity that accommodates cultural practices and modes of encounter that are shifting and unstable. The apparatus fixes the viewer in a certain relationship to the institution whilst more contemporary approaches consider how the subject is in tension between modalities of spectatorship and viewing, and notions of screen identifications, in contrast to an institutional apparatus that locates them, however. The histories and genealogies that contextualise or explain works are also contestable. An account of work by women artists, and that considers the place of narrative within this work and elsewhere, is conspicuous by its absence across critical accounts. Also, the genealogy of practice that fixes the

[7] See, Peirce, C. S.; Hartshorne, C., and Weiss P., (1932), Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Vol. 2, Elements of Logic, Ed. Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press; Houser, N., and Kloesel, C., (1992), The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings. Vol. 1, Ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press; Hoopes, J., (1991), Peirce on Signs: Writings on Semiotic by Charles Sanders Peirce, Ed. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press

work within an arts discourse fails to recognise fully the history of the screen and cinematic displays instead tracing a trajectory from early modernism through to sculptural minimalism, and beyond. The medium of film has come under scrutiny and a defence of medium specificity has been made whilst the focus has shifted from the indexicality of the photographic medium toward a semiotic approach to the frame.

The post-cinematic or other cinema 'takes up the cinematic image as support for affective engagement and subjective dislocation' (Uroskie, 2011). In *Artists' Moving Image in Britain Since 1989*, edited by Erika Balsom, Lucy Reynolds and Sarah Perks (2019), 1989 is located as a point in time that marks a shift in the display of moving images in a gallery setting alongside a change in the 'institutional and economic determinations' of the 'field of practice'. Due to advancements in, and availability of, projection technologies, the parameters of artists' work experienced a concomitant development towards video projection on increasing scale and with greater visual impact (p.12). The variety of the work embraces cinema like exhibition within gallery settings, 'thereby creating a new institutional home for the filmic tradition', or reconfigured the screen and therefore its relationship to the viewer, for example Louise Wilson's *Stasi City* (1997) that 'sculpturally transfigures the gallery, negotiating how the possibilities of virtuality inherent in the projected image reside in tension with the actuality of the viewer's embodied encounter with the image in time and space' (pp.12-13).

Throughout the 1990s work increasingly focussed on 'pictorialism and narrative'. In Gordon's *24 Hour Psycho* (1993), Gordon projected a video copy of Hitchcock's film at a greatly reduced speed, so that the duration of the film image lasted 24 hours, rendering the image 'at once obstinate and immaterial, paralysing the forward momentum of the once suspenseful film through the imposition of extreme slowness' (p.13). The 1980's was a decade that had seen in the event of home viewing and video tape players, and Gordon's appropriation of this technology further indicated 'the tremendous technological and social changes underway in the cinematic institution: cinemas were closing and video, rather than film, was becoming the dominant material support' (p.13). It is also the case that during this time and subsequently, film as a medium acquires a new centrality to areas of practice. In Tacita Dean's *The Green Ray* (2003), Dean filmed the setting sun over the ocean from the west coast of Madagascar, to capture the reported but otherwise illusive green flash, as the last light of the sun refracts and bends over the horizon. The time of the setting sun was coordinated with the duration of a single role of film. At the same time, the event was also recorded on video and that ultimately failed to capture the phenomenon. Despite also not being evident on a single frame of celluloid however, once developed the green ray was itself visible across the flickering images of moving

film. For Dean this clearly demonstrated that analogue and digital are two different mediums, 'which is to say, two separate supports for the image, with a great chasm dividing them' (Krauss, 2016).

Sites, or themes of practice, throughout the 90's and into the new millennium excavated or problematised notions of race, ethnicity and sexuality, negotiated boundaries (fields) of practice, specifically between art and film, and maintained a commitment to practice as a site of counter-culture community, and politics (Balsom, Reynolds and Perks, 2019, p.17). In Akomfrah's *Vertigo Sea* (2015) the artist confronts 'postcolonial diaspora's expanded geographies that transgress national boundaries' but also the work takes a 'geological turn' that reconfigures the contexts or scale of historical reference to 'ecological concerns set in expansive non-human territories and post-anthropocentric temporalities' (Demos, 2019, p.32). The work maintains its connections to histories, of racism, slavery, and colonialism, whilst also exploring geological events and environments. With these multi-faceted concerns, these practices 'face problems of scale – both of time and of space, as well as of agency and impact' which are constituted as a problem of aesthetics: 'how to express in filmic form the splits, disunities and conflicts of postcolonial national crisis and posthumanist social formations…' (p.32).

The re-negotiation of film as medium, and of history, is symptomatic of an 'archival impulse' in contemporary moving-image art. The post-Foucauldian impulse refers us to a contingent present, of which Foucault teaches us is not a historical inevitability, and of the usefulness of archaeological examination (of the archive) to recast present conditions and affections. In *The Poor Stockinger, the Luddite Cropper and the Deluded Followers of Joanna Southcott* (2012), Luke Fowler 'traces' the educational project of E. P. Thompson in Yorkshire's West Riding during the 1950s, and 'challenges the authority of both the official, idealising, history of the past and the supposed certainties of the archive in order to draw attention to the instability of our understanding of history' (Boaden, 2019, p.150). The attention towards the contingency of history and the certainty of its documentation further 'challenges our contemporary encounter with that past as well as the way in which we record and document the present and build the archives of tomorrow' (p.150).

Isaac Julien's *Looking for Langston* (1989) and Patrick Staff's *The Foundation* (2015) are two pieces of work that bridge the period from the beginning of the 'contemporary' to the (relatively recent) present. Both pieces of work 'take on the task of constructing queer genealogies and memories' that use the archive as 'a way of thinking about loss, absence and lack' (p. 151), and together 'suggest transatlantic identifications with cultural figures and also a troubling of temporal boundaries' (p.156). James Boaden notes that *The Foundation* evokes 'a

living archive, a space in which objects are to be used, touched and narrated… that marks the passing of memory into history' (p.156). Both films attach desire to sedimentations of the past, through the archive, to speak against a 'disappearance of lived social space' (p.167).

Johanna Gosse points us to the allegorical impulse in much contemporary moving image art that mines the archive as a means to access a present, and future. In Mark Leckey's *Dream English Kid 1964-1999 AD* (2015), Leckey combines what he describes as 'found memories', analogue and digital found footage, alongside constructed elements, animations, and 3D-environments into 'an associative, episodic and loosely chronological montage that stiches together personal and collective memories' (Gosse, 2019, p.187), what Leckey calls a 'false memoir' (p.189) or, an 'allegory of the internet as this vast repository of history' (Leckey, 2017). The chronology of *Dream English Kid* begins in the year of the artists' own birth, 1964, and progresses through the 1970s, 80s and 90s but stops in 1999, the year of a total solar eclipse and the turn of the millennium, with its attendant paranoia, of the speculated and anticipated global technological shutdown, the so called 'millennium bug'. The historical pivot for the whole of the work is the year 1979, a year in which Leckey saw the band Joy Division perform, and a recorded and discovered fragment of which initiated the construction of the work. The video 'mash-up' is not specific to this biographical detail however but of an 'effect of media and, particularly, a mass-media imagery rife with fragmentation, elision, glitch and repetition' (Gosse, 2019, p.191).

The allegorical impulse refers to the 'capacity to rescue from historical oblivion that which threatens to disappear' and the operation is one in which 'one text is read through another, however fragmentary, intermittent, or chaotic their relationship may be; the paradigm for the allegorical work is thus the palimpsest' (Owens, cited in Gosse, 2019, p.195-196). As an allegory, *Dream English Kid* provides a portrait of the artist, through a personal connection to the archive (and personal history) but it also allegorises British identity: the Beatles, the *Carry On…* film series, Joy Division, branded clothing, significant historical events, images of familiar places now gone, or remodelled and remade through the archive; this is signalled at various points throughout the narrative with an image of a bridge at various stages of its existence, its final incarnation representing the rebranding of culture in Britain by New Labour in the 90s. The narrative is 'bound up with the specificities of time, place and, particularly, cultural identity, which are framed through markers of gender, nationality, regionalism, musical taste, subcultural affiliation and, most explicitly and self-consciously, class' (Gosse, 2019, p.190), and through which Leckey cultivates 'an audiovisual pleasure principle rooted in the practices of consumption, appropriation and remediation that characterise cultural participation in the digital

age' (p.189). The purpose and allegorical foundation to the work reveals 'the ways that this identity has been subject to fragmentation and instability… identity that reinvents and renovates itself through constant self-reference and cultural feedback' (p.204). Through the digital archive the fragments of shared cultural history are reanimated in new ways to generate new memories that will themselves constitute further fragments, and history is vitalised.

From the late 1980s onwards the projected moving image in Britain, and beyond, has invigorated an art of narrative, medium, and spectacle. Examples of the post-cinematic includes works that use existing film footage, such as Gordon's *24 hour Psycho*, (1993), in work that employs narrative technique perhaps more familiar to film and television audiences such as Julien's *Ten Thousand Waves*, (2010), and also more obliquely in work that disrupts or intervenes in some way, or reimagines our relationships with screen representations, for example *Der Sandmann*, Stan Douglass, 1995. Raymond Bellour (2008) comments on the difficulties to subsume post-cinematic or Other cinema work into the tradition of the plastic arts, '… the very framework of which they explode'. Instead, Bellour proposes to 'recapture cinema in the historical and formal singularity of its own device... to open ever more clearly the indefinable expansion of an Other cinema, according to which an aesthetics of confusion are clarified and amplified' (2008).

Bellour approaches film and video installation in *Of Another Cinema* (2008), in a fashion congruous with a Deleuzian approach to cinema, 'to describe the explosion and dispersal by which that which one thought to be or have been cinema' (p.407). Deleuze's own two treatises on film, *Cinema 1: The Movement Image*, (1992) and *Cinema 2: The Time Image*, (2005)[8] signal an ontological shift in relation to the study of film and (perhaps more significantly), to philosophy; practice of one kind or another 'thinks' specific to its mode of production – philosophers make concepts (with language); filmmakers make sensations (with movement-images). Thought is particular to its medium of expression and Deleuze's philosophy proposes something that remains essential to philosophy whilst seeking recourse to a study of film – *Cinema 1* begins with Bergson's philosophical thesis on movement.

Rather than locate some essentialist property unique to the medium however, Deleuze expands a compendium of its forms. According to Gregory Flaxman's (2000) reading of Deleuze, 'Sensations mobilize the differential forces that make thinking possible… Approaching images is always linked to the genetic forces of thinking, and to the question of ontology' (p.13). Deleuze's taxonomy is perhaps less a system of classification but rather a list of various

8 *Cinema 1*, originally published in France as *Cinema 1, L'Image-Mouvement*, 1983; Cinema 2, originally published in France as *Cinema 2, L'Image-Temps*, 1985

cinematic strategies for approaching the moving image and logic of time. Notably, Deleuze comments on the gaseous perception in the cinema of a number of American experimental film makers, and in the notes that accompany reference to Snow's *La Région Centrale*, (1971), Deleuze considers how 'the camera under the control of an automatic apparatus… frees the eye from the condition of relative immobility and of dependence on co-ordinates' (1992, p.230). Alternative (philosophically) driven accounts of moving image art seek to highlight the 'variation in dispositif' (Bellour, 2012), and the explosion of modalities between images, not by hermeneutics or with recourse to some dialectical argument but by the apprehension of the multiplicity by which forms may mutate.

Film analysis and film thought

Thought, and ideas, are at the centre of the project that proposes an analytical function for gallery film. Some indication of the ways that the displaced screen may function, to interrupt or intervene in screen identification, has already been made but to address the question directly, whether the displaced screen has an analytic function, the following provides some context and consideration of the possibility, for art and film to present philosophical proposition and conceptual thinking. It is the nature of all the arts to reflect upon its own activity and the cinema is no different:

> The cinema has always had trouble analysing itself. Representing itself, on the other hand, is something it does most incessantly, its most powerful works haunted by a kind of mirroring and *mise en abyme* which seem to be their favourite form of torment. Lang, Hitchcock. In its purest fiction, the machine even runs away with itself, carried away as if in a hall of mirrors, where in the attempt to see its own image, it no longer knows where to stop. When I say "analysing itself," I mean pausing and stepping back in a way that displaces and redefines the way we look at a given art form… (Bellour, 2012, p.31, italics original)

Thierry Kuntzel (1976), ascribes to the filmic apparatus the status of the psyche. The spectator perceives the moving image, it registers in the receptive centres, and passes into memory, the screen registers the moving frame and its correlative, the film stock passes the shutter, onto the reel. The analogy is rich but flawed in as much as the screen is proffered the status of the receptive function upon which the sensation is inscribed, and the reel of film is allocated the function of memory; it is psychic insofar as memory plays upon consciousness and this is the richness of the analogy, but this is a closed system, not open onto the world but distinguished from it. The relevance of this, in the analysis, is that it mirrors the psychic apparatus

of the spectator at the moment of viewing. The form of presentation makes the film, as a collection of images, inaccessible: the viewer is subject to the order of presentation whereas the film issues from a totality, the catalogue of images that coexist on the film reel. It is the gap between the well of images on the one hand and their projection on the other that for Kuntzel constitutes the défilement[9], and that between the two there exists another film – the film text, in which 'the initial figure would not find its place in the flow of a narrative, in which the configuration of events contained in the formal matrix would not form a progressive order, in which the spectator/subject would never be reassured' (Kuntzel, cited in Bellour, 2012, p.34).

Kuntzel appropriates film, with video, as an extension of this occupation, 'which links the subject up to itself more directly' (p.36). There are equivalents to this position, perhaps most notably the film essay and the video essay. The film essay 'has emerged as the leading non-fiction form for both intellectual and artistic innovation' (Arthur, cited in Rascaroli, 2008, p.24). Although Laura Rascaroli resists the idea that the film essay is a genre, the consideration of the form in its historical development, its theoretical positioning and by comparison of competing definitions and textual features, there is some attempt at categorisation in the article *The Essay Film: Problems, Definitions, Textual Commitments* (2008).

The film essay 'is a hybrid form that crosses boundaries and rests somewhere between fiction and nonfiction cinema' (p.24) and is characterised by what Theodor Adorno refers to, in reference to the literary essay, as 'heresy'; the essay film 'disrespects traditional boundaries, is transgressive both structurally and conceptually, it is self-reflective and self-reflexive' (Alter, cited in Rascaroli, 2008, p.24). Certain features of the film essay are identified as characteristic of the form, most notably its reflectivity and subjectivity. Godard, considered to be an essayistic director reflects, 'as a critic, I thought of myself as a film-maker. Today I still think of myself as a critic […] Instead of writing criticism, I make a film, but the critical dimension is subsumed' (cited in Rascaroli, 2008, p.25).

The film essay 'contains and incorporates in the text the act itself of reasoning' (Rascaroli, 2008, p.26). The subjectivity of the film essay is a specific subjectivity, unlike for example the highly subjective films of Federico Fellini, the subjectivity of the film essay is also a mode of address that 'addresses the spectator directly, and attempts to establish a dialogue' (p.35). The 'you' of the addressee is 'not a generic audience, but an embodied spectator'. The essay film 'constructs such spectatorial position by adopting a certain rhetorical structure: rather than answering all the questions that it raises, and delivering a complete, "closed" argument, the

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9 Kuntzel, (1975), *Le Défilement*, and (1976), *A note upon the filmic apparatus*, for défilement also see, Augst, B., (1977), *The Défilement Into the Look*

essay's rhetoric is such that it opens up problems, and interrogates the spectator' (p.35). The effect of this rhetorical strategy is to 'mobilize the subjectivity of the spectator'. Although many examples of films that can be described as essay films rely extensively on the voice over, and the subsequent direct or indirect implication of the author that generates the text, there is recognition that the spoken text is not a necessity,

> *Since film operates simultaneously on multiple discursive levels – image, speech, titles, music – the literary essay's single, determining voice is dispersed into cinema's multi-channel stew. The manifestation or location of a film author's voice can shift from moment to moment or surface expressively via montage, camera movement and so on* (Arthur, cited in Roscaroli, 2008, p.37).

Avoiding structuralist and post-structuralist positions with respect to authorship, it is acknowledged that there is further discussion that can be generated around the problem, but suffice to say, for Jean-François Lyotard, the essay is a 'genre of absence' in which there is 'no truth, just truth making' (cited in Roscaroli, 2008, p.39). Roscaroli considers that the film essay, rather than be thought of as a genre, is a *mode* defined by 'textual commitments' and 'rhetorical strategies', that is 'sited at the crossroads of fiction, nonfiction, and experimental film' (2008, p.43).

The video essay is 'essentially a short analytical film about films or film culture' (McWhirter, 2015, p.369) and has two distinct poles, that of the 'explanatory, which is analytical and language-based, and the poetic, which is expressive and battles against language with a collage of images and sounds' (Keathley, cited in McWhirter, 2015, p.371). As Eric Faden puts it, 'media stylos' use 'moving images to engage and critique themselves; moving images illustrating theory; or even moving images revealing the labor of their own construction' (2008). The main distinction between the essay film and the video essay is that the essay film may 'take anything as its subject, the video essay itself only has the subject of film (or television) as its centre' (McWhirter, 2015, p.371). The clear advantage of the video essay (or film essay) is that the critic or scholar no longer needs to play 'on an absent object' (Bellour, 1975, p.26), by describing, evoking or mimicking the object of their study but can invoke the object directly. According to Bellour, Kuntzel finds in video,

> … *the (intellectual, material) force which makes it possible to displace cinema in relation to itself, to give it that supplement that it still lacks and that would ultimately bring it close to writing. Writing not as a privileged endeavour, but rather to allow us to escape its spell by taking away some of its power. Writing as expression, quite simply, freely orchestrated from the essay to the poem, from auto-biography to thought.* (2012, p.57)

Displacement, of film to video, seems necessary, a displacement of 'word' to video or 'word' to film, as a means to free writing up from itself, from its own 'power', and to bring about its 'expressive' qualities that may be enlisted to the pursuit of knowledge. What of cinema's ability to think itself, to think at all; this is a problem that is necessary to confront because any possibility or limitation provides us with a sense of the work that might be done.

To consider the question, can cinema be applied to philosophical or analytical thinking, there are examples in which such endeavour is explicit such as Pier Paolo Pasolini's (1975) *Salo o il centroventi giornate di Sodoma* (Salo or the 120 days of Sodom), in which a bibliography is included in the title sequence or Alain Resnais' *Mon Oncle d'Amerique* (My Uncle From America) (1979) 'which cut back and forth between shots from an interview with Henri Laborit and scenes from a series of interlaced fictional stories that may be taken as both exemplifying and challenging Laborit's sociobiological propositions' (Livingston, 2006)[10].

There are less explicit meditations on philosophical themes, for example in the scene in Bergman's *Seventh Seal* (1957), in which the knight Antonius Block enters a church and, believing he is speaking with a priest, makes a confession. The knight speaks through an iron latticework on the other side of which is the figure of Death; the latticework is composed of eight by eight squares, as you would find in a chequered pattern of a chessboard. The chess board imagery may be understood as 'contributing to a more general, anti-liturgical opposition between the vain and violent institutional forms of what Søren Kierkegaard called "Christendom" and the Pauline "God is love" theme that punctuates Bergman's corpus' (Livingston, 2006, p.15). In his 1943 film, *Vredens Dag* (Day of Wrath) Carl Theodor Dreyer ruminates on ethical and epistemic issues, to raise doubt about scapegoating mechanisms specifically within the context of the then Nazi occupied Denmark (p.14). Paisley Livingston concludes that films may have 'value' and contribute to knowledge generation 'insofar as they provide a useful complement to the overarching project of philosophical pedagogy and research' (p.18). In other words, film can operate as an adjunct or support, to help elucidate or represent philosophical thinking and as such has a pedagogic role to play, but what of films ability to make 'original' contribution?

Taking Livingston's 'bold thesis' as the point of reference, Aaron Smuts (2009) proposes a more radical perspective. The approach to establish equivalence between philosophy and film is to, in the first instance, lessen some of Livingston's requisites: the condition that the contribution is original, and the condition that the contribution made is not able to be subject to

10 For an extended discussion see Chatman, S., (1990), Coming to Terms: The Rhetoric of Narrative in Fiction and Film, Cornell University Press

paraphrasing,

> *That problem itself takes the form of a dilemma. If it is contended that the exclusively cinematic insight cannot be paraphrased, reasonable doubt arises with regard to its very existence. If it is granted, on the other hand that, the cinematic contribution can and must be paraphrased, this contention is incompatible with arguments for a significantly independent, innovative, and purely "filmic" philosophical achievement, as linguistic mediation turns out to be constitutive of (our knowledge of) the epistemic contribution a film can make.* (Livingston, 2006, p.12)

Smuts adjustment is simple, it should not be necessary for the contribution to be original to establish the capacity for philosophical insight, nor should it be rejected if the contribution is open to paraphrasing (2009); neither position delegitimises the capacity for cinema to do philosophy, original or not.

Philosophy, according to Smuts, is surmised as the practice of producing arguments related to a philosophical question; this involves offering premises in support of a conclusion. Further, the notion of 'success' is employed[11] as a means to elaborate upon the definition and to establish a criterion for evaluation, 'To do philosophy is, stated crudely, to attempt to provide reasons to believe some philosophical claim' (2009). Smuts provides two specific examples with which to develop his case: a consideration of the "For God and Country" sequence of Eisenstein's *October* (1928), and *The Twilight Zone* episode, "The Little People" (William F. Claxton, 1962), written by Rod Serling.

The 'For God and Country' sequence of Eisenstein's *October* (1928) begins with displays of Christian religious artefacts; alternating images of statuary, cathedrals, and artworks are gradually intercut with images of pagan statuary. In this sequence Eisenstein compares Christianity with earlier forms of (primitive) religious belief and iconography and in doing so Eisenstein offers 'a genealogy of sorts' (Smuts, 2009)[12]. Eisenstein describes the sequence this way: "Maintaining the denotation of 'God,' the images increasingly disagree with our concept of God, inevitably leading to individual conclusions about the true nature of all deities. In this case, too, a chain of images attempted to achieve a purely intellectual resolution, resulting from a conflict between a preconception and a gradual discrediting of it in purposeful steps" (cited in Smuts, 2009, p.415). Smuts compares the approach with the method of argument employed by Friedrich Nietzsche

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[11] See Peter van Inwagen, "Philosophical Failure," in The Problem of Evil: The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of St. Andrews in 2003 (Oxford University Press, 2006): pp. 37-55

[12] Also see Carroll, N., (1998), For God and Country, in Interpreting the Moving Image, Cambridge University Press, p.88; and Kepley, V., (1997), Eisenstein and Soviet Cinema, in Defining Cinema, ed. Lehman, P., (1997), Rutgers University Press, p. 43

in, *On the Genealogy of Morality* (1887). Genealogy is employed as a form of rhetoric, but the argument is not confined to these rhetorical goals, rather the form of rhetoric provides an analogy that may be ascribed to other meta-ethical theories. Through these same means *October* presents us with an analogical argument.

In a further example, we see how story, in the way demonstrated, rather than narrative technique, functions to make propositions by way of analogy. In *The Twilight Zone: The Little People* (William F. Claxton, 1962), written by Rod Serling, two spacemen, Peter Craig (Joe Maross) and William Fletcher (Claude Akins), are stranded on a planet, their spaceship in need of repair. Craig discovers a race of tiny inhabitants, much in the vein of Jonathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* (1726) and so begins a reign of terror, the immoral Craig demands that the tiny 'people' of the alien civilisation worships him as their deity. Refusing to leave once the repairs are complete, Craig exiles Fletcher from the planet but shortly thereafter more spacemen arrive, only this time it is Craig who is dwarfed by comparison to their gigantic size. Craig is inadvertently killed by one of the 'giants' and the tiny inhabitants rejoice and tear down the idol of their god.

In this, Craig is deified because of his disproportionate size and strength in contrast to those of the planet's inhabitants but 'his moral depravity invalidates any suggestion that he is a worthy object of worship'. The story questions power as sufficient reason, to make something worthy of worship, 'the episode does not simply come out and tell us that power is insufficient; it actually leads us to this conclusion via the example of a megalomaniac spaceman' (Smuts, 2009).

In the *Twilight Zone* example, story can also be considered more directly as a 'thought experiment' to deliver premises, a pattern of inference, and a conclusion. One of the most famous thought experiments involves imagining a person on a train, witness to two simultaneous lighting strikes at each end of the train: a passenger (observer) rides on a train whilst another person observes the train moving from an embankment. At a point where the relative positions of the two observers are equally distant from the two ends of the train, lighting strikes these two points, the ends of the train, simultaneously. The observer on the embankment sees both flashes at the same time whilst the person on the train sees one fractions of a second before the other, because of their motion on the train; a thought experiment that is deeply connected to Einstein's theory of relativity. According to Tom Wartenberg, a thought experiment asks a reader,

> *…to consider a certain possibility that she might not have considered before, a possibility that is often at odds with her established patterns of belief and action. Once this possibility is entertained as a real possibility, then the reader is confronted with the question of what justifies*

> *her customary belief rather than the possibility put forward in the thought experiment.* (cited in Smith, 2006, p.35)

The thought experiment is a device for challenging the 'tenacity of the habitual'.

Noël Carroll (2002) identifies the thought experiment as something that connects philosophy and the narrative arts but, questioning whether the thought experiment occupies the same function in each, concludes that, although this may be the case, the 'relative significance of the epistemic and various artistic values will vary among different kinds of artworks'. Richard Moran contrasts hypothetical and dramatic imagining in the thought experiment, 'to imagine something hypothetically is to pose the possibility of some counterfactual in a spare and abstract way' (Cited in Smith, 2006, p.39). Dramatic imagining involves the elaboration of the counterfactual, the 'what if…?', through narrative positioning, dramatic imagining "involves something... like genuine rehearsal, 'trying on' a point of view, trying to determine what it is like to inhabit it" (Moran, 1994)[13].

As Murray Smith puts it, the issue to paraphrase the epistemic value of a work of art is characterized by the complexity of the elaborated counterfactual, 'no matter how "philosophical" the theme of a narrative, to the extent that it is designed as an artwork it is apt to put a spanner in the philosophical works' (Smith, 2006, p.40). And, as Cleanth Brooks says, 'When we consider the statement immersed in the poem, it presents itself to us, like the stick immersed in the pool of water, warped and bent. Indeed, whatever the statement, it will always show itself as deflected away from a positive, straightforward formulation' (cited in Smith, 2006).

For Deleuze philosophy is the production of concepts whereas the 'proper occupation' of the arts is to produce sensations, or 'compounds of sensations', although art is nonetheless considered a form of thought alongside philosophy and the sciences, 'great artists and authors are also great thinkers, but they think in terms of percepts and affects rather than concepts' (Smith, 1997, p.168). The material 'support' for the creation is in the sensation and is thus characterised as expressive, 'one material is exchanged for another, like the violin for the piano, one kind of brush for another, oil for pastel, only inasmuch as the compound of sensations requires it' (Deleuze, 1994, p.167). Neither the creations, of concepts in philosophy, of blocs of sensation in art, or functions in science, has any privilege over the other or is in practice 'more difficult or more abstract' than the other, 'it is no easier to read an image, painting, or novel than it is to comprehend a concept' (Smith, 1997, p.168). In its most fundamental formulation, 'we

[13] See also Tamar Szabó Gendler, (2000), The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance, Journal of Philosophy 97: 55–81.

paint, sculpt, compose, and write with sensations. We paint, sculpt, compose, and write sensations' (Deleuze, 1994, p.166).

In *Difference and Repetition*, (1968) Deleuze formulates what may be considered the pivotal account of his own philosophical position, or as James Williams describes it, 'is at the centre of his philosophical works, not only chronologically but also methodologically and in terms of interpretation' (Williams, 2012, p.33), and is 'the keystone' to Deleuze's philosophy. Difference for Deleuze is, 'in itself', as 'pure difference defined not in relation to identity' (p.37) therefore, not an empirical relation between two identities or a negation of identity but a 'transcendental principle that constitutes the reason of empirical diversity' (Smith and Protevi, 2018). Difference is 'an ideal or virtual potential for the transformation of identities' (Williams, 2012, p.37). The implication is twofold: the principle both gives rise to empirical diversity and, empirical diversity has difference as its principle, "the individuation of entities is produced by the actualization, integration, or resolution (synonymous) of a differentiated virtual field of Ideas or 'multiplicities' that are themselves changed, via 'counter-effectuation,' in each individuating event" (Smith and Protevi, 2018). To put it differently, difference is not some actual quality contained by objects and that can be compared with other actual qualities or things; actual qualities remain but these are the outcome or 'crystallisation' of the differential potential. For example, to consider this in terms of natural science: a tree may be characterised by amongst other things leaf shape and one tree may be identified self-different/ self-same to another on account of their respectively shaped leaves but, for example, the incidence of light on the leaf's surface, and the capacity for the leaf to convert light into sugar (photosynthesis) is a differential that is actualised in each empirical instance or actuality of a tree with particularly shaped leaves. This potential is difference and gives rise to all the instances of different shaped leaves for all trees.

Difference is virtual potential until expressed 'in actual processes of becoming at different degrees of intensity' (Williams, 2012, p.38). An example given in Smith and Protevi (2018) to progress this idea considers colour. We can extract from red that which makes it red, blue that which makes it blue and so forth. This is one way to determine identities in the manner, x and y. We can also combine all of the colours, as you might do through a prism, to get white light. In the second instance, by considering each of the colours in relation to the white light derived on their combination we can understand the actualisation of light each time we encounter it in all its varieties. White light in this instance is the differential of the actuality of colour.

Deleuze critiques throughout his work the 'tracing' operation by which, 'identities in real experience are said to be conditioned by identities in the transcendental' (Smith and Protevi, 2018). An example of this may be seen in the Kantian notion of *apperception* in which

preconditions for experience, the transcendental, are invested of identity, foregrounded by the subject, 'I think', which is itself a product of experience but nonetheless cannot be experienced. This movement reproduces identity of one in the other, hence 'trace'. Thus, 'experience is not confined to a personal Cogito of a Cartesian subject but represents an experiment with the environing world: we can, and should, learn from experience' (Semetsky, 2009, p.443).

Experience is the starting point for knowledge, but to satisfy the demand that the condition (for knowledge) cannot resemble the conditioned (empirical experience), the transcendental must be impersonal and pre-individual, that which enables thought. The virtual then, has no identity and is the 'condition for real experience' (Smith and Protevi, 2018); identities of the subject and the object are products of processes that resolve a differential field.

We may be reminded that the site, object and subject of a work of art is under some investigation and that in the case of the materialist/structural film makers the constitution of the work in relation to the viewer is a central concern. Likewise, in more recent analysis it is the configuration of certain video installation pieces that places the viewer in a certain relation to the work, and to 'themselves'. There is an implied tracing manoeuvre, previously touched upon, from the (transcendental) subject to the experience and the reproduction of the identity of one in the other. Site may be considered for both its physical properties but also as a locus of cultural activity. Lastly, and where we are moving through and towards, the displacement of the cinema, for example via the medium of video, gives expression to writing and analysis whilst at the same time, and necessarily, undercutting something of the power of writing. We move towards a position where the action on cinema in this way expresses (analysis) cinema. Film may provide philosophical or conceptual thought, by way of analogous argument and genealogy, or the thought experiment, which is to a lesser or greater extent pure, abstract or allied with the poetic. This last alignment would appear unnecessary, without negating its terms: thought is not the sole province of philosophy or science but, according to Deleuze, the resolution of the virtual, a differential field. Difference is the constitution of things in experience.

Repetition is the repetition of this differential i.e. we can identify two trees by their respective leaf shapes (self-identical/ self-different) but the differential 'photosynthesis' is also repeated in this formulation as an idea that determines diversity, in repetition, and that is actualised in trees in all their instances (and with each experience). You can abstract from the different varieties of trees an abstract and general idea of a tree: trees have different shaped leaves, or you can conceive that trees photosynthesise; both hold but photosynthesis 'activates' different shaped leaves and actual objects, whereas different shaped leaves do not, or as Inna Semetsky puts it, 'objects of experience are real but their reality exceeds what is actually given to senses in

experience' (2009, p.443). It is perhaps noteworthy that this is not of the order of causality i.e. the differential 'photosynthesis' does not *cause* trees to have different shaped leaves rather, it is only in the virtual, between concept and experience, that the virtual is actualised.

Repetition echoes Nietzsche's eternal return, defined as 'a differential variation across series' (Williams, 2012, p.38). There can never be, in Deleuze's terms, a repetition of the same thing, only a repetition of the differential, 'It is because nothing is equal, because everything bathes in its difference, in its dissemblance and its inequality, even with itself, that everything returns' (Deleuze, 1994, p.243). We have in this an indication of our method and to which a studio practice is well aligned. In the analysis of film or the cinema then, we cannot fix some identity and decree we have located the object because the object only emerges from our efforts to think it. For Deleuze, 'knowledge is irreducible to a static body of facts but constitutes a dynamic process of inquiry as an experimental and practical art embedded in experience' (Semetsky, 2009, p.443). Thought thinks, 'by virtue of the forces that are exercised on it in order to constrain it to think' (Deleuze, 1983, cited in Semetsky, 2009), thinking 'is always a second power of thought, [and] not the natural exercise of a faculty . . . A power, the force of thinking, must throw it into a becoming-active' (2009). Thought in this respect is, 'the presentation of the unconscious, not the representation of consciousness' (Deleuze, 1994, p.192).

Difference, 'embedded in real experience' as 'the objective structure of an event', shocks thought into thinking, and demands the faculties of perception to go beyond the given 'sense-data'. Concepts are therefore objects, "of an encounter, as a here-and-now... from which emerge inexhaustibly ever new, differently distributed 'heres' and 'nows'.... I make, remake and unmake my concepts along a moving horizon, from an always decentered center, from an always displaced periphery which repeats and differentiates them" (Deleuze, 1994, xx–xxi). The origin of knowledge is sensibility of the encounter and for Deleuze, 'intensity is the characteristic of the encounter and that sets off the process of thinking. Virtuality is the characteristic of the Idea. Intensive processes are themselves in turn structured by Ideas or multiplicities' (Smith and Protevi, 2018) e.g. tree, leaf, shape, light, photosynthesis, 'tree', is a structure of thinking. This encapsulates the central concern of Deleuze: the notion of a plane of immanence: encounter, sensibility, intensity, idea, actual experience or encounter.

An Idea or multiplicity (white light, photosynthesis) is a 'process of progressive determination of differential elements, differential relations, and singularities' (2018). Elements must have 'no independent existence from the system in which they inhere. Differential relations determine singularities or remarkable points at which the pattern can shift' (2018). An illustration of this might be given as when water boils to become vapour, or the way that language becomes

dialect; phonemes are the differential under which the pattern of language shifts, 'the Idea of sound could be conceived of as a white noise, just as there is also a white society or a white language, which contains in its virtuality all the phonemes and relations destined to be actualized in the diverse languages and in the remarkable parts of a same language' (2018).

The process of thought is activated in the encounter; the plane of immanence is constructed, in order to, 'find one's bearings in thought' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p.37). To orientate in this way is not to provide some 'objective reference' point or to situate a subject, subjects and objects are concepts. The plane of immanence is 'the image of thought' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994). The plane is ceaselessly in movement such that its features are not inscribed in any volume or surface, rather the movement, 'passes through the whole of the plane by immediately turning back on and folding itself and also by folding other movements or allowing itself to be folded by them, giving rise to retroactions, connections, and proliferations' (p.39). The plane of immanence may be seen as that which makes thinking possible but without reducing it to a concept. To reduce the plane of immanence to a concept would introduce the idea of a universal or metaphysics, whereas universal concepts are orientations on a plane of immanence. A plane of immanence may be best described as the milieu (Deleuze: plateau, slice, milieu) within, or against which concepts may be fabricated. The question "What is?" posits ideas as transcendent, whereas 'minor' questions such as "Which one?" "Where?" "When?" "How?" "How many?" "In which case?" "From which viewpoint?" defines the differential ideas immanent to the intensive processes they structure (Smith and Protevi, 2018).

Philosophy is the creation of concepts (intensive multiplicity), inscribed on a plane of immanence, peopled by 'conceptual personae'. A conceptual persona is not a subject, thinking is not subjective; a conceptual persona is a *character*, set against the plane of immanence and with which concepts are laid out, 'A conceptual persona is a proto-literary figure that appears in philosophical texts not only to illustrate a concept, but to dramatize its function' (Günzel, 2014, p.34). The 'lesson' is one that Deleuze learns from Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Dramatization for Deleuze is the coming alive of a concept: The metamorphosis into a bug in Kafka, for example, is the dramatization of the concept of becoming minor according to Deleuze. This becoming minor then serves as a critique of classical ontologies, whose primary category of "being" always refers to a static universality' (p.34).

Art creates blocs of sensation, compounds of percepts and affects, the genetic principles of which are 'the principles of composition for works of art' (Smith and Protevi, 2018). In general, Deleuze will locate the conditions of sensibility in *an intensive conception of space and a virtual*

conception of time, which are necessarily actualized in a plurality of spaces and a complex rhythm of times. Art however, 'cannot be recognized, but can only be sensed' (2018).

It is in this respect that we can perhaps reconcile philosophical and analytical thought with practice. It is feasible that film can do philosophy in the sense that it can present analogous constructions of genealogies and provide thought experiments in philosophical argument, but this is perhaps to also decentre or confound the potential of the thinking inherent to the sphere of practice, to the realm of the other in an unnecessary or problematic relation: art produces sensations, philosophy concepts, however. Art and philosophy have as their point of origin, sensibility, sensation and intensity as its characteristic. Deleuze identifies art with the capacity *to reveal the conditions of sensibility and how we encounter the world*, the conditions of our perception and of the intensity of this encounter.

Methodology and method

Methodology: Aesthetics and Immanence

Reminding ourselves of the essential question, what considerations need to be made when adapting cinema for the gallery and installation art or, how film must be adapted, for the gallery, a qualifying procedure was placed on the enquiry, that any work must be specific to the gallery for it to qualify an answer. The objection that there is something necessary in this adaptation, the *must* in the sentence, how must film be adapted for the gallery, can be countered, it is necessary unless we are simply relocating the cinema; we would not question this necessity were the adaptation be from stage to film, or film to radio. The reason for this condition is outlined as such: in the context of what first motivates the question, we are not in the *habit* of making films but work of a different order, that accommodates a different kind of spectatorship, employing related but distinct methods and materials, whether this be the work of a printmaker, painter or sculptor. Work may be situated outside of the gallery but nonetheless is constituted by a certain presence or being, that we can analyse and create concepts for, and some example of this will be provided. The nature of this being is to some degree placed under question, but is not taken as essential insofar as, it is not determined by the concepts we use to invoke it, which are determinate yet subject to change; this is not to say that these same concepts cannot be brought to bear on art production. These concepts outline a system, we saw an example of this in the discussion on site, when considered as 'essentially bound to the physical and empirical realities of a place. Such a conception, if not ideologically suspect, often seems out of synch with the prevalent description of contemporary life as a network of unanchored flows' (Kwon, 1997, p.108).

From a brief reading of Gidal we established that the structural/materialst filmmakers aligned film practice with modernist fine arts practice, the abstract expressionists and sculptural minimalists. The strategy made specific claims, about the nature of spectatorship and therefore provided an evaluation of mainstream cinema, which came under criticism. On the other hand, Kuntzel developed film theory with the use of video, of which some connection was made with the film or video essay, and a form or 'writing'. This development considered the *défilement* of the film, existing as a collection of images that is then projected according to a prescribed pattern and pertaining to codes and conventions, a development on the apparatus film theory of Baudry. The film 'text' was therefore the subject of interventions between these two 'films', the reel and the projection. We are building our own framework with which to propose understanding here, that we can apply expression to writing in the form of the 'essay'. It may be

a bold statement to make, that any attempt to wholly produce the concept in a work of art is anathema to artistic work, but a discussion on philosophy *in* film suggested, at the least, that the concept here is immersed within the expression. Consideration of Kuntzel suggests that the expression is what enables a kind of analysis.

The phenomenological subject, implicit in the materialist/ structuralist position and in subsequent analysis was problematised by a repositioning or employment of the transcendental empiricism of Deleuze, rather than constitute knowledge within the subject, 'experience is not confined to a personal Cogito of a Cartesian subject but represents an experiment with the environing world: we can, and should, learn from experience' (Semetsky, 2009, p.443). The problem, as Deleuze sees it is that (Kantian) preconditions for experience, the transcendental, are invested of identity, foregrounded by the subject, 'I think', which is itself a product of experience but nonetheless cannot be experienced. This movement reproduces identity of one in the other, 'trace'. Phenomenology locates the transcendental within experience, 'anything transcendent comes to be located within experience.' (Lawlor, 2012, p.103) The preposition *within*, 'amounts to a reduction to immanence' (p.103). The ground, that is the condition for experience, must 'remain within experience', but at the same time the ground 'must not resemble what it grounds' (p.104). In phenomenology however, the immanence of the ground, experience itself as the condition of experience, is 'to' something, 'a subject or consciousness that constitutes the given', the ground is reproduced in the grounded (p.104). Gidal says of identification and narrative that it 'demands a passive audience', the film is constructed around identity and specifically, the identity of one in the other (trace). The reverse mechanism is also applied:

> *The repression is that of space, the distance between the viewer and the object, a repression of real space in favour of the illusionist space. The repression is, equally importantly, of the in-film spaces, those perfectly constructed continuities. The repression is also that of time. The implied lengths of time suffer compressions formed by certain technical devices which operate in a codified manner, under specific laws, to repress (material) film time.*
> (Gidal, 1978, p.4)

The attempt to reformulate film to the phenomenological, physical-spatial experience of the viewer is self-evident, all under the philosophical Marxism of Althusser.

Deleuze strives for a *pure* plain of immanence, that is, not in (dative) relation to something (identity). *Différence* is, 'in itself', as 'pure difference defined not in relation to identity' therefore, not an empirical relation between two identities or a negation of identity but a 'transcendental principle that constitutes the reason of empirical diversity' (Smith and Protevi, 2018). Experience

is the starting point for knowledge, but to satisfy the demand that the condition (for knowledge) cannot resemble the conditioned (empirical experience), the transcendental must be impersonal and pre-individual, that which enables thought. The virtual then, has no identity and is the 'condition for real experience' (Smith and Protevi, 2018). Identities of the subject and the object are products of processes that resolve a differential field.

Deleuze's transcendental empiricism then provides us with a differential ontology, one which does not situate one thing against or to another, in our case subject/work of art, both are constituted within the same plane of immanence. We cannot therefore make an appeal to the subject to provide knowledge of the art form, or art of subject: the ground must be in the grounded. In this same way then we start with the cinema, we remain with the cinematic, in Deleuze's case to develop concepts, in ours, expressions (analysis); this is the attempt, and methodology. The approach is realist ontological insofar as we place the cinema under scrutiny and develop understanding from the thing itself, and not in relation to its contexts, and therefore empirical in its approach to knowledge.

Aesthetics

Deleuze' analysis of the Cinema, discussed in some detail shortly, may be characterised by a negotiation of a Poetics, or more strictly speaking an Aesthetic analysis of cinema, this is not strictly the case. In a discussion on aesthetic experience and aesthetic analysis, David Fenner makes a distinction between the two: *aesthetic experience* is the study of 'the experience of raw data' and *aesthetic analysis* is a kind of 'Taste theory' (Fenner, 2003, p.40). Aesthetic experiences, 'if we are to treat them as "raw data," must be explored without pre-conception, prejudice, or limitation' (p.41). The insistence here is that we bring to any experience a host of attitudes, ideas, emotions that may 'colour' the experience (habit) but furthermore, 'the vast majority of aesthetic experiences are not focused exclusively, in terms of their contents, on formal or simple-sensory matters' (p.41). Aesthetic analysis is by contrast a more controlled affair that separates out aspects of experience (2003). John Dewey's account of aesthetics of experience is one that takes in all experience, each as 'bounded organic whole' (cited in Fenner, 2003, p.42). The emphasis here is that meaningful experiences are individuated instances of an otherwise boundless perception. Jerome Stolnitz proposes a 'phenomenological' explanation: aesthetics are motivated experiences for their own sake, 'It is the attitude we take which determines how we perceive the work. An attitude is a way of directing and controlling our perception.... an attitude organizes and directs our awareness of the world' (cited in Fenner, 2003, p.43). The attitude here is *towards*, is *to* experience rather than *in* experience. Archibald

Alison posits imagination as the 'mechanism' that is necessary for the aesthetic experience, 'The emotions of taste may therefore be considered as distinguished from the emotions of simple pleasure by their being dependent upon the exercises of imagination; and though founded in all cases upon some simple emotion, as yet further requiring the employment of this faculty for their existence' (cited in Fenner, p.45). Alison's position it may be noted is not wholly incommensurate with the view of Deleuze insofar as, it is from the sensation that we proceed to imagination and then thought. *Taste* in this respect though is conceptual, not emotional. Subsequent to this, Fenner expands imagination, to include association of all kinds and thereafter to consider context.

What is most present in the account is the 'divided self' or the doubling of experience. Aesthetics is a means to account for a class of experience that is derived at by a confrontation with the world and, a confrontation of the world with the experiencing subject that in turn determines the nature of the experience. The experience itself is somehow frozen somewhere between the two, like a photograph; the experience resides in both the qualities of the object of experience and in the qualities of the subject of experience but neither wholly in either, or it resides completely in the one that is issued to the other, subject to object. In the article, *Experience and Aesthetic Analysis*, Fenner locates the difficulty of the positions extolled, that of 'the metaphysical story' (p.45). There is a strong echo here of the account of gallery film and video installation by Mondloch. Fenner also considers how the positions discussed throughout differ, in some instances explicitly oppose, Kantian metaphysics.

It is clear that for Deleuze there is a distinction to be made, between the commonplace experience and that encountered in the work of art. To account for this he considers the Kantian notion of the sublime, 'It is only in Nature's immensity that we find our own limitation. It brings us to our knees as we recognize our physical impotence… Nature is to us the object of an intuition that informs us of the limits of our sensibility but expands our aesthetic reach when it provokes the feeling of the sublime, by means of which it is at least in accord with our faculties' (Olkowski, 2012, p.269). Imagination, which is 'first crushed then freed from its own bounds', is one of the faculties with which the sublime finds its 'accord with Reason' (p.269). *Catastrophe* is the mathematical theory that explains the progression of experience to the free play of imagination and finally to the regime of reason, *catastrophe* describes 'what happens when imagination moves from the harmony of free play to the violence of inadequacy, and finally to the stability of its suprasensible destination' (p.270). The structure of this event is the structure of experience, of sensation, imagination, thought, what might be described as the

constitution of the subject[14].

The question of originality permeates throughout Deleuze's thinking; thought, as art, is a creative act and otherwise, simply habit and cliché. In this respect most experience, most 'thought', can be conceived of as habitual and unoriginal. We may here be reminded of Livingston's requirement for originality of contribution and the condition of paraphrasing when considering film's ability to make a contribution to philosophy. There is also a 'solution' to Fenner's approach to aesthetic experience, which is phenomenological in tone, experience being conditioned by habit, and which is why we can and should 'experiment with the environing world'; the encounter is the starting point from which imagination and thought follow. This is an attitude that is exemplified by a studio approach to expressing the cinematic, it promotes creative experimentation with the object of experience. It is difficult to view this simply as *simulacra*, when the objective universe is itself identified with the image.

The aesthetic approach then implies a twofold method here, to align the thinking that is applied in the creation of works, and the thinking that is applied in the development and use of concepts, that explicate the passage, experience to concept. In other words, the phenomenon to be explored is cinema, as an object of real experience. At our disposal is a range of tools with which to explore the object: dialogue, sound, shot, narrative, (physical) space, etc. and from this to develop a conceptual account. From the first to the second: we can respond to the sensations that in some way respond to the experience and, at the same time there is also a conceptual account, one that is derived from the practice and that strives for an immanent analysis of the transformation. The onus of the approach however is not on taste, or judgement, in terms of value of a work of art rather, an analysis of the forms as images of cinema and of movement-images, and time-images.

The movement-image

Central to the method is Deleuze's own analysis of the cinema, this provides both a methodological reference for the final analysis here and also an exemplar of how we might approach our subject, a literal theory in practice, in this case: artists 'always' confront their subject directly and through experience. Deleuze begins the first book on cinema with Henri Bergson's theses on movement. As the first gesture towards thinking the cinema this would seem a reasonable place to begin especially in light of what follows; Bergson's theses on movement are given a name: the *cinematographic illusion* (1992, p.1). The first thesis is

14 The (cinematic) progression of experience to subject formation is outlined in Cinema 1, deleuze, G. 1992

developed as follows, 'movement is distinct from the space covered. Space covered is past, movement is present, the act of covering' (p.1). Space is divisible whereas movement is not, you cannot divide movement without somehow changing it qualitatively, 'the spaces covered all belong to a single, identical, homogenous space, while the movements are heterogeneous, irreducible among themselves' (p.1). Movement cannot be 'reconstituted' with 'positions in space or instants in time' but only by stringing positions in space onto the 'abstract idea of a succession, of a time which is mechanical, homogenous, universal and copied from space, identical for all movements' (p.1). Movement so described is always missed and cinema ascribes to its images the movement of the mechanical apparatus. Bergson aligns this mechanism with natural perception because he says, 'We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality, and, as these are characteristics of the reality, we have only to string them on a becoming abstract, uniform and invisible, situated at the back of the apparatus of knowledge…' (p.2). The problem with this formulation is that what the cinema gives us is not 'an image to which movement is added, it immediately gives us a movement-image' (p.2). The reason given for Bergson's 'error' is that at the outset of cinema the camera was fixed, and the shot was therefore largely spatial and immobile. Once emancipated from the fixed position, by montage or the mobile camera, the shot stopped 'being a spatial category and became a temporal one, and the section would no longer be immobile, but mobile' (p.3).

To progress the idea, there are two ways of reconstituting movement from instants or positions, the first is 'an order of *poses* or privileged instants, as in a dance' (p.4) whereas the other is not related to privileged instants (poses) but to any-instant-whatever, 'when one relates movement to any-moment-whatever, one must be capable of thinking the production of the new' (p.7). Bergson develops the thesis further still; the instant is 'an immobile section of movement, but movement is a mobile section of duration, that is, of the Whole, or of a whole', movement given thus expresses 'the change in duration or in the whole' (p.8).

Where does this lead us; firstly, there is a warning, 'wholes', 'must not be confused with *sets*; a set is a relation of parts or are parts and can be divided whereas a whole cannot, a whole is duration and so cannot be divided without qualitative change however, 'sets are in space, and the whole, the wholes are in duration' (p.11). Movement then has two aspects: that which happens between objects and that which expresses a whole, or duration. This leads us to the final formulation:

(1) there are not only instantaneous images, that is, immobile sections of movement;

(2) there are movement-images which are mobile sections of duration;

(3) there are, finally, time-images, that is, duration-images, change-images, relation-images,

volume-images which are beyond movement itself… (p.11)

This negotiation of Bergson's theses sets the ground for the discussion that follows. Firstly, *framing* is the determination of a *closed system*, or *set*, that has certain tendencies, for example towards saturation or rarefaction. The frame as such is 'legible as well as visible'. The frame also acts in relation to chosen coordinates or selected variables, separates or brings things together, determines an out-of-field and an angle of framing or point-of-view. Framing 'is the art of choosing the parts of all kinds which become part of a set' but that in this gesture also 'determines an out-of-field, sometimes in the form of a larger set which extends it, sometimes in the form of a whole into which it is integrated' (p.18). There may be an impulse, to identify framing with mise-en-scène, but the set is more comprehensive than the art of staging.

The shot is determined by cutting, by a start and an end, and the shot determines the movement, which is the relations between parts of the set (frame) and is, 'the mobile section of a whole whose change it expresses' (p.19). The shot, as an abstraction of a duration or whole, a constant becoming, divides, subdivides duration and also reunites divisions within duration and as such can be described as having a consciousness, is a consciousness, a 'camera consciousness'. The shot 'traces a movement' according to 'the elements between which it plays in a set' but also recomposes 'into a great complex indivisible movement according to the whole whose change it expresses' (pp. 20-21).

Lastly, we have montage and camera movement. Montage and camera movement between them constitute the movement-image proper. The fixed shot, associated with tableaux, is defined as an image in movement rather than as a movement-image for a number of reasons, and it is the primitive form of the cinema to which Bergson's theses were directed. The fixed shot is a spatial determination and movement is 'fixed' to objects and characters within the tableau. Enlargements, such as a close-up, of these spatial determinations indicate slices of space in relation to the fixed position. What montage and camera movement do is to act out the *tendency* of the fixed shot, that is, to the movement-image. The shot is therefore characterised by *unity*; there are any number of different examples of types that can constitute the shot: fixed, moving, through depth, by the continuity of connection (between two or more successive shots), through shallowness such that movement takes place on one plane…

Montage is, 'the determination of the whole… by means of continuities, cutting and false continuities' (p.29). Between the start and end of the narrative something has changed, it changes; in drama we refer to the *arc* of a character that denotes change, but more than this, change in the one means change in the whole; this is the qualitative nature of duration. Montage 'bears on the movement-images to release the whole from them, that is, the image *of* time'

(p.29) but this image of time is an indirect image because it 'is deduced from movement-images and their relationships' (p.29).

These are the basic constituents of the movement image, and Deleuze follows this concept by applying it to a host of cases, that represent different schools of film from the early to mid-period of the twentieth century, namely, the American school, the Soviet school, the French school and the German school. These schools coincide with what may be designated as coherent styles or attitudes towards the cinema. The American school, parallel continuity, is characterised by organic composition and a convergence of actions, 'the parts must necessarily act and react on each other in order to show how they simultaneously enter into conflict and threaten the unity of the organic set, and how they overcome the conflict or restore unity' (p.30). The Soviet school is in relation to the American school, of which the Soviet school 'criticises… for having a thoroughly empirical conception of the organism, without a law of genesis or development' (p.32). The American school approached its subject as a collection of parts rather than as a 'unity of production'. The organic composition is maintained in the Soviet school, 'through the development and transcendence of the oppositions' (p.33) but the *dialectical* nature of the organism is operationalized, 'under the dialectical law of the One which divides itself in order to form the new, higher unity' (p.34).

The pre-war French school is concerned with *quantity of movement* and 'built up a vast mechanical composition of movement-images' (p.41). The pre-war French school invents, according to Deleuze, a cinema of the *sublime*, by the way that it presents time as interval and as whole, 'time as variable present and time as immensity of past and future' (p.48). In this, notably in the work of Abel Gance, 'the greatest relative quantity of movement in the content and for the imagination; the whole has become the simultaneous, the measureless, the immense, which reduces imagination to impotence and confronts it with its own limit, giving birth in the spirit to the pure thought of a quantity of absolute movement which expresses its whole history or change, its universe' (p.48).

Expressionism is described as the *non-organic life of things*, that is, a vital spirit in all things and that can 'claim kinship with a pure kinetics' (p.51) and is 'the subordination of the extensive to intensity' (p.51). If the French school is distinguished by the mathematical sublime[15], 'the immense and the powerful' (p.53), then the Expressionist school is distinguished by the dynamic, by the 'measureless and the formless' (p.53). Across the four schools we therefore have an 'organic-active' and 'empiricist' American montage, typified in the work of Griffith; a

15 Kant distinguishes the two types of sublime; see the *Critique of Judgment*

dialectical montage of Soviet cinema, 'either organic or material', typified by the work of Eisenstein; a 'quantitative-psychic' montage of the French school and 'intensive-spiritual' Expressionism that is 'non-organic and non-psychological' (p.55), and of which F.W. Murnau is one of the great exponents.

The movement image and its three varieties have already been discussed in relation to subjectivity. We have already seen how the camera is figured as a form of consciousness. It is the juncture between the actions of a perceptive centre, in the affective centre, that gives rise to the three types of movement-image: the perception image, the action image and the affection image, roughly speaking the long-shot, the mid-shot, and the close-up. From perception to action, around the centre of indetermination (affection), we have a description of the motor-sensory subject. Each of the three varieties are considered in some detail and in terms of their qualities: objective, subjective, mobile-intensive, immobile-reflecting, the milieu and environment… Once established, the remainder of Cinema 1 considers the three varieties in detail and across the variety of their appearance in cinema.

At the conclusion to Cinema 1, Deleuze locates the 'crisis of the movement-image' that roughly coincides with the pre-war and post-war periods. Implicit throughout Cinema 1 is the advent of the post-war period of a cinema of time-images. The movement-image is an indirect image of time because of the way it replicates the motor-action of things, of things one-upon-another, whereas the time image breaks free from this scheme. Characters do not act without seeing themselves act, and we watch them in the act of seeing. Space takes on a new significance, as does time.

The time-image

In James Joyce's *Ulysses*, first published in 1922, the familiar form of the hero journey is subsumed, to critique forms of ancient heroic virtue and Irish nationalism, typified in the myths of Cuchulainn, Joyce wrote, 'Do you not think the search for heroics damn vulgar – and yet how are we to describe Ibsen? ... I am sure however that the whole structure of heroism is, and always was, a damned lie and there cannot be any substitute for the individual passion as the motive power of everything – art and philosophy included' (cited in Kiberd, 1992, x).

The novel eschews 'extreme situations' rather to focus on the banal routines of everyday life. The central character, Leopold Bloom, is a quiet family man, a 'nonentity who had absolutely no hankering to become a somebody…'. The myth of paternity is discredited, the fathers in the story being 'exponents of a boozy bravado and a false masculinity' (1992). Joyce's answer to the questions he poses is a feminized masculinity, Bloom is androgynous. In the opening, Bloom

prepares his wife's breakfast, which she eats in bed whilst he eats his alone, down stairs in the kitchen. Bloom considers throughout what it might be like to be born and live as a woman. Male power is characterized as impotent and challenged by women who, able to exist on their own terms are also able to co-exist with men within a patriarchal culture; male identity is however unable to compensate for its own lack in the same way.

In *Literature and Life* (1997) Deleuze writes of literature, 'Writing is inseparable from becoming: in writing, one becomes-woman, becomes-animal or -vegetable, becomes molecule, to the point of becoming-imperceptible'. In this sense, Joyce/Bloom becomes a nation (a view of a nation), becomes-woman, 'to become is not to attain a form (identification, imitation, Mimesis) but to find the zone of proximity, indiscernibility, or undifferentiation where one can no longer be distinguished from a woman, an animal, or a molecule - neither imprecise nor general unforeseen and non-preexistent, singularized out of a population rather than determined in a form' (p.225). Joyce's view is that a 'feminized' Ireland is the corrective to 'vulgar nationalism'. In this same respect, it is the mechanism that we see in Herman Melville's *Moby Dick* when Captain Ahab *becomes* the whale, that is, not identifies with the animal but can no longer distinguish between them, or when Catherine says, 'I *am* Heathcliff' in Emily Brontë's *Wuthering Heights*; 'A great novelist', Deleuze writes, 'is above all an artist who invents unknown or unrecognized affects and brings them to light as the becoming of his characters…' (1994, p.174). *Becoming* takes place within an assemblage through the relation of the discrete elements of the assemblage to one another, by drawing together, a 'zone of proximity', and in so doing bringing about a new unity. The notion of becoming is central to Deleuze's project, which deactivates the subject 'as an act that brings about a synthesis of things' (Deleuze, 2005b, p.27); becoming is a consequence of time.

Time, 'as cyclical and inseparable from the movement of physical bodies', the period of the planets in relation to cardinal points, is time as rational movement, a concept of time that 'is a mode and not a being. No more than number is a being, it's a mode in relation to what it quantifies, in the same way time is a mode in relation to what it measures' (Deleuze, cited in Voss, 2013, p.195). Time in this classical conception 'allows movement to become rational' (Sommers-Hall, 2011) and in this respect we cannot have a pure conception of time because time is no more than the way something else presents itself. Deleuze turns towards Immanuel Kant as someone who provides a concept of time distinct from a representation of movement and an 'order of succession'.

The modern conception of time is 'purely formal', a pure straight line defined by Kant as a 'form of interiority' that splits the subject in half, between the spontaneous 'I think' and the

empirical self that 'experiences the effect of thought' (Voss, 2013, p.196). Kant demonstrates how time cannot be seen as the expression of an order of things by asserting difference in kind between concepts and perception, and in so doing disjoins time from rational movement and raises the possibility of a 'pure form of time', however. Kant attempts to reconcile concept and intuition with the faculties through the notion of *synthesis*, closely aligned with a notion of judgment, 'the same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of the understanding' (Kant, cited in Sommers-Hall, 2011, p.9). The outcome of this is that time is now a faculty of the subject, 'the difference between being and thought, or matter and form, is *interiorised*' (Voss, 2013, p.197, italics original), however, what Kant achieves is to separate time from the expression of a rational structure. In order to progress the concept of a pure form of time, Deleuze conceives time as a "productive power of synthesis or 'static-synthesis', constituted by the 'cut'." (2013, p. 197) Henry Sommers-Hall identifies this synthesis as 'passive-synthesis', that conceives time 'as capable of exhibiting organization in its own right' (2011).

Daniela Voss provides an account of Deleuze's synthesis as characterized by Friedrich Hölderlin's *Remarks on Oedipus*[16], whilst Sommers-Hall refers us to Baruch Spinoza's conception of substance. The cut or caesura presents us with an order of time, which draws together a before and after, and therefore a totality of time. The cut is a symbolic event typified by the moment that Oedipus abandons and is abandoned by the gods, 'the past is the time before the caesura; the pure present is the becoming equal to the event and the experience of internal difference; the future finally is the time after the caesura' (Voss, 2013, p. 199). Spinoza, for Deleuze, presents the possibility of time as substance capable of synthesis, or to put it differently, time as pure form can resolve succession and coexistence because succession and coexistence are attributes or modes of time; substance in this respect is of the order of an ontology. Deleuze reverses, categorically, the idea that succession and coexistence define time,

> *Time cannot be defined by succession because succession is only a mode of time, coexistence is itself another mode of time. You can see that he* (Kant) *arranged things to make the simple distribution: space-coexistence, and time-succession. Time, he tells us, has three modes: duration or permanence, coexistence and succession. But time cannot be defined by any of the three because you cannot define a thing through its modes.* (Deleuze cited in Sommers-Hall, 2011)

[16] Schmidt, J., Beissner, F., (1969), *Hölderlin Works and letters*, Frankfurt am Main, Insel

Invoking Deleuze's account of Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*, Sommers-Hall identifies, in a similar vein to the caesura experienced by Oedipus, the state in which Zarathustra is not equal to his action, to think the eternal return; the spirit of revenge is set against the serial progression of circumstance and the inability to will backwards, 'in this framework, temporality itself is seen as the ground for resentment, man is not the ground for his own actions (he cannot will backwards), and so he is in this sense alienated from what he is by the structure of temporality' (2011). Likewise, both Oedipus and in Sommers-Hall's account, Hamlet, are unequal to their action, 'they are in the past and live themselves as such so long as they experience the act as too big for them' (Deleuze 2004, p. 112). Hamlet's relation to the world, and to himself, is 'mediated through a time' distinct from the movement of bodies, and experiences his subordination to time: 'the spontaneity of which I am conscious in the "I think" cannot be understood as the attribute of a substantial and spontaneous being, but only as the affection of a passive self which experiences its own thought... being exercised in it and upon it but not by it.' (Deleuze 2004, p.108)

A conception of time therefore is foundational to a conception of the subject, and pure time of becoming, 'Hamlet is the first hero who truly needed time in order to act, whereas earlier heroes were subject to time as the consequence of an original movement (Aeschylus) or aberrant action (Sophocles)' (Deleuze 1998, p.28). Habit and memory are differences in kind analogous to succession in time, and to the order of things. Rather than place any priority of existence between habit and memory or between succession and order, Deleuze posits that all are modes of time. At the point of rupture, cut, or caesura, the subject is ripped from modality, from habit, from memory, and from itself as subject and opens up the possibility of a becoming, 'the eternal return does not only have a destructive and lethal impact, rather it manifests a positive and productive power. It carries the ungrounded and abandoned subject to a point of metamorphosis, when all its possibilities of becoming are set free. It liberates the subject not only from the rule of identity and law, but also from the form of the true and thus bestows it with the power of the false and its artistic, creative potential' (Voss, 2013, p.207).

It is in this sense that Leopold Bloom becomes a nation, becomes a woman; a negation as much as an affirmation. His modality is a consequence not of some subjective formation and psychology against which the world is apprehended but of his *situatedness* (Ming-Qian Ma, 2009), and inability or refusal to act in the face of a past and present situation, of his wife's affair and his own impotence, or acceptance of the state of things, but he is also a becoming, that is, not identical with himself, allowing for all possibilities of becoming. It is only the future that allows the self of the past to be brought into a 'secret coherence' with the present, as action

precisely is this relation of past and present towards a future. Together they provide what Deleuze calls a 'symbol' or 'image' (Deleuze 2004, p.112) of the totality of time. The whole of Ulysses may be read as a meditation on the potential for a nation state. The eternal return, or the empty and pure form of time is that which makes the relation of past and present possible, rather than this relation itself. It is also that which allows us to think an ontology where time is not subordinated to the movement of things, but rather where things emerge from the unfolding of time.

Thus, the ground is set for Deleuze's second treatise on Cinema, *Cinema 2: The Time Image*, which begins with a meditation and critique of André Bazin's neo-realism, 'we are not sure that the problem arises at the level of the real, whether in relation to form or content' (2005, p.1). Deleuze asks the question, "Is it not rather at the level of the 'mental', in terms of thought?". In *Bicycle Thieves: A Re-Reading* (Tomasulo, 1982), the film is cast as 'ideological compromise, rather than a film of revolutionary import'. This view is reached by way of a close reading of the text, and of the representational, rather than the image in its sensational aspect, 'thus, Bicycle Thieves evinces a novelistic/dramatic narrative structuration which relies heavily on the creation of a closed system and character individuation through mimetic and perspectival representation of visual space' (p.5).

Deleuze contests that, what defines neo-realism is a 'build-up of purely optical situations (and sound ones, although there was no synchronized sound at the start of neo-realism), which are fundamentally distinct from the sensory-motor situations of the action image in the old realism' (2005, pp.2-3). Perhaps the significant point of diversion is that Deleuze locates 'objects and settings' within the films as taking on 'an autonomous, material reality which gives them an importance in themselves. It is therefore essential that not only the viewer, but the protagonists invest the settings and the objects with their gaze, that they see and hear the things and the people, in order for action or passion to be born, erupting in a pre-existing daily life' (2005, p.4). This view is not necessarily in contradiction to Frank Tomasulo's observation that, 'the dramatic construction of the film's narrative is modelled on the eleven steps of classical plot development,' or even the objection that the film fails 'to think beyond the level of family melodrama', because the objectives are here in contrast to those of Deleuze.

For Deleuze the film operates on an order of a system of signifiers, opsigns and sonsigns, which refer to 'subjective images' where the characters do not act without seeing themselves act, or 'objective images' that transforms the action into 'displacement of figures in space'. The first of these images provides a vision with depth that tends towards abstraction and the second a close, 'flat-on vision inducing involvement' (2005, p.6). Deleuze characterizes both kinds of

images by a principle of indeterminability, there is no distinction between what is imaginary or real, physical or mental.

We can discern in Tomasulo's critique an equivalent sense of the work, 'A frequently deployed spatial strategy of Bicycle Thieves is the pan or dolly shot which initially constricts or flattens space only to open up or stretch the horizon line into deep background space through camera motility' (1982); that Tomasulo invests the camera with an autonomous function is not insignificant but beyond this the accounts diverge. For Deleuze the consideration is of the order of creation, by way of a system of signs, prior to that of the theorization of narrative themes and representations. The significant transition marked here is from the 'sensory-motor' situations of traditional realism to the 'any-space-whatever' of neo-realism, and a cinema of seeing or, in the form of a journey narrative, a sight-seeing whereby the protagonist is at least one remove from the event-spectacle. The journey narrative is capable of straddling the old and the new, the action–image that describes movement and the new image of the state of things from which action 'erupts', not as in a causality but from a plane of immanence (potential) from which things emerge.

In *Cinema 2* Deleuze provides his most comprehensive critique of the cinema as a language system. Beginning with Metz's question, 'under what conditions should cinema be considered as a language?', we first consider the fact that historically, over time, cinema was constituted as narrative and presenting a story but, in following this development an approximation is made, shots and sequences are assimilated to (oral) utterances. With what 'right' do we make this approximation but by the attribution of determinations that condition utterances of non-verbal language: semiology. Subsequently a semiology of the cinema "applies linguistic models" to images "as constituting one of their principal 'codes'." (2005, p.25)

Narration, it is contested, and as we have previously indicated, is not the result of linguistic determination, but a 'consequence of the visible [*apparent*] images themselves and their direct combinations' (pp. 25/26). Narrative determined as an utterance operates 'through resemblance or analogy' (p.26). In place, *modulation* of movement images counters the codification of analogous signs offered by Metz. Modulation of the movement image (we are referred to Deleuze's first treatise on the cinema) is the images most authentic characteristic. Between a process of *specification*, which is the interval between perception and action, and a process of *differentiation*, the expression of 'a whole which changes, and becomes established between objects' (p.28) is constituted a *signaletic material*, 'which includes all kinds of modulation features, sensory (visual and sound), kinetic, intensive, affective, rhythmic, tonal, and even verbal (oral and written)' (p.28). It is this, described as a 'plastic mass', that is an 'a-signifying', and 'a-syntaxic'

material, and as such it is not formed linguistically but semiotically, aesthetically, and pragmatically (p.28). Semiotics, in contrast to semiology, means that language systems exist in 'reaction to a *non-language-material* that it transforms' (p.28) and why narrative flows from the image or in reaction to it.

We cannot possibly do justice to the whole of what is a complex consideration of the time-image under Deleuze here. From establishing at the outset, a new kind of image, the time-image, and after a 'recapitulation of images and signs' Deleuze progresses the analysis towards a taxonomy of its forms. We begin with the recollection image (flash-back), which corresponds with the perception image, developed from an account of pure recollection, past and memory as circuits: the past is a place (plane or sheet) into which we situate ourselves, rather than a remembering, of a specific point in time. Dream operates in the same way but here the virtual recollection image is not realised in a perception but becomes actualised in a further, virtual, recollection image and constitutes itself a kind of circuit, we can see this in sequences where objects from one scene become features in other scenes, for example, a cigarette becomes a chimney, or the columns of a Greek temple.

The crystal image is, as the name might suggest, an image which is faceted and where the distinction between real and unreal is dissolved; the example of the hall of mirrors is given, in which a protagonist finds him or herself, unable to distinguish whether what she sees is a reflection, a reflection of a reflection, and so forth, or the thing itself. The crystal image is the opposite tendency to the dream or recollection, rather than ever expanding circuits of recollection there is the smallest possible circuit, between the image and its simultaneous virtuality, the present passing. There is an actual and a virtual image that operate around a point of indiscernibility, they are actual and virtual at the same time. An example of the crystal image can be seen in the films of Krzysztof Zanussi (*The Structure of Crystal*, 1969), or Tarkovsky (*Mirror*, 1975), and in the films of Orson Welles (the famous mirror scene at the end of *Lady from Shanghai*, 1947) and is present in films where for example an actor plays a part such that we can no longer distinguish between which is the part and which is the actor (Kon Ichikawa's *An Actor's Revenge*, 1967). In the case of Zanussi, it is the image of the two friends that becomes almost indistinguishable, their alternative occupations, and (self) doubts.

'Peaks of present' and 'sheets of past', typified in films such as *Last Year at Marienbad* (Resnais, 1961), or in *Citizen Kane* (Welles, 1941), distinguish two kinds of time image revealed by the crystal image and the passing of presents or, time divided in two, from the presents that are passing, to the present which preserves the past (recollection). The present exists 'only as an infinitely contracted past which is constituted at the extreme point of the already-there'

(p.96) and the past exists like regions that coexist from the vantage point of the present. It is therefore that time-images extend themselves into *lectosigns* and *noosigns*: sense, as it is the past of language and idea as the past of thought, in the way that the image of sentences, the word, is pre-formed in sense, or similarly with the idea.

Between the first and second treatise on the cinema that Deleuze gives us then, we have an application of philosophical *immanence* to the understanding of a phenomena. The cinematic image is movement-image and time-image. The movement-image is exactly that, not an image of movement but the image *in* movement. The time image is equally precise, not an image *of* time but an image *in* time: past, present and future manifest by times division into itself, of presents passing, of the caesura or cut (in time), and therefore the creative capacity for becoming, of becoming. This is the plural of *Bicycle Thieve*s, two bikes are stolen, one at the outset and the other at the films end, when, 'erupting' from daily existence and experience, the protagonist himself attempts to steal a bicycle. It is the irony of *Ulysses*, as the name under which Leopold Bloom capitulates to the heroism of adventure; at the end of the novel he is, of course, reunited with his wife. It is the two senses of 'Last' in *Last Year at Marienbad*, a recollection of a time before, and a condition of the present, and that prefigure the future. If we are with these characters on their journeys it is, Deleuze would say, a consequence of the image as much as through a process of identification.

Logic of Sensation

A brief consideration of Deleuze's Logic of Sensation will hopefully suffice to complete the context for the methodological approach. Immanence is the character of being and experience and the sensation is the expression of this. Philosophers think in concepts, artists think in sensations or blocks of sensation. The method progresses from the cinematic to the gallery and some consideration of artistic practice of this kind, under the approach being applied is relevant. Between the 'aesthetics' of the cinema and Deleuze's approach to painting we have a description of what we will call the 'structure' of consciousness and thought. The painter deals most directly with sensations: blocks of colour. In the forward to the edition, *The Logic of Sensation*, (Deleuze, 2003) there is the note, that any order in the presentation of the discussion is relative, 'and is valid only from the viewpoint of a general logic of sensation. All these aspects, of course, coexist in reality. They converge in color, in the "coloring sensation," which is the summit of this logic. Each aspect could serve as the theme of a particular sequence in the history of painting' (Deleuze, 2003). The 'generalisable' nature then of the logic can be ascribed to the view that, 'spectacles of horror, crucifixions, prostheses, and mutilations, monsters' are

'facile detours' in a consideration of the work of Francis Bacon, who is not directly interested in representations of violence but 'the violence of a sensation' (preface, 2003).

There are two primary pictorial concerns for Bacon, that of the flesh, the 'invisible forces that model flesh or shake it', and fields of colour within, against, or on which bodies are to be located, or one to the other from which they 'draw life'. In Bacon, 'It is the confrontation of the Figure and the field, their solitary wrestling in a shallow depth, that rips the painting away from all narrative but also from all symbolization' (ibid). This is painting that is concerned with means, rather than ends, specifically. The questions concern how we might express the figure and the field without one becoming or merging with the other. We find the same questions being asked of painting when we look at, for example, a Vincent Van Gogh or Paul Cézanne, and also in the work by Paul Gauguin. A tendency, of recent history, has been to devoid the painting of the figure and to focus solely on the field (fig.1). Bacon can be seen to pursue the problem. It is perhaps a useful interjection to consider how Buren 'expands' the preoccupation with field, beyond the two dimensions of the canvas and to project this into the physical space of the gallery, or conversely, to reduce physical space to those of the dimensions of a painting. This is not the same as for historical fresco painting as we will later see.

Fig.1 ***Blue Over Red,*** **Rothko, 1953**

Deleuze identifies Bacon's desire to avoid reintroducing story and narrative into painting, whilst insisting on putting (for the most part) one or more figures into a single painting. To begin with we have the field, the paintings being composed 'like a circus ring, a kind of amphitheatre as "place".' (p.1) The manoeuvre is to isolate the figure in some way and there are different strategies for this, placed inside a cube, on a bed or chair, within a circle, hanging from a wire. The operation is to 'frame', that is, to provide a place for the figure and so the field can be seen to operate deictically, through deixis, 'this', or 'that'. In this way then 'the Figure becomes an image, an Icon' (p.2).

Deleuze uses Lyotard's *figural* to locate the procedure, although there is some resonance between deixis and figure in this respect. Figural is employed by Lyotard to oppose the 'figurative'. The Figure or figural is outside of language but can be linked by its operation, like

deixis, to the pointing finger, 'that', or 'this' and connected to language by its expressiveness[17]. The reason, to isolate the Figure (adopting the distinction from 'figure') is to 'avoid the figurative, illustrative, and narrative character the Figure would necessarily have if it were not isolated.' (p.2) This is a question of 'pure' painting where reference to the 'real' is not a concern. On the one hand painting can progress towards abstraction and on the other, 'toward the purely figural, through extraction or isolation' (p.2).

There is then an inverse relationship between the framing of the Figure and narrative, and one that has particular relevance to our exploration if we take the literal frame as a potentially figural gesture, specifically within the gallery, and of the potential relationship of one frame to another as 'a composite whole which assigns a specific object to each of them. Narration is the correlate of illustration. A story always slips into, or tends to slip into, the space between two figures in order to animate the illustrated whole. Isolation is thus the simplest means, necessary though not sufficient, to break with representation, to disrupt narration, to escape illustration, to liberate the Figure: to stick to the fact' (pp.2/3). In the first instance though, in the presentation of the logic of sensation, is the field and its relation to the Figure. The defining characteristic is that which situates both these terms 'on a single plane', and that 'encloses space, which constitutes an absolutely closed and revolving space' (p.6).

Deleuze tells us that, in Bacon's painting, the Figure is wrapped in a contortion that relates it to the structure; the structure is constituted by the fields as the space for the Figure. There are then three components to the paintings, the field, place or arena, the structure composed by a number of fields (blocks of colour), and the Figure. The 'contour' is a 'place' where there is an exchange between the structure and the Figure, which helps define the functioning of the painting. There are different 'athleticisms' that the Figure, or body, undergoes to attempt its aims. The spasm is the *event* of the body moving from within itself and that attempts to exclude the spectator (attendant), and therefore to confine itself; there are 'attendants' in many of Bacon's paintings that serve some function. The attendant is a *waiting* element of the Figure distinct from a spectator, as will be shown later in the discussion on the triptych. This is the body attempting to escape itself. Another way, athleticism, that the body achieves is to attempt to pass through the contour of the structure that surrounds it, in order 'to dissipate' into that same material structure. The 'prostheses-instruments', a sink, drain, toilet, umbrella, constitute the passage with which the body attempts its escape from itself into the structure and field.

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[17] See Lyotard, J. -F., English trans., (2019), *Discourse, Figur*e, University of Minnesota Press; originally published, (1972) Discours, Figure, Paris: Klincksieck

The deformations of the body are also '*animal traits*' (p.21), we are in familiar territory here; Deleuze does not speak of the animal as a form but of a 'spirit', the paintings constituting a 'zone of indiscernability' between the two, between 'man and animal' (p.21). Although not directly allied with time in this case, this is an act of *becoming*. It is meat that is the 'common zone' between man and beast,

> *I've always been very moved by pictures about slaughterhouses and meat, and to me they belong very much to the whole thing of the Crucifixion . . . Of course, we are meat, we are potential carcasses. If I go into a butcher shop I always think it's surprising that I wasn't there instead of the animal.* (Bacon, cited in Deluze, 2003, p.24)

There are often more than one Figure within the same painting, but figuration is avoided when two Figures 'spring' from the same *fact*. In this case there is not a relation between Figures, and therefor illustrative or narrational, but 'the question thus concerns the possibility that there may exist relations between simultaneous Figures that are non-illustrative and non-narrative (and not even logical), and which could be called, precisely, "matters of fact." Such is indeed the case here, where the coupling of sensations from different levels creates the coupled Figure (and not the reverse). What is painted is the sensation' (pp.65 - 66). In this respect, in an image such as *Three Studies of Figures on Beds* (Fig.2) we see the central panel contains a compound, or coupling, of sensation that creates the single coupled Figure, 'there is one Figure common to two bodies, or one "fact" common to two Figures, without the slightest story being narrated' (p.66).

Fig.2 ***Three Studies of Figures on Beds,*** **Francis Bacon, 1972**

Referring to John Russel's invocation of Marcel Proust and involuntary memory[18] Deleuze considers Bacon's refusal of 'the double way of a figurative painting and an abstract painting'

[18] See John Russell, Francis Bacon, rev. ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 121

(p.67). Proust, according to Deleuze did not want 'an abstract literature that was too voluntary (philosophy), any more than he wanted a figurative, illustrative, or narrative literature that merely told a story. What he was striving for, what he wanted to bring to light, was a kind of Figure, torn away from figuration and stripped of every figurative function: a Figure-in-itself' (p.67). Involuntary memory operated by coupling together, 'two sensations that existed at different levels of the body, and that seized each other like two wrestlers, the present sensation and the past sensation, in order to make something appear that was irreducible to either of them, irreducible to the past as well as to the present: this Figure' (p.67).

According to Deleuze, in the Logic of Sensation, we have sensations, couplings of sensation (resonance) or Figures and we also have rhythms. In Bacon's triptych's the 'relationship must be neither narrative nor logical. The triptych does not imply a progression, and it does not tell a story' (p.69). What it does do is set up rhythms between the elements, 'first, an "active" rhythm, with an increasing variation or amplification; then a "passive" rhythm, with a decreasing variation or elimination; and finally, the "attendant" rhythm. Rhythm would cease to be attached to and dependent on a Figure: *it is rhythm itself that would become the Figure, that would constitute the Figure*' (p.71; italics original).

The painted sensation in Bacon is 'essentially rhythm', the triptych 'would be the distribution of the three basic rhythms. There is a circular organization in the triptych, rather than a linear one' (p.72). We find that rhythm exists in simple sensations or single figures as a 'vibration' that moves the sensation, in the coupled figures or sensations rhythm is 'liberated' because it 'unites the diverse levels of different sensations' and is therefore 'resonance'; in the triptych, 'rhythm takes on an extraordinary amplitude in a forced movement which gives it an autonomy, and produces in us the impression of time: the limits of sensation are broken, exceeded in all directions' (p.73).

Deleuze asks the question, 'is there an order in the triptychs, and does this order consist in distributing the three fundamental rhythms, one of which would be the attendant or the measure of the two others?' (p.74). The visible attendant, which may be a figure, a camera or photographer, such as in the right-hand panel in fig.3, an observer such as that in the left-hand panel of fig.3, the two observers in the left-hand panel of fig.4, and so on, necessary for the variation rhythm, follows the horizontal.

Fig.3 *Studies from the Human Body*, Francis Bacon, 1970



Fig.4 *Three Studies for a Crucifixion*, Francis Bacon, 1962

The horizontal is presented in a smile of a figure, in sleeping bodies, in a movement between figures, one that does not necessarily move in one or the other direction but is between, there are any number of instances of such horizontality. The attendant function is imposed upon such figures but 'it abandons them to affect more profoundly a rhythm that has itself become a character, a retrogradable rhythm or an attendant-witness following the horizontal' (p. 76).

In fig.4 we see the two figures of the left-hand panel, both facing to the right. One seems to plant his hand in the hollow of his lower back as if to support his own weight, whilst the other seems to almost spring upward, feet, legs and arms rising. In this respect, rhythmic attendants can be *active* or *passive*: the visible attendants such as the photographer in the right-hand panel in fig.3 'are on the verge of springing up or falling down' (p.77).

A further element of complexity concerns these two other rhythms, active and passive; in

some instances it is simply a matter of a descending-rising opposition, in others a contraction-expansion, or a flow, in fig.3 this may be seen in the vertical and upward force of the figure rising from shadow on the left in opposition to the downward force of the figure on the right, that appears to dissolve and run off the edge of the canvas.

Deleuze summarizes the 'laws' of the triptych (Bacon's) 'whose necessity is grounded in the coexistence of the three panels',

(1) The distinction between the three rhythms or the three rhythmic Figures;
(2) The existence of an attendant-rhythm, along with the circulation of this attendant throughout the painting (visible attendant and rhythmic attendant);
(3) The determination of an active rhythm and a passive rhythm, with all the variations that depend on the character chosen to represent the active rhythm.

In a final consideration of movement, Deleuze identifies a third kind, beyond horizontal and vertical, there is also the relationship of the figures to the ground, or field in which they are unified, 'if the unity of light or color immediately incorporates the relationships between the Figures and the field, the result is that the Figures also attain their maximum separation in light and color: a force of separation or division sweeps over them, very different from the preceding force of isolation' (2003).

Bacon's painting then, and implicitly through the method of analysis much of the history of painting, contends with the creation of sensations, with colour and light. The questions posed by Cézanne, Van Gogh, the Impressionists, Symbolists and Fauves, of those prior to and since, and with different emphasis, contend with their subject and its expression. This is of course not limited to painting but in painting the artist arguably has the most control and means for intervention, compared to, for example, cinema, when dealing with the pictorial. Deleuze concludes that beyond light and colour, exemplified in the triptych, but present nonetheless across the entirety of Bacon's oeuvre, is rhythm, and that this is the essence of all painting, 'Rhythms are the only characters, the only figures' (2003). In this way then, Bacon effects a relationship between painting and music.

All art may be construed as belonging to ways of thinking; for Deleuze, all forms of art are seen as phenomena with which to generate (philosophical) concepts but he also identifies arts practise as a mode of thought. Deleuze insists that we must be forced to think, and gallery film and video installation is afforded something of its status as analytical because of its destabilising aesthetic. The reimagining of the cinematic in the context of the cultural space of the gallery intervenes in the form of cinematic presentation. This holds true potentially as much for the practitioner as for the viewer; the artist engaging with the cinematic confronts a subject with

different materials. The aesthetic of confusion and the disorienting effect of the installed media object, the potential of the frame as deixis, the figural, a pointing finger, and the work that must be done in the adaptation of the cinematic is itself a form of défilement – these characteristics afford the gallery film or video installation its expressive means.

The critical approaches taken are guided by an Aesthetics of cinema and critique the idea of the museum as a site of shifting 'practices that define (its) place' (McCarthy 2001), object/subject positioning in relation to screen 'representations', with a realignment of narrative as images of duration, movement, and time. The objective here then is to develop gallery film and video practice that expresses something about narrative cinema, or perhaps more precisely, considers a particular kind of image with respect to arts practice, site and mode of spectatorship. Informed by a Deleuzian philosophical project, one which does not necessarily seek to locate some meaning in a given work of literature, art, or film but to consider the creative gestures, movements and developments of works in their productive capacities. The *genetic* principles of the work are its principles of composition and are addressed by minor questions: Which one? Where? When? How many? How? In which case? From which viewpoint? Etc. The research as such is not concerned with interpretations and meaning, this is not hermeneutics, but the outcomes are viewed on one level as 'matter of fact', in itself and of itself, the outcome of a process of engagement that will be described and through which a position reached. An immanent analysis of the outcomes is finally applied to reach necessary conclusions. In the process, the practicalities of techniques, and the usefulness of the method, to ally production practices with studio practice, will be evaluated. A commentary on the process, alongside practice elements presented here, allied to the commitment that practice can contribute to the generation of knowledge through the reconfigurations, ruptures, and events, of the reimagining of cinematic form in gallery film and video installation, considers the situation under which it possible to make new work and provide an insight on cinema.

Method

The questions, addressed by the research, and that place the idea of medium specificity under scrutiny once more, stem from a proposition that unifies aesthetics, with modes of expression, and with functionality, that amounts to a *folding* of the thing back upon itself: an aesthetics of aesthetics. This is not a simple doubling of the thing, holding of a mirror, this implies some direction, from one discrete entity to another, that is its double. The proposition is that this folding operation, across the field of expression, signals an event through which we

develop understanding. In more straightforward terms, rather than simply adding space to the cinematic, space is already part of an expressive material of which the cinematic image also forms a part. We take points from the same field and bring them together, in so doing, we develop understanding through the imaginative leaps necessary. To put this in Deleuzian terms, this is a *becoming* cinema, finding that zone of proximity between the fine arts and the cinematic arts.

There is an issue with the proposed endeavour, which can be described this way: a production process has limit factors determined by the objective, the creation of a film, that of the rectangular frame, duration, and the demands of story (prose narrative, character and plot). In an industrial context we could add to this, audience and budget. Within this form then, the combinations are limitless, or as good as, but nonetheless, we know what container requires filling from the outset. We can apply the same thinking to the duration of a film, which although undetermined can be specified from the start and usually conforms to expectations. It is the nature of the method here, to subject this process to an open, studio practice, which has the inverse objective, to remove the limit factors, problematise the container, and then subject a process to an open-ended exploration. If the container, or limit factors, are completely unknown or unspecified then we have a problem of a different order: we are potentially in the realms of unfettered creation but for there to be a useful exploration there must be some constant here, and for the method to bear any fruits; this is first constituted by the framework and question.

We start with a creative 'problem' so ultimately this is a problem-solving exercise. We can propose solutions and test those solutions however, rather than solutions to real world problems or scientific functions, the outcomes are to develop creative strategies and hypothesis with which to refine the problem or develop further problems and solutions, to refine techniques, seek out new forms, and in the process challenging certain received theoretical approaches i.e. critique what has gone before. In many respects, this is recognisable as studio practice where the emphasis is placed on the intermediate outcomes, reflections and movements ('development') in an open-ended exploration, but the question on which this exploration is founded is one that indicates a generalisable set of conclusions: thoughts on medium specificity, and mechanisms or approaches to art theory and practice.

The exercise can therefore be described as a process of determination through creative exploration and experimentation (trial and error) or otherwise, research *through* studio practice, or practice *led* research. As it is, the outcomes of studio practice therefore provide the necessary case studies on which an analysis can be made, conclusions reached, and further

exploration developed either directly, in a linear fashion, or more obliquely depending on the outcomes at each stage of the exploration. The criteria against which the outcomes of the exploration must be judged are established: the work must be specific to the gallery, or equivalent space, the work must attempt to engage with a *mod*e of spectatorship, that is, the *intermittent* spectator, lastly the work must engage with the cinematic experience, guided significantly in this case by Deleuze's own imminent analysis of the cinema with some recourse to his analysis of painting.

Practice is further defined by the two fields of operation with which the question concerns itself. We have on the one hand a studio practice and on the other film production. These are two seemingly incompatible arenas of practice because film production implies a singular process, albeit one with many aspects to it: an idea is *developed*, largely in the form of a screenplay, possibly based upon an existing story, the screenplay designates thereafter an activity and acts like a set of instructions, providing the necessary 'ingredients' (cast, locations, props, costume) and procedures (stage instruction, and dialogue). There is arguably a storytelling craft applied: writing for screens, as the often-repeated adage goes, is about showing, not telling. This holds true for all drama, is the essence of 'act', although the film image makes a specific demand of the writer in this respect.

Images, as Deleuze tells us, are compound sensations, and prior to any writing is experience. Themes, or 'controlling ideas' of film works are formulated from experience although may simply be repetitions of existing ideas, as such may figure beliefs and cliché. The screenwriter and author of *Story*, a guide to the craft of writing for film, Robert McKee (1997), asserts that themes represent human values and explain how and why life undergoes change. In this respect theme is equated to *the idea* and the film thereafter little more than its (idea's) exposition. Of course, how the writer moves from beginning to end cannot be so simply dismissed. It is also the case that this formulation is an outcome of the second and third moments of Deleuze's material subjectivity, that is, the incurving of the world around a special perceptive centre and the potential to action that this implies, followed by action/response; there are examples of films that do not follow this dictum and there are other values that the film image can give us besides purely human values, such as intensity and saturation. Dziga Vertov gives one example where the camera rather than subject is a special decentred perception in *Man with a Movie Camera* (1929), a 'day in the life of…' however. Human values may be linked to feelings, goals, standards, priorities, and defined by amongst other things, achievement, power, security and conformity (Schwartz, 2012). Human values represent 'what is important to us in our lives' (2012) and as such imply a certain judgement or evaluation and a moral dimension; the story

form as genealogy may be seen as self-identical with a moral position. For classical cinema, the triad of perception-affection-action can be summed up as the choices a character makes, especially under pressure, that give rise to situations (time is a consequence of action or movement); the form is situation to action, to new situation (the large form of the action image) or action to situation, to new action (the small form). These moments would mark singular moments, or events, where a character will move from one state to another. These qualitative leaps ('catastrophes') in their most fundamental formulation present change, of the state of things within the set, if not shown then implied, or given circumstances, and relations of objects that constitute the (fictional) world laid out from the start of the narrative. It is sufficient in this respect for a single qualitative change to figure an image of movement or an indirect image of time.

'Choices' made by characters are indicative *of character* and so are given as originating from a transcendental subject. Choices may also be viewed as manifestations, of singularities from a field or plane of immanence. The screenwriter's role, according to McKee, is to make these choices appear as inevitable (1997). In many instances this may be more straight forward than an appeal to craft makes apparent: the repetition of habituated responses to situations, for bodies to move closer or further apart as a consequence of their action on one another, for there to be violence (conflict), or submission (resolution), each with many inflections and 'strategies', this is the nature of (story) change. The idea of a 'strategy' is aligned with motive force, and therefore value, the 'will' of the transcendental subject often described as the 'want' of the character, that may be psychoanalytic in its determination, but that allocates to characters a memory, mind (centre of *indetermination*) and body (disposition) as potential action. When a character seemingly exceeds their potential within any situation, either succumbing to, or triumphing over that situation, this carries with it a moral aspect. Values though are not restricted to one kind or another but are experienced through movement. The question remains, *how* movement takes place by changes (modulation) in value.

The screenwriters craft always makes an appeal to the image indirectly and by way of story event, character and plot. Of course, there are more than one type of story, for example, the fable, tragedy, biography, etc. The event of a story is not the same as that for the image or sensation, we saw this in the analysis of the case, of Bacon's painting, and the violence of sensation, rather than that of the represented. Narration, according to Deleuze, is determined by *how* not what the image shows. A theme then is the accumulation of objects, and perhaps implied qualities, that will act one upon the other, the outcomes of which *figure* change and the nature of which implies, on the one hand a moral dimension (bodies in action) and on the

other is, *in its completion*, an image of movement or time. The difference that exists between the screenwriters craft as described by McKee and a view of cinema expounded by Deleuze can be summarised by the observation that narration 'flows' from the images, in the way that poverty can be opposed to wealth in a binary structure (parallel continuity) or can be aligned with wealth in a dialectical relationship (montage). The question is how the images constitute narrative and that in this respect, the screenwriters craft, story writing, can never be more than an approximation of the film and narration. This is a distinct view that also distinguishes Deleuze from, for example, Gidal and similarly oriented analysis.

The film production process then begins with a script, that designates an activity, production. Once the locations have been identified, cast assembled and so forth, these resources are marshalled together, and the filming undertaken. In reality the process may be operationalised in phases or discrete stages depending, but largely speaking is contained within a period of 'principal shooting' that accrues all the necessary material with which to edit. The whole process can be summarised by the three main phases then of pre-production, production, and post-production. At each stage there are distinct tasks and craft skills in operation, one stage feeding into the subsequent stages, and in which respect the activity can be seen as a whole. It is only by proceeding through all the stages that the film work may be seen to have been completed, whilst there are various opportunities and qualitatively different activities distributed across the process. The craft of the screen writer is distinguished from that of the cinematographer, costume designer, art director, production designer, sound designer, and editor. This is qualitatively a very different procedure from the processes of artist studio practice – the image of the lone painter or sculptor 'wrestling' with their material (not necessarily always an accurate image). These two distinct processes must therefore be made to communicate with one another in a profitable fashion.

There are specific advantages to composing an 'original' film, rather than to work with existing film footage, when approaching the research question. In the most straightforward way, existing films are already the outcome of a process and the available material to work with may represent only a tenth of the originally shot footage; edges of shots have been trimmed; shots omitted; sound may be less problematic because this at least can be stripped from the image but thereafter requires reconstruction or creating anew. Inevitably then, there is either a situation where the constriction of working with the existing film footage is accepted or the task of creating, from the ground up, new films that may reflect on existing films can be considered as an alternative strategy.

Approaching existing films may contribute insight into individual cases, although there is some insistence that any viewer is also familiar with the original film. An example of this might be gleaned from Douglas Gordon's *24 Hour Psycho* (1993) or Christian Marclay's *The Clock* (2010), both of which relate a specific conception of time to film. In Gordon's piece, Hitchcock's *Psycho* (1960) is projected on a screen but slowed down so that the length of the film is distributed across 24 hours. Marclay painstakingly collected images of clocks from different films, images that accounted for every minute of the day; these images were strung together in sequence to make a clock. The film plays on a loop and, when displayed, is synchronised with local time so that as you enter the gallery the time on the film is the same, also as you would see on a personal wristwatch or phone. In both of these examples there is an appropriation or détournement of cinema that offer concepts. The necessity of the appropriation aligns the concept with cinema in each case. In both instances the so-called illusionism of space is flattened, in much the same way that Krauss indicates in her critique of Richard Serra's *Hand Catching Lead*, that is by imposing a uniform and homogenous time across space. From this respect neither *directly* engage with the cinematic.

A risk associated with appropriating existing cinematic images, in the way outlined for example, is that of repeating a formulation, of isolating the instances of form as they have already appeared in existing films: duplication rather than analysis. What both Marclay and Gordon demonstrate is that the creative gesture has a critical potential; both draw attention to the temporal facet of cinema in relation to cosmic time. What is necessary is that this critical potential is applied directly to an analysis of the cinematic. In place of détournement, which serves alternative ends, the act of original creation can progress an analytical view, to employ 'moving images to engage and critique themselves' (Faden, 2008) and direct focus on the genesis of their composition.

It is important nonetheless to approach in the first place existing 'texts' in order to begin the necessary work and to thereafter reflect on the simple assertion, that gallery screen-based interventions have some leverage when it comes to developing film analysis. To some degree this has already been established but the first stage of the research therefore begins with viewing. It is difficult to imagine an immanent analysis of the cinema without starting with experience of the cinematic, to consider the kinds of story and examples of films from which we can begin to fashion a response. It is also useful to respond to the potential for work of this nature to 'reveal the labour' (Faden, 2008) of its own construction, and that in this a more direct creative exercise is necessary: we can consider the outcome of a directors work but not the process of creation, in terms of the thinking, without documenting this process in some way

so, some form of film development will be undertaken thereafter as an integral part of the research.

The first stage of the research will necessarily involve a gathering exercise, in the form of a collection, of resources, images, and narrative beginnings. These initial stages of production are characterised by an expansion of material with which to begin to fashion form. The material is invested of potential, of its resonance with itself and with the established framework. At this initial point, the gathering exercise is a means to establish some foundational approaches, elemental substances and nascent images, from which to extract, or condense into a unified form. A 'sketchbook' approach is to be adopted, and that coincides with the ideas presented about collections at the outset of the report. Alongside film viewings, visual stimulus (images) will be collected, using readily accessible technology, and with which to begin working through ideas. J. Ronald Green, (2000) sets out a relationship between the techniques of writing, installation, collection, collage and montage, whilst Raymond Lucas (2014) formulates the sketchbook as a collection, by analogy to the museum and the process of curating, 'There is an interesting parallel which can be drawn between the sketchbook and the museum, both of which can be understood explicitly as activities, as practices of collecting' (Lucas, 2014). The sketchbook can be thus characterised as itself a form of installation, collage and montage, and in line with the 'Derridean notion of écriture— understood as a "theoretical hypothesis" which replaces the notion of sign with that of "trace," referring processes of signification back to a differential movement whose terms are unassignable and unfixable' (Stam, 1992).[19]

Following on from the collection of material, this will then be organised, refined, elements rejected or retained, and evaluated; the judgement here is based upon the potential of each element individually and collectively to coalesce with other elements and with the overall research objectives, for example, an image's potential use in a film. The process of gathering, selecting, grouping, rejecting, organising and refining will go through a number of cycles until the basic constituents of the film(s) is arrived at. This is considered part of the 'writing' of the film(s) and has relevance to narrative.

Subsequently, the first forays into providing an analysis of the work under consideration will be made both in terms of developing a gallery film based upon existing texts (the term is used reservedly) and to develop an original film script proper. It will be necessary to follow something of a conventional script development process: visual 'clues' may be taken as suggestive of possible characters and plot development. Eventually, once characters have

[19] The use of the term trace here is distinct from that referred to by Deleuze

materialised, scenes will be developed and written, also with reference to received approaches to developing story (e.g. McKee, 1997; Field, 1984; Mamet, 1982), to develop an initial plan of activity. The subject matter and themes for the works are to be derived at from reflection on experience, films, from the literature that is informing the research, and from the sketchbook elements, for instance, daily encounters with a place as a site of visual encounter that offers material to be recorded in moving images, events scoured and divested of their potential for appropriation to visual (re) construction. The outcome of this phase, a treatment, and script is to be the 'road-map' for the work to follow. What is present throughout is a mindfulness of the aesthetic capacities of the form of production, towards specific images that evolve, and narrative development, and of the consideration of screens within a gallery setting, their configuration, scale, and how one impacts upon the other, in order to address the central research questions. There is a determination demonstrated in the methodology that the various strategies of the different schools of filmmaking, of different films, pursue specific lines of enquiry, of thought, and that determines film form, and this is reflected here in the method.

Subsequent stages of the production, that is, in the designation or development of cinematic images represents the problem in its most acute form. The story and existing narrative(s) will be considered as the basis for practical exploration, to begin to consider the ways in which these can issue from images and with respect to gallery presentation. To these ends, the sketchbook model outlined, will be applied to a storyboard, as the central method for the visualisation of the scripted elements (see appendix). Conventionally, the storyboard is a useful means for the script to be translated into images and to plan how sequences will be shot (covered). The storyboard facilitates production in a variety of ways not least as a means for the director to begin the process of translation, and to plan complex visual staging, and communicate these ideas. Applying the notion of a sketchbook to that of the storyboard, it will be feasible to not only plan for a production but consider numerous alternative approaches, work through ideas and collect these ideas. Therefore, the storyboard will feature as a significant tool for developing alternative strategies that address the questions.

Moving forward, the production proper will be undertaken: locations scouted, cast and crew resourced where necessary, consent and release forms obtained, risk assessment finalised, and all the necessary logistical requirements including transport, equipment hire, props, set dressing and costume, prior to principal shooting on location or set commences. The production will be executed, and the necessary footage obtained. Once the principal shooting has been completed, it will be necessary to consider the work in post-production and within an 'artist studio' setting both, as part of an editorial process where the material will be edited into visual

sequences for single or multi-channel display. It will be necessary during this editorial process to reconsider the work, as it exists on individual screens and across the multiple screens of installation and will entail a 'unique' editing scenario from this perspective; this represents the final stage of the practical exploration.

At each stage of the method, the analytic determination of the work is imminent i.e. the negotiation of approaches associated with the cinematic such as point-of-view, continuity, time, movement and progression, narrative, frame, shot, light and shadow (lighting), performance, depth-of-field, montage, etc. in relation to approaches associated with the art object (painting, sculpture): frame, colour, form, and in relation to the museum or gallery, which also include collection, display, curation, space, lighting, and alongside those outlined. The final analysis will need to, where relevant, reflect on the work throughout the various stages outlined and provide an aesthetic account, in the terms given, of the work completed.

Process and outcomes

Fig.5

Thinking Space, Ellis, 2021

Thinking Space (Ellis, 2021, fig.5) is a 'work-in-progress' three-channel gallery film, the form of which was arrived at after a number of permutations were considered and explored on paper, (see appendix), and practically, in the form of short video clips, and thereafter in production and post-production. The film was constructed over a period of time, and over that time the film was envisaged as a single channel film, as a two-channel film with parallel panels, with three parallel panels, two and three adjacent panels, distributed across many screens, and finally, as a five-channel installation consisting of two adjacent screens, flat to a wall, with a single screen on the facing wall, and a further two screens, at right-angles to one another and in the corner, so that together the arrangement of the screens was constituted by a rectangular space. In the final production only three channels, two adjacent screens with one facing, exists, 'When there is no more money left, the film will be finished' (Fellini, cited in Deleuze, 2005, p.75).

A 'conventional' script for *Thinking* Space was developed initially (see appendix). Although the development of the script was responsive to the ideas being explored through practice and according to the method, principally at the outset with respect to a concerted viewing of cinematic production (films), it also nonetheless constituted a necessary component of a production process. It became apparent as the exploration continued that one cannot be completely divorced of the other, although this is not a surprising conclusion. Certain key adjustments to the script were made along the way, not so much in terms of the events of a story, but rather to consider how these events were to be constructed thereafter, the decisions of which stemmed from reflection on the 'film' and the demands of the research. The script in this respect did not determine the film but rather, as will be discussed in more detail, was a necessary organising document that responded to a developing image; the plan builds as the film builds. It is perfectly feasible at this time to imagine that there exist a number of (gallery)

films, all the different permutations, and that from each we arrive at a different narrative. *Thinking Space* as such is as much a *process*, of a number of determinations of solutions to a problem, an experimental process, and studio practice.

What is essential to characterise here is that we begin with nothing beyond a question and a context for this question. It is only this that designates an objective, and this has already been described: there are no limit factors other than this prior to the exploration, first it is necessary to formulate the question in practice terms. We have projection and we have the camera, these are our fundamental tools with which to begin to fashion ideas. We also have some nominal notion of physical space. Some care must be taken here to restate what we mean in this respect by an idea – we are not producing concepts in practice but expressions (sensations), which are nonetheless thoughts: What considerations are necessary when adapting the cinematic for the gallery, and how does the operation have something to say about cinema.

Prior to any practice, we have our subject, the cinematic. Clearly any encompassing consideration of the subject is a large undertaking so there will inevitably be some degree of selection. From the general to the specific then, some account of the 'grounded' is required. There is a methodological issue here: a strictly conceptual account of the cinematic is not the objective of the research, and we do not proceed from the conceptual to practice, but from experience to practice. Moreover, the scale of the undertaking is itself problematic, at the very least to simply account for the activity. There is a question also about the focus of the research that is useful to discuss. In the following account, the films discussed represent only a small fraction of the total number of films viewed during the process, and these films represent a particular selection nonetheless: majority directed by men, and for the most part either issuing from a European or North American film tradition and production culture, spanning a period from the 'classic' through to the 1970s. It will be noted that the selection is not quite so limited as this and that there are Japanese, and Soviet (Armenian) films, and films by women, for example Yasujirō Ozu, and Marguerite Duras. The discussion here however does not account for the totality of the exercise undertaken, nor to discuss the work of, for example Danièle Huillet, and Agnès Varda, amongst numerous others. It is also the case that a selection for viewing is ultimately necessary and that any survey has some bearing on the outcomes.

In a sequence from *The Searchers* (Ford, 1956), a posse of 'cowboy' riders makes their passage through a gully, bordered by a rise or ridge. Atop the ridge appears a native American, the Comanche chief, also on horseback. In the bottom of the frame, the posse of riders; the land and sky split the screen in half across the horizontal. In a single low angle long-shot, 'punched-in' from the first shot, the chief makes a gesture with his arm. Returning to the first

wide shot we see the cowboy posse exit frame-right at the same time as a Comanche posse forms on the ridge top. We cut to a mid-close-up of the Comanche chief, mid shots of the other Comanche riders, a mid-shot of the cowboy posse, and then, a wide shot of the whole scene. The wide shot is framed similarly to the opening shot of the sequence, a wider frame still, the land forms the bottom half of the frame, the sky the top half. In the foreground, contained by the form of the land, the line of cowboys and further off, almost directly above in frame, the line of Comanches, who 'occupy' the imaginary, imperceptible line formed between the contrast of land and sky; visually their form is against or within the sky, field of white and blue (fig.6). There is a simple division or relation in this sequence and shot, land/sky, cowboy/Comanche.

Fig.6

***The Searchers*, Ford, 1956**

We can progress this, but the point is, the combination of 'percepts' and 'affects', high/low, near/far, the imperceptible line between forms, by virtue of the forms themselves, is an aesthetic principle or thought, and sensation. There is a sense of containment or enveloping, the vertical bearing on the horizontal. Indeed, placing the Comanche where they are, constitutes the line between one form and another, land and sky. It would be difficult to identify the cowboys or Comanche as Figures, although both are contained within a field, the sky is a pool, liquid, and reflecting, but there is depth also, from the fore to the mid ground, a depth which relates earth to sky, beyond the imperceptible line between forms is the sky that encompasses all, and which relates the line of Comanche riders to that of the cowboys. This is figuration though we have sufficient grounds for our exploration. Within the whole of cinema, we have the range of expression (sensation), and we have specific instances, and notable examples so, how to proceed. It is surely sufficient to take a number of such instances and accommodate this within the broader view; from the experience to the expression of this within the gallery there is a correlate, and from this we can develop our concepts. Practice then, as indicated, is the means

through which to develop our concepts on the *correlate* (zone of proximity) of cinema to gallery film.

Tokyo Story (Yasujirō Ozu, 1953) is remarkable in many respects, indeed the whole of the body of Ozu's work is remarkable in the way that received approaches to constructing continuity are seemingly abandoned. There are other aspects to the work that also resonate: the still life, the framing of shots and choices of lens, for example, all of which contribute to a particular image. In the image (fig.7), the two figures are talking; the woman on the left panel is framed in the centre and the eye-line is practically on the axis to the camera. The angle of view is also to the horizontal, to the eye-line. The panel on the right is very similar. There is a disjuncture between the images and the overall framing is more consistent in some respects with portraiture than with film continuity.

Fig.7

Tokyo Story, Ozu, 1953

In the second and third images here, (fig.8a and fig.8b) we have a further two consecutive shots from the film. The convention has it that if a character leaves the screen on the right hand side of frame then in the following shot they will enter from the left to provide the 'illusion' of a continuous movement; it may actually be the case that movement is between two adjacent sets and therefore that it is actually continuous in its direction, the convention remains.

Fig.8a

Tokyo Story, Ozu, 1953

Fig.8b

Here the continuity of action is reversed, the boy exits right-of-frame (viewer perspective) in the left-hand panel (fig.8a) and enters right of frame in the right-hand panel (fig.8b); the 'line of action' has been broken. The shot is taken from a relatively low angle (a similar angle to fig.7) and is fixed.

In these ways the shots are related one to the other but not by conventional rules of continuity; movement in its most fundamental screen representation is disrupted. Each shot appears both as part of a sequence and for itself, almost in the way that Doane says, the orientation of the frame pointing to the object, 'this man', 'this woman', 'this space'. The narrative of the film takes the form of a journey; grandparents make a return visit to see their family in Tokyo, but the focus is on the banality of everyday life. There are 'privileged instants' such as the grandmother's death but this is figured within the overall pattern of life and the dramatic event is not constituted as necessarily more significant than other events but rather, equivalent to, 'death happens'. Death as such is not a finality, it is non-destructive, positive as a force, and the flow of life/death continues. Movement is subordinated to time, by the framing, the absence of conventions of continuity of action, and the relative emphasis on events; action images disappear 'in favour of the purely visual image of what a character *is*' (Deleuze, 2005, p.13), for instance, much of the key events of the film are not seen but only spoken about.

In Vittorio De Sica's *Bicycle Thieves* (1948) the characters move through the streets of Rome, as a series of encounters. This is in some contrast to *Tokyo Story* where the encounters take place within mostly domestic settings. *Bicycle Thieves* is set in post-war Rome. The main character, Antonio Ricci (Lamberto Maggiorani), secures employment, against much competition and in such straightened circumstances; Rome during and after the war suffered from a significant economic (and social-cultural) depression. Having pawned personal items in order to pay for a bicycle, Antonio secures a job putting up film posters around the city. Whilst putting up one of the posters, the bicycle is stolen. Antonio and his young son, Bruno (Enzo Staiola),

then go on a chase/hunt across the city for the stolen bicycle. The whole journey is constructed by a series of encounters, markets, church gatherings, empty streets and neighbourhoods, a fortune telling, and the film takes in much of the geography of the central part of the city. What is most significant about these encounters is that they are almost always just that, an image of a man and child seeing rather than acting. It may be objected that the whole film is constructed around the singular action of Antonio, and that it is Bruno who sees, but from scene to scene they are confronted by events that they are largely incapable of responding to and which have an indirect bearing on their activity: they are searching.

Germany Year Zero (Rossellini, 1948) is a film in a similar vein to *Bicycle Thieves*. Both films have essentially tragic endings, both are set in post-war Europe although the vision of Germany after the war is one of almost complete devastation, black market trading, poverty, hunger and death. Roberto Rossellini also employs the vision of a child although here the child takes the central role, unlike in *Bicycle Thieves* where the character of Bruno acts as a counterpoint to the obsessive searching of his father. In *Germany Year Zero*, the boy, Edmund Köhler (Edmund Moeschke), lives with his family in the cramped rooms of the Rademacher's apartment. Each member of the family, the father, the older sister and brother, resist and succumb to their circumstances, the daughter refuses to prostitute herself, the son's refuses to claim ration stamps because of a fear of reprimand, and the father suffers ill health. We see the struggles that the young Edmund faces to help his family and, misunderstanding the advice of an old teacher, eventually poisons his father. In an act of final desperation Edmund commits suicide. Throughout the film, Edmund is incapable to comprehend and surmount the reality of his circumstances and we follow him on this journey. In these respects, then, both films are films where the events and circumstances presented to the characters are too great for them to react, until the desperate acts of the final scenes at least, Antonio attempts himself to steal a bike, and Edmund poisons his father and in his final act, completes the terms of death. In each case, the perspective of the child is given.

It is perhaps obvious to say that we are here outlining the work that must be done. There are specific examples from, and the whole body of work of all the directors and films we might turn our attention towards. The Classical form may be contrasted to post-war film, Soviet to American, to French, and German. In, *The Passion of Joan of Arc* (Dreyer, 1928) the close-up, the oblique framing, of a shot that tends towards emptiness, whiteness even. The intensive face with its micro movements, shifts in affect, and the pure reflecting qualities of the face. The slow tracking shots across austere interiors in *Ordet*, (Dreyer, 1955), or the camera slowly rotating around its subject unify the changes in frame under the movement of the shot. Intensive series

of close ups (Eisenstein), alternations between long shot and close-up (Griffith)… A stylistic across all instances. Michelangelo Antonioni empties out spaces, gives us space; in *L'Eclisse* (1962), we find a treatment of 'limit-situations' of 'dehumanized landscapes', and 'emptied spaces that might be seen as having absorbed characters and actions, retaining only a geophysical description, an abstract inventory of them' (Deleuze, 2005, p.5). In the closing frames we are left with only the empty spaces through which the couple, a man and woman, have previously existed within, traversed. In *L'Avventura* (1960) we pursue an absent, never to be seen character, after she first disappears during a boating trip to some islands. Once again, the characters of the film traverse space in the supposed hunt for the missing woman; in the final moment the pursuing couple stare out onto the landscape.

In Gance's *Napoleon* (1927) we find the use of three screens and what Gance calls 'simultaneous horizontal montage' (cited in Deleuze, C1, p.47). *Napoleon* employs three screens side-by-side, "by inventing the triple screen, Gance achieves the simultaneity of three aspects of the same scene, or of three different scenes, and constructs so-called 'non-retrogradable' rhythms, rhythms whose two extremes are the retrogradation of one by the other, with a central value common to both" (p.48) and in this way Gance 'truly constitutes the image as the absolute movement of the whole which changes. It is no longer the relative domain of the variable interval, of kinetic acceleration or deceleration in the content, but the absolute domain of luminous simultaneity' (p.48). We will return to this last point.

We are not restricted to one kind of film or another; Samuel Beckett's *Film* (1965), stands alone in his oeuvre, and was originally intended for Chaplin, in the role of O, that Buster Keaton eventually played, Keaton and Chaplin both making significant contributions in their own work, and each with a significant style. If there are obvious and seemingly significant gaps here in this briefest of accounts then we are only to be reminded that we are able to move from the general to the specific, and back to the general, in order to develop our sense of the cinematic, and this is just a sample of the work (viewing) that must be undertaken. Of course, in any study, certain cases may standout. Bergman's *Persona* (1966) is one such case, because we may posit the notion that this is a film about film, or film about the face (close-up) and the obliteration of identity, and that in this way finds some comparison with Beckett's *Film*, in which it is only in the closing moments that the face of the character O is revealed. Throughout *Persona* the identity of two women is progressively challenged until the final image, the two halves of the face one from each of the woman, combine, one half indistinguishable from the other, in close-up. In *Film*, the character O determines to evade the gaze. On returning to his home, O covers a birdcage, and fishbowl, with a cloth, he does not wish to be seen by the animals inside, before sitting in a

chair. We see O from over the shoulder, not the face, as he looks at photographs of himself from different points in his life, he tears up one of the images. The camera shifts around to the front view of O, it is only then that the man's face is revealed, but not the face of a man but the face of the horror of being seen. The face *is* the close-up and the close-up is specific, not unique necessarily, to the cinema.

With Sergei Paradjanov's *Colour of Pomegranates* (1969), sometimes referred to as *Sayat-Nova*, and a film about the life of the Armenian poet of the same name, we may find the most direct expression of the idea that, "the objects of reality have become units of the image, at the same time as the movement-image has become a reality which 'speaks' through its objects" (Deleuze, 2005, p.27). Whether it is stone, cloth, paper, water, the film provides what may otherwise be understood as a simple biography but one that is transformed through a poetics of materials (fig. 9), that plays upon traditional Armenian art and architecture. Not in any way an abstraction but the material of a culture turned towards an expression of that same culture.

Fig.9

***Colour of Pomegranates*, Paradjanov, 1969**

In, *The Structure of Crystal* (Zanussi, 1969), and *Mirror* (Tarkovsky, 1975) we lose our sense of being grounded within a fiction, and in relation to its terms. A brilliant scientist, Jan (Jan Myslowicz), has given up his career and moved to the country to work as a meteorologist, collecting weather data. He is visited by a friend and once colleague, Marek (Andrzej Zarnecki), who has arrived to persuade Jan to return to his career at the university, perhaps with the hope of collaboration. Marek makes a persuasive argument but Jan resists, despite some sense that he recognises how his self-imposed isolation may be a 'waste of time', and that his previous existence was not without its value. Marek's position is not as firm as he might believe and at times, he seems to waver in the face of Jan's contented domesticated and sedentary lifestyle; Jan is married and he and his wife, Anna (Barbara Wrzesinska), have children. The positions, of each, interchange, shift, at times solidifying and at times dissolving in relation to the other. The

whole film is set in a vast snow-covered landscape within which the 'warmth' of a domestic life is located.

Tarkovsky's *Mirror* on the other hand gives us a time of before and a time of now, through the recollections of an unseen man, Aleksei (voiced by Innokentiy Smoktunovskiy). We begin with Aleksei as a boy (Filipp Yankovskiy/ Ignat Daniltsev), with his mother, Masha (Margarita Terekhova), which is related to Aleksei as he is now, with his wife, Natalya (also played by Margarita Terekhova), but we are further given Aleksei as a boy with his mother, and Natalya with his child, Ignat, played by the same actor who plays Aleksei as a child. We never, or only ever very partially, see Aleksei as a man. The past and the present coalesce and divide with or against the perceptions/recollections of the mothers and children, and throughout the distinctions are not always clear. The film also divides around colour, saturated verdant settings, dark interiors, black and white imagery, shifts in views, especially around a moment from early on in the film where a blazing barn is revealed as we navigate through the interior of the childhood house, and the reflection of the flames in a mirror and through a doorway.

Alain Resnais' *Last Year at Marienbad* (screenplay by Robbe-Grillet, 1961) divides time under the recollection of the two main characters with respect to their present. A woman (Delphine Seyrig), who is staying with her husband (Sacha Pitoëff) at the grand Marienbad hotel, meets a man (Giorgio Albertazzi) who insists that they have met before at the same place, during which encounter they had an affair. The woman insists that this never happened. The camera restlessly moves through the space of the hotel, along its corridors, sometimes with the characters and sometimes independently of them; during such moments, movement of character may be stopped momentarily, in series of tableaux, or the characters appear to be frozen in their recollections or refusal thereof, one to the other, in the recounting of the past and the condition of their present.

India Song (Duras, 1975), 'depicts' the last days of a woman (Delphine Seyrig) before she commits suicide. The film also consists of a series of tableaux, with minimal movement of characters, although the camera makes slow movements within the space. Duras worked with Resnais on *Hiroshima Mon Amour* (1959) and although tableaux are not used in the latter film, there is still a sense of time stretching out around a present. In *India Song*, there is no dialogue, little action, or interaction between characters. The film is accompanied by a sound track with voices, as with a narrator, but the 'narration' does not provide us with some exposition of what we see on screen rather, the voices are of unseen characters, of whom we never have sense of, other than they have awareness of the characters we see on screen. They recount the seen characters past life, comment upon what they (we) see, and so there is an apparent disjuncture

between sound and visual image. Sound and visual image are nonetheless related, as though the image exists for the sound, presenting itself to and for commentary. In this way we have two mutually dependent but separate images.

We can continue to expand these cases or deepen the description and analysis in this vein, and much work has been done beyond what is accounted for here, however, what is important and relevant is that we begin with the cinema. The journey narrative may seem to be a profitable form to consider, the reasons are simple: the defining characteristic of the gallery spectator is of an *intermittent* viewing experience, the spectator themselves takes a journey through the gallery space. The suggestion here is not to mirror or 'signify' the spectator to themselves, through their mirror image, but rather to consider the most elemental of activities and how this might be accommodated. A single screen with a durational 'content' demands the attention of the spectator, supposedly for the same duration of the film, this is counter to the notion of an intermittent viewing activity, where by the duration is the time it takes to walk through the space, or longer, and in no discernible or predetermined order necessarily[20]. The spatial determination of narrative against or alongside the temporal determination of narrative, if not essential, may be seen as a potential quality of the gallery film, as problematised by the question. The (virtual) spectator approaches the work, moves around the work, moves from one screen to another, pauses, moves on... The spectator thus is characterised by a journey of their own, and by encounters and events.

Accompanying the process of viewing, some attempt must be made in practical terms, the impressions of one having to find expression in the other, this is the necessity of the method. The process of creation (in cinema) conventionally begins with the writer, or some producer's intuition and then the writer. At the advent of cinema, the essential plan for a film was a treatment and with the advent of the 'talkie', the screenplay. A distinction is made here between writing (screenplay) in an industrial context, and the writing of film as a creative analytical gesture that is constituted throughout the process, up until its 'completion'. The process embraces the screenplay as a tool for developing and organising ideas, but also as a part of the process of *writing the film* which also embraces cinemaphotography and editing as part of the techniques employed. If the distinctions between the two positions is difficult to locate then this is understandable, the distinction exists as much in the objectives as it does in the procedures employed to reach them, and the method requires that production is subject to a

[20] In Screens (Mondloch, 2010), it is noted that, work that can be seen to accommodate the mobile spectator encourages behaviour similar to the flâneur

studio practice, so we must establish the production in the first place. By necessity then, a (film) viewing activity inevitably informs both processes, production and studio practice.

The process begins in all instances with collection and organisation, of materials. After an expansion of materials, it is necessary to consolidate and structure the material to locate qualities that have some accord with the objective: sense of cinema and suggestiveness for application within a gallery setting. A studio methodology is explorative by nature, open ended, but guided often by parameters. The same questions may be asked over and again, in this case: how we fill the frame pictorially and in duration; where the camera is placed, what the actors (if used) are instructed to do, and how the shots are to be pieced together or related thereafter. These questions result in creative decisions and stem from a determinate intuition, determinable in the film. The moment we change the literal frame of the film then the solutions to the same questions may be different. Not only may they be different but the frame itself as container, or limit function, is now constituted as one of the questions: what frame, how many, where etc. and whether the 'solution' satisfies the predetermined parameters. It is difficult to separate these variables out, as one might expect, in the search for gallery film form.

The operation may be reversed, how might a change in the frame accommodate a mobile spectator and how does this change what choices we make in terms of the shots, and sequences, where we place the camera, what we tell the actors, if any, to do and how it is all pieced together. Although the artistic operation has changed, the imposed stipulation, that the work respond to the 'intermittent' spectator radically challenges received approaches to duration and story-telling (prose narrative, character and plot). Solutions to this that already exist may be commonplace, the 'loop' for example, but things are less straightforward, especially when considering story; we can interrogate this approach (loop) and discover further problems and may provide additional responses. It is also necessary to challenge the assumption that a painting, for example, does not ask the viewer for their time, but the image is nonetheless comprehendible in an instant, and duration is not a constituent quality. We encountered a number of works at the outset for which duration is a component, principally the earthworks and sculptures, and also the mobiles of Calder. We can argue the case that the journeys of Richard Long or the sculpture of Boccioni although figuring movement and time are just that, figures of, rather than expression in, or with. Other works may be seen to challenge this notion, for example the colour field paintings of Rothko, it may be argued, are pure quality and therefore only experienced in time; we can extend that analysis to many works. In the latter case, movement and time are neither figure nor explicit constituent quality.

Seeking solutions, we may return to Daniel Buren and *Le Musée qui n'existait pas*, (2002, June 26–September 23, Paris) for some guidance here, although any of Buren's 'installation' work can be referred to. We can take the view that Buren challenges the space of the gallery or, we can invert this and view the space of the gallery implicating itself within the painting: a doorway is both aperture and form, one that also changes with the movement of the spectator. This provides one explanation for the monitor room: movement in space and movement *of* space, the forms (of space) shifting in relation to one another and in relation to the spectator. It must be acknowledged that the Buren room makes a direct appeal to the experience of the viewer, in terms of their recollection, and the ability to project forward in time. The 'painting' then is *with* the gallery as much as response to it.

In a short passage at the start of *Stalker* (Tarkovsky, 1979), the main character rises from his bed and passes the camera, which turns to face the opposite way to follow the character's movement, the character then exits the shot; moments later the character reappears but on the other side to the frame from which he exited. What is most noticeable about this deceptively simple movement is the way the character exists and re-enters the frame, the space that we do not see behind the camera acquires a presence because, for the character to re-enter frame on the side that he does means he must have been mobile within the unseen space. In this simple moment Tarkovsky inverts what Buren does with the gallery, the space becomes present (mobile) around the spectator and in the interim we have the empty room that the camera (audience) faces.

Let us change the terms of the description. The camera, occupying an autonomous existence within the ensemble (set) shifts its perspective, to keep a view on the character but the character evades the cameras 'gaze', momentarily at least. The room in which the camera sees remains motionless, only the camera's point-of-view changes within it, the camera is mobile. The character also acts or moves independently of the room, and of the camera. By situating the camera as he does then, Tarkovsky implicates the audience in place of the camera's gaze. The movement of the camera is justified at first by the movement of the character, or to put this differently, initially the movement of the camera is 'attached' to the movement of the character, although the camera assumes an autonomous point-of-view. Two images, side-by-side, of a mobile camera and of movement of the shot and object, and static camera and shot and mobile object. The moment between these two images is the moment of surprise where the space unseen, the out-of-view, becomes momentarily present. The first is a movement image and the second a spatial image in which movement takes place, which is movement image by virtue of the imminence of space that the character movement implies.

Applying Tarkovsky's method to our own ends, hypothetically to begin with, the thing that distinguishes our scenario is the spectator and the space of viewing. The camera may move, within the scene, but then so may have the spectator and in this respect, it is difficult for the camera to insinuate the spectator within the room of the scene unless, as the spectator moves the frame does also. We can now imagine, at its most simple, two frames (screens), side by side, separated perhaps by a short distance, necessary to distinguish between the frames but close enough for there to be some relation. Each frame (screen) is located in the same space but together expand the ensemble or set of objects, room and character, each showing a different perspective. This is not the same as previously because now, the image moves (changes) with the spectator, in order to navigate between the two frames. This is much the same were the spectator (camera) to look one way and then another, the change in frame implies the change in position, or movement. The space between the frames constitutes a cut (montage) or change of perspective (fig.10). If there is somehow included also the movement of a character within the shot, from one frame (screen) to the next, then something different may happen depending on the movement of the spectator. Should the spectator follow the character, screen to screen, frame-to-frame, shot-to-shot, then we have closely approximated the Tarkovsky sequence, at least the first part of the sequence.

Fig.10

***Thinking Space*, Ellis, 2021**

Should the spectator remain static, in front of the one frame/shot/screen, whilst the character moves to the next, then we have the reverse of the original in some sense, a character's exit from frame (fig.11). Our hypothetical scenario tells us that in this most simple of instances it is at least feasible to implicate the space of a gallery within the film image. Movement (image) implies the addition of screens/frames when space is immanent or, translation in space substitutes for the movement of the camera or montage.

Fig.11

***Thinking Space*, Ellis, 2021**

There are implications for the idea, that actual space substitutes for the movement of the camera or montage, because the single screen can still function much as is does with the cinematic image i.e. the camera may still move or editing still performed on one screen, regardless of the presence of another. To add screens is just this however, not a duplication but an addition. If we return to our first scenario, to illustrate the point, a character gets out of bed and moves across the space towards the camera and as the character passes the camera, it follows the movement to reframe on the reverse angle. The character then leaves frame, to return moments later. The problem, as it is described and for our concern, relates to the movement of the spectator within a gallery setting from one image/screen/frame to another i.e. they may miss the character movement at every turn e.g. empty room in one frame and empty room in the other, unless the movement of the spectator *reconstitutes* the cut or the movement of the camera. The essential proposition must be maintained, actual space substitutes for the movement of the camera or montage; by the time the spectator may have reached the second screen, it must therefore be continuous to the first, something must have changed, in this case beyond the change of perspective. Furthermore, the insistence is that no screen shows the same as any other at the same time, otherwise movement is not constituted, moreover, no screen can show the same image consecutively as one of the others; there is always the risk that at the moment that the spectator moves nothing has essentially changed on screen and so there is no movement in the film (fig.12). Of course, this can be an intentional effect: duplication of the image across screens implies something else, stasis or the passage of time alone.

Fig.12

***Thinking Space*, Ellis, 2021**

The difficulty in this is that there is always the possibility that at some point the intended on-screen movement is missed, or the movement-image is not constituted. With a mobile spectator each *viewing* is different, and it may be said that the film itself changes with the position of the spectator and, since no two spectators can occupy the same space then there can never be the same film experience. This can be seen as a simple extension of what is already happening in the cinema only here the change of position is relative to the one screen and one flow of images. The moment the image becomes a spatial one then there is a likelihood that the image will change for each individuated encounter, unless the image is consistent around all axis, however. The axiom that the orientation of the spectator to the screen constitutes the image must be considered; the image exists nonetheless, it is the viewing that changes and not the film. Something similar happens when we watch a single channel film more than once; on each subsequent viewing the *experience* may be different[21]. Sensation of the thing is not located in identity; thought and sensation of each experience is actualised in every individuated encounter. It is also the case that if the image changes then we have a movement image, whether or not we miss the movement of, for example, a character walking along a moorland path, or making their way from one room to the next.

Rather than be preoccupied with the spectator in this way, that they may experience a work differently at each viewing, we can simply say that actual space substitutes for the movement of the camera; we can progress this. In Vertov's *Man with A movie Camera* (1929), we have an example of the 'omnipotence' of a camera consciousness, especially with the superimposed image or, as with the case of *Napoleon* (Gance, 1927) when we have views placed side by side,

[21] The eternal return of the *differential* is relevant here.

simultaneously. We have options here, on the one hand to display simultaneity, and collapsing the spatial, two adjacent screens (fig.13).

Fig.13

***Thinking Space*, Ellis, 2021**

On the other, with a spatial configuration of screens, two screens facing for example, we can maintain spatial-temporal simultaneity (Fig.14). The out-of-view takes on a different significance once we introduce actual space into the film: the out-of-view is still simply a matter of perspective, in some respects, but the perspective is now one that is already given, on to space.

Fig.14

***Thinking Space*, Ellis, 2021**

When we think of the out-of-view, this can be in the sense that, what the woman (fig.13) looks at (fig. 14) may be heard but not seen, the sound of children playing, but with the addition of frames then the out-of-view also becomes the always possibly seen; of course, there is no compulsion for there to be a view of children at play. The frame can operate in two ways in this respect, on the one hand to act like a window or aperture, a mask, and on the other, to operate like a picture frame, that isolates; we can think of a centripetal or centrifugal tendency, one pointing outwards beyond the frame and the other inwards from the frame's edges. The close-up of the woman (fig.13) is relatively closed despite the cutting of the face by the edge of frame, if anything this emphasises the edges and co-ordinates to, rather than to 'dissolve' them, which is perhaps closer to a mask. Despite the relative closure of the image, there is none-the-less an out-of-field (view), that which she looks at, the detail of the street behind, and so on, to

infinity. The frame always refers in this way to other frames and *sets*. Even when the shot is completely closed, it refers to other *sets* because a set can always be divided: a full face, half a face, an eye, a mouth. Indeed, the more closed the shot becomes, the more it opens itself onto duration. The reason for this is relatively straightforward: *sets* are positions of objects in relation to one another, that is, an instance in time, and the more that this aspect of the image is emphasised the more spatial it becomes. The more that the spatial dimension in the composition of things is reduced then the more it tends towards the temporal and durational aspects of the image (fig.15).

Fig.15

***Thinking Space*, Ellis, 2021**

Returning to our premise then, the out-of-view is compromised once we introduce actual space and the addition of screens/frames/views into the film, we add space to space. The frame may determine a relatively closed set or a relatively open one in the way described however, the perspective is nonetheless now one that is already *given on to space*, onto other frames, other sets, so we emphasise the spatial relationships between objects over and above the temporality of their existence. This is perhaps none too surprising when we conclude that the addition of screens/frames expands the set as an always given and that this has the effect of spatialising the image.

The tendency of the cinematic frame is to either open itself out onto a wider *set* (ensemble) or to isolate from a wider *set*, the same as the way that the frame can be approached as either a window or aperture or as a panel or 'canvas'. Offset or oblique framing may be one way to view a frame which artificially closes itself off from wider sets in the way that the image is coordinated to the edges of the frame, or geometrically. The less spatial the frame becomes the more *artificially* closed off it can be seen to become, however. Here we are speaking of pictorial space rather than the spatial of the installed screen. In the case where there is more than one screen, and these screens are, for example, opposite to one another, or should we have many screens placed around and within an exhibition space, then both tendencies are always manifest.

The 'frame' which is the whole of the collection of screens/frames (obliquely, the gallery or exhibition space), always consists of more than one set (ensemble), 'frames within frames', and therefore is both always the wider set, whilst the image as a whole, that is the *multitude* of screens individually, are always partially closed. Indeed, the simultaneity in this case is of this tendency of framing, which in an analogous way to *free indirect subjectivity*[22] is an always 'divided' frame such that neither tendency can be said to dominate.

If we extend this notion, that of frames within frames, and of an ever-present division or multiplication of space, within simultaneity, we can go further from what we have said previously, to say it is simply the addition of space to space and say that the addition of screens (frames) tends towards the *elimination* of framing. If 'the museum does not exist', in the sense that Buren challenges the space, that it is no more than a constituent of the art object, we progressively move to a conception of frameless, and therefore formless (limitless) space, an infinite expansion of the set and of frames: a virtual world of objects, like sitting inside a planetarium. Between pictorial space and the space of exhibition we multiply the set, of objects, that is the 'plastic mass' of the image in two directions, the frame within a frame, or across frames, within a single screen image, and the frames within frames and across these of the installed screen space. Once again, there is no compulsion to expand ever more the numbers of screens but rather, it is the tendency that is under consideration here.

It must be asked whether the temporal 'vanishes' under such a condition, and whether we have progressed the installed screen to the purely spatial category. Should we oppose movement to movement, for example, then do we have some kind of temporal vanishing point, in the way that a mirrored and opposing movement such as the one illustrated (fig.16), of a single train track, itself static but taken from a moving train, with a changing frame. The motion erupts outwards, like an explosion, or expansion, or is consumed by the centre of the image, depending on which direction the image is mirrored, but there is no change, or differential in a mechanistic sense, from one image to the other. Were the train to slow to a stop then we have simply a mirrored image, indistinguishable as such because there is no apparent join. Variation in speed (acceleration), or direction (velocity), or both, would further constitute change (movement-image), or at least constitute rhythm.

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[22] The director 'has replaced wholesale the neurotic's vision of the world by his own delirious vision of aestheticism' (Pasolini, in Deleuze, *Cinema 1, p. 74)*;

Fig.16

***Thinking Space*, Ellis, 2021**



In a case where there is a more obvious difference in the image, what difference might this have. In (fig.17) we have a literal mirrored image, but the frame is different between the two shots, one is in long-shot and the other a loose mid-shot; the perspective has changed also, so although a literal mirror shot, one is not a mirror image of the other (change/movement).

Fig.17

***Thinking Space*, Ellis, 2021**

We have an expanded set in this case: in the left-hand panel, doorway and figure and in the right-hand panel, the reflection of doorway and figure in a mirror; we also have a change in proximity. Neither frame can be said to act like a mask but tend to isolate the subject. If we multiply this further still however, (fig.18-19) then we refer the expanding parts of the set back to themselves and emphasise space over movement and time.

Fig.18 (and overleaf)

***Thinking Space*, Ellis, 2021**

Fig.19

Thinking Space, Ellis, 2021

When we think of the spatial there are other considerations to make. Scale and proximity are relevant, the number of screens, the specific arrangement of the screens in relation to each other, whether this be flat to a wall or 'free-standing', and, as we saw with Buren, whether or not the space of the exhibition implies itself *with* the arrangement. We can also change the substance of the screen itself, and what we project onto. Each of these scenarios is considered, through practice, sometimes in isolation and at times in conjunction. The latter of these we can progress from quite quickly.

Once we change the substance of the screen, we provide a literal and metaphorical support for the film, we frame the film as it were, place it within or relate it to a point of reference. For example, we might hang a sodden white sheet from a washing line, onto which is projected the image of a wind farm, and to one side an electric fan. It may be that the poetics of this frame of reference are no less accomplished for their subsistence. The reverse impact may also be true, that the film becomes support for the substance of the screen, or indeed that the two are mutually supportive and set up a kind of resonance. In any event the manipulation of the

substance of the screen moves us increasingly away from the cinematic towards purely sculptural form (we may be headed in this direction nonetheless). This is not to say that in such instances the projection of an image may be redundant; if it is the substance of the screen that we are manipulating then it remains a screen nonetheless and this must be apprehended. This is the extent to which one necessitates the other. The same can be said of the space of exhibition, or the structure of the space of the exhibition and in this we might be referred back to Deleuze's consideration of Bacon's painting. The screen in relation to the structure of the space of exhibition makes a Figure of the screen and the question is how the screen in this case relates to the space and structure. If the screen is hung like a painting then we can approach it as and for itself, as an image. Once the space of the gallery, or equivalent, is introduced then it is the whole which is to be considered (fig.20).

Fig. 20

***The Weather Project*, Eliasson, 2003**



What is perhaps of note in *The Weather Project* (Eliasson, 2003) is not constituted so much by the sphere of light hanging in the space but by the way that it connects to the space of its exhibition, and indeed the viewer. The yellow incandescence of the sphere bleeds into the walls and floor, energises the space around it. The spectators become part of the work, seen from a certain perspective, themselves as figures, of a narrative in this instance, bathing in light. There is vertical direction or tension that exists between the figures, ball of light (sun) and people.

What of number, scale and proximity of screens; imagine reducing the screen size to no more than a postage stamp, certainly this would challenge the image (and audience), but a close-up in miniature though is no less a close-up, however. What at the very least must be acknowledged is that once we introduce the screen as a screen, the frame as a frame, then we

are asking further questions of the cinematic. There are many examples within the cinema where the frame has been mobilised in this way, the split screen is the most obvious example.

In *Timecode* (Figgis, 2000), the screen is divided into four quarters, and in each quarter a distinct set of events takes place. On occasion the events of one 'screen' coincide with those on another, and the perspectives of each combine in surprising and novel ways, but it is arguably no less cinematic for its invention and novelty, quite the contrary. The notion that each panel of the film can be viewed independently of the others does not invalidate the claims, as will be shown. Simultaneity is also established as being no less cinematic. It is only when the space of the exhibition implicates itself directly within the film that we might begin to intuit something else at work. What of the other way around, we have already mentioned how this is itself not absent from the cinema, for example in the case of Hitchcock's *Notorious* (1946), in which at one point in the film the view can be seen to implicate the cinematic space of the film within the space of the audience (fig.21); how the space implicates itself, one to the other, may be varied.

Fig.21

Hitchcock, *Notorious*, 1946

The architecture of exhibition space is specific; to simply hypothesise two screens facing one another presupposes a space that can accommodate such an arrangement. Prior to any creation is the space that the film is 'purposed' for. We can assume idealised spaces, but we must account for how the spectator enters the space, navigates the space, and exits the space. If actual space substitutes for the movement of the camera then it also determines the sequence and shot – a narrow corridor for example may lend itself to an extended sequence of frames, on both sides, whereas a large cube may ask something different of the image.

In her multi-channel installation, *Working Class Hero (A Portrait of John Lennon)*, (2006), Candice Breitz staggered 25 individual screens spirally around a seven-story high stairwell of the Baltic Centre for Contemporary Art, Gateshead. During a residency at the Baltic, the artist had

worked with John Lennon fans to produce a re-recording of Lennon's first solo album, *Plastic Ono Band* (1970). Each screen featured one of the fans recordings, of which the full a cappella sound track could be heard across the whole space. The album may be understood as a piece of self-expression, 'the 11 tracks on *John Lennon/Plastic Ono Band* constituted a searing, album-length self-examination of Lennon's life, politics and personal relationships' (Tochka, 2021) in songs such as *Mother*, about childhood abandonment, and the namesake of the installation, *Working Class Hero*, about the social-cultural mechanisms and pressures that 'push' young men towards armed service.

Each screen in the installation figures one of the contributors, shot from the front (piece-to-camera), in close-up, against a black backdrop. The 'actors' were not directed in any way, but each had an ear piece with which to reference the original recording in their own performances of the full album. As such, the individual and collective shots can be viewed as a kind of portrait and much has been said on the relationships between mediated, celebrity and popular culture figures, such as Lennon, and the subsequent meanings that circulate for the identities of the people that consume them. In this respect the work is wholly conceptual, however. Placed as it was, in the Baltic exhibition, the images formed a kind of gallery, of portraits, but one in which there was a certain relation to: the viewer passed each image as they made their way down (or up) the stairwell. In this respect the images also formed a sequence, an 'intensive' series of close-ups, if you will. We can imagine the same work on a single screen, one shot cutting to the next, all the time accompanied by the vocal track, or alternatively a single tracking camera across a line of these people. The movement of the spectator, unlikely as they would be to spend any length of time on the relatively narrow confines of what constitutes a walk way, constituted the shot or in this case sequence of shots; arguably, there is an implied duration here also.

In the case where two or more screens may be placed side by side on a single wall then the viewer may not be inclined or required to move but can take in the full view from a single position, there are many examples of work of this kind. In this instance the spatial is still imminent to the screen image but only to expand or multiply it in two dimensions. Should these dimensions be significantly expanded, such that the viewer must move in order to experience the full work, then the same operation takes place. Several rooms propose an alternative image to a single space, and so forth. Filmic composition, that of movement and time, is therefore melded with architectural or environmental space. This is not to suggest that the artist's work is only possible once a site of exhibition is established or that works may not be made independently of the exhibition space but that nonetheless, the eventual siting of any piece of work may make specific demands of the space of exhibition, this includes the creation of 'pop-

up' cinemas in galleries. If it is objected that this is largely true of much art, then this is not an objection but simply an affirmation that the architectural or environmental space of exhibition is melded with the work. This is a simple assertion though.

We can site screens against walls, or free standing within space. We can project into corners, onto ceilings and floors. We can combine or coordinate panels, of different shapes and sizes, whether this is to align them or separate them in space, it is compositional. The movement that is permitted by the installation of the screen may be revealing; a screen in the centre of a room permits the viewer to walk around it, past its edges, and to see the screen from both sides. A screen placed against a wall or equivalent is pictorially visual in its intention, rather than perhaps 'sculpturally' visual. We can combine these two approaches, we can push screens into corners, which may afford the screen three-dimensional form whilst also retaining its essential flatness, and in so doing have the option to consider the perspective anamorphosis. It is worth distinguishing between the two tendencies whilst noting that the frescos of Giotto di Bondone in the Cappella degli Scrovegni (c.1305) tells a story, in overlapping bands consisting of 38 scenes, that culminate in a single large fresco at one end of the chapel; this is most certainly not sculpture.

Events (scenes) in film are distributed in time, across the duration of the film whereas in the Scrovegni chapel, Giotto distributes time, the episodes in the lives of Joachim and Anna (1-6), episodes in the Virgin Mary's life (7-13), episodes recounting Christ's life and death, according to a spatial arrangement, essentially sequential, running in bands around the chapel (fig.22).

Fig.22

Giotto, Cappella degli Scrovegni (c.1305)

The story it tells is ubiquitous, especially for the period and culture. The familiarity with the events that the story tells helps the viewer to orientate themselves within the space and narrative presentation and to 'read' the story according to the narrative scheme that it follows without much difficulty. The scheme follows convention and provides an organisational

structure, one that is largely understood in terms of chronological time. How time as such is figured may be considered in more depth but it is enough for us to make the comparison.

The essential difference between the scenes in the frescos and a film is of course that the images (scenes) in the fresco are poses, tableaux, still-images, in complete contrast to those of a film. Continuity of action within film requires the careful matching of the action across different consecutive frames, of eyelines, and movement of which all conventionally follow the 180-degree rule (line of action). This line of action is a convention, which may not always be observed, as we saw in the examples from *Tokyo Story*, (Ozu, 1953). The ordering of events and the continuity of action (camera perspective) are both conventions within cinema. The ordering of events may be different to a chronological sequence but what is essential are the events themselves, how they are ordered is another matter. Once again, when considering the gallery film, we can consider how the spectator may view individual panels in any order and so determine the overall structure of events. Continuity of action is difficult to replicate unless by conventional cinematic device and on a single screen otherwise there is no feasible way, other than technological perhaps, to control the perspective of the spectator in relation to screen action across different screens. Once more we must also be careful to over indulge the agency of the spectator in the ordering of events, the composition is spatial-temporal, in that order and with that emphasis, and as such the form does not change regardless of the order in which the spectator sees the work. From an idealised vantage point there is one 'unchanging' form. There are exceptions to this rule.

We might consider replicating the cinematic movement, that is, single instants in time (any-moments-whatever) that move within the mechanism of the camera. If we are content to say for the moment that the digital or video image is a frame constructed not by moving parts as such but by the phases of an electrical signal that, depending on the frequency, constitute a number of frames each second, then we can include the video image in this consideration; one frame replaces the next and so on. We might imagine a gallery film where we employ more than one screen (frame), perhaps in a series, then display an image one screen for a given amount of time before displaying the subsequent image on the next screen (frame) in the series, and so on. The spectator in this instance is engaged in a cat and mouse game of 'chase-the-frame'. Rather than tease our audience this way we might more simply alternate the frames, on two adjacent screens, one following the other and then to switch back again. Once again, the movement is constituted by a translation in space. We can say therefore that, the composition of frames or screens in space replaces the ordering of events in time. In the case of

Working Class Hero, time is replaced by the spiral or cylinder and constituted by an ascent or descent; an aperture, or zone (plane/section) that is passed through.

We have largely considered the overall siting of the cinematic image but what of the image itself both visual and in sound and how this is reformulated for the 'new' frame. The sound and the visual image work differently when considered for their respective physical properties: we cannot close our ears or redirect our attention away from sound. It may be possible to focus our attention, there are studies that have shown this, but sound is nonetheless pervasive in space. *Working Class Hero* used this quality, whichever way we may have approached the installation we are given immediately a whole, in terms of sound, whilst the visual can only be apprehended partially, incrementally, in slices or cross sections and with rotation. If we have two separate screens and two separate images with a sound source that matches one, and not the other, then somehow, we must account for this; this may be particularly apt when dealing with synchronised sound and picture in the form of speech. The other image is the visual image and everything that constitutes this. We already have an analysis of the cinematic image to refer to and that provides an overall theoretical framework to the research, the question here is how this is impacted upon by the spatial arrangement of the screen previously outlined. To recapitulate before we progress: space substitutes for the movement of the camera or montage; the addition of screens (frames) has the effect of eliminating framing or of adding space to space; the composition of frames or screens in space replaces the ordering of events in time. We can add to this that simultaneity is spatial-temporal, which is to say that objects can coexist spatially in time.

Beginning with a simple situation to suggest some initial ideas, to consider a single story, of events and characters, we have already outlined some of the variety of ways that this story may be narrated. These can be given as two alternatives; we can group frames together in such a way as to constitute a single image, for example, the bank of monitors in the Buren exhibition can be seen as a number of separate monitors or they can be considered as a single collective of monitors. We can join screens together so that although they are constituted by their singularity in some respects, work essentially in their unity (fig.23).

Fig.23

***Thinking Space*, Ellis, 2021**

There are very good examples of gallery films that operate in this way such as Yang Fudong's *The Fifth Night*, (2010) or an exemplary piece of work in this vein by Eija-Liisa Ahtila, *Horizontal – Vaakasuora* (2011), a 6-channel projection with Dolby Digital 5.1, 6-minute film of a tree; each panel shows a section of the tree and across the six panels we have the full expanse and image (fig.24).

Fig.24

***Horizontal- Vaakasuora*, Eija-Liisa Ahtila, 2011**

Image removed due to copyright restrictions

The alternative, assuming here we are talking about all instances other than a single channel film, is to separate out the screens and to develop their 'uniqueness'. In both cases all screens must form part of a unity, so it is the extent to which each frame works independently or discretely, as a part of a larger whole. In the case of *Horizontal – Vaakasuora* it is evident that these panels are supposed to be viewed collectively, non-sequentially, and that they form a 'panorama', but the image is also a collective of separate panels. The movement of each frame is out of phase with the others so that a kind of rhythm is established between the parts. In this way then each panel may be seen as a figure (part of a tree), and together as a figuration of movement (phases of its motion). The film may be construed as a movement-image in the first case analysis, that of (re)presenting progressive frames of any-instance-whatever through the

mechanism of a camera/projector, and that narrative being told. Although not an exact reproduction, it is a film strip, presented as such[23].

We can return to the split-screen as an example and to further the analysis. In a sequence from *The Boston Strangler* (Fleischer 1968), we see police detectives begin an investigation. One detective question's a man, we see this in two panels located in the right hand third of the screen, a long shot in one panel and adjacent to this a close-up on a police badge. In the centre third of the screen we have a different location and another detective in long shot, and in the top half of the left hand third of the screen a further location, a library, another detective who shows his badge, which we see in close up in another panel in the bottom half of the left hand third. The images appear and recede at different times. At a different moment we see a car from the front and back, simultaneously, each view occupying the left- and right-hand thirds of the screen respectively. The centre panel is split roughly in half, top and bottom, with different views of suspects being taken in for questioning (fig.25).

Fig.25

***The Boston Strangler*, Fleischer, 1968**

In these examples we have simultaneous views of two separate events. Shots that may conventionally be shown is sequence may still appear in this same sequence, the director still calls attention to a particular view at a particular time, for example the introduction of the close-up on the police badge. In this case the convention of matched action is also applied. At times, the events that we see simultaneously are in disconnected spaces, unified by the action and contemporaneity of the event.

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[23] Rees applies a similar analysis in the chapter 'Film Machine' (2020, pp.11-21) to, amongst other examples, Wim Wender's *Kings of the Road* (1976), and Elia Kazan's *On the Waterfront* (1954). In the case of Vaakasuora, it is the transposition of the moving image to the gallery space and the form of the work that constitutes it as a 'filmic signifier' (p.13); the horizontal of the title clarifies the image and the form.

In *The Thomas Crown Affair*, (Jewison, 1968), at the start of the film, in a scene featuring a polo match, the film frame is split into a number of smaller frames. On one we see a close-up of a woman watching the match, in another we see a mid-shot of a man on a horse, and in the remaining frames there is the blurred motion of the horses and of the game from the point-of-view of the rider (fig.26).

Fig.26

***The Thomas Crown Affair*, Jewison, 1968**

At times, a single image is multiplied many times, for example, we see the same shot of the ball lying on the pitch in as many as twenty or more smaller frames. In the latter case we have a simple multiplication of the image but in the former, there is a more complex view of the scene. We have a close-up of a woman looking through her field glasses at the match playing out in front of her and the point-of-view of the woman at the same time. We are also provided with the point-of-view of the rider that the woman looks at. There are therefore two simultaneous points-of-view that issue from the one character, or that lead us to the close-up, arguably there is an order for these shots, there is an implied sequence, despite their simultaneity, that *hinge* upon the close-up of the woman. The relationship of image to set (ensemble) can be much the same as we would find in any film, the long-shot and mid-shot providing some physical relation and the close-up being an abstraction of the scene or affect.

Returning to *Timecode* (Figgis, 2000), we have something quite distinct. Each panel or frame is shot in one seemingly continuous take and each character for the most part occupies a discrete existence. We may only assume that these characters are connected by simultaneity and only have this confirmed at moments in the film where the paths of the characters (and shots) happen to coincide. Without this frame of reference or comparison then we may just as well assume that these are completely unrelated views or related in some other way; their coexistence is reason to search for narrative, there being the identification of one image with another. The simultaneity of shot or image does not necessarily suppose a cohesive simultaneous spatial or temporal determination for what we see on screen though, this is fairly

self-evident once we have considered it, but nonetheless some kind of narrative cohesion is generated.

In many respects then, the split screen can function in a similar way to the single image sequence. We can compare, for example, the scene from The Boston Strangler with a similar scene, in terms of the construction of events, from *The Godfather* (Coppola, 1972). In the scene from *The Godfather*, one of the main characters is at the baptism of his child whilst simultaneously a number of assassinations take place. There is a straightforward demonstration of the ability for the scene to convey the sense that these separate, albeit related, events are happening simultaneously, by their juxtaposition in time. The other way that we might approach simultaneous views is through superimposition (fig.27)

Fig. 27

***Napoleon*, Gance, 1927**

We have seen how apparent simultaneous events are constituted by the numbers of images present, but if we are confronted by seemingly disparate scenes, characters and events, then for these to be connected in a fictional world they must be confirmed as confluent in some way, which is to say, co-ordinated by the frame. The confluence of two events has defined much of narrative cinema. Parallel continuity operates by the maintenance of opposing terms, rich and poor, black and white, and it is from the opposition of these terms and the gradual bringing together of them that the narration flows. In montage, the dialectic of the shot acts like a cell, under division; we are in comfortable territory here.

It may be observed that, if the actual space in a gallery film substitutes for cinematic movement, shot and sequence and the simultaneous in time is equated to that in space also, then gallery film that employs an arrangement of screens tends towards the collapse of all movement and progression to the spatial. This might seem to be at odds when we first consider it: simultaneous events and sequential events are not the same. We can take a lead from Deleuze in this analysis and consideration of what appears to be a paradox. Considering the superimpositions and triple screens in Gance's *Napoleon* (1927), Deleuze identifies 'non-retrogradable' rhythms, 'rhythms whose two extremes are the retrogradation of one by the

other, with a central value common to both' (1992, p.48). This rhythm is a simultaneity of 'counter-impression'. We are in the realm of the orbit of the planets here! Retrogradation is the phenomenon whereby a planet's orbit appears to reverse because of the orbit of the earth, from which the first motion is determined. There are three elements here: the point around which two bodies are in orbit, the orbit of the two bodies, and then the apparent orbit as seen from one of the bodies. The apparent retrograde rhythm is only explained if both bodies are in motion around the sun and this is what Deleuze refers to when he says, 'a central value common to both'. To put this in our own terms, we have individual screens, and from one to the next we may substitute movement, whilst they are simultaneous when considered as part of a whole. These two appearances are common to a third term: form. Screens are coordinated in space, by space. If we consider for a moment once again, *Working Class Hero*, there are two seemingly opposing tendencies, that of the immediate simultaneous whole, and that of the sequence of screens, which can only be coordinated under the form of their composition. In this respect, it is not the coincidence of two images that necessarily confirms their simultaneity but the reference of both these images to form (or the frame) that unifies the simultaneous with series. When we are confronted with simultaneous images then, in a spatial arrangement, we have an image, or composition, of a whole which may also constitute the sequence.

In terms of the specifics of the shot, in its most precise form, we confront the problem of composition in the most detailed way: geometries, planes, depth, dynamics, light and dark, colour. It is through this that we further determine the form. We may approach the frame like a mask, where characters move through and beyond the confines of the frame (fig.28), or geometrically composed, with stark oppositions, planes, diagonals, coordinated by the frame (fig. 29), or we may have diffuse and gradual tonal shifts of the image where the elements of the frame are coordinated in relation to each other rather than specifically to the frame itself (fig.30). We may introduce colour, or collapse perspective to a single plane (fig. 31), or the reverse, and of course all of this as part of a spatial configuration and consideration of screens.

Fig.28

***Thinking Space*, Ellis, 2021**

Fig.29

Thinking Space, Ellis, 2021

Fig.30

Thinking Space, Ellis, 2021



Fig. 31

Thinking Space, Ellis, 2021

The form is a consequence of the image and the frame, in the manner just described, distributed and arranged spatially. We have then, much as we would find in the cinema, instantaneous sections (images) in movement, the movement-image, and mobile sections (more than one frame/screen – montage), and the possibility of the moving shot. Movement, or movement-images are mobile sections of duration, that is, change in the whole (consciousness), so where, if at all, is the difference between our formulation and the cinematic … either there is an error in the formulation as it is applied here, or we are missing something. We asserted that movement implies the addition of screens/frames when space is immanent or, actual space substitutes for the movement of the camera (or montage), the mobile section therefore is not one in time but one in space, a translation in space. If we take it that we can still have montage within the frame, and a change in frame across space then we have a compound structure. If

the shot is unchanging, fixed and continuous then we have a spatial shot, this would seem necessary if the movement is to be wholly constituted by the addition of frames (screens). We also said that the addition of screens (frames) has the effect of eliminating framing, or of adding space to space, which seems contradictory to the previous assertion. To reconcile the two positions, we give to movement a physical-spatial coordinate, or composition; we return movement to space.

The image we are left with is two-sided, either that of a compound structure, or something which increasingly resembles the snapshot (cold dark matter), or primitive cinema. There is a further possibility, the image *in depth*. We might begin to imagine how we can make forms communicate with one another across space, *despite* space, such that the image ceases to be one of movement and space, an organisation of planes of movement that describe form, to one which may bring us ever closer in proximity to the cinematic image. *Working Class Hero* may once again afford us some insight here. In most respects, situating the screen in the gallery, in the way described returns the cinema to its primordial state, spatializes movement and homogenises time. Movement-image is spatial and time (of the gallery), in the movement image, is not the same time as the time of consciousness, that splits itself into pasts, presents and futures (time-image); perhaps for the spectator, but not for the image. In the gallery film there is only the reduction of movement to spatial configuration and the time of the present or measured time of the clock, unless the images can be brought into some greater coherence, or there is cinema proper, with seats, durations, black-box. *Working Class Hero* is a good example where coherence is achieved, by connecting the forms, individual frames, one to another, spatially but also *in depth*, from the single to the collective, one to the many. It is as though the present opens out onto the whole of history, stretching out in both directions; this is an image of time and of bodies, that generates the sensation and gives it back to thought. The song is powerful in this respect, it is an accumulation of voices (bodies) but on its own is not sufficient. The form, sound and frames coalesce, a single image in which each part resonates with the others. It is the 'violence' of the image and its 'vibration', the composition of the whole, each part 'communicating' with the other parts, as in sensation, not representation or abstraction, but *resonance*.

We are left then with a final question, of the potential for the image to 'think' itself, and towards analysis. We established at the outset, in relation to Kuntzel's notion of défilement, an intervention between the film as it exists as a reel of simultaneous images, and the projection of this according to conventions of cinema. In the analysis, the mechanism is a substitute, analogous to the psychic apparatus, of perception, and memory, and that the film work takes place

between these two; a Freudian model applied to the cinematic apparatus essentially. What Kuntzel reveals more than anything is the possibility of the expressive function of 'writing' for a creative intervention for analysis, this is not wholly unique in the cinema, but it remains for the moment only a possibility.

The movement image, as fact, is neither abstract or figurative, it 'makes' movement, and so does not rely on reference for its appeals to something, in the way that for example some of painting does, notwithstanding earlier discussion, the sun rises, or rather the image is capable itself of rising. In this way the cinema was conceived as something new (shock), distinct from the other arts whilst able to contain them; the movement-image as shared power of what forces thinking (shock) and what thinks under it, movement; a circuit, the movement of thought itself. The cinema gives us thought, at least this is the position of some of the early pioneers (Eisenstein, Gance, Murnau, Lang). Taking Eisenstein as the example, montage is given as the intellectual process itself, which under the shock ['the very form of communication of movement in images', with *opposition* defining 'the general formula, or the violence of the image' (2005, p153)] thinks the shock. This, according to Deleuze, is the definition of the *sublime*, 'that the imagination suffers a shock which pushes it to the limit and forces thought to think the whole as intellectual totality which goes beyond imagination' (Deleuze, 2005, p.152). In the most straightforward sense, we cannot imagine infinity, but we can think it and confronting the unimaginable the shock propels the faculty of thought towards this goal. In the same way the movement-image that the cinema gives to us, new as it was, and previously unimaginable, confronts the imagination. The cinema gives us the ability to think.

There is a concomitant moment, from the shock to the thought and from the thought back to the affect, which 'gives passion back to the intellectual process' (p.154) and which is why intellectual cinema has as its correlate (according to Eisenstein) 'emotional intelligence'. In essence, we intuit the whole, the unimaginable, through the mixture of its parts; an internal monologue made real. The ambition it would seem then is to make conscious 'the unconscious mechanisms of thought' and this is achieved through metaphor, the connection of images under the unity of a single image. We may now return to our previous example, *Working Class Hero*, and consider how not only is the space reduced or immanent to movement and time through resonance, but also how this resonance is formed as a unity of the differentiation of its parts: one face, many faces, the face of a people. We can go further to say that there is a *harmony* achieved between the parts in other words, achieved through *metaphor*.

There is a further moment of metaphor beyond the harmony achieved between terms, that of the identity of image and concept, one in the other, not from-to, and that is 'dramatic,

pragmatic, praxis, or action-thought'. This 'action-thought' indicates '*the relation between man and the world*' (p.156, italics original) and distinguishes the cinematic image from the theatrical image in the way that it goes 'from the outside to the inside, from the setting to the character, from nature to man' or 'the externalisation of man' (pp.156/157) and means that nature 'must be named *the non-indifferent*' (p.157, italics original). Woman 'becomes the collective subject' of her 'own reaction, whilst nature becomes the objective human relation', the unity of nature and woman (fig.32). We can refer to and extend our consideration of *Working Class Hero*, of the many (mass) to the individual, the one *in* the many.

Fig.32

***Thinking Space*, Ellis, 2021**

There is still yet another view, that of the powerlessness, or 'impower' of thought. Antonin Artaud gives expression to a view of the cinema as he saw it become, that has elsewhere been described as 'mediocrity' and 'fascistic' in its production, 'the imbecile world of images caught as if by glue in millions of retinas will never perfect the image that has been made of it.' (Artaud cited in Deleuze, p.160). The dream of an intellectual cinema, a cinema of thought, of 'a whole thinkable through montage', of 'an internal monologue utterable through image' (p.162) collapses under an 'art of the masses' turned towards propaganda and manipulation. We perhaps must be reminded here that we are only concerned with the possibility for an analytic capacity in the form of gallery film. There is the possibility though, that when the cinematic image confronts its 'aberration' of movement, 'carries out a *suspension of the world* or affects the visible with a *disturbance*' then rather than make thought visible (Eisenstein) it directs itself towards what does not 'let itself be thought in thought' or 'seen in vision' (p.163). Thought is to be confronted with its own impossibility through the powers of the false and by confronting its own limit. This is the moment where we abandon any attempt to make an image of thought, in the way so far described, through metaphor or otherwise, and the moment where cinema is too great for us to be thought. In its stead we are left with only the belief of the link between the image and the object, between the relation of one (gallery film) to the other (cinema) because the latter is already in the former. It is left then for one to show what it can, not the

cinema, but a commitment to it, to demonstrate its own commitment and give back to it that which it already is: image.

There are strategies implied if we follow this route. The first is to abandon metaphor and internal monologue. A second method is to make the process deductive, as of thought. Artaud's objection, of the 'impower' (impotence even) of thought is contrasted here by the *problem*. It is the deductive reason as an expression of the problem in each instance ('spatialising cinema') rather than linking thoughts over which there is 'formal power, in a model of knowledge'. There is an accord here with studio practice as a process of determination which does not restore 'knowledge, or the internal certainty that it lacks' but 'puts the unthought into thought, because it takes away all its interiority to excavate an outside in it, an irreducible reverse-side, which consumes its substance' (p.170). What we *know* about the cinema are the deductions we can make of it in the process of adapting it for the gallery. This is the way we restore thought, not as an interior mode of knowledge but by the *progression* of determination as a 'belief' in cinema. Our 'viewpoint' is spatial, and it is through this 'lens' that we bring *relief* to the cinema. *Depth* in this respect, and to which we previously referred, is the depth of viewpoint (stance) and a way to introduce a problem into cinema; the problem is one of form (and void) and the solutions may be many and varied. When we resolve to form (literal) the cinematic we find that we generate further problems[24] for instance, the possibility that movement is missed, or that the out-of-view is reconstituted, so too the relationship with sound. What we do in effect is carve the cinema out, rather than to locate its 'essence'. Each problem requires we approach the image anew: two adjacent screens, two screens facing, screens pushed into corners, distributed around space and across different spaces, leaning against one another, shattered into a thousand pieces. Each time we introduce the problem of actual space into the cinematic we are required to confront the image.

The choices we make when confronting a problem give rise to solutions, solutions which are evidence of only our choice, in other words, it is not the choice to do this or that which matters so much, but the choice to choose at all; this is in itself a 'definition'. It is left to us then to connect the impossibility of thinking the cinema (non-choice), with the thought (choice) resolved by the problem, and this can and must be done through the form. The condition of choice must be made visible, we can choose this, AND we can choose that. In our terms the choices are *how* we adapt the cinematic in space, so there is a *between* and there is a limit between: two-adjacent panels and contents - two facing panels and contents. We asserted

[24] See Appendix, 'storyboard' and script

earlier on that the out-of-view was challenged by the simultaneous and multiple frame, everything tends towards an out of view, or everything is always 'in view', when speaking of a form in space, of screens. What is not apparent in this formulation relates to the contents, the specifics of the image on screens. The *between* also applies to the between images and previously we only concerned ourselves with the movement image (visual), and its constitution in spatial arrangements, between one screen and another. Once we introduced the problem of sound as a distinct image and its relationship to the seen (non-synchronous sound) we also introduced the notion of *false continuity* or the disjuncture between images (non-associative). Between the first position (movement) and the second (false continuity) then, we have the possibility of introducing not the thing itself but the *between* images: this and this, AND, this and that. This is not retrograde motion unified under the one but rather a mixing of different terms, and therefore revealing the choices being made (fig.33).

Fig.33

***Thinking Space*, Ellis, 2021**

The two positions are also the two ways in which the whole is constituted through the problem, on the one hand the space of the gallery (and configuration) is support for the movement image and on the other the space of the gallery is the contingent component of the image. In the former, movement-image is subordinated to space and in the latter space

coordinates the movement-image; one is arranged within the other or, one arranges the other. The outcome of this is that metaphor and harmonics are replaced with 'atonal series' (p.177) and the question of progression which refers 'to a way of seeing or speaking, for its own purposes' (p.177), or otherwise, an expression.

By imposing a problem from the outside then, we carve out the cinematic, sculpt with it, in two ways which is to say, we may make sculpture with it, but we also must work with the medium as a tangible substance and in so doing develop understanding. Once we can demonstrate the pliability or plasticity of this understanding, that the substance itself is malleable, through the mixing of its forms, opposed to say 'juxtaposition', necessary to avoid establishing some 'interior knowledge', then we reveal it as *expressive*. In this respect it is not so much that, in Kuntzel's terms, we add expression to the already expressive but that through our operation we reveal this as the condition. For Kuntzel there was a hidden, repressed cinema. For us cinema is there to be seen already so the question is not how to reveal its hidden secret but how to show the already visible, expression as expression. This is a cinema we may already be familiar with and from which we can further develop our own sense of practice.

Conclusions

Gallery film, understood as film within the gallery for the *intermittent* spectator, the perambulator, meditator, and curious epistemophile, even cinephile, in a space equated with the museum, collection, and form of display, and which therefore presupposes, ontologically, something of its objects, challenges the artist, spectator and gallery all. Cinema is an altogether different artform from that which we have historically associated with the gallery, viewed within 'the black box', with a persistent audience, no less curious or thoughtful than their counterparts in the museum or gallery. Art (the fine arts) has an unproblematic relationship with sculpture and painting but in the same way that we can view cinema as a means of expression and of thought, these are no more than means of expression, one of space and form, and the other of light and colour. There is a simple distinction between these mediums however, providing we ignore for the moment the durability of the medium itself, and that is movement and time; paintings do not move, nor do sculptures. Of course, there may be objection to this, and we outlined some instances where change, movement, and time, are constituent elements of sculpture and painting: earthworks, mobiles, and installations are just some of the ways that this view can be challenged. Contemporary practice goes further, to accommodate processes, or at the least ideas, concepts, but here we move beyond the creation of sensation and into, arguably, the realm of philosophy; it is after all the concept that takes priority here.

Despite calls from some quarters for a revised history of artist film that redresses the apparent position in respect to narrative and cinematic 'illusion', a phenomenological account, derived from sculptural minimalism, that the 'pioneers' of artist film (the history goes further back than the 50s and 60s) extended into film practice, has persisted in analysis. There are more recent and contemporary shifts in thinking, specifically with respect to Deleuze, but these are relatively few in number and the project of applying a method can be seen as something of a development or continuation of this project[25], and of which our attempt makes some contribution. Otherwise, artists film is largely figured within a discourse on the avant-garde, and with respect to modernism, and post-modern codas, and accordingly, territory is fashioned in contrast to 'mainstream' cinema.

The cinema has its own history, its own developments. If we assume the same position as Pasolini, a cinema of poetry has been subsumed by a cinema of spectacle, and entertainment, for the masses. This development is unsurprising given the nature of the medium, and its

[25] Art and the Moving Image, (Ed. Tanya Leighton, 2008) largely follows a similar analytical trajectory and identifies a number of the key issues and developments. Notably there is included in the collected essays recourse to Deleuze as a key theorist and one essay dedicated to discussion of his work.

commercial reach. There is of course much film activity that falls outside of this narrow definition and regardless, an essential contribution is not limited to one kind of film practice or another. The gallery is largely an altogether different commercial enterprise, although commercial nonetheless. Of course, both cultural spheres benefit from relatively complex funding mechanisms that include public finance and support, in varying degrees. In the process, of reaching its audience, cinema has been aligned with theatre and the novel, but these are wholly different in terms of their means and materials. Narrative prose, it is argued, is not the providence of the cinema, and it's (cinema's) 'writing' takes place through a complex process of determination, albeit one that has been industrialised and therefore mechanised and professionalised over time, as is the case across all the various craft skills that together constitute the film work. Pasolini insists that the poetry of cinema persists regardless, even in the most commercialised of films; perhaps *subsists* is a better characterisation.

We must be wary of any impulse to prioritise language within the cinematic. The means of its expressiveness are not linguistic. Whether or not we have sufficiently made the case for this, and others have done it better already, but by focussing attention on the aesthetic and sensible form we have indicated how this can be taken as the case. The imposition of narrative prose (story) only conceals its means and a reverse operation is enacted when we come to represent the cinematic, it is only from the images (visual and sound) that we can provide a reading or interpretation at all, the construction of which is reliant on the construction of the image in the first instance; to proffer meaning that resides outside of the thing to which we apply it might be construed as reproducing one in the other without justifiable logical cause.

Thierry Kuntzel redresses, in some respects, the priority of language over the medium and provides an alternative analysis through the notion of défilement. Video was the tool Kuntzel used for the analysis and intervention between the film as it exists as a reel of simultaneous images and the projection of this according to conventions of cinema. In the analysis, the mechanism is a substitute, analogous to the psychic apparatus, of perception, and memory, and that the film work takes place between these two; a Freudian analytic. What Kuntzel reveals more than anything is the possibility of a creative intervention for analysis. Writing's 'weakness' is its potential lack of expression, which in an analytic formulation is supressed or subtracted. When considered in relation to film's powers to conceptualise, it was the expression that was seen to obscure the idea (concept), like a pencil in a glass of water, the idea becoming bent and warped. Deleuze on the other hand makes a more straightforward case in many respects, artists think in and with sensations (percepts and affects), and create sensations (thoughts), whilst philosophers think with concepts. The question arises, to what extent it is the providence of the

artist to generate concepts rather than sensations, Deleuze does not rule out the possibility of the artist creating concepts but rather indicates that the closer to concept the art becomes, the less it may be considered art at all, lacking in expression. Some connection was made between these ideas and the video or film essay. The proposition then is reformulated: expression is a form of thought, foundational thought, and is the first apprehension of the thing in or through sensation. We reveal something, the thought, through the creation of sensations. The nature of this thought may be original, not necessarily, and is achieved in a process of becoming, that is, by proximation. This view is one in which film may be both analytic and expressive and describes to some degree the methodology.

The objective then was to find the 'place' (zone) where one entity finds its expression in another. The method we followed is simple, to apply the practice of one to the expression of the other, as a means with which to develop understanding, and upon which we can draw conclusions and begin to develop our own concepts. Practice in this respect is a means rather than an end in itself, research through or led by practice. If there is objection that, prior to practice there is a conceptual account with we have developed understanding of our subject in the first instance, then we can offer this, the notion that cinematic images are images in motion, that the image itself moves (changes), that there is composition of and in the image, then this is evident in itself. Ultimately the attempt has been to progress towards a conceptual account, derived from reflection on a practical engagement with the problem, however. The method is one that demands in the first-place experience of the thing (cinema) and it is necessary to engage in a concerted viewing of examples from cinema prior to and throughout the process and of which we were able to offer some limited account of. For the artist to study their subject this way is certainly nothing new. Without this then we are only given onto supposition, received ideas, cliché, or that we commit a *tracing* procedure, that of tracing the identity of one thing in another. The danger as it may be seen is that we commit a similar error in our efforts to practice, what is conventionally referred to as stimulus, worse still, derivation, or appropriation. This need not be too great a concern if our aims are to arrive at a conceptual understanding, rather than at any pretence of originality of art in the process.

The theoretical underpinning has been more foundational than as simply a guide to the method (methodology). It is through the theoretical adjustments made in the first instance that we were able to reconsider the phenomenological construct in an approach towards gallery film. It must be noted that this formulation has increasingly lost favour in practice over the past decade or so, with artists increasingly making work on its own terms, rather than premised by some (phenomenological) relation to the viewer, whether this be to highlight a perceived

ideology at work, or to signal the relationship of screen to spectatorship in other ways. Video 'installation' is now almost ubiquitous in a gallery setting, and perhaps this, more than the aforementioned stimulus, is reason to place gallery film under close scrutiny.

There is a formulation of gallery film as an art form in its own right, separate from painting, sculpture, and cinema. For this to be the case then, the form must have something to which the others cannot lay claim; the medium must be specific in some way. Notwithstanding a rigorous discussion on sound and the sound image, it is safe to say that without the camera there is no cinema. The cinematographic image is not constituted by poses, in the way that for example animation is, whether or not animation has since taken something from the cinema in its approach to the image. The cinematograph takes snapshots as it were, twenty-four times a second and reconstitutes movement by stringing these onto abstract time. The shot in this respect, misses movement because movement cannot be constituted by the spatial location of objects against abstract time, movement is concrete. The frame, that which is in the shot, is divisible, in the most straightforward way, we can 'cut'. We can also join frames to other frames (splice) and in so doing generate an image that is *in* motion (changes). This is the specific quality of cinema although the analysis here is not our own but how Deleuze lays out his thesis at the start of Cinema 1, and that guided our own exploration.

Prior to this we can posit that without the lens there is no image and thereafter the mechanism with which to record the image, and the moving image specifically. None of this however presupposes the cinema, which is what happens subsequently, but sets the conditions in which cinema evolves. Indeed, at the outset 'cinema' more closely resembled painting and it took some time for the same medium to develop as a form, 'things are never defined by their primitive state, but by the tendency concealed in this state' (Deleuze, 1992, p.25). The cinematic issues from the medium. We cannot suppose, to arrive at the cinematic, without the mechanism because the two are one and the same thing.

The medium affords then a particular kind of expression, or production of sensation, a production that is germinal at the outset and that finds its fullest expression once the camera ceases to attach itself to space and is emancipated into movement proper: the camera *in motion*, montage (mobility of camera), and sequence (mobile section). A static camera that records a train arriving at a station and is fixed in space, the frame unchanging, only gives us the successive positions of the form of the train that moves in relation to a fixed point – spatial; that this may happen in time does not itself constitute an image of time and the image *itself* is relatively static. In this respect, the mobiles of Calder are still spatial, sculptural, movement proper is only constituted in the gallery by the movement of the spectator, unless perhaps we

introduce the cinema into the gallery, which is where we began. It is not strictly speaking possible to produce cinema outside of itself, this may seem obvious to some. Whilst this may be the case, it is possible that we can think the cinema in other ways, through other means. There is no expansion of the former by the latter but rather an approximation, a *becoming* cinema.

It may be contested that what is specific to gallery film is its reorientation around sculptural minimalism, but this hardly seems specific, and is that to which Krauss makes the critical designation, compound structure. In some sense the same criticism might be levelled at Ahtila's *Horizontal- Vaakasuora*, (2011) but the case was made here that the separate panels constitute a kind of figuration, as though narrating Serra's *Hand Catching Lead* in a double way, the looping of the image and the multiplication of the frame, adding space to space. The spatial configuration of screens is unique, at least potentially so, in the gallery film, at its most limited through the adjacent multi-channel panel, a common configuration but, allowing for technical restrictions, also limitless in terms of the possibilities. This is a simple statement in and of itself though, what is more pressing is that which the potential offers to the artist

There are problems to be encountered when simply transposing cinema into space unless we do this wholesale and simply move the black-box of the cinema into the gallery. There will always be a technical confrontation between the lighting conditions of a gallery and the necessary darkness for projection, but this is a technical problem as much as a creative one and presupposes projection as the form of display. Nonetheless, the question here refers more directly to (re)production and is an altogether different set of problems than the ones we have posed for ourselves, and we can ask any number of related questions, which is to say, how is ambition squared with technical means. The same problem confronted Gance when he made *Napoleon* and the 'simple' solution proven effective.

The specific challenges, points of conflict, rupture and continuity when adapting cinema for a gallery context are constituted in the first instance by considering the frame of reference, which in the cinema is concealed. It is this which gives rise to the metaphors of window, or mirror: from the relative darkness of the auditorium we see a rectangle of light and changing forms. We sit (usually) facing this rectangle and watch the contortions of its contents, movement, and when experienced at one remove, through a cut that demarcates a present of the image and that therefore constitutes also a past and future, time. The frame of reference of the gallery, in its most reductive sense perhaps, is the gallery itself or to invert this proposition, the art 'object' is constituted by its materiality, traditionally whether this be painting or sculpture, and in our case, the screen. We may object once more and refer back to Renaissance perspective, initiated

in the frescos of Giotto, and the illusions of space contained therein, but we also find here the pictorial and narrative scheme of paintings that decorate the walls of the Scrovegni chapel, of the people who would sit there to worship, of the function of that space, and *its* adornment.

The rectangle of light then, within the gallery or its equivalent, has material property and dimension; this is no less true necessarily than the cinematic rectangle of light. The problems arise therefore from an insistence to impose a spatial configuration on the screen. Even in the darkened gallery, the dimension of the screen is evident, more often than not because the screen is multiplied and configured in relation to the space of exhibition. Once we introduce this problematic into the situation then further questions arise, all of which in this case stem from one central preoccupation, to question the very legitimacy of a practice that places the moving image within the gallery context, this is where the research began. At a time when the screen is a ubiquitous presence in galleries, playing as it were for that audience, we asked certain questions of it:

What are the issues and problems encountered, the specific challenges, points of conflict, rupture and continuity when adapting cinematic works for a gallery context and, what strategies can be proposed as solutions to these problems?

What are the implications, of the adaptive strategies adopted for the transformation of the cinematic to the gallery space, to the understanding of gallery film installation, as a discrete field of cultural and arts practice, with its own history, formalistic devices and by implication, aesthetics?

How can a transformation of cinema constitute an analytic, what procedures or manoeuvres may be necessary, for a gallery film installation to say something about the moving image and fiction cinema?

The oppositions to cinema, that preoccupied the structural and materialist filmmakers, have over time given way to artist work that embraces this other tradition, as a source rather than as counter-definition, to practice. At each turn therefore, it is a necessity to engage with the cinema as it has existed, historically, whilst acknowledging here the limitations of any survey undertaken, and with reference to the distinctions made between 'experimental film' and mainstream cinema. In its most primitive state then, we have the camera, and the frame, in the sense that the frame is everything that is in the image. Once the camera has been freed of its relative immobility, primitive cinema, we add to the frame the shot, editing and montage, continuity of action and movement, and designated simply as the 'movement-image'.

The construction of movement within cinema then is allied to the mobility of the camera, and the changing nature of the frame. Once we have introduced a spatial component into our confrontation with the screen, the first problem we encounter is simply that of connecting shots. This assumes that connections are to be made across screens, although the possibility that the same operations may also take place within the single frame is not discounted but, to resort to this one operation is to simply reproduce the cinema. In the discussion, a virtual viewer/spectator was introduced as a means to illustrate the problem as conceived, rather than as a means to constitute the solution; this is an important detail of the method. We may have just as well considered the notion of sculptural form in place of this mobile spectator, and at times the latter device was employed in the discussion as an alternative. In practice, this virtual spectator is constituted by the artist in the development of a piece of work, and the use of the sketchbook-storyboard was here the principal mechanism with which to visualise the problem and consider the solutions prior to filming. The separate frames of the sketchbook-storyboard constituted possible configurations of screens with images rather than consecutive sequences of shots alone, which is what we find in a conventional approach to the storyboard; the distinctions may be narrow but exist nonetheless. The necessary characterisation is of the objective, to spatialise the cinematic image.

When focussed solely on the movement-image, of shots that change according to visual dimensions such as, composition, proximity to the object, and point and angle of view, then it is apparent that in order to accommodate the translation of this movement, from the cinematic construction to that in space, that there is a concomitant reduction of movement, and therefore time, to space. In the simplest terms this can be illustrated by considering one panel or screen showing the same object from different perspectives consecutively or two panels showing the same object from different perspectives concurrently. This may seem like a simple assertion but in the process of negotiating the adjustment in practice, from a simple cinematic sequence to its spatial approximation, and thereafter through the derivation of the terms, conceptually, the details of this translation were clarified: space substitutes for the movement of the camera. It followed, both through practice and thereafter in the conceptual account, that the translation of a more complex event implied an expansion of space, and theoretically the implication was that the addition of frames (screens) is a tendency that opposes framing and adds space to space. Relating this in cinematic terms then, the composition of frames or screens in space replaces the ordering of events in time; when we are confronted with simultaneous images, in a spatial arrangement, we have an image, or composition, of a whole which approximates the sequence of film. There is an implication, that these adjustments constitute a compound image, one which

tends to flatten movement, time and space, or alternatively present us with the 'snapshot', *cold dark matter*, the instantaneous section. This new problem, constituted by the initial practical solutions, is overcome by images *in depth* that rely on *resonance* and *harmony* and that constitute a metaphorical image, and that finds its cinematic equivalent in the work of Eisenstein, amongst others. We identified this solution in the example of *Working Class Hero.*

In many respects, situating the screen in the gallery, in the way described returns the cinema to its primordial state, spatializes movement and homogenises time. Time of the gallery and of the gallery film, is not the same time as cinematic time, the time of consciousness and memory, that splits itself into pasts, presents and futures. In the gallery film there is, taken to its logical extremity, only the present, or measured time of the clock, unless the images can be brought into some greater coherence, or there is cinema proper, with seats, durations, black-box; Gordon's *24 Hour Psycho* is some testament to this. *Working Class Hero* is a good example where coherence is achieved by connecting the forms, individual frames, one to another, spatially but also *in depth*, from the single to the collective, one to the many, and that therefore might be said to constitute the gallery movement-image 'equivalent'. *Working Class Hero* therefore figured time, through metaphor, and as such is an indirect image of time. It remained a question as to whether there is also a gallery equivalent of a time-image proper, of the temporal cut that distinguishes a past and future around a present.

In the final analysis we returned to the question, whether there may be a creative-analytic function to gallery film and how a transformation of cinema may constitute this analytic. The question issued from a number of contexts, in the first instance from the notion that the introduction of screens into galleries destabilised conventional relationships to the screen, thus affording the gallery film installation this particular function. The film essay as a possible model, specifically in terms of its mode of address and use of the rhetorical form, and the notion of 'truth-making', progressed the discussion on philosophy in art. Kuntzel unravelled the film to release it from its presentational organisation and uncover it as a reservoir of images: a psychic apparatus. Between the operation of the latter and the mode of the former we identified something of the manoeuvre which amounted to a commitment, or belief, in cinema, that was operationalised through a studio methodology and praxis. Rather than lay claim to some essentialist truth of our subject, we located the procedural occupation of approaching the cinematic, through practice, as the necessary operation with which we might say something about cinema. The implications of this are more far reaching than may at first appear and there are existing bodies of knowledge that further approach this question, and there is scope to

develop the research here. On the one hand we have a model of knowledge, and on the other, there is an image of time, or time-image, in the gallery.

The variety of solutions to the problem as it was posed, and that resulted in the final form of the practice, a multi-channel film installation, taken together are constitutive of an analytic. In the form of the presentation it is the case that there are combinations of the various solutions, what may be described as 'series' that variously and in combination constitute the cinematic as expressive material. Applied to analysis, the commitment to an intrinsic knowledge, film as thought, and expressed in the work of Eisenstein, is shown to be impotent. It is in the commitment or belief in the cinematic that opens up the possibility of revealing something about the nature of cinema itself. The essayistic work of Godard was identified as exemplary of such a kind of film practice. Its proximation may be identified in certain forms of gallery film, although in our case, in so far as the practice was undertaken and represented in conclusion by the final multi-channel film installation. In this way, rather than through the method of Eisenstein, we may intuit how an image of thought may be constructed. 'Series' also constitute their own kind of rupture and progression. In the final outcome, to what is a process, the gallery film installation was envisaged as a sort of box, with one single large screen facing two, smaller and adjacent panels, and one corner formed by two further panels at right-angles to one another. Each screen, or pairs of screens, variously contributed an aspect to the whole, and each with its own internal logic and solution to the problem posed by the research questions, sometimes in isolation and at others in combination, across the arrangement. As such, the final outcome, in practice, itself constituted a spatialising of the movement image, and a metaphor, but one that also relied on 'series', of form. It is perhaps pertinent to reflect on the outcome, that a box, or cube, was the 'final' form of the work.

The gallery film is a distinct *field* of artistic practice. A.L. Rees made explicit use of the term and the variety of its concepts in his book, *Fields of View* (2020) and through the collection of essays made a case for the variety of conceptual approaches to artist film and gallery installation under the collective 'category' of *field*. Across the collection of essays is a commitment to an art form and discipline that often resists simple analysis. Throughout the collection there is another commitment that is clear, a commitment to cinema itself. In this research we considered a *becoming* cinema, through the practice of gallery film installation, to find a zone of proximity, as Deleuze would put it, where it is not a case of taking on the identity of the other but rather to consider how one *is* or may be the other. Harmony, resonance, metaphor, and series are all ways in which gallery film installation find a zone of proximity, become cinema.

Whether a harmonic is subject to, or in service of, a literary and theatrical prose; whether resonance is achieved between terms of story or not (it is hard to see how *Working Class Hero* does not tell a story); whether metaphor is established between these terms, harmony and resonance, for our story, whatever it may be; and finally, whether this is part of a series, and that there are other series, to be determined, that we may create; all of these suppose a 'cinematic' image. We may suggest that a harmonic be for its own ends, and that a metaphor can serve a variety of purposes but, referring to Pasolini, this is the quality or *poetics* of all cinema or film, even the most commercial, even e*sthetically rather adult*... In a gallery film installation, harmonies, metaphors, and series are established across screens and within the form of their configuration, it remains compositional. The form of the composition distinguishes the practice as one that has a unique contribution to make as an art form: moving image but not necessarily movement-image, or time-image, strictly speaking; moving image as something else. In this respect it is not art becoming moving image or cinema but a moving-image becoming.

Appendices

Appendix 1: 'Storyboard'




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


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



2/

Presses the bell





















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

Low/High angle









Bus comes into frame, which holds until bus has left frame



Nanny seats herself

1/ 2/






2/
(High Angle)
LS (exit frame)

2/





Figure positioning; moves to front and - sits



CUT TO:


Por missing.



Order of the hangings, progression from work to work - static. Fig 1 is seen from behind (shadow)

1/


MUST BE SEEN.

2/


With short crab
to windows –
owen enters frame
after crab 2/owen
enters frame in crab
3/owen is already
in frame










2
(pendant in pocket)
a/c
(polishes)
c/a
b


1/2


takes pendant out of pocket


scale


1/2
To base of stairs and exits
Front door/takes coat.


Enters and stops. Looks first before approaching.




Angle L/R

Appendix 2: Script

"THINKING SPACE"

Written by

Robin Ellis

"Thinking Space"

Op	Son
1. INT. BUS — DAY	
The light permeates the lids of her eyes: then pink, then red, then black, then orange, white, pink, black.	(voice 1) There is no beginning. We pass through, enter into and exit from. It endures, changes. *We* endure and change.
CUT TO:	
2. INT. HOUSE — DAY	
The house is silent and still.	Now, you are here.
CUT TO:	
3. EXT. MOORLAND	
Wind turbines stroke the prevailing breeze.	Now here.
CUT TO:	
4. EXT. MARKET TOWN STREET	
The townspeople bustle.	Now here. We move on.
CUT TO:	
5. EXT. THE 'TOPS' — DAY	
Mottled, earthen, billows of moorland stretch in all directions. NANNY, young, wholesome, tribal, all in black, packing two largish bags in either hand and another on her back, comes into view. She plods her way across a bridleway towards the road, away from a resolute stone cottage. Her tread leaves traces in the mud. ROAD	(voice 2) The house is smaller than she remembered. The hospital has gone. And the residents. The residents are frightening. The house seems less. (FX) Laughter, people at leisure, 'carnival'.

Nanny falters a moment; beyond looms a beacon monument high on the pike. Nanny looks back and in the background the path away from the house Nanny has just trodden.

(voice 2) The house is exactly as she remembered. There were summer fetes. Her mother would help. A tombola. A cake-stand. Fancy dress. She feels the loneliness.

CUT TO:

INT. BUS — DAY

GERTY, middle-aged and lithe, clutches at her shopping bag.

The bus lurches along. The BELL sounds. The bus pulls to a stop. PASSENGERS' alight, purchase tickets, flash their OAP passes to the stout driver. The bus moves on.

GERTY (VO)
Don't think. Don't think. Put it out… What else?

From the guttered floor of the valley, planes of sunlight and shade deconstruct the steep walls. Cascades and flows, industrial occupancies of the moorland landscape of the West Ridings, form the topographies of history's ardour and ingenuity.

Gerty closes her eyes against the sunlight that strobes through the gaps between houses and trees. The light permeates the lids of her eyes: then pink, then red, then black, then orange, white, pink, black.

Gerty opens her eyes and watches the outside slipping by. Gerty presses the BELL.

(voice 2) Back to the beginning. Is there a beginning?

(Voice 1) There is no beginning.

She is happy. she wants to be a better version of herself. She is unsatisfied.

(voice 2) Her husband had an affair. Great hands all over...

(voice 1) He was loyal. He died. She feels guilt for his death, for her persistent attempts to appease everyone around her, to her dissatisfaction and sclerosis.

One evening at dinner, he died. She hesitated to act. A future without him manifested in her imagination. He died on the kitchen floor that night with her son watching on. She is afraid.

CUT TO:

EXT.THE 'TOPS'/BUS STOP - DAY

Nanny deposits the bags next to a wall at the roadside, relief. Opposite, cows amble in a muddy field; old tractor parts strewn across; the hills roll out behind.

Nanny sits on one of the bags. Searching off down the road, a diminutive circular can be seen approaching. The bus WHEEZES to a halt. Nanny wearily rises, grabs for the bags and heaving against their weight, struggles on.

CUT TO:

(voice 2) *She* is becoming, equal to the hills. She struggles to become. She is undone by her task.

(voice 1) The load is metaphor… The load is premise…

(Voice 2) She carries out her duty. She was happier then but didn't know it. She thought that life was unbearable in this place.

(FX) breaking glass, music, party chatter.

EXT. ROAD - DAY

Empty road, junction, another empty road, another junction.

GERTY'S HOUSE

Gerty pushes back the door and pauses a moment at the threshold listening for signs of life; the house is silent and still.

(Voice 1) Now we are here. We begin again.

Regret persists. She is not free. It may be that life will be better without him. If life is not better once he has gone then this is untrue. If life is better without him then, this was untrue. She is not free. We begin again.

CUT TO:

EXT. BUS STATION - DAY

Nanny stumbles down from the bus and stands a moment, scrutinising the small market town around her. People go about their day. Cars judder to and fro. Some school kids laugh and fight their way along. People go about their business.

(voice 2) Believing that there is always a reason, her prodding and teasing only unsettles and disturbs those around her, who are unable to satisfy her demands. Life is always somewhere else, to be unearthed.

A train scuttles across the viaduct overhead. Nanny checks the time on her watch.

CUT TO:

INT. GERTY'S HOUSE - DAY

Gerty stands at the sink: hands in the soapy water, light bouncing off gleaming soap-bubbles, steam drifts upwards; Gerty sees a cat at the kerbside below.

Gerty strokes a plate with the dishcloth; dirty plates and dishes at the side, clean dishes on the draining board, an empty kerbside, a person at a car farther off down the road.

LIVING ROOM

Gerty enters from the kitchen and stands now at the threshold to the living room. There is unfinished plasterwork and pipes trailing conspicuously; the carpet is worn and tatty, with one wall neatly painted and finished. Sofa and television, and a chair that sits some way towards the stairs, that descend into the space, at the bottom of which stonework is exposed, and a gap between the riser and footer and the stone step underneath.

Gerty moves the chair to create more space between the foot of the stairs and the edge of the chair. Gerty slumps into the chair and furls her self into a ball.

YARD

(Voice 1) The town is unfamiliar?

(Voice 2) Yes, she strives to recreate the world around her.

(Voice 1) The past is immanent to the present. The past is present, and the sedimentation of its presence testifies to time. We begin again. There is no beginning. She has lived in the valley all her life. She wanted to say it all. She grew up in the town and lived there all her life. She loves to swim. Their life together was…

(Voice 3) He does not blame her for what happened. The son is angry, but he doesn't know why. He isn't as competent as he would like to think. He is compelled towards space; she fills space, arranges space. They revolve around one another like planets. The space they leave behind needs filling. Nature abhors a vacuum.

(Voice 1) The son is bored, he does not know what he wants. She does not know what to do. He is curious and sentimental.

(Voice 2) An image of warmth; an image of contemplation; an image of a goal.

(Voice 1) One day, she begins to rebuild. One day she returns to find her husband is still there. He is a pigeon. His bristles make her face itch. She was

Gerty comes out of the house with a basket full of laundry and begins pegging sheets on the line, the sheets glow in the light and their shadows dance across the flags as they billow in the breeze.

Gerty picks up the washing basket, and sees a figure appear, shadowed behind the sheets.

CUT TO:

INT. CURIOSITY SHOP - DAY

All manner of recovered items jostle against one another in the shop: pine and oak tables and chairs, copper bed warmers, and bronze pans, Nazi memorabilia and Buddhist figurines, candlesticks, clocks, and rugs.

Nanny stares into a glass display case that houses medals, jewellery and other curious trinkets.

CILLIAN MOSS, a hollowed-out kind of figure, sits at a desk in a small cubicle, carefully counting money out in notes from a tin box.

Cillian considers Nanny for a moment, and the bags Nanny has been carrying, once more deposited on the floor by nanny's side.

Cillian taps the rustle of notes to regiment.

AMALIA MOSS, middle-aged and glamorous, a folklore gypsy, stands to one side, looking on.

AMALIA

a good woman, kept her own. He died.

(Voice 3) He does not blame her for what happened. The son is angry, but he doesn't know why. He isn't as competent as he would like to think. He is compelled towards space; she fills space, arranges space. They revolve around one another like planets. The space they leave behind needs filling. Nature abhors a vacuum.

(voice 2) The old farm house predated the town. She loves the house. Living there affords her freedom.
Her father would keep stock in the barn. And his car. She loved being around it all. She especially liked when her father would bring back from auctions or reclamations of one kind, or another, boxes of random items, usually as spares or simply for their novelty. She would rummage through the boxes, looking for treasure.

You have your work
cut out for you
there

NANNY
Not for long

AMALIA
The house…
(Beat)
Perhaps we'll see
you more often

NANNY
I've no reason to
keep it.

Cillian clears his throat, licks his fingers, counts again, and adds a couple more notes from the tin, and taps again all the while deferring to Amelia's observance.

CILLIAN
(To Amelia, then to Nanny)
Okay?

Amelia begins to polish the cabinets.

Nanny turns back from the glass case. Cillian, rising, closes the tin and puts it up on the shelf above.

NANNY
I'm keeping this.

Fishing a piece of jewellery from her pocket Nanny dangles a pendent, mossy green stone set in silver on the end of a fine chain, for all to see.

CUT TO:

INT. GERTY'S HOUSE/TOILET - DAY

Gerty sits on the toilet, legs together, and trousers round her ankles, with one hand clasped inside the other across her thighs.

Gerty stares towards the door. Gerty reaches for some toilet paper and wipes herself.

LIVING ROOM

A pair of feet hangs over one edge of the sofa, and the top of a head can be seen lolling at the other end. A large pair of boots lies discarded on the floor.

Gerty quietly descends the stairs, creeps through and past, before leaving the house.

(Voice 1) He left home when he was sixteen years old. He worked in an abattoir and left home. He cleaned the blood off the floors in an abattoir. The smell clung to his insides. The smell got inside.

He was sick on his first day. The smell of disinfectant and blood and meat.

He left home at sixteen and worked. He was in and out of work. He left home at sixteen and did nothing. He may not survive on his own.

CUT TO:

INT. CHARITY SHOP - DAY

Nanny arrives at the charity shop and hauls one of the bags onto the counter.

The woman at the counter, ROSA, plump and all tie-dye and bangles, pulls open the bag and begins to take items of clothing out, one-by-one; Rosa treats each with some degree of reverence, folding them carefully before laying them on the counter.

ROSA
I'm so sorry...

NANNY
(A little taken aback)
Thanks

ROSA
We're all going to miss her, so much.

(voice 2) Her mother filled the house with things from the shop, exotic things.

(voice 1) After her father left…

(Voice 2) Her mother seemed to struggle. After her father left… Her mother was invigorated. Friends would visit, she was charitable. Money was tight. Life is always somewhere else, to be unearthed.

NANNY
Is that…

ROSA
This can't be easy?

NANNY
They're not much use to her now.

ROSA
No, I suppose not…

NANNY
It's best just…

ROSA
Perhaps… Would you agree to gift aid? I just need a postcode; you can use your mum's, if you like.

Nanny dips into her pocket and pulls out the small bundle of notes, the ones Cillion gave to her in the Curiosity shop.

Nanny pulls a couple of notes from the bundle and scrunches them into Rosa's hand.

NANNY
Will this do?

ROSA
That's very generous

NANNY
You can keep the bag.

Rosa begins putting the clothes back in the bag. Nanny exits.

CUT TO:

EXT. MOORLAND/VALLEY – DAY

Turbines sweep the breeze.

(Voice 1) There is no beginning.

CUT TO:

(FX) A train passes through.

EXT. RESEVOIR - DAY

A young boy, ruddy-faced scamp, is skimming stones. Gerty sits on a nearby bank watching on.

(Voice 1) Her son watched on. She watched on.

(Voice 2) And waited. Is she to be accused?

When Gerty looks back, the boy is gone. Panicked, Gerty searches for sight of the boy and scrutinises the surface of the reservoir. Gerty rises to look more closely but sees the boy now on the track above.

(Voice 1) It was for him she… She acted, with indifference. To see with his eyes…

Gerty relaxes.

GERTY(VO)
I wanted to ...
I'm sorry.

The boy turns and runs away.

CUT TO:

EXT./INT. LIBRARY - DAY

EDITH EDIN is behind the library counter, munching on a biscuit. JULIANNA GILL is tidying shelves, casting the occasional galnce. A couple of people are using the computing facilities in an adjacent room. Nanny enters.

(Voice 3) Elizabeth Wem was enamoured by his otherness. He blew in from another place. He was exotic. She was determined. They married and had a daughter. She didn't understand; he was a dreamer and full of sentimentality.

JULIANNA GILL watches as Nanny approaches the desk.

EDITH
Hallo!

She became listless, restless. She threw parties. Such fun they have. Such passion there is. He surrounded her with things, beautiful things, but they were not enough. She wanted excitement, new experiences.

Nanny heaves a bag onto the counter and fishes out a library card from her pocket, handing it over to Edith.

EDITH
Oh-my.

NANNY
How much?

EDITH
A lot, by the looks of things. Let me scan this in first, it won't take too long.

Edith takes one of the books from the bag and opens the cover. She scans the barcode inside. The computer makes a disgruntled BLEEP.

EDITH
Jules, have you got a minute?

JULIANNA GILL snaps closed a book she is holding.

CUT TO:

EXT. SCHOOL - DAY

Gerty stands outside a school. Children run around, gaggles in corners, skip, tag, and play, all under the supervision of two TEACHERS. The teachers eye Gerty suspiciously from within the fenced playground. Gerty notices their inquisition, checks her watch, and skulks away.

(Voice 1) She is full of longing and regret. She settled for less than she hoped for, with him. He was… a common man.

(Voice 3) A good man

(Voice 1) Yes. The radical moments in the *everyday* disturbs the senses.

CUT TO:

INT. LIBRARY - DAY

Julianna has joined Edith behind the counter. Julianna sweeps crumbs from the counter, picks up yet another book and punches-in something

(Voice 3) She…

(Voice 2) Elizabeth

on the keyboard of the computer.

EDITH
Shouldn't be much longer

NANNY
Sorry! Mum, she was unwell for a While

JULIANNA
(Indicating the book)
Three years!

NANNY
No. Not that long. Sorry!

EDITH
No need to apologise dear.

ENTRANCE PORCH

Gerty enters, immediately producing a copy of the previous council meeting minutes from her bag.

LIBRARY DESK

Gerty extends the crumpled sheets of paper to Julianna.

JULIANNA
(eyeing the ragged sheets)
What am I supposed to do with these?

GERTY
I've had other things…

EDITH
We heard.

JULIANNA
(To Nanny)
Would you excuse me a moment?

(Voice 3) Yes. She was spoilt, and spiteful. She was mean.

She wouldn't begrudge them a laugh, she loved a good joke.

(Voice 3) She went suddenly. Alone. She had friends… occupation. She is in decline.

NANNY
I am in a bit of a hurry.

JULIANNA
Won't take a minute

Julianna starts rummaging through some files.

Nanny peels off to one side and begins to look up and down the aisles of books, scanning the shelves of romantic novels, local history, and general knowledge.

LIBRARY DESK

Gerty looks over at Nanny in the adjacent room. Nanny has found a book and is looking through its pages.

JULIANNA
(to Gerty)
Didn't see you there

EDITH
I hardly recognised her.

JULIANNA
She's the image of Lizzy! Not a bit like her father though, eh Gert?

Gerty looks at the nails of her left hand, turns them over then considers the nails of her right hand.

JULIANNA (CONT'D.)
So, Owen's back.

EDITH
Now he *is* the image of his father.

GERTY
(tapping her wrist)

(Voice 3) Time presents itself as false, memory as unreliable in the face of the present. The past is a chasm in which we locate ourselves; the present is our connection with the past and future. The past persists without us.

(Voice 2) Time splits in two either side of the present, into the past or future. She will leave this place. This place exists without her. She is in this place and will always be in this place; the future in the present, the past in the present. She is here, she is not here.

Must go.

Gerty exits. Nanny appears at the counter.

JULIANNA
You can just leave these… I'll sort it out. Account closed, no charge.

ENTRANCE LOBBY

Gerty is at the notice boards in the entrance lobby. The boards are covered with local government advice and guidance pamphlets, local amateur dramatic production advertisements, pleas for information on lost pets, the usual spread of things to do and see.

Nanny makes her way through from the library and exits the building.

Gerty takes another scrumpled sheet of paper from her bag and pins a copy of the minutes from the previous town council meeting and notification of upcoming sessions to the board, then follows.

CUT TO:

EXT, LIBRARY - DAY

Nanny is outside the library; she now has only her back-pack. Nanny watches as a train floats over the viaduct and then heads of in the other direction.

Gerty exits the library, and watches Nanny go. Gerty checks the time on her watch, once more, and makes in the opposite direction to Nanny.

CUT TO:

INT. PUB — DAY

Nanny is at the bar of a spacious old coach house: low ceilings, numerous rooms and corners, dark and dimly lit, with themed fixtures, scattered ornaments and other idiosyncratic decorations. At a table, close by, sits Cillian. Cillian watches Nanny, for her to notice him.

Nanny takes her drink and, ignoring Cillian, goes to sit next to IDSABELLA, on the other side of the room. She dumps her back pack on the floor and sits.

(Voice) Occasionally a friend would come and spend the night and often there were parties and Nanny would keep out of the way, adults can be a little frightening when they drink alcohol.

CUT TO:

INT. TOWN HALL - DAY

A neoclassical stone box replete with Corinthium columns, pediment, and statues, dominates the town centre.

A few COUNCILLORS and a handful of members of the PUBLIC have gathered.

Gerty sits behind the pretentious desk that circles one half of the committee room. The councillors occupy the remaining chairs behind; in the gallery the public in attendance.

COUNCILLOR 1
Good afternoon everybody We'll get straight on. Apologies for absence and nominated substitutes…

Pause, no-one in the room speaks out.

COUNCILLOR 1
(Cont'd.)
Can I please remind members of the need to disclose any pecuniary interests or other interest that they may have in relation to the items included on the agenda

Item 3: admission to the public; it is not recommended that the public be excluded from the meeting for the consideration of items of business on this agenda

Item 4 minutes of a meeting of the planning committee held on the 25th September

Approved, seconded?
(pause)
Did you get that?

Gerty acknowledges.

COUNCILLOR 1
Item 5: withdrawn applications, have there been any?
Cont'd

COUNCILLOR 1
(silence)
We move on to the first application: application number 18/000675/HSE

COUNCILLOR 2
Thank you Arthur; just an update with what's in the report with received further letters of

objection to those already highlighted…

On her note pad, Gerty doodles images of wind turbines; the scribbles look like pictures of roses.

CUT TO:

INT. PUB — DAY

Nanny and Isabella sit at adjacent tables; a pint of beer each on the table in front of them.

Cillian casts glances across the room.

They both drink, and stare into their respective glasses.

(Voice 2) Once, at a party, she came across her mother with another man, they were kissing and holding each other. Her mother's dress hitched up past her thighs and the man all hands and sweat. She knew the man. Neither her mother nor he noticed her.

CUT TO:

INT. TOWN HALL - DAY

There is a tangible atmosphere in the room, papers are being shuffled, glances exchanged, an overall disquiet has descended into proceedings; the meeting is finished.

Gerty collects her things.

CUT TO:

INT. PUB - DAY

Gerty arrives at the pub accompanied by a couple of the councillors; they order drinks at the bar. One or two of the other faces from earlier have now gathered there also. Cillian is still sitting, not far off. Gerty turns to see who else is in.

(Voice 3) Later on, her parents argued, they did this a lot. Mostly it was her mother shouting and her father would then simply disappear for a day or two.

He is a victim of circumstance. By revisiting the past through the prism

CILLIAN
Gert…

GERTY
Cillian.

CILLIAN
(beat)
Owen's back…

Gerty sees Nanny and Isabella in a corner, now together, still drinking.

GERTY
So's Nanny, I see.

CILLIAN
You weren't at the funeral.

GERTY
We weren't that close.

CILLIN
You were once.

GERTY
Excuse me.

Gerty takes her drink from the bar and goes to join Isabella, and Nanny.

GERTY
(seating herself between them)
My sympathies.

ISABELLA
Any news?

GERTY shrugs the question off.

GERTY
Planning…

Isabella sinks into her pint.

NANNY

of the present, in order to better understand it, we find everything new and the past inaccessible and strange. The past is not gone, we can find ourselves there, still.

She is still a child to him, still her mother's daughter. She is both and neither. He is haunted. He insists he is happy.

For what?

GERTY
On the common, three more turbines.

NANNY
Horrible things.

GERTY
I find them graceful, stately almost.

NANNY
I’m not against them in principle…

GERTY
But… Everything in its place!?

NANNY
They diminish the landscape.

GERTY
There will always be industry, around here.

NANNY
That’s not a reason.

GERTY
It defines who we are.

NANNY
It keeps us in our place.

GERTY
We need…

NANNY
What need?

GERTY
To live…

NANNY
But what’s it all for?

The three of them sit in silence; Isabella furtively scans the room; Nanny appears deep in reflection; Gerty sits quietly, erect and statuesque considering her companions, and Cillian sulking, still across from them on his own.

NANNY rises, picking up her back-pack and knocking her glass as she does. It smashes on the floor. She approaches Cillian.

NANNY
I'm leaving now.

Nanny sits into the chair opposite

CILLIAN
I can call you a cab

NANNY
No need

There is an awkward moment.

CILLIAN
All done then.

NANNY
I suppose so.

CILLIAN
Why don't you come home?

NANNY
I'm happy where I am.

CILLIAN
You have a home here.

NANNY
It's so familiar. Too familiar. I keep expecting, to find… something.

(voice 2) The house is smaller than she remembered. The hospital has gone. And the residents. The residents are frightening. The house seems less.

The house is exactly the same as she remembered. There were summer fetes. Her mother would help. A tombola. A cake-stand. Fancy dress. She feels the loneliness.

(Voice 1) Regret persists. She is not free. It may be that life will be better without him. If life is not better once he has gone then this is untrue. If life is better without him then, this was untrue. She is not free. We begin again.

CILLIAN
What about your family, me? I miss you.

NANNY
I have occupation.

CILLIAN
You seem lonely.

NANNY
I'm doing something.

CILLIAN
What?

NANNY
You should know.

CILLIAN
Well I don't. I don't know. I don't know anything. I'm happy.

NANNY
How can you be happy? You were never happy.

CILLIAN
Never?

NANNY
I must go

CILLIAN
Visit. Stay in touch.

NANNY
I will.

Nanny takes her back-pack and leaves. Cillian is left on his own.

EXT. PUB/CANAL — NIGHT (DUSK)

Nanny stares at the water, the patterns of light and shade merge, separate, form; an image of a building,

(FX) A train passes through.

(Voice 2) Once, you had to stay in the place where you

becomes distinguishable then collapses. Ducks swim idly by. Nanny continues to stare at the slick of water.

Gerty exits the pub and sees Nanny. Gerty joins her at the canal side.

GERTY
It's getting late. Why don't you come back with me.

Nanny starts walking; Gerty stares back into the water.

CUT TO:

EXT. TOW PATH — NIGHT (DUSK)

The two women have walked a way along the canal and once more stare into the inky blackness of the water.

The shadows slide across the surface, into each other, merge, separate.

CUT TO:

EXT. GERTY'S HOUSE - NIGHT

Gerty opens the door but turns to find Nanny is making her way off down the road.

INT. GERTY'S HOUSE (KITCHEN)- NIGHT

Gerty once more stands at the threshold. The room is dark except for the light from the street. A pair of boots just visible, discarded there, in the middle of the kitchen floor, the shadow of a table and four chairs in the centre of the room.

were born. Parishes were responsible for looking after their own.

(Voice 1) Parish councils must have a Proper officer, to implement decisions… They have no powers to make any.

(Voice 2) Children were from the same place as their fathers; wives, the same as husbands.

(Voice 1) The applicant indicates that The Company would provide for community benefit. A sustainable future… Upper Valley Rejuvenation.

No powers to make any decisions…

(FX) A train scuttles past.

Gerty wearily removes her coat and hangs it up. She straightens the boots to one side and turns to face the door.

Moments later, Owen enters. He flicks on the light. The room feels bright now, too bright.

Gerty is motionless

OWEN
You stood there, like that, then. You turn away.

Gerty remains motionless

OWEN
You stood up, walked to where you are now and turned away.

GERTY
I'm sorry.

OWEN
Sorry for what… For who?

GERTY
I am sorry you had to see.

OWEN
There is nothing you could have done about it.

GERTY
I watched, and I let you watch. I shouldn't have done that.

OWEN
You were terrified.

GERTY
You were angry

OWEN

Not at first. Later, yes.

Owen goes to leave the room, pausing at the light switch.

OWEN
Why do you still beat yourself up about it? There is nothing you could have done.

He turns off the lights.

CUT TO:

INT. BUS — DAY

The light permeates the lids of her eyes: black, then pink, then red, then black, then orange, white, pink, black.

(voice 1) There is no beginning. We pass through, enter into and exit from. It endures, changes. *We* endure and change.

CUT TO:

INT. HOUSE — DAY

The house is silent and still.

Now you are here.

CUT TO:

EXT. MOORLAND

Wind turbines stroke the prevailing breeze.

Now here.

CUT TO:

EXT. MARKET TOWN STREET

The townspeople bustle.

Now here. We move on.

CUT TO:/ END

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