The Emergence of the British ‘Security State’? An Evaluation of the Security Executive, 1940 – 1953

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List of Abbreviations

BUF – British Union of Fascists
CID – Committee of Imperial Defence
Comintern – Communist International (also known as Third International)
CPGB – Communist Party of Great Britain
DTC – Defence (Transition) Committee
FOI – Freedom of Information
GC&CS – Government Code and Cypher School
HD(S)E – Home Defence (Security) Executive
IRA – Irish Republican Army
ISC – Inter-Departmental Committee on Security
ISC-CO – Working Party on Co-ordination of Security Policies and Procedures
JIC – Joint Intelligence Committee
LOC – Liaison Officers' Conference
MI5 – Security Service
MI6/SIS – Secret Intelligence Service
SE – Security Executive
SGP – Committee on General Security Procedures
SIC – Security Intelligence Centre
SIGINT – Signals Intelligence
SO – Official Committee on Security
SSC – Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security
TUC – Trade Union Congress
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WAAC – Women's Army Auxiliary Corps
WAAF – Women's Auxiliary Air Force

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Abstract

This thesis explores the origins and development of the Home Defence (Security) Executive (HD(S)E), a body set up in 1940 to address the supposed 'Fifth Column' threat present in Britain. Through a detailed examination of this organisation, hitherto overlooked by historians, it is possible to discern the creation and subsequent expansion of Britain's official 'machinery of security'; the bureaucratic apparatus through which Whitehall could discuss and address security specific concerns. The Executive survived both the end of the Fifth Column threat and the end of the Second World War, first as the Security Executive and subsequently as the Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security, continuing to survive well into the 1950s and beyond. Drawing on archival material from a range of government departments the thesis demonstrates both the rapid expansion of the state's security apparatus and the evolution beyond the Executive's initial remit, its wartime work ultimately encompassing a range of security issues that included the control of information and communication, identity cards, passes and permits, and overseas security. The expansion of the machinery of security itself is demonstrated through an analysis of the various sub-committees created by the Executive, including the Security Intelligence Centre, the Committee on Communism, and the Liaison Officers' Conference. These organisations filled a gap in the machinery of government that Whitehall had not fully appreciated existed – and consequently proved reluctant to give up in 1945, and thereby continued into the post-war world. While rebranded under yet another change of name, the core functions of the post-war organisation can be traced back to its wartime roots, seeing the 'Security State' survive well into the 1950s, and beyond.

Introduction

This thesis studies a hitherto overlooked aspect of the history of the British State during the Second World War and the immediate post-war years: the origins, development and post-war survival of Whitehall's 'machinery of security'. While there is an enduring interest in matters of intelligence and defence, beyond the security intelligence and counter-intelligence work of MI5, security as a clearly defined function of the State continues to be largely absent from most existing historical accounts of 20th Century British history. As such, this thesis offers a new perspective on both Britain's Second World War and the development of the British state in the immediate post-war years. Following the characterisation of Britain in the 20th Century as seeing the emergence of the 'vigilant state', 'secret state', and 'warfare state', alongside the more well-known 'Welfare State', this PhD argues that the creation of the Home Defence (Security) Executive was ultimately responsible for the development of what can be characterised as the British 'Security State'.[1]

The origins of the 'Security State' can be found in Whitehall's response to the fear of a new threat upon the outbreak of the Second World War: the supposed existence of a German Fifth Column – which resulted in the creation of the Home Defence (Security) Executive (HD(S)E) in May 1940. History was, in some respects, repeating itself as a similar scenario playing out in the years leading up to the outbreak of the First World War. On that occasion the fear played a significant part in the origins of two of the key institutional components of the modern-day British intelligence community: the Security Service (MI5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6). Both organisations had their origins in the Secret Service Bureau, which was founded in 1909 in large part as a consequence of whipped up fears about the existence of an army of German spies at large in the UK.[2] While this proved to be a phantom menace, exacerbated in no small part by the popular fiction of the day and spurred on by the popular press, MI5 and SIS survived into the inter-war years, albeit on a heavily reduced basis.

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[1] For 'vigilant state', see Bernard Porter, *The Origins of the Vigilant State: The London Metropolitan Police Special Branch before the First World War*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987). For 'secret state' see Peter Hennessy, *The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War*, (London: Allen Lane, 2002) For 'warfare state', see David Edgerton, 'Warfare State', in *The Rise and Fall of the British Nation: A Twentieth-Century History* (London: Penguin Books, 2019) pp. 339-359.

[2] For material relating to the origins of MI5, and spy-fever in Britain, see Christopher Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm* (London: Penguin Books, 2010) pp. 3-109; Jules J. S. Gaspard, 'A lesson lived is a lesson learned: a critical re-examination of the origins of preventative counter-espionage in Britain'. *Journal of Intelligence History* 16, no. 2 (2017) pp. 150-171; David French, 'Spy Fever in Britain 1900-1915', *The Historical Journal* 21, no. 2 (1978) pp. 355-370. For material relating to the origins of MI6 and spy-fever in Britain, see Keith Jeffery, *MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2010). pp. 3-36 and Philip Davies, *MI6 and the Machinery of Spying: Structure and Process in Britain's Secret Intelligence*. (London: Taylor and Francis Group, 2004) pp. 26-55.

Their continued existence was secured, at least in part, by the threat of Communism from the Soviet Union, before going on to grow again upon the outbreak of the Second World War.[3]

The outbreak of the Second World War saw a return to fears of a threat from a German Fifth Column in the UK.[4] The response, however, was markedly different to that which had been taken thirty years earlier. Rather than seeing the emergence of an organisation designed to deal with both the collection of information abroad and the detection and prevention of enemy secret agents operating at home, the 1940 scare instead saw the emergence of a new Committee – the Home Defence (Security) Executive, that gave matters of security a bureaucratic existence, analogous to the existing Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), and the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID).[5] While the Fifth Column scare did not extend beyond August 1940, this thesis will argue that it had a far more enduring legacy, and an impact upon the British machinery of government, in the form of the security apparatus that was created in order to address it. This proceeded to outlast not only the Fifth Column threat but also the Second World War itself, continuing to function well into the 1950s.[6] The ability of the Executive to survive, to continually adapt to the changing security environment, all the while

[3] For information on MI5 during the interwar period see Andrew, 2010, *The Defence of the Realm*. pp. 112-213; Kevin Quinlan, *The Secret War Between the Wars: I5 in the 1920s and 1930s* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, Incorporated, 2014); and Mary S. Barton, *Counterterrorism Between the Wars: An International History, 1919-1937* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 42-71. For MI6 between the wars see Jeffery, *MI6*. pp. 139-323 and Davies, *MI6 and the Machinery of Spying*, pp. 56-97.

[4] The feared Fifth Column in Britain consisted of aliens, fascists and communists, and will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.

[5] The JIC were responsible for coordinating intelligence between military and civil arms of Government. In 1944, the JIC claimed that its duties were to 'advise the Chiefs of Staff and through them the Minister of Defence and the Cabinet upon the immediate and long terms intentions of the enemy and the probable course of events'. CAB 163/6: 'Charter for the JIC' 13.07.1944. While this bold claim was likely a tactic to attempt to demonstrate importance and thus survive the war, it also demonstrates that building political infrastructure was an approach used at this time. For intelligence, this meant the JIC. For security, this meant the SE. For more information on the JIC see Michael Goodman, *The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee: Volume I: From the Approach of the Second World War to the Suez Crisis* (Oxon: Routledge, 2016); Michael Goodman, 'Creating the Machinery for Joint Intelligence: The Formative Years of the Joint Intelligence Committee, 1936-1956'. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 30, no 1 (2017) pp. 66-84; Michael Goodman, 'Learning to Walk: The Origins of the UK's Joint Intelligence Committee'. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 21, no. 1 (2008) pp. 40-56; Philip Davies, 'Twilight of Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee?' *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 24, no 3. (2011) pp. 427-446. The CID was responsible for controlling matters of defence and encouraging coordination between the Services and intelligence organisations, as defined by Nigel West, *MI5: British Security Service Operations 1909-1945* (London: The Bodley Head Ltd, 1981) pp. 1. For literature concerning the Committee of Imperial Defence, see George Aston, 'The Committee of Imperial Defence: Its Evolution and Prospects', *Royal United Services Institution. Journal* 71 no, 483 (1926) pp. 456-463; John P. MacKintosh, 'The Role of the Committee of Imperial Defence before 1914', *The English Historical Review* 77, no. 304. (1962) pp. 490-503; Valkoun, 2015, 'The Establishment of the Committee of Imperial Defence and the British-Dominion Relations, 1904-1911'. pp. 61-72.

[6] While it can be difficult to identify a specific moment a shift in opinion occurs, Churchill's statement in the House of Commons that the Fifth Column threat had been 'exaggerated in this Island' and through the establishment of the SE it had been 'reduced to its proper proportions and is being gripped and looked after with very high efficiency'. PREM 3/418/1: 'Oral Answers: Swinton Committee'. 15.08.1940.

extending its reach and influence across Whitehall, resulted in the body being considered indispensable by the end of the Second World War, which saw perhaps the most significant adaptation of all; its ability to survive the end of hostilities and to continue dealing with threats to security in peacetime as the Standing Inter-departmental Committee on Security (SSC). The body then underwent a further evolution in 1948, to be known as the Inter-departmental Committee on Security (ISC). The thesis will conclude in 1953, at which point the ISC was allegedly 'wound up', following a critical report by the Tripartite Security Working Group in the previous year.[7] However as this thesis will show, further rebranding of this body occurred alongside a restructuring of security in Britain.[8] While this body was dissolved, material available at the National Archives suggests that the machinery of security that had been constructed by this point continued to survive and thrive.[9]

This thesis argues that the wartime creation of the Home Defence (Security) Executive led to the emergence of a 'Security State' in post-war Britain, by which is meant the organisational machinery, which allowed representatives from all Whitehall departments to come together to consider 'security' as it applied to all aspects of state activity, offering advice, guidance and instructions where necessary.[10] This will be achieved by addressing a number of more specific research questions. The first will be to consider the factors that led to the initial creation of the HD(S)E in 1940, outlined above, in greater detail. Once the origins of the body

[7] CAB 125/128: 'Letter from J.L.V. to Mr Wilson'. 16.07.1954.

[8] This thesis will conclude in 1953 as this is when the major reconstruction of security took place following the report of the Tripartite Security Working Group. Following this, a new body was created called the Official Committee on Security. While this was not the direct successor of the SE, its responsibilities were clearly heavily influenced by the wartime SE. This body continues for several decades, demonstrating that the Security State continued far beyond the confines of this thesis.

[9] Some examples of file material available at the National Archives demonstrating the further existence and evolution beyond 1953 include; T 199/488: 'Poster about Official Secrets Acts 1911-1939: revision through Inter-departmental Committee on Security', 1952-1958; CAB 21/5330: 'Official Committee on Security', 1953-1964; CAB 21/5331: 'Ministerial Committee on Security', 1953-1964; PREM 11/2078: 'Ministerial Committee on Security, 1956-1957. Certain elements of the 'machinery of security' remained, for the Security Officers' Conference was a direct successor of the Liaison Officers' Conference (which was a subcommittee established by, and operating under, the SE). This was stated in CAB 125/128: 'Letter from J.L.V. to Mr Wilson'. 16.07.1954. There are files relating to the Security Officers' Conference available at the National Archives, such as CAB 134/1162: Committee on General Security Procedures: Security Officers' Conference: Papers 1-3 (1953); Meetings 1-2 (1954); Papers 1-8 (1954); Meeting 1 (1955); Papers 1-6 (1955)', 01.12.1953-27.10.1955 and CAB 134/2466: 'Committee on General Security Procedures: Security Officers Conference: Meeting 1 (1956); Papers 1-4 (1956); Meeting 1 (1957); Papers 1-4 (1957)', 08.1956-07.1957.

[10] Despite much of the work of the Security State operating in secrecy, it is worth noting that this is a concept separate to that of the 'Secret State', which is concerned with the world of intelligence and the work of the intelligence and security agencies For research into the Secret State, examples include; R. Gerald Hughes, Peter Jackson and Len Scott, *Exploring Intelligence Archives: Enquiries into the Secret State* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008); Peter Hennessy, *The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War* (London: Allen Lane, 2002)*;* and Hugh Bochel, Andrew Defty and Andrew Dunn, 'Scrutinising the secret state: parliamentary oversight of the intelligence and security agencies' *Policy and Politics* 38, no. 3, pp. 483-487. While there were undeniably links between the civil security network this thesis is focused on and MI5 and MI6, they were distinct entities.

have been explored, the thesis will seek to understand why it came to survive: why did the HD(S)E outlast the end of the Fifth Column threat? The thesis will then go on to address the question of what contribution did the HD(S)E make to security in Britain during the war? How successful was it in developing a cross-Whitehall apparatus of security during the remainder of the Second World War? Here, success will be measured in relation to its ability to pinpoint security threats and to address them efficiently through cross-departmental cooperation. Having explored the Executive's role during the conflict, the thesis will then return to the question of the organisation's ability to adapt: why did the HD(S)E survive the end of the Second World War, and how did it adapt its activities to peacetime? Here the thesis will consider how matters of security continued to occupy departmental attention in the immediate post-war world.

One key theme that will run throughout this thesis is the ability of the HD(S)E to adapt and survive through the Second World War and beyond into the post-war period. The thesis will explore what the organisation's ability to survive can demonstrate about how organisations operate. The cross-departmental nature of this body can also demonstrate how different departments, with different priorities and agendas, come together on the collective issue of security. The thesis will show whether departments are able to work collaboratively to ensure the highest level of security or if the individual concerns of the departments will take priority, and if this is the case, question whether certain departments 'outrank' others when there are disagreements. In his work analysing how organisations operate, Charles Handy states that 'change is a necessary condition of survival…' and this thesis will evaluate how the HD(S)E changed over time enabling it to survive in significantly different political climates.[11]

As a study of the bureaucratic machinery in Britain, this thesis is heavily reliant on the archival material available at the National Archives.[12] Despite a dearth of existing research in this area, as will be discussed later in this chapter, even a cursory search of the National Archives online catalogue reveals a rich seam of material which is available in the public domain for consultation, including a series of Cabinet Office files (CAB 114) which contains

[11] Charles Handy, *Understanding Organizations* (London: Penguin [4th edition eBook], 2007) p 394.

[12] The Covid-19 pandemic, and subsequent national lockdowns, has highlighted the difficulty of conducting archival research from a distance. While some records held by the National Archives have been digitised, the vast majority of material used in this study has not been digitised. This has made accessing material for this thesis more difficult, as over the course of 2020-2022 the National Archives was closed for significant periods of time, and even when it was possible to make bookings, this was on a heavily reduced basis, making bookings much more difficult and limiting the amount of material that could be accessed in each visit.

the surviving paperwork of the Security Executive.[13] As the organisation had an impact across Whitehall, further relevant material exists in the files of other departments, including the Prime Ministers' Office, the Treasury, and the Admiralty.[14] Acknowledging Aldrich's warning that heavy reliance upon archival material released to the National Archives runs the risk of producing official history, albeit one step removed, efforts have been made to supplement the released material where possible. Given the time period being covered, and the sensitivity of the subject matter, it has been impossible to find subjects for interviews or consult private papers. Even such public personal testimonies that do exist are not particularly helpful. This was most clearly demonstrated by Lord Swinton when discussing the Security Executive in his memoirs. He admitted that 'if the story with which this chapter deals could be fully told, it would be much more interesting.'[15] This comment encapsulates the challenge faced by the historian when trying to move their research in this area beyond the official record and to engage with the memoirs and published diaries of the key individuals related to the SE. Due to the secretive nature of the body, many of the individuals involved have said very little about this period of their lives, and sometimes nothing at all.[16] One area it has been possible to try and extend what material is available is through Freedom of Information (FOI) requests, thereby challenging existing decisions on what can be released and what must be retained, concerning the use of FOI legislation.[17] The use of FOI as a research method has its limitations, as it offers no guarantees of success in terms of releasing further documentary material.[18] However, despite some rejections, there has also been a notable level of success, with over 1,000 pages of material being released.[19]

[13] This series contains 54 separate files, and includes a large amount of material that provides valuable insight into the work of the SE. The National Archives, 2019, 'War Cabinet and Cabinet: Home Defence (Security) Executive: Records'.

[14] Examples of material from each of these departments are as follows; Prime Ministers Office: PREM 3/418/1: 'Establishment of Home Defence Security Executive', 01.10.1940-31.08.1940; Treasury: T 199/488: 'Poster about Official Secrets Acts 1911-1939: revision through Inter-departmental Committee on Security', 1952-1958; Admiralty: ADM 178/227: 'Security of Ports and Shipping: report and recommendations of Travelling Sub Committee of Shipping Security Co-ordination Committee; co-ordination of this and other port and maritime committees under authority of Security Executive', 1942.

[15] Lord Swinton, *I remember*, (Essex: Hutchinson & Co, 1948) p180.

[16] For example; the diaries of Duff Cooper, second Chairman of the SE, were published posthumously by his son. They cover the First World War and the interwar period, then skip straight to 1944, bypassing Cooper's wartime experience. John Norwich, *The Duff Cooper Diaries 1915-1951*, (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 2014).

[17] Freedom of Information Act 2000.

[18] Christopher J. Murphy and Daniel W. B. Lomas, 'Return to Neverland? Freedom of Information and the History of British Intelligence'. *The Historical Journal* 57, no. 1 (2014) p273-287.

[19] There was a rejection for the file 'CAB 114/37: Control of Irish labour in the United Kingdom: policy towards employing Irish labourers on secret work'. This file was retained with two exemptions, firstly under section 23(1), which relates to bodies dealing with security matters, and secondly under section 24(1), which relates to matters of national security. A second rejected has been given for the minutes and papers of the Security Intelligence

Academic research in the area of international history of the Second World War is unsurprisingly focused on the issue of Allies vs Axis powers, and security between states in this period is often concerned with building and maintaining alliances. Following the end of the war, the international landscape had changed irrevocably and 'security' came to be used as shorthand for preventing future conflicts and maintaining peace. There were several concerns in Europe and the wider global community following the end of the war that came to be discussed under the wider heading of 'security'. There was a need to prevent future conflict, to protect against the rising tide of communism in the East, to reassert European strength given the growth of two new 'superpowers', and simply the general consensus that a united Europe was preferable to a divided one. This culminated in one overarching definition of security in this context: peace. There has been extensive research into the Britain's place on the international stage following the end of the Second World War, in such areas as the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the independence of India and the beginning of the end of the British Empire, the impact of the Cold War upon foreign relations, and the 'special relationship' with the United States of America.[20] Following the end of hostilities, it immediately became of the upmost

Centre beyond 26.09.1940, though the Cabinet Office has confirmed it holds these documents. The rejection was again made on the basis of section 23(1). This is currently under internal review. However, due to Covid-19 and the subsequent national lockdown there has been no outcome to this review. Despite these drawbacks, a significant amount of material has been acquired through FOI requests with only minor redactions. The files in question that have been released are; FO 936/636: Security liaison: officers committee; minutes of standing committee; FO 158/92: Inter-Departmental Committee on Security; 'FO 936/632: Interdepartmental Committee on Security: minutes'; 'FO 936/633: Interdepartmental Committee on Security: proceedings'; 'FO 371/38172: Visitors to United Kingdom from Latin America. Code 51 file 214'; 'FO 371/50586: Visits to factories and research establishments concerned with war production. Code 49 File 779'.

[20] For a concise, introductory overview of the international impact of the Second World War see Margaret MacMillan, 'Rebuilding the world after the second world war' *The Guardian* (2009). For information on the ECSC, see Berthold Rittberger and Iris Glockner, 'The ECSC Treaty', *Research Gate* (2010) pp. 1-25 and Anne Deighton, 'The Last Piece of the Jigsaw: Britain and the Creation of the Western European Union, 1954', *Contemporary European History* 7, no. 2 (1998) pp. 181-196. For information on the creation of NATO see, for example, John Milloy, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1948-1957: Community Or Alliance?* (Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006) pp. 9-34 and Strobe Talbott, 'A brief history of NATO, from Truman to Trump' *The Brookings Institute* (2019). For academic arguments regarding the relationship between Britain and the Empire following the end of the Second World War see Nicholas White, *Decolonisation: The British Experience Since 1945* (Oxon: Routledge, 2014) pp. 11-32 and David Sanders and David Houghton, *Losing an Empire, Finding a Role: British Foreign Policy Since 1945,* (London: Palgrave, 2017) pp. 83-107. For information on the Cold War and international relations see William R. Keylor, *A World of Nations: The International Order Since 1945,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) pp. 1-38 and Odd Westad, 'The Cold War and the international history of the twentieth century', in *The Cambridge History of The Cold War: Volume I: Origins,* ed. Melvyn Leffler and Odd Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) pp. 1-19. For the early Cold War relationship between Britain and the USA is Graham Goodlad, 'Attlee, Bevin and Britain's Cold War: Graham Goodlad examines the role of Britain's postwar Labour government in the early stages of the Cold War' *History Today* 69 (2011).

importance to stabilise the global landscape and bind Europe together to achieve a shared desire for security.[21]

In terms of existing accounts of Britain in the late 1940s, security can also be found within the history of the 'Welfare State'. There is plethora of literature available in this area, including a focus on definitions, both of welfare state and of social security.[22] When discussing the specific welfare state it is meant as 'the system of social security which was developed by William Beverage in 1942 and implemented by the Labour government of 1945'.[23] The literature that has been published regarding the British Welfare State focuses on issues such as the origins of the Welfare State, the evolution of the Welfare State, and how the Welfare State links to specific areas, such as housing and women.[24]

A review of the existing literature concerning the HD(S)E is disappointing. The results of such a review are limited, as references to the body in any of its guises are infrequent at best, and even where they are mentioned they tend to lack in any detail or analysis. A number of reasons can be put forward to explain this absence, perhaps the most obvious being the release of works that predated the release of government files relating to the HD(S)E, as was the case for Peter and Leni Gillman in their book concerning internment, published in 1980.[25] A further reason for the continued absence of any great detail on the SE can be seen in the fact that the focus of existing research lies elsewhere, as can be seen in Lomas's study of Attlee's

[21] Arthur I. Cyr, 'Britain, Europe and the United States: change and continuity', *International Affairs* 88 no. 6, (2012) pp. 1315-1330; Jan Suchaček, 'European Integration After World War II: The Way to the Treaties of Rome', *Kakanien Revisited* 1. (2002) p. 6.

[22] For examples of definitions of the 'welfare state' see; Edgerton, *The Rise and Fall of the British Nation,de* pp. 217; Janet Fink, 'Welfare, Poverty and Social Inequalities', in *A Companion to Contemporary Britain 1939-2000,* ed. Paul Addison and Harriet Jones (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005) pp. 263; OED, 2019, 'Welfare'; Mary Daly, *Welfare,* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011) p. 6; Asa Briggs, 'The Welfare State in Historical Perspective', in *The Welfare State: A Reader*, ed. Christopher Pierson, Francis G. Castles and Ingela K. Naumann (Cambridge: Polity, 2000) pp. 18. For examples of definitions of 'social security' see; OED, 2019, 'Social Security'; Walker, *Social Security And Welfare: Concepts And Comparisons,* (Berkshire: Open University Press, 2004) p. 311; Rodney Lowe, 'The Welfare State in Britain since 1945', *Recent Findings of Research in Economic & Social History* 18 (1994) pp. 2-3.

[23] Fink, 'Welfare, Poverty and Social Inequalities', p. 264.

[24] For literature on the origins of the Welfare State see Arthur Marwick, 'The Labour Party and the Welfare State in Britain, 1900-1948', *The American Historical Review* 73, no. 2 (1967) pp. 380-403; Bernard Harris, 'Social Policy by Other Means? Mutual Aid and the Origins of the Modern Welfare State in Britain During the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries', *Journal of Policy History* 30, no. 2 (2018) pp. 202-235; and Chris Renwick, *Bread for All: The Origins of the Welfare State* (London: Penguin, 2017). For literature on the evolution of the welfare state see Gideon Calder, Jeremy Gass and Kirsten Merrill-Glover, *Changing Directions of the British Welfare State* (Cardiff: University of Wales, 2012); Derek Fraser, *The Evolution of the British Welfare State: A History of Social Policy since the Industrial Revolution* (London: Palgrave, 2017); and Robert Page, *Revisiting the Welfare State* (Berkshire: Open University Press, 2007). For housing and the Welfare State see Peter Malpass, *Housing and the Welfare State: The Development of Housing Policy in Britain* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); for women and the Welfare State see Elizabeth Wilson, *Women and the Welfare State*. (Oxon: Routledge, 1990).

[25] Peter Gillman and Leni Gillman, *'Collar the Lot!' How Britain interned and expelled its wartime refugees* (London: Quartet Books Limited, 1980).

relationship with the intelligence and security services, and its focus on the intelligence-policymaker dynamic.[26] Volume IV of the *Official History of British Intelligence in the Second World War* does take into account some of the history of the HD(S)E, but there are still notable omissions, and the work suffers from many of the pitfalls common amongst official histories.[27] A further work that includes limited references to the SE is Nigel West's *MI5: British Security Service Operations 1909-1945.* However, in common with other criticisms levelled at West's works, these references are misleading at best, and at points are simply inaccurate.[28] The greatest likelihood of finding references to the HD(S)E is within the existing studies of counterespionage; that is, the wartime work of the Security Service, MI5.[29] The Security

[26] Daniel W. B. Lomas, *Intelligence, Security and The Attlee Governments, 1945-51* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017).

[27] These pitfalls include; a lack of referencing, sympathy towards the government with an unwillingness to criticise, an overly narrative style of research as opposed to deeply analytical research, and too wide a subject area to allow true depth to the research. F. H. Hinsley and C. A. G. Simkins, *British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume Four: Security and Counter-Intelligence* (London: HMSO, 1990). Hinsley also prepared an abridged version of this official history in which the SE is barely mentioned. F. H. Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Abridged Edition* (London: HMSO, 1994).

[28] Despite thanking former members of the SE, alongside many other departments, for their testimonies, there were several points made about the SE in this work that do not align with the archival evidence. The first reference defines the committee incorrectly, describing it as subcommittee to the Home Defence Executive, when a 'sister committee' may be a more appropriate analogy. West then goes on to claim that the body was 'to oversee MI5 and give political guidance to those departments coping with the many difficulties involved in the wholesale internment of aliens'. As this thesis will demonstrate, this is in inadequate definition of the SE, and does not do justice to the variety and scale of the work that was undertaken by the body. Secondly, it references Sir Joseph Ball and identifies him as Deputy Chair of the SE, when this is inaccurate. He was Deputy Chairman of the subcommittee created by the SE, called the Security Intelligence Centre. A further error involves a list of people named as members of the SE. While this list does include members in the form of Wall and Foot, the other people listed are not strictly members, but rather people who regularly represented their departments. For example, Harker is listed as a member when he was not a member, though he was the representative for MI5 for a time, and MI5 attended every meeting. One final note to mention is that the role of Lord Swinton as holding executive control over MI5 is somewhat misleading. While he did hold both roles and thus the two roles were linked, which is emphasised by both roles passing to Duff Cooper when Swinton left, the two roles were themselves separate. West is writing about MI5 and as such obviously that is where the focus of work lies. However, it is not made clear that Swinton's role as Chairman of the SE was separate and much larger. West, *MI5* pp. vii; 111; 113-116; 118, 122. Evidence of the separation of these two roles can be found by looking to a letter written from David Petrie to Herbert Creedy. This letter explains that Petrie would refer to Lord Swinton as 'Chairman' when discussing matters relating to the SE but would refer to him by name when discussing 'matters arising out of his person control of MI5'. He claimed this had proved 'a convenient method of distinguishing the two functions' and Swinton had a similar approach when contacting Petrie. Cooper had announced on his appointment as Chairman that he wished to always be addressed as such rather than by name, and Petrie was explaining the standing arrangement with Cooper's predecessor and his belief that this system was the best was to manage the 'two sides of the dual position' that Cooper now held. CAB 21/3498: 'Home Defence Security Executive: Letter from Petrie to Creedy'. 06.07.1942. In addition to the above examples, the misconception regarding the purpose of the SE is briefly repeated in West's similar study of MI6. Nigel West, *MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations 1909-1945.* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983) p. 94.

[29] Other areas on intelligence history literature are also unconnected to the subject of this thesis, with the emphasis being on areas such as the work of the Government Code and Cypher School (GCCS) at Bletchley Park, the work of wartime bodies such as the Special Operations Executive (SOE), and the history of prominent individuals and their relationship with the intelligence world, particularly Churchill. For literature on GCCS and Bletchley Park see Christopher Grey, 'An organizational culture of secrecy: the case of Bletchley Park', *Management & Organizational History* 9, no. 1 (2014) pp. 107-122; F. H Hinsley and Alan Stripp, *Codebreakers: the inside story*

Service was certainly heavily involved with the work of the HD(S)E, and regularly represented at its meetings at a high official level.[30] Despite such evidence of crossover, the role and function of the two organisations was markedly different, and it would be a mistake to conflate the two. The popular perception of the wartime role of MI5 was the 'defence of the realm', which consisted for the most part of spy-catching; apprehending German agents sent to the UK, followed by their incarceration and interrogation with a view to 'turning' them to work for the British side; offensive counterespionage whereby misleading information was sent back to Germany. Known as the Double Cross (or XX) system, this work has been public knowledge since 1972 with the publication of John Masterman's *The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939-45.*[31] In recent years, the research conducted into the work of MI5 has begun to grow in both quantity and quality but until the 1980s was limited, largely on account of a lack of available material. This was summed up well by Richard Thurlow who claimed;

> Before the 1980s our knowledge of the security agencies had been limited to the reflections of exaggerated exploits of ex-SB officers saving the nation from spies and saboteurs, and journalists and military historians such as Chapman Pincher and Nigel West recounting oral information from ex-MI5 officers amongst other sources [sic][32]

Yet ultimately, as the late Michael Herman observed, there is more to security than national security and security intelligence. As Herman notes;

> Some things outside any reasonable definition of the national security area also need information security protection, for example sensitive

of Bletchley Park (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Tessa Dunlop, *The Bletchley Girls: War, secrecy, love and loss: the women of Bletchley Park tell their story* (London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd, 2015); Gordon Welchman, 'Ultra revisited, a tale of two contributors', *Intelligence and National Security* 32, no. 2 (2017) pp. 244-255. Literature can be found relating to wartime bodies, most prominently SOE (see Michael R. D. Foot, *SOE in France: an account of the work of the British Special Operations Executive in France: 1940-1944* (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Christopher J. Murphy, *Security and Special Operations: SOE and MI5 during the Second World War* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); David Stafford, *Secret agent: the true story of the Special Operations Executive* (London: BBC, 2000)) but also bodies such as the Ministry of Information (David Welch, *Persuading the People: British Propaganda in World War II* (London: The British Library Publishing Division, 2016)) and the Ministry of Economic Warfare (Peter Davies, 'Geoffrey Vickers and lessons from the Ministry of Economic Warfare for cold war defence intelligence', *Intelligence and National Security* 31 (2015) pp. 810-828. For literature on Churchill and intelligence see P. R. J. Winter, 'Churchill, British Intelligence, and the German Opposition Question', *War in History* 12, no.1 (2007) pp. 109-112; Christopher Andrew, 'Churchill and Intelligence', *Intelligence and National Security* 3, no. 3. (1988) pp. 181-193.

[30] As can be seen from Appendix III, MI5 were present at every meeting. The representatives who attended were prominent members of MI5, such as Vernon Kell, Oswald Harker, and David Petrie.

[31] John Masterman, *The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939-45*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972). For more information see Andrew, 2010, *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5,* pp. 241-262; Terry Crowdy, *Deceiving Hitler: Double-Cross and Deception in World War II* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008).

[32] Richard Thurlow, 'The Historiography and Source Materials in the Study of Internal Security in Modern Britain (1885-1956)', *History Compass* 6, no. 1 (2008) p. 149.

> economic and financial information or even confidential information about individuals.[33]

Something of the difference in function between MI5 and the HD(S)E is reflected in official attitudes about the release of relevant official archival material into the public domain. While the release of the official records of the Security Service began with much fanfare in 1997, material relating to the Security Executive in all its wartime forms has been available at Kew for much longer; hidden in plain sight and overlooked by historians. While this aspect of security may not provide the same headline-attracting excitement of James Bond style accounts of spies, sex scandals and explosions, it is an important feature of British history, helping us to understand how, and why, decisions were made. It can draw parallels to John Ferris' comments on intelligence, when he claimed:

> Students of intelligence should aim not just to astonish their audience, but to bore them; and always to answer the key questions – why and how did intelligence really matter? and if not, why bother?[34]

While MI5 have gradually released material since 1997 which has enabled a greater quantity and variety of research to be conducted, this has not been the case for the SE. The material pertaining to the HD(S)E began to be released long before the very existence of the Security Service had been avowed, with The National Archives stating that the series titled 'War Cabinet and Cabinet: Home Defence (Security) Executive: Records' was acquired from the Cabinet Office beginning in 1974.[35] While this was obviously not a complete release of information with other files being released gradually over time, it does demonstrate that research into the HD(S)E has been possible for decades.[36] The literature on MI5 and spy-catching is not confined to the Second World War, with much of the Cold War intelligence literature being focused upon spies, such as the 'Cambridge Five' and the 'Atomic Spies'.[37] While the emphasis of

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[33] Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) p. 165.

[34] John Ferris, 'The Road to Bletchley Park: The British Experience with Signals Intelligence, 1892-1945', *Intelligence and National Security* Vol 17 (1) (2002), p.55.

[35] A significant amount of material pertaining to the Second World War was released during this year, due to this being a midpoint of the Second World War and the '30 year rule' that states material is released into the public domain after 30 years, unless there is a just cause for withholding that material.

[36] PREM 3/418/3: 'Chairmanship of Home Defence (Security) Executive'. 1942; CAB 301/81: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive (HDSE): financial correspondence', 28.01.1941-14.02.1946.

[37] For literature on the Cambridge Five see Christopher J. Murphy and Daniel W. B. Lomas, 'Revealed: the panic that followed the defection of the Cambridge spies' *The Conversation* (2015); Andrew Lownie, 'The Cambridge Spies: The Quest for Stalin's Englishman, Guy Burgess' *Huffpost* (2016); and Edward Harrison, 'Some Reflections on Kim Philby's *My Silent War* as a Historical Source', in *Intelligence, Defence and Diplomacy*, ed. Richard Aldrich and Michael F. Hopkins (London: Frank Cass, 1994) pp. 205-225. For literature on the Atomic Spies see Marian Smith Holmes, 'Spies Who Spilled Atomic Bomb Secrets' *Smithsonian Magazine* (2009); Jeffrey Richelson, *A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Charmian Brinson and Richard Dove, 'The spy who was caught: the case of Klaus Fuchs', in *A Matter of Intelligence: MI5 and the Surveillance of anti-Nazi refugees, 1933-50* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014) pp. 196-209.

literature regarding MI5 in this era is concerning with spy-catching, there are examples of literature on other topics yet the HD(S)E remains conspicuous in its absence. For example, West devotes an entire chapter to 'The British Fifth Column' in his book on MI5, which fails to mention the HD(S)E at all, despite being discussed later in the work.[38]

A similar criticism can be levelled at more recent research that has been conducted in areas that are related to the HD(S)E but fail to engage with this readily available material. Intelligence history is rife with references to the ubiquitous 'missing dimension' of intelligence, and specifically MI5, garnering criticism of related fields of study.[39] However, literature concerning MI5 in this period has a clear tendency not to make any reference to the HD(S)E, even when discussing subjects that are directly related. These omissions create a new 'missing dimension', that of the role of the HD(S)E and the emergence of the 'Security State'. This can be seen, for example, in the work of Jennifer Grant, who has written about the role of MI5 and the internment of British fascists during the Second World War. While this research is concerned with MI5, the lack of engagement with the role played by the HD(S)E excludes a significant aspect of this area of study: that is, the inter-departmental process of decision making regarding the management of the security threat of fascists in Britain during the Second World War. A second issue in this piece of work is that the HD(S)E is actually mentioned twice, but in an extremely limited way with no explanation as to what the body was, or its

[38] The lack of discussion on the SE here in this chapter is further evidence of West's misunderstanding of the role and purpose of the body, as mentioned earlier in this chapter. He gives credit to MI5 for battling the Fifth Column threat, and is perhaps too enthusiastic in his praise of the success of this. This chapter discusses little beyond the experience of MI5 battling the British Union of Fascists (BUF) and is too generous in its evaluation of the scare, claiming that it seemed 'to have been dealt with by MI5 with remarkable calm, considerable efficiency and fairness'. There is no reference to the role that the SE played in dealing with the BUF, despite it playing a key role as will be outlined later in this thesis. West also somewhat dismisses the number of individuals interned due to the Fifth Column panic, listing this as 'slightly over 1300 people, many of whom were only held for a matter of months and most of whom were released by the end of 1941'. He claims, 'when this figure is considered in terms of the total population of the United Kingdom, it is not a very large one'. It is likely that these individuals who were interned felt rather differently about this situation. He claims that there were no concentration camps in Britain, but the difference between a concentration camp and an internment camp is open to argument. West also makes no mention of the treatment of aliens during the Fifth Column panic. West, *MI5,* p. 94. So many aliens were interned in Britain that the resources were not available to accommodate them all and thus plans were being made to send them to other British territories overseas, leading to the Arandora Star tragedy. The National Archives places the figure of interned aliens in the first two years of the Second World War at around 8,000 individuals. TNA, 2020, 'Internees: Research Guide'. When viewing the wider picture of interned individuals, West's positive outlook on the handling on the Fifth Column situation is called into question, as over 9,000 individuals is a significant number of people who were held against their will without committing a crime.

[39] Examples of this include; Calder Walton and Christopher Andrew, 'Still the "Missing Dimension": British Intelligence and the Historiography of British Decolonisation' in *Spooked: Britain, Empire and Intelligence since 1945,* ed. Patrick Major and Christopher R. Moran (Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009) pp. 73-96; Philip Davies, 'Editorial: The Missing Dimension's Missing Dimension', *Public Policy and Administration* 25, no 1. (2010) pp. 5-9; Meir Zamir, 'The "Missing Dimension": Britain's Secret War against France in Syria and Lebanon, 1942-45 – Part II', *Middle Eastern Studies* 46, no. 6 (2010) pp. 791-899.

relevance.[40] This lack of engagement with the body suggests that the HD(S)E and its significance is either, at best, unknown or, at worst, dismissed even though the author is aware of its existence. It is understandable for historians to mention well known bodies or organisations, such as MI5 or the Home Office, without providing a significant amount of institutional history, but as the story of the HD(S)E has never been told in any meaningful way passing references, such as Eunan O'Halpin pointing out that Duff Cooper was chairman of the body in 1943, but without any further context for the reader are unhelpful, if not essentially pointless.[41] Limited references can also be found in some legal histories. For example, A. W. B. Simpson's work on internment mentions the HD(S)E very briefly.[42] A further legal work is *MI5, the Cold War and The Rule of War* by Keith Ewing, Joan Mahoney and Andrew Moretta. This work does contain references to the SE, but these are inaccurate, such as listing Herbert Creedy as the Chairman of the Committee on Communism when this role was actually held by Alfred Wall. It also lists Anthony Eden as Chair of the Home Defence (Security) Executive, which is also not accurate. The confusion in this matter may relate to the separate role played by Lord Swinton and later Duff Cooper as operational head of MI5, but Eden never held the position of Chairman of the HD(S)E.[43] These are minor errors in an area that is not the primary focus of the book and as such do not necessarily cast doubt over the reliability of the research as a whole, but do further demonstrate the lack of understanding and research done into the HD(S)E. It is also worth mentioning that the book has been criticised under peer review by Dr Ewan Smith, who wrote that the work lacks context and holds perhaps an unjustified level of indignation, ignoring the things that were done well and focusing only on critique of MI5 and its practices and oversight. Smith claims the work 'picks over eggshells while ignoring the omelette'.[44]

[40] CAB 66/8/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive'. 27.05.1940. The first is simply that during meetings of the SE there were attempts to improve the internment appeals process, with no explanation as to why this would be the appropriate theatre to do so. The second is that in his role as Chairman of the SE, Lord Swinton mediated a discussion regarding the release of interned fascists but once again lacks even a basic level of context. Jennifer Grant, 'The Role of MI5 in the Internement of British Fascists during the Second World War', *Intelligence and National Security* 24, no. 4 (2009) pp. 499-528.

[41] Eunan O'Halpin, 'The Liddell diaries and British intelligence history'. *Intelligence and National Security* 20, no. 4 (2005) pp. 670-686.

[42] A. W. Brian Simpson, *In the Highest Degree Odious: Detention Without Trial in Wartime Britain*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) pp. 185-188.

[43] Keith Ewing, Joan Mahoney, and Andrew Moretta, MI5, the Cold War, and the Rule of Law. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).

[44] Ewan Smith, 'Review: Ewing, Keith, Mahoney, Joan and Moretta, Andrew, MI5, the Cold War and the Rule of Law, Oxford, OUP, 2021, 511pp, hb £84.00' in *The Modern Law Review*. (2022). https://doi-org.salford.idm.oclc.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12737.

A further work which contains passing reference to the SE is Michael Herman's book 'Intelligence Power in Peace and War'. While this work does simply mention 'the British achievements in the Second World War was the establishment of the Security Executive and an interdepartmental security structure alongside, and linked with, the Joint Intelligence Committee…', and only references the work of Hinsley and Simkin – the pitfalls of which are mentioned above, the work provides broader value to this thesis.[45] Firstly, the acknowledgement of a 'security structure', an idea which will be developed throughout this thesis to demonstrate the core argument of this work which is that the creation of this 'security structure' or machinery of security can be described as the origins of a Security State. Furthermore, Herman's research into the relationship between information security and intelligence is highly relevant. While this thesis is focused on the civil security machinery, there is undeniably a link between intelligence and security, though the two concepts are distinct from each other. Herman describes this as 'information security apparatus is best seen as a special kind of intelligence user, but with intimate intelligence involvement in it.'[46] He goes on to note that 'security is supported by collection and analysis on foreign intelligence', but notes that this is only one half of the contribution that intelligence plays to security. The other half is when intelligence services themselves become active within the security apparatus, using their own offensive expertise to guide the decision-making process for the defensive work of security structures, with Herman describing this as these intelligence services becoming 'poacher turned gamekeeper'.[47] The interdepartmental nature of the HD(S)E, and particularly the significant involvement of MI5, and less so MI6, shows clearly this security activity being undertaken by intelligence agencies.

Similarities between intelligence and security can also be seen by reviewing Sherman Kent's work *Strategic* I*ntelligence for American World Policy,* where Kent describes intelligence as a threefold concept, namely knowledge, organisation and activity. Security can be viewed in a similar manner. The 'intelligence is organization' section of this work is described as dealing with 'organizational and administrative problems of central and

[45] Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) p 171.
[46] Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) p 166.
[47] Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) p 176.

departmental intelligence'. The organisation study of security is an area that has not yet been assessed, and is the gap in the existing academic literature this thesis will fill.[48]

While this thesis is a work of history, given its subject matter, the decision not to engage in depth with the academic field of Security Studies warrants a mention here. In marked contrast to the continuing interplay between the historical and theoretical approaches in the related fields of Intelligence Studies and Intelligence History, which have long proved able to co-exist, the leading journal in the field combining theoretical articles on the subject with the latest archival-based historical research, security studies has a predominately theoretical focus, applying International Relations theory to the concept of security rather than conducting empirical research: the archival based research conducted here in order to produce a piece of security history is missing from security studies.[49] Despite an increasing interest in the academic subject of security from the 1950s onwards, and the increasing breadth of angles and topics covered by scholars of security, there remains a conspicuous absence of historical security studies.[50] There are a wide variety of subtopics that have been studied within the field of Security Studies which do not consider 'security' in the same context as the 'Security State'.[51]

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[48] Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

[49] The journal of *Intelligence and National Security* was described in its first issue as 'the first scholarly, interdisciplinary journal devoted to the past history of intelligence work, to the analysis of its contemporary functions and problems, and to the assessment of its influence on foreign policy and national security'. An editorial review celebrating 30 years of the journal demonstrated that this interdisciplinary approach had continued throughout the years. Loch Johnson and Mark Phythian, 'Intelligence and National Security at Thirty', *Intelligence and National Security* 31, no. 1 (2016) pp. 1-7.

[50] While Security Studies first emerged in the 1950s, the 1960s saw an increase in policy related discussion and theoretical issues, with particular emphasis on deterrence theory. Deterrence theory is the idea that the military might of one nation will result in another nation choosing not to go to war against them for fear of retaliation. It is often applied to nuclear weapons. Some literature relating to nuclear deterrence theory includes; Lawrence Freedman, 'Deterrence: A Reply', *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 5 (2005) pp. 789-801; Tom Sauer, 'A Second Nuclear Revolution: From Nuclear Primacy to Post-Existential Deterrence', *Journal of Strategic Studies* 32. (2009) pp. 745-767; Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, 'The Great Debate: Is Nuclear Zero the Best Option?', *The National Interest* (2010) pp. 88-96. With the 1970s came a decrease in interest in theory but a sharp rise in all discussion related to the Cold War. The 1980s saw several arguments over whether the field was still relevant, due to the previous preoccupation with nuclear issues becoming increasingly less concerning, see Stephen Walt , 'The Renaissance of Security Studies', *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (1991) pp. 211-239. The result of this was the 1990s seeing significant growth in a variety of different aspects of Security Studies, with a renewed interest in theories and a growth into disparate subsections, as shown in Ole Waever and Barry Buzan, 'After the Return to Theory: The Past, Present, and Future of Security Studies', in *Contemporary Security Studies*, ed. Alan Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) p. 418.

[51] While Barry Buzan introduced the idea that there are different aspects to security beyond the traditional military focus in 1991, the subsections he identified, such as political security, economic security, and environmental security, are still not applicable to a study of the machinery of security in the UK, see Barry Buzan, *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) pp. 1-34. In recent years, subdivisions of security studies have increasingly gained popularity amongst academics. Examples include topics such as; 'gender security' see Nadine Puechguirbal, 'Peacekeeping,

A survey of the Security Studies literature also indicates a tendency to focus upon issues of definition; what *is* 'security'?[52] However, rather than engaging directly with this extensive theoretical literature, which has itself been described as a 'Tower of Babel', this thesis takes an empirical approach: what was security considered to be by those involved with it? As such takes the definition of security as provided by the Executive itself as its starting point. This was

Peacebuilding and Post-conflict Reconstruction', in *Gender Matters in Global Politics,* ed. Laura J. Shepard (Oxon:Routledge, 2010). *pp*. 161-175; 'energy security' see L. Proskuryakova, 'Updating energy security and environmental policy: Energy security theories revisited', *Journal of Environmental Management* 223, (2018) pp. 203-214; and 'peace studies' see John Karlsrud, 'The UN at War: Examining the Consequences of Peace-Enforcement Mandates for the UN Peacekeeping Operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali', *Third World Quarterly* 36, no1. (2015) pp. 40-54. While there are many separate topics discussed throughout the literature, there is a large amount of overlap between them. For example, 'human security' is concerned with keeping people safe and can include the availability of basic necessities such as food, shelter, and healthcare. However, 'food security' is also a subsection in its own right, as is 'health security' and 'environmental security'. For 'human security' see Nana K. Poku, Neil Renwick and John Glenn, 'Human security in a globalizing world', in *Migration, Globalisation and Human Security,* ed. David T. Graham and Nana K. Poku. (Oxon: Routledge, 2000) pp. 9-22; for 'food security' see Eve Fouilleux, Nicolas Bricas and Arlene Alpha, '"Feeding 9 billion people": global food security debates and the productionist trap', *Journal of European Public Policy* 24, no. 11 (2017) pp. 1658-1677; for 'health security' see William Aldis, 'Health Security as a Public Health Concept: A Critical Analysis', *Health Policy and Planning* 23, no.6 (November 2008), pp. 369-375; and for 'environmental security' see Cornel Zwierlein, 'Historicizing Environmental Security', *European Journal for Security Research* 3, no. 1 (2017) pp. 1-13.

[52] There is such a large catalogue of publications dedicated to defining security that it is not possible to cover them all here. Indeed, it is to such a scale that it has previously been described as a 'Tower of Babel' in Edward A. Kolodziej, *Security and International Relations.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) p. 11. However, there are several different angles that theses definitional approaches can take. For example, they can be viewed in terms of needing a definition to explain or inform policy, such as Emma Rothschild, 'What is security?' *Daedalus* 124, no. 3, (1995) pp. 53-98. Other reasons for needing a definition can be for security as a commodity to be sold to individual businesses, as in Garrell Sutherland, 'Answering the question - what is security?' *Security Management* 36, no. 7. (1992). Other general definitions of security include Gheorghe Udeanu, 2012, 'Defining Elements of the National Security Concepts (I)', *Scientific Bulletin – Nicolaae Balescu Land Force Academy* 17, no. 2 (2012) pp. 156-163; Gheorghe Udeanu, 'Defining Elements of the National Security Concepts (II)', *Scientific Bulletin – Nicolaae Balescu Land Force Academy* 18, no. 1 (2013) pp. 75-84; David J. Brooks, 'What is security: Definition through knowledge categorization', *Security Journal* 23, no. 3. (2010) pp. 225-239. Even literature that has a wider scope has a tendency to commit significant amounts of time defining security, with books devoting whole chapters to this task, such as Lee Jarvis and Jack Holland, *Security: A Critical Introduction.* (London: Palgrave, 2015) pp. 21-43; Bourne, *Understanding Security* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan 2014) pp. 1-9; Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) pp. 8-19. Security has been defined as an 'essentially contested concept' (see Paul Williams and Matt McDonald, *Security Studies: An Introduction* (Oxon: Routledge, 2018) p. 1.) Many definitions are so vague as to offer little benefit, such as Arnold Wolfers, 'National security as an ambiguous symbol', *Political Science Quarterly* 67, no. 4 (1952) p. 485, or are overly complicated such as the definition of 'a function of the presence and interaction of Asset (A), Protector (P) and Threat (T) in a given Situation (Si), or s=f(APT)+Si', by Giovanni Manunta, 'What is Security?', *Security Journal* 13, no. 3 (1999) p. 58. Other definitions are inappropriate for this study as they are intrinsically linked to physical war, such as Kenneth Waltz, 'The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18, no. 4 (1988) p. 619; Saul Takahashi, 'Volume Introduction: State Security' in *Human Rights, Human Security, and State Security: The Intersection* (California: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2014) pp. 536-539; McNamara, 1966, 'Security in the Contemporary World'. Some definitions are focused upon the internal/external question, see European Union, 2010. *Internal security strategy for the European Union: Towards a European security model,* p. 8, or on security networks, for examples see , Tuomas Forsberg and Graeme Herd, *Divided West: European security and the transatlantic relationship* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005); Michito Tsuruoka, 'The UK, Europe and Japan', *The RUSI Journal* 158, no. 6 (2013) pp. 58-65. For private security see Hans Born, Marina Caparini, and Eden Cole, 'Regulating private security in Europe: Status and prospects' *Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control Policy Paper No. 20* (2007).

defined in a report outlining the functions of the HD(S)E, at this time known as the Security Executive (SE) in October 1942 as;

> …the defence of national interests against hostile elements other than the armed forces of the enemy; in practice against espionage, sabotage and attempts to procure defeat by subversive political activity. "Security" in this sense is not confined to the United Kingdom. It extends to the Colonies, the Dominions and India, and covers such British interests abroad as the security of British ships and cargoes in foreign ports.[53]

Even this definition, firmly rooted in the HD(S)E itself, is problematic when considering the reality of the work of the body, as it places a heavy emphasis on matters that would be considered Fifth Column activity, and as this thesis will show the work of the body went far beyond this. The HD(S)E operated defensively, working to identify possible gaps, and to eliminate them, to ensure they could not be used to compromise the security of the state. This definition also places an emphasis upon subversive political activity, which directly contrasts with a proposed explanation to a query from Labour MP George Strauss regarding the work of the HD(S)E, that claimed that the notion that the HD(S)E was 'concerned solely or mainly with suspicious political activities' was a 'complete misapprehension'.[54]

While 'security' is a contested term in theoretical works, the historical study of security is fragmented, more simply on account of the varying contexts within which the word can be used. While there is much that can be found in existing historical studies that talks of 'security', the definition means that such work is rarely, if ever, relevant to the current study. References to the HD(S)E in existing studies of the Second World War are rare, while references to its post-war survival are effectively non-existent: at the time of writing it has proved impossible to locate any reference to the post-war SSC/ISC. In its search for existing studies of the machinery of security in Britain during the Second World War and post-war period, this chapter has demonstrated a clear gap in the current literature. This gap consists of any significant analysis of the wartime body the HD(S)E, and its post-war successors, the SSC and later ISC. An extensive review of the theoretical study of security has shown there is a lack of focus on history. A review of the literature of this period from an empirical perspective demonstrates some 'security' in various forms but little to no engagement with the history of the HD(S)E and, by extension, the bureaucracy of security that was created in 1940 and developed

[53] CAB 21/3498: 'Home Defence Security Executive'. 26.10.942.

[54] This suggested reply was drafted by Lord Swinton, and edited by a Mr Williamson to include the word 'complete'. However, this section of the draft was never used by Winston Churchill in his parliamentary response, with Churchill preferring to say as little as possible about the committee, a trend which continues despite further questions. CAB 21/3498: 'Suggested Reply', 19.07.1940.

throughout the Second World War and beyond. This thesis will begin to fill this gap, providing the first detailed account of the HD(S)E and expanding the current body of knowledge of the British State and security from 1940 until 1953, at which point the there was a major reconstruction in the civil security operations in Britain.

Chapter One

'Pandering to the Fifth Column neurosis'?[55]

The Origins of the Home Defence (Security) Executive

This chapter will explain why the British government felt that a new body was required to deal with the Fifth Column of 1939 – 1940 by first exploring the notion of a Fifth Column generally, before providing the context of the First World War and interwar period, displaying the symmetry present regarding these fears. The chapter will then analyse each of the three pillars of the British Fifth Column: aliens, fascists, and communists. It will then continue to explore why they were considered a threat and whether the fear of these groups was justified, and discuss the consequence of these fears, the creation of the HD(S)E.[56] Overall, the chapter demonstrates that the significance of the measures to *address* the Fifth Column were greater than the threat itself. Following this, the chapter will continue to analyse the key actions taken regarding the three main Fifth Column threats. It will demonstrate that there was little work done by the SE on the topics of aliens, fascists and communists, particularly beyond the practicalities of internment. By showing how little of the work conducted by the SE was directly related to its initial purpose, it will demonstrate that the scope of the body broadened significantly from what was originally intended, and laying the groundwork for the SE to take on such a significant role to be the origins of a machinery of security in Britain, which would continue after the end of the war.

The term 'Fifth Column' was first used by General Emilio Mola during the Spanish Civil War. He claimed that, as well as the four columns of army forces that were heading for an attack on the city of Madrid, there was a hidden Fifth Column within the city that were ready to assist by whatever means available to them.[57] For the purpose of this study, a Fifth Column can be taken to mean a body of enemy supporters, with some level of active support for the enemy, such as attempting to gather further support, pass on information that may be of value, or have plans to assist the enemy in the event of an invasion. Much has been published on the Fifth Column activities in a variety of countries during the Second World War.[58] There has

[55] CAB 93/5: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Security Intelligence Centre: Meeting 1'. 15.06.1940.

[56] The term 'alien' is used repeatedly throughout this work. This is for simplicity, as this is the term used during the relevant period. This is not reflective of the views of the author. The term is used throughout the thesis to mean: 'Born in, or owing allegiance to, a foreign country; *esp.* designating a foreigner who is not a naturalized citizen of the country where he or she is living'. Oxford English Dictionary, 'alien', 2019.

[57] Interestingly, it has been argued that no such body of supporters existed and that Mola was simply using the fear of potential supporters in a bid for victory with the least amount of fighting.

[58] The work of the German Fifth Column has been the subject of academic scrutiny for many different countries, from Australia to Europe and the Middle East. For a discussion of the concept of Fifth Columns and specifically

also been academic debate on whether the Fifth Column ever actually existed in Britain in this era.[59] Perhaps the most pertinent research on the subject comes from Richard Thurlow, who argued that the presence of a Fifth Column was not the key issue, rather the *fear* of a Fifth Column held the significance.[60] In essence, when studying the behavior of the state, the important factor is what the state believed to be true, and the evidence presented in this thesis will clearly demonstrate that there was a substantial fear of a Fifth Column by the British Government in 1939.

The arguments over whether the Fifth Column ever existed has continued in recent years, especially following the release of documents to the National Archives detailing an MI5 operation which has been known as the 'Fifth Column' Operation, where MI5 employee Eric Roberts, also known as Jack King, organised a collective of individuals who believed they were serving Nazi Germany in a manner that is in line with that of a traditional Fifth Column.[61] However, this information was going directly to MI5 and was used to assist the highly

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the Fifth Column in Australia during the Second World War see Loeffel, 2015. Futher discussion of the German Fifth Column and its activities in Austria, Sudetenland, Slovakia, Danzig, Iraq and Iran is available in a thesis by Sean Govan, '*Pawns, Provocateurs and Parasites: Great Britain and German Fifth Column Movements in Europe and the Middle East, 1934 – 1941'*, (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 2015).

[59] 'The so-called "Fifth Column" conveys nothing to me because it doesn't exist except in the imagination of fantastic minds or as a phantom conceived by unscrupulous propaganda for obvious purposes'. While this quote from Adolf Hitler shows he denied of the existence of a Fifth Column is hardly conclusive evidence that one did not exist, it is surprising that he chose to take this standpoint regardless of whether one existed or not. Hitler, quoted in *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 16.06.1940. Examples of literature concerned with the Fifth Column in Britain include arguments such as that provided by Andrew Roberts, who expressed a belief that the Fifth Column was potentially extensive and included a higher-class of 'Fifth Columnist' than he would have expected. Communists made up a large segment of the feared Fifth Column, and some of the most famous British communists, those collectively known as the 'Cambridge Five' were recruited from Cambridge University, which is still one of the most exclusive universities in the world. Students at Cambridge have always come largely, although not exclusively, from affluent, upper class backgrounds. Given this, the idea that the many of the Fifth Columnists were not from working class backgrounds may not be as surprising as Mr Roberts seems to think. Andrew Roberts, 'Double-Barrelled Traitors of 1942' in *The Spectator*, (1993), pp. 19-20. A wealth of literature is available concerning the 'Cambridge Five', just some examples include; James Gannon, *Stealing Secrets, Telling Lies: How Spies and Codebreakers Helped Shape the Twentieth Century*, (Sterling: Brasseys, 2001), pp. 209-221; Richard Dunley and Andrew Holt, 'Burgess and Maclean: Revelations' *The National Archives*, (2015); Christopher Murphy and Daniel Lomas, 'Revealed: the panic that followed the defection of the Cambridge spies' *The Conversation*, (2015).

[60] Richard Thurlow, 'The Evolution of the Mythical British Fifth Column, 1939-46' *Twentieth Century British History* vol 10(4), (1999), pp. 477-498. While Thurlow has written on this topic specifically, he is not alone in making this argument. In his Authorized History of MI5, Christopher Andrew talks about the 'spy mania' that remained following the First World War and which exacerbated the fear of a Fifth Column, although he maintains that a Fifth Column did not actually exist, see Christopher Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5* (London: Penguin Books, 2010), pp. 217-240. Further examples include Glyn Prysor, 'The 'Fifth Column' and the British Experience of Retreat, 1940' *War in History* Vol 12(4) (2005), pp. 418-447 and Steven Woodbridge, 'Fifth Column Fears in Richmond, 1939-1940: A brief survey' *Richmond History Journal* vol 29, (2008).

[61] Robert Hutton, *Agent Jack: The True Story of MI5's Secret Nazi Hunter* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2018).

successful ‘double cross’ counterintelligence operation.[62] Some have argued that the success of this operation proves the existence of a Fifth Column within Britain.[63] However, it can also be argued it proves nothing more than that a true Fifth Column *could* have existed had the organising force been in place to make use of the individuals who were willing to aid the Nazi cause, or if an invasion had occurred. It is impossible to prove a negative, and thus no conclusive proof can be provided that such a threat did not exist. While there is no solid evidence that a Fifth Column ever existed, both the general public and the government feared the existence of a Fifth Column that consisted of three main groups; aliens, fascists and communists.

Spy mania, or ‘spy fever’, was a significant issue during the build up to the First World War, and similarly was the case immediately prior to the Second World War. The stories published in the early 1900s by authors such as William Le Queux proved highly popular, resulting in an enthusiasm that approached hysteria where the ‘gullible public was beginning to mistake fact for fiction’.[64] This paranoia was not held simply by the general public, but also by high level intelligence officials such as the head of the Director of Military Operations Counter-intelligence Section (M. O. 5), Lieutenant-Colonel (later Brigadier-General Sir) James Edmonds, who had his suspicions of German spies encouraged by the testimony of a former French secret service agent, who claimed every German living outside of Germany was a spy.[65] This ‘spy fever’ was coupled with a rise in anti-Semitism, with individuals recalling ‘all Jews were described as being “Germans”’.[66] It can be difficult to identify the difference between ‘anti-alien’ sentiment, particularly ‘anti-German’, and anti-Semitism, but it has been claimed that, during the early years of the First World War, “Germans, Jews and Spies became nearly synonyms”.[67]

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[62] The operation is detailed on the MI5 website in the ‘World War Two’ section. For information on Doublecross see; Christopher Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5* (London: Penguin Books, 2010), pp. 28-253; John Masterman, *The Double-Cross System in the War: 1939-1945* (London: Pimlico, 1995); Christopher Murphy, *Security and special operations: SOE and MI5 during the Second World War* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2006), pp. 170-194.

[63] Examples of the mainstream press who have used the material released in 2014 to argue the existence of a Fifth Column includes Cahal Milmo, ‘Enemy within: The network of Britons who sped for Hitler during Second World War’ *The Independent* (2014) and Helen Warrell, ‘How MI5 spied on Britain’s wartime fifth column’ *Financial Times* (2014). The records of ‘Jack King’ can be found at TNA in various MI5 files (KV files).

[64] David French, ‘Spy Fever in Britain, 1900-1915’ in *The Historical Journal vol* 21(2) (1978), p. 356.

[65] Edmond Lajoux, *Mes souvenirs d'espionnage* (1905), referenced in David French, ‘Spy Fever in Britain, 1900-1915’ in *The Historical Journal, vol* 21(2) (1978), p. 356.

[66] F. Ashe-Lincoln (1914), quoted in Catriona Pennell, *A Kingdom United: Popular Responses to the Outbreak of the First World War in Britain and Ireland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). p. 110.

[67] For discussion on the difference between anti-German feelings and anti-Semitism, see Colin Homes, *Anti-Semitism in British Society 1876-1939* (London: Routledge, 1979) pp. 121-140. Quote can be found in Sebastian Bischoff, ‘Spy Fever 1914’ in *International Encyclopedia of the First World War* (2019).

As well as the aforementioned 'spy fever', during the lead up to the First World War there was a significant fear of aliens, due in part to the large, concentrated number of German individuals in Britain, particularly in London. This resulted in riots, with innocent German families being attacked by mobs, especially following the sinking of the Lusitania and the use of poisonous gases against Allied troops.[68] It is hardly surprising that people felt such strong negative feelings towards enemy aliens, even those who had lived in England for decades, during war time. This was due in part to British Government propaganda, which painted the German people as the 'evil Hun' who had been committing horrendous unimaginable atrocities that were in reality considered largely fictitious following the end of hostilities.[69] This propaganda, and the national sentiment that went along with it, touched everyone, including children, who grew up during the First World War, singing nursery rhymes that lauded the killing of the enemy and hatred for the so-called 'Hun', were to become the soldiers and wider population who held these ingrained ideologies and fears brought back to the fore at the outbreak of the Second World War some 20 years later.[70] Thus, it is not surprising that there was a fear of aliens, particularly Germans, from the outset of the Second World War, nor were the calls for internment of enemy aliens. Initially, the Home Office determined that the general public would be fearful of enemy aliens and there might be anti-German riots and public disorder similar to the experience of the First World War. This view was aired in a House of Commons debate, where the extent of feelings held by some regarding internment were made clear by Captain William Shaw's comments that 'if all enemy aliens and many aliens who have been naturalised were interned, it would increase the feeling of security among the British people…'.[71] However, this feeling did not last and, to the relief of the Home Office, any widespread public support for interment waned by early July 1940.[72] This was largely due to the sinking of the *Arandora Star* and the consequent revelations of harsh conditions within internment camps.[73]

[68] The Guardian, 'Anti-German riots spread', *The Guardian* (2015).
[69] Jo Fox, 'Atrocity Propaganda', *The British Library* (2014).
[70] Jay Winter, 'Propaganda and the Mobilization of Consent', *The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) p. 219.
[71] William Shaw, House of Commons Debate, 23.05.1940. vol 361, c297.
[72] Richard Thurlow, 'The Evolution of Mythical British Fifth Column, 1939-46' in *Twentieth Century British History* vol10(4) (1999), p. 482.
[73] Harry Hinsley and C. A. G. Simkins, *British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume Four: Security and Counter-Intelligence* (London: HMSO, 1990), p. 58. Other arms of the state security apparatus, such as MI5, did not share the Home Office reluctance towards internment, as they viewed free aliens as a risk to security due to suspicions that classified information was being leaked to the enemy. For more information, see Richard Thurlow, 'The Evolution of Mythical British Fifth Column, 1939-46' in *Twentieth Century British History* vol 10(4) (1999), p. 482.

There are several reasons why the aliens suspected of being part of a Fifth Column were not any threat to Britain or British interests. Many of them had lived in Britain for significant lengths of time and had built lives in Britain, many with British spouses and children. They had friends, jobs, and lives within Britain, and as such their allegiance was now wholeheartedly with Britain. Many other aliens, including enemy-aliens, were refugees who had fled to Britain to escape the Nazi party. Many of these refugees were Jewish, who had more cause than most to hate and fear the Axis powers and had no intention of aiding them. While Kell argued that these individuals could be subject to pressures to aid the enemy through blackmail due to loved ones remaining within the reach of the Nazis, it is still unlikely that refugees would act in any way that would aid those they were running from.[74] However, the worry that accompanies large numbers of refugees in any conflict is that, hiding in the crowds of people genuinely fleeing war, there are people that would do harm to the country they are entering.[75]

Aliens, both enemy and non-enemy, only made up one third of the suspected British Fifth Column. Unlike the First World War, the Second World War undeniably had its foundations in ideological differences. From a British perspective, it was the battle of liberal democracy against the supposed 'evils' of fascism and communism, even when fighting on the same side as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Other groups, including pacifists and Jehovah's Witnesses, also came under the scrutiny of the SE owing to their anti-war sentiments due to worries about how such attitudes would impact upon morale, especially on the Home Front. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) also identified the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as another branch of the Fifth Column. Some held significant fears over the activities of the IRA, for example Major Desmond Morton, significant member of Churchill's personal staff during the war, concluded that 'Ireland was the "power house" for the entire German Fifth Column organisation in Britain'.[76] However, in December 1940, MI5 told its regional security officers the 'Special Branch, who have been watching the I.R.A for nearly 20 years, have no positive evidence that the Germans have used it as a "Fifth Column"'.[77] None

[74] Richard Thurlow, 'The Evolution of Mythical British Fifth Column, 1939-46' in *Twentieth Century British History* vol10(4) (1999), p. 482.
[75] This fear has not been resigned to the past, with the same fears being voiced throughout history whenever there is mass movement of people seeking refuge. An example of this in the modern era is the 'migrant crisis'; see Steven Hopkins, 'Potential Terrorists 'Exploiting Migrant Crisis To Travel Unchecked Through Europe'', *The Huffington Post* (2016); Anthony Faiola and Souad Mekhennet, 'Tracing the path of four terrorists sent to Europe by the Islamic State', *The Washington Post* (2016); Laura Koran, 'Will regugees bring Europe's terror woes to US homeland?' *CNN* (2016).
[76] Paul McMahon, *British Spies and Irish Rebels: British Intelligence and Ireland, 1916-1945* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2008), p. 312.
[77] KV 4/122 19.12.1940; quoted in Paul McMahon, *British Spies and Irish Rebels: British Intelligence and Ireland, 1916-1945* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2008), p. 356.

of these other groups were considered dangerous enough to constitute a Fifth Column in any significant manner, and the SE did not dedicate the same amount of time and energy into discussing any associated risks.[78]

Those with ideological differences to British liberal democracy were more of a concern. The inter-war period had seen a significant rise in the support for alternative ideologies for a variety of reasons. The aftermath of the Great War and economic struggles of the 1920's and 1930's caused many intellectuals, such as Beatrice and Sidney Webb, Aldous Huxley, and J. F. Horrabin, to question what was the best direction for Britain's future. For them, there was only one certainty; liberal democracy had failed and a new ideology needed to be adopted. The uncertainty arose from whether fascism or communism was the correct direction in which to head.[79] Both schools of thought garnered support; however fascism initially proved to be the more popular. Fascism was a growing security concern during the interwar period and, given the nature of the war, which could essentially be seen as liberal democratic Britain battling against fascist Germany, is perhaps the easiest to see why the fears existed.[80] However, troubles with British fascist organisations, especially Mosley's British Union of Fascists (BUF), did not arise purely because of the advent of war. A major security concern of the interwar period was the growing violence between contrasting groups, such as the BUF and anti-fascist groups.[81] The advent of Mosely's BUF changed official attitudes towards the far right in Britain. In 1933

[78] While there was an identified risk posed by the IRA, almost 200 supporters of the IRA had been expelled from Britain by mid-May 1940, as explained by David Stafford, *Churchill & Secret Intelligence* (London: Abacus, 1997), p. 205. There may have been a sense that the immediate threat posed by the IRA had been nullified by this action.

[79] Matthew Worley, 'Communism and Fascism in 1920s and 1930s Britain'. in: Sharpe, T. (ed). *W. H. Auden in Context* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 141-149.

[80] As with all studies of history, it is important to be considerate of the benefit of hindsight. While the contest of liberal democracy and fascism is apparent when viewed after the event, it would not have been *as* obvious at the time, though the difference in ideologies would have likely have been apparent to some extent.

[81] Oswald Mosley left mainstream politics, largely due to disillusionment with the inaction of the Labour Party and his own extreme economic views. The economic views held by Mosley were Keynesian, and a stark contrast to the austere policy being used to combat the post-First World War recession. He initially founded the New Party, but a lack of electoral success led him to take more extreme views. After visiting Italy and meeting Mussolini, he was enamoured with the concept of fascism, although some later claimed he had always been a fascist. More information on the life and politics of Oswald Mosely can be found in Bret Rubin, 'The Rise and Fall of British Fascism: Sir Oswald Mosely and the British Union of Fascists' *Intersections* 11(2) (2010), pp. 328-348. He returned to Britain and established the BUF. Mosley's stance was that violence was not the correct manner in which to bring about a new fascist electoral system, and that the presence of the now infamous 'Blackshirts' was to ensure freedom of speech at BUF rallies and marches. For more detail on this see Oswald Mosely, *The Greater Britain*, (London: Jeffcoats Limited, 1934), p. 188. He was also dismissive of anti-Semitic views, claiming that they were not intrinsically linked to fascism, as some people had suggested, see The Jewish Chronicle, 'Sir Oswald's Odyssey', *The Jewish Chronicle* (1933), p. 9. However, anti-Semitism grew within the party, helped by prominent party members such as William Joyce, more commonly known as Lord Haw Haw. A large body of material exists pertaining to key members of the BUF. In the case of William Joyce, a good example is Peter Martland, 'Lord Haw Haw: The English Voice of Nazi Germany', *The National Archives' 'Secret History Files'*. (2003).

a conference was held, attended by Home Office officials, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, MI5 officers and a representative from Special Branch. The decision was taken for Special Branch to collect information on fascism in Great Britain, which would then, along with other sources, be evaluated by MI5.[82] This demonstrates a change in attitudes during the interwar period showing that fascists, and in particular the BUF, were increasingly considered to be a security threat that required attention.

The BUF enjoyed some early success, especially after the *Daily Mail* began supporting Mosley and the party, however this did not last. Dissent from anti-fascists groups, particularly communists, continued to grow as the BUF became more prominent, and violence between the groups rapidly escalated. The BUF lost many members after the *Daily Mail* eventually dropped their support and this was exacerbated after the events of the 'Night of the Long Knives'.[83] The party was in freefall. The threat to security posed by British fascists had largely been eliminated by the outbreak of the war. This was due to increasingly extremist rhetoric, the violence that haunted the BUF, and increasing opposition to Hitler. Another factor that was instrumental in the downfall of British fascism was a change in official attitudes as it was not until the Second World War that fascism was considered a significant enough threat to national security that the authorities took action to eliminate. While British fascists were an obvious place to look for Fifth Column activities, they were neither popular nor powerful enough to have much of an impact by the time the war began.

Finally, communists were considered to be a serious Fifth Column risk. Despite similar ideological principles, communism posed a very different threat to fascism. Communists were considered a serious threat due to links to the Communist International (Comintern), and still posed their own security risks.[84] The prominent role the CPGB played in the General Strike of 1926 would likely have immediately identified the party as a security risk. The strike was orchestrated due to the extension of working hours of miners, combined with a significant pay cut. As well as the mines not being operational, there was also serious disruption of other vital

[82] Richard Thurlow, 'British Fascism and State Surveillance, 1934-1945' *Intelligence and National Security, Vol 3*(1), (1988), p. 79.
[83] The 'Night of the Long Knives' refers to period between 30 June and 2 July 1934 in which Hitler orchestrated the execution of many of his political opponents. This was a significant event in Hitler's political rise, and as such a wealth of academic literature covers the subject. A good example of a brief overview of the significance of these events is Elizabeth Wiskemann, 'The Night of the Long Knives' *History Today Vol 14*(6) (1964), pp. 371–380.
[84] The 'Comintern' was a Soviet lead international organisation attempting to achieve global Communism. The CPGB initially supported the war (as did the Comintern) but dramatically changed positions to condemn the war at the command of the Comintern. The change itself was not particularly significant to the threat posed by the CPGB, but it does show the level of influence held by the Comintern, and having such close links made the CPGB a potentially much more dangerous threat than it may have otherwise been. Monty Johnstone, 'The CPGB, the Comintern and the War, 1939-1941: Filling in the Blank Spots'. *Science & Society. Vol 61*(1) (1997), pp. 27-45.

services as other professions went on strike in solidarity. Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin claimed that while he was a 'man of peace' he would not be willing to 'surrender the safety and security of the British constitution'.[85] While the Trade Union Congress (TUC) was officially the organising body, a significant number of communists were actively involved, resulting in many communists being arrested. They continued support for the striking miners after the strike officially ended, and the party grew to more than 10,000 members.[86] While this was a significant increase on previous membership, it pales in comparison with BUF party membership during the interwar period. It is also significantly less than the CPGB party membership during, and after, the war.

The links to the USSR would also have been viewed as dangerous by the Government, given the overthrow of the previous Russian political system under Tsar Nicholas II. The dramatic change of political system in another country may have forced the Government to consider that it could happen in Britain too, especially given the tensions within Great Britain during the economic slump that followed the First World War. However, any threat from communists helping the enemy to invade, or assisting them post-invasion, was mitigated by Hitler himself with his decision to attack the Soviet Union. This was a turning point of the Second World War in many ways. Importantly, communists who may have otherwise been sympathetic to the views of the Nazi party given the pact with the USSR, or at least possess an anti-war mindset, were turned against him.

Having outlined that there was a significant fear of a Fifth Column in Britain, this chapter has also shown that it is unlikely that any such threat ever existed in any significant way. However, the reality of the threat was of little consequence, as there was a genuine fear amongst the government and their behaviour was influenced by this fear. This was clearly demonstrated in the first meeting of the Security Intelligence Centre, which stated that:

> the activities of the Executive had been to a large extent carried out in the dark and the measures taken had necessarily been of a general defensive character, since they had no precise knowledge of the organisation they were fighting although they were convinced of its existence.[87]

This fear, and the subsequent actions, would lead to the creation of what would ultimately become a powerful and widespread machinery of security, that involved numerous government departments, growing in scale rapidly not just during the Second World War but also beyond

[85] BBC News, 'What was the General Strike of 1926?' *BBC* News. (2011).
[86] Marxists Internet Archive, Communist Party of Great Britain: History Section'. *Marxist Internet Archive* (2017).
[87] CAB 93/5: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Security Intelligence Centre: Meeting 1'. 15.06.1940.

into the post-war years. The form this took was the creation of the Home Defence (Security) Executive.

May 1940 was a significant turning point in the Second World War. 10 May saw the end of the Phoney War, when German forces invaded France and the Low Countries. It was also the day that Winston Churchill became Prime Minister, and he wasted little time in making clear his position on the war through the famous 'Blood, Toil, Tears, and Sweat' speech; Britain was to fight for victory, not stopping short of the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers.[88] Just over a fortnight after becoming Prime Minister, Churchill felt that there was a real and imminent threat from Fifth Column activities and authorised Neville Chamberlain, now Lord President of the Council, to take action.[89] In response, Chamberlain created the Home Defence (Security) Executive, its purpose '...to consider questions relating to defence against the "Fifth Column", and initiate action'.[90] Similar in some respects to the modern concept of a 'fusion centre', it brought together representatives from different government departments and organisations concerned with security, to defend against the Fifth Column.[91] While there may have been no actual threat from a Fifth Column, the fear of one was significant, and as such the HD(S)E was created to mitigate the perceived risk. Churchill gave the command to 'find out whether there is a Fifth Column in this country and if so to eliminate it'.[92] Despite this change of opinion, and the realisation that there was not a significant Fifth Column threat, the work of the HD(S)E continued. In the same speech before the House of Commons, Churchill also justified the creation of the SE, although he noted that panic had subsided by this time. He claimed;

> …a wave of alarm passed over this country… I felt in that hour of anxiety that this side of the business of National Defence wanted pulling together. I therefore asked Lord Swinton to undertake this task… I can assure the House that the powers that Parliament has given

[88] House of Commons Debate, 13/5/1940, vol 360, c1501-25.
[89] CAB 65/7/39: 'War Cabinet 144 (40) Conclusions'. 28.05.1940.
[90] CAB 66/8/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive'. 27.05.1940.
[91] Fusion centres are 'an entity where different units within the intelligence and security community and other agencies work together on one or more threats', as defined by Gudrun Persson, "Fusion Centres – Lessons Learned: A Study of Coordination Functions for Intelligence and Security Services," *Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies*, Swedish National Defence College (2013) p. 9. They have been considered to be a largely American invention, mostly emerging post 9/11, with the creation of bodies such as the 'Terrorist Threat Integration Center' in 2003, which would later become part of the National Counterterrorism Center. An overview of fusion centres in Europe, including the origins of fusion centres, can be found at Renske van der Veer, Walle Bos, and Liesbeth van der Heide, 'Fusion Centres in Six European Countries: Emergence, Roles and Challenges' *International Centre for Counter Terrorism Report* – The Hague (2019). The most prominent British counter-terrorism fusion centre is the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC).
[92] Winston Churchill, quoted in Christopher Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5* (London: Penguin Books, 2010), p. 227.

> to the Executive will not be used consciously in any unfair, oppressive, or, if I may use the expression, un-British spirit.[93]

As well as providing justification from Churchill's perspective of the need for the creation of the HD(S)E, his words also show the clear indication that the body was to continue to exist despite the 'wave of alarm' having subsided.

The creation of the HD(S)E was not universally popular. While responses to the HD(S)E are discussed in more detail later in this thesis, one comment that is worthy of note can be found in the extensive diaries of Guy Liddell, Director of B Division of MI5, and in charge of counter-espionage in Britain during the Second World War.[94] He claimed that the SE was 'really pandering to the Fifth Column neurosis, which is one of the greatest dangers with which we have to contend at the moment'.[95] It is quite possible that this negative viewpoint was due to inter-services rivalry, a phenomenon that has often occurred between the intelligence and security services. This is made more likely as, at the time of the creation of the SE, there were serious concerns about the effectiveness of MI5. This concern grew as it become increasingly apparent that the Fifth Column had never existed. The result of this concern was a restructuring of MI5, beginning with a change in leadership. Vernon Kell had been the head of MI5 since its creation in 1909, and had been able to count on Churchill as a firm supporter.[96] However, Kell had been adamant about the existence of a Fifth Column, and insistent in his support for internment. The whole situation was considered to have been badly mishandled by MI5. By the time the Fifth Column panic had passed, it was considered that Kell had grown too old, and that MI5 needed to make dramatic changes to cope with the task at hand.[97] On 10 June 1940, Kell was dismissed, and MI5 was restructured.[98] It was decided that Lord Swinton should take on executive control of the organisation, and would also 'exercise operational control over the work of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), in respect of all the activities of MI6 in Great Britain and in Eire'.[99] This was in addition to another role that had been granted to Lord Swinton; he had also been named the Chairman of the HD(S)E. The two jobs were linked for several years, as Duff Cooper took over the executive power of MI5 and the internal

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[93] House of Commons Debate, 15.08.1940, vol 364, c957-964, also available at PREM 3/418/1: 'Oral Answers: Swinton Committee'. 15.08.1940.
[94] Responses from members of parliament and from the press are discussed on page 87.
[95] Christopher Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5* (London: Penguin Books, 2010), p. 229.
[96] Christopher Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5* (London: Penguin Books, 2010), pp. 29-30.
[97] David Stafford, *Churchill & Secret Intelligence* (London: Abacus, 1997). p210-213.
[98] Christopher Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5* (London: Penguin Books, 2010), p. 227.
[99] CAB 66/10/1: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive. Special Operations Executive. Memorandum by the Lord President of the Council'. 19.07.1940.

activities of MI6 when he succeeded Swinton as Chairman of the Security Executive (SE) in 1942.[100] In order to restructure MI5 in the most effective manner, it was decided that a review would be conducted, a task which was given to Sir David Petrie, before he took over as head of MI5 in order to carry out the reforms needed.

Given the nature of the HD(S)E, numerous individuals from different departments appeared at its meetings. While there was a tendency for the same individuals to regularly attend, variation did occur among the representatives of departments. However, there were a few permanent members of the committee who also conducted additional duties, such as chairing meetings and subcommittees. Lord Swinton was the first Chairman of the HD(S)E.[101] He was a prominent Conservative, first as an MP for Hendon for 17 years before becoming a Lord in 1935. He held his first Cabinet position early in his political career. Four years after entering the Commons he become president of the Board of Trade. His *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* entry states that 'the reputation he acquired during these years was that of an effective minister, somewhat abrasive in style, but personally very interested in and knowledgeable about the topics with which he dealt on a daily basis'.[102] His appointment as Chairman was met with some derision, though Churchill clearly did not agree given the decision to appoint him. Austin Hopkinson, Independent MP for Mossley, asked Clement Attlee 'does the right hon. Gentleman think that Lord Swinton is a suitable person for this office?' Attlee did not respond.[103] Despite a previous 'gagging order' issued by the Press Censorship Office on the HD(S)E following an article by Maurice Webb in the *Daily Herald* on 23 July 1940, reference to the HD(S)E in the Commons enabled further publication on the matter.[104] This will only have fuelled Churchill's ire at questions being entered onto the paper

[100] By this time, the HD(S)E had changed its name to the SE. This change of name is discussed on page 83.
[101] Swinton had many names and titles throughout his life, both prior to the time period of this thesis and beyond it. His name was Philip Cunliffe-Lister (having been changed from Philip Lloyd-Greame) and he rose through the ranks of British nobility to become 1st Earl of Swinton. For clarity, this thesis will refer to him as Lord Swinton.
[102] Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 'Lister, Philip Cunliffe – first earl of Swinton' *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (2008).
[103]Hansard HC Deb. Vol 364, Col 415-416. 08.08.1940. As well as the example given above, MP Sydney Silverman queried of Churchill, 'what were the special qualifications that led the right hon. Gentleman to appoint this particular chairman?' Hansard HC Deb. Vol 363, Col 601-602. 23.07.1940. Further to this another example is that during a speech giving information on the Executive, when Churchill mentioned the selection of Lord Swinton as Chairman, he was greeted with heckles from the Members of the House, including the claim that Swinton 'failed in another job'. Hansard HC Deb. Vol 364, Col 45-47. 15.08.1940.
[104] The original publication that sparked the public debate on the SE, and discussions in Parliament, was written by Maurice Webb and can be found at *The Daily Herald*, 'I Find Our "Secret Weapon" Against the Fifth Column'. 23.07.1940. A letter explaining the committee dealt with security issues and as such should not be referenced in publications can be found at CAB 21/3498: Letter from Chief Press Censor. 24.07.1940. The decision to ban newspapers reporting on the committee was met with some controversy in Parliament, with Mr George Strauss questioning Churchill '… whether he approves of the prohibition which has gone out that no newspaper may

concerning the body, which he had already clearly stated he would not answer.[105] Questions in the House began the same day as Webb's publication, with George Strauss, Labour MP for Lambeth North, asking Churchill 'whether the committee appointed by his predecessor, under the chairmanship of Lord Swinton, to report to him suspicious political activities is still in existence; who its members are; and whether is it now making any Reports'.[106] The first misconception, that the committee was set up Churchill's predecessor, may seem one of rather little consequence, especially given the technicality that Chamberlain oversaw the set up of the HD(S)E, it was not under Chamberlain's premiership. However, it was a distinction that was considered important enough to be considered in a draft reply to this question, despite ultimately not being used.[107] The second misconception was more damaging, especially in a post-Zinoviev letter world.[108] While there was a clear crossover between 'suspicious political activity' and the work of the HD(S)E, it was considered by Swinton and Ball that is was a 'complete misapprehension in supposing that it is concerned solely or mainly with suspicious political activities'.[109]

Due to the persistence of questions about the HD(S)E, which had a tendency to be focused around its composition, what its members were paid and where this money came from, Churchill gave a speech addressing some of these questions on 15 August 1940.[110] Prior to this speech, there was already a general understanding that Lord Swinton was Chairman, and this was confirmed in this speech.[111] It was also known that trade unionist and political activist

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mention this Committee without special permission'. Churchill responded firmly that he did approve and reiterated his belief that it was not in the public interest to discuss the Committee, see Hansard HC Deb. Vol 363, Cols. 1153-1154. 30.07.1940. References to the parliamentary discussion on 08.08.1940 in the press can be found in such examples as *The Daily Telegraph*, 'Lord Swinton's Committee: MP's demand to know rates of pay'. 09.08.1940, and *The Daily Herald*, 'MPs Ask Full Debate on Swinton's Secret Job', 09.08.1940.

[105] Churchill stated, 'it would not be in the public interest to give any information on the subject…' Hansard HC Deb. Vol 363, Col 601-602. 23.07.1940

[106] Hansard HC Deb. Vol 363, Col 603-604. 23.07.1940.

[107] While Chamberlain did set up the committee, it was under the authority of the War Cabinet at the time, which was headed by Churchill. This technicality is minor, but demonstrates the confusion borne by the secretive nature of the body and its work. It was also considered important enough to include a correction in a proposed reply to the question, although this reply was never actually used with Churchill electing to refuse to answer any questions on the subject, as noted above. The suggested reply, with correspondence between Swinton and Ball regarding this reply can be found at CAB 21/3498: 'Suggested Reply'. 19.07.1940.

[108] The Zinoviev letter was a document published by the *Daily Mail* in 1924, implying ties between the Labour Party and Soviet Russia. For more information on the authenticity of the letter, and its source and leak, have been discussed frequently but the most prominent work on the subject is Gill Bennet, *The Zinoviev Letter: the conspiracy that never dies'* (Oxon: Routledge, 2018).

[109] CAB 21/3498: 'Suggested Reply'. 19.07.1940.

[110] Questions of this nature will have been made due to public money being used to fund the Committee, and thus granting MPs the right to raise the topic of what money is going where. This would have been harder for Churchill to completely ignore, when compared with questions relating to the activities of the SE which could easily been refused to be added to the agenda due the security implications, as parliamentary discussions are public and thus information cannot be kept secret.

[111] Hansard HC Deb. Vol 364, Col 957-964. 15.08.1940.

Alfred Wall was on the committee but that neither he nor Swinton were paid for this role.[112] Questions had also arisen regarding the involvement of Sir Joseph Ball and Mr William Crocker, with an emphasis on what they were paid, and by which department. Churchill declined to answer this, although a letter from Swinton to Major Desmond Morton the day prior to this speech shows that Crocker was not receiving a salary for his role in the Executive.[113] Crocker's membership of the Executive was short lived, with *The Daily Telegraph* reporting that he had 'ceased his association' with the body on 15 October 1940. This same article noted the Mr Isaac Foot had joined the HD(S)E.[114] A lengthier piece was published in the *Evening Standard*, which reported that Crocker had resigned and Foot had joined the committee, and attempted to provide further background to both individuals and to the Committee, though this was still very brief, and said little more than the colloquial name of the body (the Swinton Committee), and pointed out that it operated in secrecy.[115] An earlier mention can also be found in *The Manchester Guardian* on 10 October 1940, although this simply stated that Foot had joined the body. However, this short piece also included misinformation, such as it still listed Crocker as a member of the body, and listed Ball as a member, which he was not despite being linked as deputy chairman of the SIC.[116] On review it was considered that the persistent misapprehension over the composition was 'deplorable', but there was no way to remedy it.[117] Despite Churchill's best efforts, these references were still appearing in the press and the lack of information being provided through official channels resulted in inaccuracies. As with Attlee's earlier speech, Churchill addressing the issue in Parliament resulted in further mentions in the Press, not least owing to a blunt exchange between Ernest Thurtle and Aneurin Bevan at the end of the speech.[118] The next day, this argument was referenced in the *News Chronicle, Manchester Guardian* and *Birmingham Post*.[119] A second particularly long piece was also published in the *News Chronicle*.[120] While this public discussion through the press would have doubtless annoyed Churchill, he may well have appreciated the support of the *Birmingham Post*, which put forward the belief that no

[112] Hansard HC Deb. Vol 364, Col 415-416. 08.08.1940.
[113] CAB 21/3498: 'Letter from Swinton to Morton'. 14.08.1940.
[114] *The Daily Telegraph*, 'Home Security', 15.10.1940.
[115] *Evening Standard.* '"Hush Hush" Committee'. 15.10.1940.
[116] *Manchester Guardian*. 'Mr Isaac Foot on the Swinton'. 10.10.1940.
[117] CAB 21/3498: 'Note on The *Manchester Guradian* Article'. 14.10.1940.
[118] Thurtle mused that the Members of the House that were persisting with questions about the Executive were 'rather lukewarm about the prosecution of the war'. Bevan responded by stating that 'certain hon. Members should cease to act as pimps of the Government'. Hansard HC Deb. Vol 364, Col 957-964. 15.08.1940.
[119] *News Chronicle*, 'The Swinton Committee'. 16.08.1940; *Manchester Guardian*, 'Unedifying'. 16.08.1940; *Birmingham Post*, 'The Swinton Committee'. 16.08.1940.
[120] *News Chronicle*, 'Premier and MPs in Row'. 16.08.1940.

information should be shared about a committee of this nature, and that 'there is no need for the limelight to be turned upon any aspect of their work'.[121] For the MPs, there was far too little discussion on the SE, for Churchill there was far too much.

While Churchill's speech contained very little information on the Committee, or its members, earlier drafts reveal further information and greater insight. For example, Sir Joseph Ball was paid £1,500 per year for his role within the SE. This role was as deputy Chairman of a subcommittee created in the early days of the HD(S)E, known as the Security Intelligence Centre (SIC).[122] Ball's inclusion on the Committee was met with unhappiness, due to his long-standing association with the Conservative Party.[123] The high number of Conservatives represented on the HD(S)E was a source of criticism from both MPs and the general public, and resulted in the repeated emphasis in the drafts that there was also a trade union representative on the HD(S)E.[124] In one of the several drafts produced, Ball's experience with MI5 was referenced to justify his position in the SIC.[125] He was a prominent civil assistant in MI5, and 'was doing the best work, and very important and responsible work indeed'.[126] Ball had spent much of the First World War 'questioning prisoners, internees, suspects and aliens', which would likely have been valuable experience when dealing with the Second World War Fifth Column work of the SIC.[127] There is suggestion, though of course it cannot be proven, that Ball may well have been a key actor in the Zinoviev letter affair.[128] Regarding the HD(S)E, a role of this nature likely suited Ball, as it was one that paid well, offered a fairly large amount

[121] *Birmingham Post*, 'The Swinton Committee'. 16.08.1940.
[122] CAB 21/3498: 'Draft Statement on the so-called "Swinton Committee"'. 13.08.1940.
[123] William Mills summed up the personality of Ball with the claim; 'had a group photograph been taken of the most influential figures in the Conservative Party in the 1930s, Chamberlain, with his alert corvine look, would have claimed pride of place in front row centre, while Ball would have been half hidden in the back row, with only an eye showing. Yet everyone else in the photograph would have been in his debt, nobody more than Chamberlain himself'. William Mills, 'Sir Joseph Ball, Adrian Dingli, and Neville Chamberlain's 'Secret Channel' to Italy, 1937-1940', *The International History Review* vol 14(2), (2002), p 279. Further information about Ball's previous work can be found at R. B. Cockett, 'Ball, Chamberlain and Truth' *The Historical Journal* Vol 33(1) (1990) pp. 131-142. Ball also held the position of director of the Conservative Party's research department from 1927.
[124] The trade unionist in question was Mr Wall and was referred to as such several times in Parliament, such as in Attlee's speech on 08.08.1940. Hansard HC Deb. Vol 364, Col 415-416. 08.08.1940. Examples of criticism in the Press of the overrepresentation of Conservatives can be seen in *News Chronicle*, 'The Swinton Committee'. 16.08.1940.
[125] CAB 21/3498: 'Draft Statement on the So-Called "Swinton Committee"'. 10.08.1940.
[126] William Mills, 'Sir Joseph Ball, Adrian Dingli, and Neville Chamberlain's 'Secret Channel' to Italy, 1937-1940', *The International History Review* vol 14(2), (2002), p 280.
[127] Christopher Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5* (2009) p. 126.
[128] For information on the Zinoviev letter see John Ferris and Uri Bar-Joseph, 'Getting Marlowe to hold his tongue: The conservative party, the intelligence services and the Zinoviev letter', *Intelligence and National Security* Vol 8(4) (1993), pp 100-137; Daniel Lomas, *Intelligence, Security and the Attlee Governments, 1945-51* (2017), pp. 9-12; and Gill Bennet, *The Zinoviev Letter: the conspiracy that never dies*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

of power and freedom, and yet allowed Ball to operate behind the scenes with Swinton being the focus of attention. Ball has been described as 'a quintessential *eminence grise*, and his influence on affairs cannot be measured by the brevity of the printed references to him', and 'one of those mysterious figures who stray through the pages of British political history, gets passing mention here and there in the memoirs of a few discreet notables and the rest is silence'.[129] Ball resigned from his connection with the SE in the summer of 1941, but still offered unpaid help on occasion.[130]

A further draft provided the details of several members who attended regularly in these early days of the Executive. This list contained 11 names, representing different departments and was as follows;

Lt. Col. V. P. T. Vivian, C.B.E. – MI6
Brigadier O. A. Harker, C.B.E. – MI5
Lt. Col. C. T. Hutchison – War Office
Maj. Gen. Sir Alan Hunter – War Office
Lt. Col. S. S. Hill-Dillon, D.S.O. – GHQ Home Forces
A. L. Dixon, Esq., C.B.E. – Home Office
A. S. Hutchinson, Esq., C.V.O. – Home Office
A. N. Rucker, Esq., C.B.E. – Privy Council Office
Major D. Morton, C.M.G., M.C. – Prime Minister's Office
Lt. Col. N. G. Scorgie, C.V.O., C.B.E. – Ministry of Information
A. M. Wall, Esq. – London Society of Compositors[131]

The early meetings of the HD(S)E had a tendency to be limited in the number of representatives, but on average this increased over time. The number of attendees, and the variety of departments represented on the HD(S)E can be clearly seen in Appendix II and Appendix III. The scale of different departments represented demonstrates the reach of the Executive throughout Whitehall. It also shows that the 'security' the Executive was concerned with went far beyond the traditional Security Services remit, although a close working relationship was maintained with MI5 and MI6 regularly represented.

The first part of this chapter has provided an overview into the reasons why the HD(S)E was initially created, discussing the three core pillars of the feared Fifth Column in Britain. It has outlined why these fears existed, and outlined what action was taken through the creation of such a committee. It has also provided details into the composition of the HD(S)E at the outset. The remaining portion of this chapter will go on to discuss the work of the HD(S)E in

[129] Robert Blake, 'Ball, Sir (George) Joseph (1885-1961)', in *The Dictionary of National Biography 1961-1970* (eds. E.T Williams and C.S Nicholls), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p.68. The second quote is from Arnold Beichman, 'The Conservative Research Department: The Care and Feeding of Future British Political Elites' *Journal of British Studies* Vol 13(2) (1974), p. 99.
[130] CAB 21/3498: 'Letter from Swinton to Peake'. 17.101941. The reason for Ball's resignation remains unclear.
[131] CAB 21/3498: 'Letter to Ball'. 07.08.1940.

the early days of its wartime existence and discuss what action was taken when fighting the feared Fifth Column.

The main concern for the HD(S)E regarding aliens, both enemy and non-enemy, was internment. Specifically, who should be interned, how their internment should be managed, and practical questions regarding issues such as living conditions and security within the camps, and overcrowding. While it is evident that the HD(S)E played an important role in the management of internment, it was not the decision of the HD(S)E to begin this process. Widespread internment began 13 days before the HD(S)E was established, on 15 May, with the decision that all aliens on the Eastern Coast would be interned immediately. Within a few days, further orders were issued to intern all 'Category B' aliens.[132] In a letter to Swinton, dated 31 May 1940, Norman Coales, a War Office official, described how the lack of planning on behalf of policymakers meant that accommodation was not immediately available for the scale of internment demanded. While Coales was eager to emphasise that the War Office had handled the situation well, he did offer complaints concerning inconsistencies within camps, how abruptly orders to intern were given, and his own personal belief that too many aliens were 'strolling about the streets, free to come and go as they like and do as they please', expressing his personal unhappiness with the situation.[133] There was a need then to establish a body to take control of this complicated situation, which held the power to make swift decisions. Thus far, the HD(S)E could be viewed as fulfilling its original purpose, making decisions to protect the country against threats from a Fifth Column.

Once Italy declared war in June 1940, panicked round ups of aliens continued, and it has been argued that Churchill became extremely paranoid over the Fifth Column, peaking with the idea that internment camps were unsafe places as they could become dropping zones for German parachutists or internees could become unruly. Thus, the decision was reached the internees would be shipped overseas to protect the British mainland.[134] Very soon after this, the *Arandora Star* set sail from Liverpool heading for Newfoundland, Canada. Carrying 1673

[132] In 1939, the Home Office set up tribunals to divide aliens in Britain into three separate categories. These three categories were based on the level of threat posed by an individual. 'Category A' individuals were known pro-fascists or agents of the enemy and were to be interned immediately. 'Category B' were not initially interned but were to be subject to certain restrictions. Finally, 'category C' was individuals found to be innocent of any security threat and not to be interned. Roger Kershaw, 'Collar the lot! Britain's policy of internment during the Second World War' *The National Archives,* (2015). However, all aliens who lived in coastal areas 'east of the line drawn from the South coast of Scotland were to be interned'. CAB 114/4: 'Letter from Coales to Swinton'. 31.05.1940. The vast majority of aliens, just over 90%, were placed into category C. David Stafford, *Churchill & Secret Intelligence* (London: Abacus, 1997). p. 206.

[133] CAB 114/4: 'Letter from Coales to Swinton'. 31.05.1940.

[134] David Stafford, *Churchill & Secret Intelligence* (London: Abacus, 1997). p210-211.

passengers, the cruise liner was at risk of attack by enemy ships if discovered. Within an hour the ship was sunk by a German U-boat. The death toll was 805 individuals, both internees and crew.[135] A review of the incident was conducted by Lord Snell, Deputy Leader of the House of Lords.[136] It was decided that his report should not be published, due to references to MI5 and to the HD(S)E. It was felt that publication of a full report of this nature would render these organisations unable to function due to the necessary secrecy in which they operated. However, a summary report on the findings made by Lord Snell was given limited circulation.[137] This report indicated that it was in fact Lord Swinton, on behalf of the HD(S)E, who suggested 'the danger of retaining alien internees and prisoners of war' within Britain, rather than this policy being the result of the Fifth Column paranoia held by Churchill as suggested by David Stafford.[138] It is unclear made this suggestion in his personal capacity or as his role of Chairman of the HD(S)E, as no reference to the Arandora Star was made in any of the minutes of the meetings of the HD(S)E. The disaster was the beginning of the end of the Fifth Column mania, with Churchill retreating on his stance and claiming the Fifth Column to be exaggerated.[139] After Kell lost his job, it was decided that MI5 need to restructure and improve. This was no doubt heavily influenced by the panic the MI5 stirred up of a Fifth Column that never existed. Issues relating to aliens in Britain remained a consistent subject throughout the meetings of the HD(S)E for the duration of the war, despite the realisation that there was no Fifth Column threat, with the term 'alien/aliens' featuring 54 time in meeting subheadings.[140] These discussions were on individual issues, such as alien seamen, employment of aliens, and

[135] Michael Kennedy, '"Men that Came in with the Sea': The Coastwatching Service and the Sinking of the Arandora Star', *History Ireland Vol 16*(3) (2008). pp. 26-29. Hinsley and Simkins seem somewhat dismissive of this, pointing out that many of the internees had been 'Category A', or on 'MI5's dangerous list', which could be viewed as downplaying the tragic nature of this event, see F. H. Hinsley and C. A. G. Simkins, *British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume Four: Security and Counter-Intelligence* (London: HMSO, 1990), p. 58. Evidence has already been provided of the paranoia, and sense of witch-hunting, that was prominent in the years prior to this disaster. While there would undoubtedly have been a variety of opinions held by these individuals, including some who would have supported Hitler, it is unlikely that many of these dangerous 'Category A' individuals were any danger to Britain. These individuals, who were arrested and held without charge on the crime of being born in the wrong country, were trapped aboard a sinking ship they had no choice but to be on. Also, while the *Arandora Star* was carrying a significant number of 'Category A' internees, the intention was for all aliens, even those judged to be of no risk ('Category C'), to be deported, as evidenced in PREM 3/49: '"Arandora Star" Enquiry: Report by Lord Snell'. 24.10.1940.

[136] The report, and correspondence regarding the report, refers to Snell as 'Lord Snell' and thus the dissertation does the same. However, by this point he had been raised to Baron. He was made Deputy Leader of the House of Lords in 1940. David Howell, 'Snell, Henry, Baron Snell' *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (2004).

[137] PREM 3/49: '"Arandora Star" Enquiry: Report by Lord Snell'. 24.10.1940.

[138] David Stafford, *Churchill & Secret Intelligence*,(London: Abacus, 1997). pp. 210-211.

[139] PREM 3/418/1: 'Oral Answers: Swinton Committee'. 15.08.1940.

[140] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meetings'. 28.05.1940-26.07.1945.

restrictions on the movements and activities of aliens, before the final 'relaxation of restrictions on aliens' which was discussed 04 October 1944.[141]

The second branch of the feared Fifth Column concerned fascism. The day after Chamberlain announced the body would be created, the SE met twice to discuss urgent issues, and to make decisions upon necessary action, straight away. Priority was given to the BUF, and how best to take action against it. This was followed by discussions on conditions in internment camps, communists, and potentially dangerous publications, namely *Action* and *The Daily Worker* which were the main fascist and communist newspapers respectively.[142] In the second meeting of the HD(S)E it was decided that certain prominent members of the BUF were to be interned, the *Action* newspaper would be suppressed, and the organisation would be proscribed. The decision to proscribe an organisation such as this always held the risk that the activities and meetings would continue, but secretly thus making it much harder for the appropriate authorities to monitor. This was noted by the HD(S)E when making the decision to proscribe the BUF, however it was argued that the internment of the district leaders of the BUF (along with other prominent individuals) would be equally as likely to have this effect and as such the fear of the body being 'driven underground should not deter the Executive', when weighed against the benefit that 'a public step like proscription would have a reassuring and stimulating effect on public opinion'.[143] Just one day after permission was granted to form the HD(S)E to fight the Fifth Column, a third of the threat had effectively been dealt with. The BUF was only directly mentioned by the HD(S)E four times.[144] In the eighth meeting, concerns were raised regarding the risk of imprisoned members of the BUF potentially being able to conspire, and may have been plotting to arrange the escape of their leaders if an opportunity arose. As a result, the War Office agreed to accommodate them, essentially moving one of the remaining responsibilities of the HD(S)E towards fighting the BUF to the War Office. The final mention of the BUF in the minutes of the HD(S)E was twofold. Firstly, Swinton in his role as Chairman questioned whether it would be legal to send interned members of the BUF

[141] The 54 mentions are in relation to subheadings specifically containing the word 'alien' or 'aliens'. Internment was mentioned more often that this however not always directly connected to aliens and as such has not been added to this number, unless the internment discussion stated it was implicitly about aliens. Examples of references to alien seamen include meeting numbers; 3, 10, 11, 18, 43, and 46. Examples of reference to the employment of aliens include meeting numbers; 6, 44, 56. Examples of restrictions on the movements and activities of aliens include; restrictions on aliens: meeting 7, aliens going to new addresses: meetings 45 and 47. CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meetings'. 28.05.1940-26.07.1945.
[142] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 1'. 28.05.1940.
[143] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 2': 28.05.1940.
[144] The *Action* newspaper is mentioned once separately. CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meetings'. 28.05.1940-26.07.1945. Internment camps are mentioned, and as such that would affect the roughly 750 fascists who had been interned.

overseas. Given the disaster of the *Arandora Star*, this may be considering somewhat surprising, but Swinton emphasised the 'great desirability on security grounds that these people should be rendered completely harmless'.[145] Despite being told it was not legal to take this action, he was undeterred, and 'strongly advised..., that if the law could be amended to enable them to be sent overseas, it should be done'.[146] The second question concerned the activities of the Committee, led by Sir Norman Birkett, which was examining the cases of interned members of the BUF.[147] The response to this was 'that the Committee confined themselves to investigating whether or not the man had been an active member of the Union. If it appeared that he had, they did not question the necessity for his internment.' This suggests that the approach taken was *proactive*, looking for reasons to intern, rather than *reactive*, waiting for reasons to intern to become apparent. The distinction is subtle, but highly significant. This approach fits with the rhetoric presented by some that the HD(S)E – and by extension its subcommittees and offshoots – were the 'Prime Ministers Gestapo'. After the internment of around 750 members of the BUF, the organisation never recovered. The members of the BUF had been branded traitors, and the act of interning them validated the idea that they were members of a Fifth Column.[148]

The final aspect of the Fifth Column threat was communism, specifically the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). The approach taken towards the CPGB was in stark contrast to that taken to tackle the BUF. According to the minutes of the HD(S)E, 'Communist activities', or 'the Communist Party' were the subject of discussion 32 times throughout the wartime existence of the HD(S)E, across a total of 109 meetings. While the BUF faced swift and decisive action, the fight against communism in Great Britain was slow, considered, and deliberate. In the first year of the existence of the HD(S)E, the CPGB was only discussed seven times out of 41 meetings.[149] At the first meeting, the delicate nature of the situation was noted, with the decision for the Chairman to speak with key individuals being the only action to be taken immediately. These conversations were to happen before anything further would be

[145] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 9'. 10.07.1940.
[146] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 9'. 10.07.1940.
[147] There is significant file material concerning the internment of British fascists and provides scope for further research. The files in question are primarily found in HO 283/1 – HO 283/5, and HO 283/25.
[148] The lives of many never recovered from this difficult time, cases of suicide, broken families, and mental breakdowns have been reported. Richard Thurlow, 'The Evolution of the Mythical Fifth Column, 1939-46', *Twentieth Century British History, Vol* 10(4), (1999), p. 490.
[149] The meeting number and item number on the topic of communism for the first year of the body's existence are as follows: Meeting 1; Item 4; Meeting 4, Item 1; Meeting 9, Item 1; Meeting 10, Item 6; Meeting 22, Item 4, Meeting 24, Item 2, Meeting 26, Item 3. CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meetings'. 28.05.1940-20.02.1941.

discussed.[150] The results of these discussions were noted in meeting four, the HD(S)E believed that the *Daily Worker* needed to be blocked, but were advised by Minister of Labour and National Service, Ernest Bevin, himself a vehement anti-communist, that no other action should be taken against communists.[151] However, despite advising that action 'should proceed against the "Daily Worker" forthwith', this was not taken until January 1941, some 8 months later.[152] This may have been due to a fear of outrage and backlash from other arms of the press who may have felt the 'freedom of the press' was being compromised unduly, alongside the constant fear of making a move too early against the communists and creating more severe security issues.[153] A letter from the Home Secretary to the HD(S)E on 8 July 1940 raised concerns regarding the 'growing boldness of the Communists', although still mindful of the 'effect which any premature action might have in upsetting labour and strengthening the hands…'[154] In response, the HD(S)E met two days later and discussed communists at length. The body split their concerns into three sections which were communist activities, activities 'designed to slow down production', and the 'Campaign Against Authority as evidenced by the agitation for "workers' control" of factories and "arming the workers"'.[155]

Each of these sections were discussed, and the resulting conclusions were:

(a) No action should be taken at present against the Communist Party as such;
(b) The present arrangements for dealing with activity designed to slow down production were working well, and should stand;
(c) The campaign against authority, of which evidence had been given, should be suppressed as urgently as possible for the reasons and in the manner indicated above.
To effect this, the Home Office should consider the framing of a Regulation to make it an offence to attempt, either in speech or writing, to subvert duly constituted authority of any sort.[156]

Even when more discussion took place, the outcome remained the same: to withhold action. The fourth mention of communism by the HD(S)E came in the tenth meeting, at which it was noted that there were difficulties framing the proposed regulation concerning the campaign against authority but that discussions were continuing. Additionally, it was noted that it would be desirable for the Government's policy towards communist activities to be clarified to Chief

[150] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 1'. 28.05.1940.
[151]CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 4'. 29.05.1940.
[152] House of Commons Debate, 22/1/1941, vol 368, c185-190.
[153] There were several different reactions within the wider press as to the cancellation of publishing, from the *Daily Mirror*'s view of 'making martyrs' and the dangers of a slippery slope when suppressing opinions, to the *Daily Mail*'s stance of 'about time too' *Daily Mirror*, 1941, p5; *The Mercury*, 1941, p2.
[154] CAB 93/3: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Paper 9'. 08.07.1940.
[155] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 9'. 10.07.1940.
[156] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 9'. 10.07.1940.

Constables and Regional Commissioners.[157] The outcome of further similar discussions in later meetings in the first year followed along similar lines, with advice being to 'deal with the actual mischief that was being caused by the bad men within the Party' rather than taking action against the party as a whole, and to argue that it was better to prosecute than intern individuals, and even then to prosecute as sparingly as possible.[158] Despite banning the *Daily Worker*, communist literature was still circulating, particularly in factories. While this was a concern, this could not have been prevented without a change to the relevant Defence Regulation and, although such a change was discussed, it was again decided that no action would be taken.[159] Further to this, efforts were being made to create a new Defence Regulation against pamphlets, as pamphlets were being used in place of the *Daily Worker* but would likely not have constituted a substitution for it. It was considered imperative that a new Defence Regulation would cover these new publications and that it should happen quickly in order to avoid these new publications becoming established. A significant problem that was faced was coming up with a satisfactory definition of a 'newspaper'.[160] While action was being taken, it is clear that this was being done cautiously.

22 June 1941 saw major changes for the CPGB. Hitler launched the largest invading force to date into the Soviet Union, in Operation 'Barbarossa'.[161] On 9 July the HD(S)E held its 41st meeting, at which the CPGB was discussed. The CPGB was also discussed at the following 18 consecutive meetings.[162] The primary concern following the invasion was to track the attitude of the CPGB, thereby allowing the HD(S)E to consider whether the Government's policy towards the Party needed to change. In order to do this, the HD(S)E addressed three questions:

(a) What policy should be adopted to the Party generally.
(b) What answer should be given to the demand for the ban to be raised on the "Daily Worker".

[157] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 10'. 22.07.1940.
[158] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 24'. 28.01.1941. Another meeting occurs between the two noted here. However, the minutes of this meeting (number 22) simply say that the conclusions reached in this meeting are recorded in the Secretary's standard file of executive minutes. This meeting was held on 09.01.1941, and on the 21.01.1941 the *Daily Worker* was proscribed. It is a reasonable assumption that these minutes will contain discussion regarding this decision. However, thorough searches of the National Archives have not yielded any results.
[159] The Defence Regulation that was relevant here was By Law No 5 of Defence Regulation 14.
[160] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 26'. 20.02.1941.
[161] See, for example, David Stahel, *Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
[162] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meetings 41-60'. 09.07.1491-18.02.1942.

(c) Whether the policy of the Services to the enlistment of Communists should be revised.[163]

In answer to the first question, it was noted that communists had not become an ally of the British Government, instead the CPGB were now critical of the help being offered to the Soviet Union, claiming that Britain was not doing enough, and cooperation had been reluctant and half-hearted. There was a feeling that the CPGB were 'preparing to have the best of both worlds'. If the USSR lost to the Germans, they would blame the British for not offering enough help. If the USSR were victorious, they had a clear example of how successful a Communist State could be. While there followed much discussion, and an acknowledgment that the situation needed to be monitored, it was advised that 'at present there was no need to revise' the existing policy.[164]

Five conclusions were reached in relation to the question of whether the ban should be lifted against the *Daily Worker*. These were:

(a) The "Daily Worker" was suppressed, not because it was the organ of the Communist Party but because of its hostility to the War effort.
(b) The Communist Party at present attached the greatest importance to the resuscitation of the paper.
(c) The statements of policy issued by the Party indicated that line which the paper would take.
(d) That line would be as embarrassing to Trade Union leaders as it would be to the Government.
(e) It would be almost impossible to re-impose the ban once it had been raised.[165]

These points led to the conclusion that, while the matter would remain under review, no action would be taken to reinstate the *Daily Worker*. Discussions on the final question, concerning enlisting members of the Communist Party to the Army, concluded that the reason for not allowing members to sign up was that their loyalty was divided. Whether this policy could be justified was challenged, as it was at odds with the professed desire to work with anyone who was willing to fight Hitler. The conclusion that the HD(S)E reached was that the Army Council should look into the policy and see how far it could be revised to avoid allegations on insincerity regarding the desire to work with anyone opposing Hitler, whilst maintaining the necessary levels of security.[166]

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[163] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 41'. 09.07.1941.
[164] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 41'. 09.07.1941.
[165] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 41'. 09.07.1941.
[166] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 41'. 09.07.1941. Prior to this discussion, the policy towards calling up communists through conscription was that rank and file members of the CPGB could have been called up but active party members would not have been. The Army Council did discuss revising this

Despite the Communist Party being a topic of discussion at every meeting between early July 1941 and the end of January 1942, very little changed as a result. The general conclusions of meetings were often inconclusive, with the general feeling being that 'in the circumstances, it seems desirable to await further developments'.[167] There was a great deal of discussion on some subjects, but the mentions at some meetings were very brief, and added nothing new to the conversation. For example, at the 42nd meeting, it was noted that there were reported tensions concerning the new Communist Party line, with leaders such as Palme Dutt remaining hostile towards the Government but Harry Pollitt genuinely appearing to desire cooperation in order to win the war.[168] There was also speculation of division between the extremist rank and file party members, who were struggling to adapt to the new party line, and leaders, before concluding with the stance that the SE should take no action at that point in time but continue to observe the situation.[169] Similarly, little progress was made at the 43rd meeting where it was simply pointed out that the long term revolutionary aims of the CPGB had not changed, and there was no change to the Government stance needed at that point.[170]

Further points of note in relation to the CPBG included the 44th meeting when the topic of enlisting members of the CPGB rose again, with the Army Council stating it did not see the need to change the current policy. There was some apprehension about this decision, with Swinton feeling that:

> …the matter was not simply a security one, but had political implications, since it was not only possible, but likely, that the Communists would raise in the House of Commons the question of the treatment of one of their members who had professed a desire to fight in order to help the Soviet Union, but had in accordance with this policy been refused opportunity to do so.[171]

As a body whose purpose was to deal with security issues beyond the remit of the security and intelligence services, this did raise a question as to whether the political issue should factor into the recommendations of the HD(S)E. The conclusion reached on this issue was that the Army

policy but came to the conclusion that the policy should not be revised, found in CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 44'. 13.08.1941.

[167] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 42'. 16.07.1941.

[168] Rajani Palme Dutt was a prominent member of the CPGB, joining in the party's infancy. He became editor of the *Daily Worker* in 1936, a brief biography can be found in John Simkin, 'Rajani Palme Dutt'. *Spartacus Educational* (1997a). Harry Pollitt was a notable speaker, and held roles such as General Secretary of the CPGB. An overview of his life and politics is available in John Simkin, 'Harry Pollitt'. *Spartacus Educational* (1997b).

[169] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 42'. 16.07.1941.

[170] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 43'. 30.07.1941.

[171] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 44'. 13.08.1941.

could continue to reject communists, but this should be infrequent and based on a man's previous actions that would make him 'likely to attempt to undermine Army discipline'.[172] It was decided at the next meeting that, due to fear of political difficulties arising from awkward questions in the House of Commons, the policy of not allowing communists needed to change. There was some argument that this should be without limitation but it was countered by arguing that the safest route would be to enlist in the Pioneer Corps, which would be considered safer than having communists mingling with the main forces but would allow the Government a stronger position to argue fairness than outright rejection would.[173] The fear of subversive actions of communists in ranks would be serious given the risk it could pose to morale, and was perhaps justified given that within factory settings there were reports that communists were using the situation to further pressure representation of factory workers in management which, it was argued, would ultimately hamper production.[174]

The action of banning the publication of the *Daily Worker* did not signal the end of communist publication difficulties for the HD(S)E, as security concerns regarding publications of this nature arose again later. Despite the CPGB no longer being able to publish the *Daily Worker*, or to create a continuation or substitution newspaper, the CPGB found loopholes within the restrictions to continue making publications. This was achieved by publishing individual broadsheets. The first post-*Daily Worker* publication made was *The Workers' Gazette*, and it was agreed that if this was a continuation or substitution to the *Daily Worker* it was a direct challenge to Government policy and could not be permitted. However, the HD(S)E were, as always, reluctant to take any formal action.[175] While it was decided *The Workers' Gazette* was clearly a continuation of the *Daily Worker*, it was not illegal as it was not technically a newspaper due to being a single publication baring no serial number or date.[176] As such, no action would be taken against *The Workers' Gazette.*[177] This issue continued to cause difficulties for the HD(S)E, with a second one-time broadsheet being published under the title of the *British Worker.* Again, no date or serial number was attributed to the publication, and as such it was not possible for the HD(S)E to take any action, although it was agreed that should this behaviour continue new powers should be considered.[178] A third publication, *The Workers' News*, pushed the HD(S)E to question whether any action could be taken under

[172] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 44'. 13.08.1941.
[173] CAB 92/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 45'. 20.08.1941.
[174] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 44'. 13.08.1941.
[175] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 45'. 20.08.1941.
[176] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 46'. 27.08.1941.
[177] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 47.' 03.09.1941.
[178] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 48'. 24.09.1941.

Defence Regulation 2D(3).[179] A solution was eventually found with the Control of Paper Order 1941, which stated that publications had to have started before 16 August 1941 in order to continue publication.[180] Consequently after the fourth CPGB broadsheet publication, *The Worker,* the Ministry of Supply was to inform the individuals responsible for the publication that any further publications, including standalone publications, would be in contradiction to the Control of Paper (No. 39) Order 1941.[181] There were some methods of broadcasting that the SE concluded that there was no possible action they could take to prevent, for example paying for broadcasting facilities from the General Post Office. This was a service offered to any individual who was willing to pay for it and thus it was not possible to discriminate against communists by not allowing them to do so. This was different to appearing on the BBC, for example, as this was not an opportunity offered to everyone.[182]

The publication of written Communist propaganda was not the only concern for the HD(S)E as the CPGB were using other methods. The BBC were also creating issues by allowing a significant number of Communists airtime. For example, a broadcast made was made by six Trade Unionists, three of whom were members of the Communist Party. Under the recommendation of the HD(S)E, the Ministry of Information was to arrange with the BBC to have closer liaison with the Ministry of Labour and the Security Service on all matters that were concerned with the policy of the Government towards the Communist Party.[183] Despite the SE raising concerns over this, reports were heard of Communists boasting that they could obtain the facilities for broadcasting whenever they liked, resulting in further questioning of the BBCs speaker selection.[184] This is just one example of issues related to Trade Unions and communists. Another example of discussions concerning Trade Unions included the necessary precautions to be taken to ensure that activities were not allowed in factories that would have made it appear that Trade Unions supported the CPGB.[185] This concern was not unfounded. In October 1941 the Communist Party Secretariat stated a clear policy of infiltration into the Labour Party and the Trade Union Movement.[186] While Production Committees were proposed in factories, there was a need for emphasis from Trade Unions that members should only participate in these Committees through official Trade Union channels.[187]

[179] CAB 93/2: 'Security Executive: Minutes of Meeting 52'. 29.10.1941.
[180] CAB 93/2: 'Security Executive: Minutes of Meeting 53'. 12.11.1941.
[181] CAB 93/2: 'Security Executive: Minutes of Meeting 54'. 26.11.1941.
[182] CAB 93/2: 'Security Executive: Minutes of Meeting 57'. 21.01.1942.
[183] CAB 93/2: 'Security Executive: Minutes of Meeting 54'. 26.11.1941.
[184] CAB 93/2: 'Security Executive: Minutes of Meeting 56'. 31.12.1941.
[185] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 46' 27.08.1941.
[186] CAB 93/2: 'Security Executive: Minutes of Meeting 50' 15.10.1941.
[187] CAB 93/2: 'Security Executive: Minutes of Meetings 51-53'. 22.10.1941-12.11.1941.

As shown above, there was a lack of decisive action taken against the CPGB, despite a significant amount of discussion. There was a strong tendency to observe and monitor, rather than to proactively challenge the CPGB. The threat to security posed by communists was not underestimated by the HD(S)E and the body was keen to ensure that this knowledge was shared across Government, and to educate those in government departments. In order to achieve this, the SE arranged for a report to be drawn up to be distributed to Government departments in order to ensure that the 'true nature of the Communist Party's activities' would be realised.[188] This report was to be created by the Security Service in consultation with the Security Intelligence Centre, and should include information such as:

> First, a summary of Communist technique, secondly, an account of the secret activities of the Communist Party (a) before and (b) after the German attack on Russia, and thirdly, the history of its open activities throughout the same periods among Trade Unions, other organisations and industry as a whole.[189]

This report was created with the purpose of answering the question 'How far should the Communist Party's professed support of national unity and the national effort be accepted at its face value?'[190] This report concluded that Russia's entry into the war had actually helped improve the position of the CPGB, and the revolutionary aims of the party remained unchanged. Lord Swinton summarised this point with the claim 'it is clear that the Communist game is still the same; but it is being played on a much better wicket'.[191] From January 1942, mentions of the CPGB became less frequent, but when it was raised, the subjects of discussion remained similar to those that had occurred previously. The predominant subject over the next five months, which saw seven meetings, was 'meetings in factories'. At the 60th meeting of the HD(S)E, by this time known as the SE, arrangements were considered to limit the subjects discussed at industry meetings to an approved list and to establish a procedure for approving proposed speakers.[192] The premises concerned were Government offices or factories or other

[188] This action has clear echoes of the now infamous 'Their Trade is Treachery' booklet, produced in 1964 and brought to light by Chapman Pincher in Henry Chapman Pincher, *Their Trade is Treachery*, (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1981). A further booklet that is likely to be along the same lines is 'Treachery is Still their Trade', although this booklet it still closed by the Cabinet Office, although the description can be found at CAB 318/77: 'Security education booklet 'Treachery is Still their Trade', 22.06.1983-01.09.1991.
[189] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 46'. 27.08.1941.
[190] CAB 93/3: 'Security Executive Paper 120: The Communist Party of Great Britain'. 30.09.1941.
[191] CAB 93/2: 'Security Executive: Minutes of Meeting 49'. 01.10.1941.
[192] CAB 93/2: 'Security Executive: Minutes of Meeting 60'. 18.02.1942. The title of the body was changed from the Home Defence (security) Executive to simply the Security Executive on 01.10.1941. For the sake of clarity, the body will be referred to as the HD(S)E for this chapter. This change of name will be discussed in detail in the following chapter

establishments directly under Government control.[193] This proposal was presented and subsequently approved by the War Cabinet.[194]

Broadcasting continued to be a subject of some concern for the SE, with prominent communist and member of the South Wales Miners' Federation Mr Arthur Homer appearing on a BBC broadcast on 28 April 1942.[195] No solution was proposed for this recurrent security concern. Trade Unions were not the only group that caused the SE concern over communist influence. the HD(S)E also discussed whether action could be taken to limit communist control in youth groups. However, while suggestions were put forward such as possible central youth organisations ran by the Government, and starting a Government backed paper for youth organisations, it was agreed that there may well have been unfortunate repercussions if the Government tried to dictate how these youth groups should have been run and that these suggestions were too totalitarian. The final conclusions reached on this matter were that

(i) There should be no attempt to restrict in any way freedom of discussion in youth clubs or youth organisation
(ii) There should be no grant of public money to youth organisations in any way connected with a political party.
(iii) There should be no central youth organisation sponsored by the Government nor any Government inspired publication for youth organisations.[196]

The awareness of the political danger of appearing to behave discriminatorily towards the CPGB remained, and the HD(S)E acknowledged again that there should be no discouraging of organisations under communist influence unless this group existed to 'serve the interest of this political party'.[197]

Almost a year passed before communism was discussed again by of the SE. The final time the subject arose was June 1943, when discussing the dissolution of the Comintern. The discussion was simply to reiterate the point that it should be assumed that nothing had changed with regards to the aims of the CPGB, and 'departments should continue to treat the Communist Party in the same way as they had done before the dissolution of the Comintern'.[198] The attitude of the SE towards the CPGB in light of this change was that 'although CPGB was now independent, it still relied on the exploitation of racial and class hatreds, the penetration of

[193] CAB 93/2: 'Security Executive: Minutes of Meeting 60'. 18.02.1942.
[194] CAB 93/2: 'Security Executive: Minutes of Meeting 61'. 11.03.1942. War Cabinet approval was granted in meeting 65. CAB 93/2: 'Security Executive: Minutes of Meeting 65'. No date on minutes.
[195] CAB 93/2: 'Security Executive: Minutes of Meeting 66'. 29.04.1942.
[196] CAB 93/2: 'Security Executive: Minutes of Meeting 65'. No date on minutes. A slight addition was made to the second point. The Ministry of Information requested that in addition to 'public money' the policy should include 'or other form of assistance' as they received requests for support in other means.
[197] CAB 93/2: 'Security Executive: Minutes of Meeting 71'. 08.07.1942.
[198] CAB 93/2: 'Security Executive: Minutes of Meeting 89'. 02.06.1943.

Trade Unions, the promotion of strikes, and the subversion of the Armed Forces; all with a view to an eventual insurrection and overthrow of the Government by force'.[199] While this did not mark the end of the British State's conflict with communism, it was the end of any discussion of it at the main meetings of the HD(S)E. Unlike the BUF, there was no sense of finality or victory. Rather, the constant balancing act of limiting the ability of the CPGB to achieve their aims, and not aiding their cause by creating a view of martyrdom or discrimination, was the position faced by the HD(S)E. This resulted in a great deal of discussion, but very little action beyond the education of individuals working in government departments.

While the evidence given, and the benefit of hindsight, has demonstrated that there was no threat posed by a Fifth Column in Britain at the outbreak of the Second World War, it has also shown that there was a very real fear that political extremists and aliens were secretly working towards an Allied defeat. There were many similarities in the fears that were held at this time to the fears and 'spy mania' that had occurred during the First World War. The threat may not have actually existed, but the fear of this threat held great significance and as a result of this fear the Government took action, creating a body to combat this hidden enemy. The main groups that were thought to make up the Fifth Column were aliens, fascists and communists. The key action taken to deal with the threat of aliens was widespread internment, and discussion on aliens tended to be focused on issues of internment, conditions in internment camps and release from internment. Fascists were dealt with swiftly by the HD(S)E by proscribing the BUF. Communists were more challenging, with minor actions being taken but largely a policy of remaining aware of communist activities. Yet taken together, out of 554 items discussed at 109 wartime meetings of the HD(S)E, only 91 mentions were made of either aliens, fascists, or communists. This means only some 16% of all topics discussed were directly related to the core Fifth Column threat. This means that over 83% of the time, something else was being discussed. Given that this body existed *specifically to deal with* Fifth Column questions, this clearly shows that the HD(S)E were operating beyond its original remit. The thesis will now proceed to explore these 'extra-curricular' activities of the Executive, but first it will consider how the machinery of security – the 'Security State' – also developed.

[199] CAB 93/2: 'Security Executive: Minutes of Meeting 89'. 02.06.1943.

Chapter Two

'Continuous and detailed oversight'[200]

The Subcommittees of the Security Executive



Figure 1: *The Structure of the HD(S)E: May 1940*[201]

The Home Defence (Security) Executive did not remain a lone Whitehall entity dealing with security for long. Rather, it soon came to represent the heart of Britain's new machinery of security. It sat at the centre of a wide-reaching network of security-focused committees and subcommittees, often intertwined and chaired by the same individuals, to deal with independent, yet related, concerns. Several such committees were created, ranging from short-term subcommittees that met on a handful of occasions to discuss a particular issue, to committees that spanned the length of the war. The purpose of this chapter is to consider the work of some of the most significant of these committees. It will begin with the Security Intelligence Centre (SIC), the first sub-committee to be established and which proved vital to the operation of the HD(S)E when handling Fifth Column questions. It will then explore the work of the Liaison Officers' Conference (LOC), which would prove to be a particularly important subcommittee that continued to operate beyond the end of the war. Finally, it will look at the more narrowly focussed work of the Committee on Communism and the Control at Ports Committee.[202] Taken together, these sub-committees clearly illustrate the fact that,

[200] Subcommittees were created to deal with 'agreed policies requiring detailed application or problems needing continuous and detailed oversight', as noted in CAB 21/3498: 'Home Defence Security Executive: The Functions of the Security Executive', 26.10.1942.

[201] Wiring diagrams have been included to demonstrate the security structure at various key dates throughout the course of the war. While these do not include every conference held by the HD(S)E throughout this time, they provide several snapshots of time showing the growth of the machinery of security that was created through this period. This first entry shows the initial creation of the HD(S)E.

[202] There were a great number of subcommittees created by the SE throughout its tenure, as can be demonstrated by Appendix IV. This provides scope for further research. Records of the Seamen and Overseas Shipping Committee have not been found despite efforts including extensive searching at TNA and FOI requests. The

following the creation of the HD(S)E, the body quickly extended far beyond its initial purpose of addressing the Fifth Colum threat, filling a significant gap within the existing Whitehall machinery to handle matters of civil security, and issues that did not fall within the remit of the military, or the intelligence and security services.



Figure 2: *The Structure of the HD(S)E: June 1940*[203]

Despite being the sole reason given for its creation, the work of the HD(S)E was never really solely limited to addressing the threat of a Fifth Column.[204] One of the most significant actions taken within a matter of days of the HD(S)E itself being created was the establishment of another new body, the Security Intelligence Centre (SIC). This decision was made at the seventh meeting, which took place on 10 June 1940, just 13 days after the HD(S)E had been created.[205] Staffed by the same people as those who sat on the HD(S)E, the SIC was Chaired by Lord Swinton, with Sir Joseph Ball as Deputy Chairman. It was made clear from the beginning that the SIC worked directly under the HD(S)E and thus under Lord Swinton. The creation of the SIC was significant. The internal history of the SE, written in February 1946, described it as 'a means of collecting and coordinating all available intelligence on the operations of the "Fifth Column"'.[206] The role of the SE was 'to consider questions relating to

Shipping Information and Home Shipping Committee also met over the course of 10 months from November 1942 to September 1943 under the Chairmanship of Admiral Sir Francis Tottenham. The minutes of these meetings can be found at CAB 93/7: 'Security Executive: Shipping Information and Home Shipping Committee', 03.11.1942 – 16.09.1943.

[203] This wiring diagram shows the structure of the HD(S)E following the creation of the SIC and LOC.

[204] A collection of the papers of the SE can be found at CAB 93/3: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Papers 1-375' 28.05.1940-31.07.1945.

[205] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 7'. 10.06.1940

[206] CAB 125/182: 'The Security Executive: An outline of its course and functions'. February 1946.

defence against the "Fifth Column", and initiate action'.[207] A significant proportion of the role that was intended for the HD(S)E, then, was effectively relegated to a single subcommittee of it almost immediately.

An explanation of the role of the SIC was given in July, at which point its three main roles were outlined as:

> To collate information likely to provide clues to Fifth Column activity in this country:
> To co-ordinate the action of the various Security Services:
> To provide investigators with intelligence guidance on the lines their investigations should take.[208]

At the first meeting of the SIC, itself a subcommittee of the HD(S)E, it was decided that its own further small subcommittee would be created. This subcommittee was concerned with methods of communication employed by enemy agents or the Fifth Column looked at a variety of different mediums. Some of these mediums were more traditional, such as wireless communications and posters, while some forms of communication discussed were perhaps more elaborate, such as markings made on telephone poles and pyrotechnics.[209] The decision to immediately create another rung on the security ladder is indicative of the rapid growth of the British state's security apparatus during wartime. The second topic of note discussed at the first meeting of the SIC was internment. It was argued that internment should extend to all male enemy aliens, 'not because […] enemy agents would be eliminated but because the field of investigation would thus be narrowed'.[210] This extreme approach was considered because the body felt it was necessary given the level of risk posed, in their minds, by the Fifth Column.[211]

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[207] CAB 66/8/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Memorandum by the Lord President of the Council'. 27.05.1940.

[208] CAB 93/4: Security Intelligence Centre: Liaison Officers' Conference: Minutes of Meeting 1', 13.07.1940.

[209] CAB 93/5: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Security Intelligence Centre: Meeting 1'. 15.06.1940. Despite the extensive search for Fifth Column communications, no concrete evidence was found. It was decided that postal communications, telegraph, and diplomatic mails and telegrams were not being used by the Fifth Column, as the security measures in place made it at least highly unlikely 'the enemy' was engaged in communicating via any of these channels. The subcommittee came to the conclusion that 'the enemy almost certainly employs wireless as one of his chief means of communicating urgent instructions to agents and members of the Fifth Column'. This conclusion was based entirely on circumstantial evidence, assuming that wireless transmissions would have contained a form of plain language code. However, no evidence was provided that this happened. Similarly, there is a claim that 'the enemy' almost certainly used wireless telegraphic transmissions in cypher to communicate with highly trained agents, although once again the subcommittee acknowledges that little concrete evidence exists. CAB 93/5: 'First Report of Sub-Committee of the Home Defence Security Intelligence Centre'. 18.06.1940.

[210] CAB 93/5: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Security Intelligence Centre: Meeting 1'. 15.06.1940.

[211] There were four arguments presented in favour of interning all male enemy aliens. First, it was argued that some of the enemy aliens would be agents, and others would be individuals who would be willing to help Germany in the event of an invasion. There may be some slight truth to this, but the percentage of people who would have posed a risk would have been very small, which is admittedly more evident with the benefit of hindsight. The second justification for interning all male enemy aliens was that MI5 and the Police did not have the time or

This opens the door to questions of the ethics of security. There is a clear implication that such an extreme approach to internment would include the detention without trial of many people who would not constitute a threat, in order to increase security by hopefully also interning any individuals who *would* be considered a threat. However, this approach would not be considered acceptable, or legal, during times of peace. At times of war, morals and ethics become more grey affecting many areas, including the measures acceptable in the name of security. A third topic discussed at the first meeting was whether government departments would have a 'whole time' member of staff sitting on SIC or whether they would be represented by a Liaison Officer. The split was even, with the Home Office, MI5, GHQ Home Forces, Air Intelligence, Censorship and the BBC all electing to have a whole time member of staff and Military Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, C. I. D., MI6 (although they did acknowledge this may change to a full time member of staff if it proved necessary) being represented by a Liaison Officer.[212] This discussion led to the creation of the Liaison Officers Conference (LOC), yet another new branch of the security apparatus of the British state that is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

As had been discussed in the previous chapter, hindsight clearly shows that the Fifth Column was not a real threat, although several reasons can be presented to understand why such fears existed. Compounding these concerns, the LOC presented the SIC with numerous reports of Fifth Column activity elsewhere in Europe. Within days of the SIC's first meeting, reports were presented detailing the Fifth Column threat in Poland, Roumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Switzerland, Belgium, Portugal, and Spain. The first report the Centre received was written by Lieutenant Suski, author of *The Gestapo in Poland*. Suski took an alarmist view of the Fifth Column, detailing

> …the methods employed by the Nazis in Poland by the so-called "5th column" to which the Reich is mostly indebted for her success in 1939.[213]

resources to watch them as well as conducting the other urgent work required of them. The third was that all Italian enemy aliens had been interned, through the infamous anger of Winston Churchill following Italy's declaration of support for the Axis cause just under a week before the creation of the SIC (10 July 1940), with Churchill calling for authorities to 'collar the lot'. The SIC argued that there was 'no logical reason for discrimination in favour of those of German or Austrian origin'. The final reason given by the SIC in favour of this high level of internment was that it would 'protect decent aliens against assault, when bombing took place'. It is unclear whether this was intended to mean they would be safe from the bombs – which seems unlikely as the mass gathering of individuals means that the risk associated with any bombing would be more severe – or, more likely, safe from the misplaced wrath of individuals who would be looking for someone to blame for the atrocities. CAB 93/5: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Security Intelligence Centre: Meeting 1'. 15.06.1940.

[212] CAB 93/5: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Security Intelligence Centre: Meeting 1'. 15.06.1940.

[213] CAB 93/4: 'Security Intelligence Centre: Fifth Column Activities Abroad: Poland'. 17.07.1940.

Having argued the Fifth Column to have played a significant role, Suski offered to share the valuable knowledge he felt he had gained regarding the Fifth Column activities from the Polish experience, which he felt:

> … may be profitable to the authorities of Great Britain in overcoming the Gestapo invasion of England which is undoubtedly being prepared.[214]

Such reports further reinforce our understanding of why the HD(S)E was so convinced that the Fifth Column was a significant threat, especially so when the reports received by the SIC contained such bold claims as:

> …all Germans residing abroad are in practice at [the] service of the Gestapo.[215]

This argument has been made before, as noted when discussing the Fifth Column, in the build up to the First World War.[216] Another example of this type of mirroring is the fears that enemy agents would be hidden amongst the crowds of refugees, which Suski warned he believed would happen, reminiscent of arguments made at the outset of the First World War. The reports received from other countries were similarly pessimistic. As well as the warnings emanating from the Polish experience, the other reports presented to the SIC in these very early days included examples of Fifth Column behaviour and lists of action taken by other countries. There were various examples of behaviour, but one predominant theme was propaganda.[217] The frequent references to propaganda in the reports on several countries would likely have influenced the SIC into thinking that this propaganda would be present in Britain, and the frequency of mentions may have persuaded the SIC to place more emphasis on propaganda than they may have otherwise.[218]

The approach taken by other countries, and the reports given of these actions, may also have influenced the SIC, increasing the desire to take more drastic actions. In particular, the report on Roumania was highly dismissive of the measures taken by the Roumanian state.[219] It was suggested that Roumania was slow to act against the threat of the Fifth Column and that

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[214] CAB 93/4: 'Security Intelligence Centre: Fifth Column Activities Abroad: Poland'. 17.07.1940.
[215] Emphasis in original. CAB 93/4: 'Security Intelligence Centre: Fifth Column Activities Abroad: Poland'. 17.07.1940.
[216] Lajoux, (1905). Referenced in David French, 'Spy Fever in Britain,1900-1915' *The Historical Journal Vol 22*(2) (1978), p. 356.
[217] Propaganda, the spreading of one's message particularly through means such as posters, leaflets, films, music, radio broadcasts and so on, is an effective method of attempting to get others to agree with your perspective, often indirectly or with false or skewed information. As such, it is a method that suits the aims of Fifth Columnists particularly well as it allows for anonymity, although governments also frequently use propaganda to sway the public opinion, especially in times of war. Examples of information on British government propaganda in World War One is available through the British Library, *Propaganda*, (2020).
[218] CAB 93/4: 'Security Intelligence Centre: Fifth Column Activities Abroad: Belgium, Switzerland, The Balkans, etc.' 17.07.1940.
[219] The spelling of Roumania is consistent with the spelling used during the time period under discussion, although it is no longer commonly used in Britain.

> The Government consistently underrated the danger and remained supremely confident in their ability to deal with any situation that might arise.[220]

The report noted that some actions were taken after April 1940 but claimed these were not far reaching enough to effectively address the Fifth Column threat. Some of the preparations taken by other countries went to the extreme. For example, some of Switzerland's preparations to deal with parachutists, such as placing military guards at all public buildings, power plants and other key points were reasonable. In addition to such steps, however, the report noted that

> Volunteer units have been formed of good marksmen each of whom is issued with a rifle and 40 rounds of ammunition. Their orders are to show no mercy to parachutists or 5th Columnists.[221]

It is clear, then, that Britain was not alone in considering a Fifth Column to be a threat, and in taking bold measures to counteract that perceived threat.

A further significant issue discussed by the SIC concerned refugees, particularly those arriving in Britain from France. While this would have fallen broadly amongst the scope of Fifth Column activities, it also went beyond this. The recommendations made by the SIC were in line with the fears mentioned from other countries above, of agents or undesirables hiding amongst the refugees. The recommendations were for all such who were not soldiers, technicians or notables to be 'conducted under supervision to a concentration camp' where security officers would 'thoroughly scrutinize everyone with a view to detecting and detaining undesirables'.[222] This issue is an excellent example of the intended purpose of the SE, and by extension the SIC, as a coordinating body. If we look again to the original purpose of the body, it was solely to '…to consider questions relating to defence against the "Fifth Column", and to initiate action'.[223] The question here was how to stop Fifth Columnists and enemy agents hiding amongst large groups of fleeing refugees. The action initiated was to instruct that all refugees not of use to the British war effort in some way be placed in a secure environment. At the next meeting, amidst the congratulations being offered for the enactment of these arrangements, it was noted that there were communication issues between departments with concerns raised by MI5 which felt it was not being informed quickly enough of the arrival of ships, and a grievance from the Admiralty being aired that a faster landing of refugees than could be reasonably controlled had been allowed.

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[220] CAB 93/4: 'Security Intelligence Centre: Fifth Column Activities Abroad: Belgium, Switzerland, The Balkans, etc.' 17.07.1940.
[221] CAB 93/4: 'Security Intelligence Centre: Fifth Column Activities Abroad: Belgium, Switzerland, The Balkans, etc.' 17.07.1940.
[222] CAB 93/5: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Security Intelligence Centre: Meeting 3'. 21.06.1940.
[223] CAB 66/8/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive'. 27.05.1940.

The HD(S)E also quickly demonstrated its usefulness in preventing conflicting instructions being issued to deal with problems that faced more than one department. Before the creation of the HD(S)E security matters were effectively dealt with on an ad hoc basis, with individual departments taking responsibility for such matters as they arose. This approach was flawed, due to security issues impacting upon more than one department, a lack of experience and knowledge of security related issues and conflicting instructions being issued. There was a clear example of the issue of conflicting instructions discussed in the fourth meeting of the SIC, with regards to 'temporary indication marks'.[224] The issue:

> …referred to a recent Security Bulletin in which the Army was advised to obliterate as quickly as possible any hieroglyphics found on buildings. The Chairman was not sure whether that did not conflict with the arrangement he had made earlier that these marks should be reported to the police and not obliterated until they had been examined.[225]

The SIC was able to quickly identify such issues and address them.[226] It was also decided 'that the Centre should arrange for appropriate instructions to the Police and if necessary the Military'.[227] The SIC would then task departments to propose solutions, before deciding whether to recommend this action or not. This helps build the image of the structural aspect of the emerging 'machinery of security' in this era. From a very early stage this was not a sole Whitehall department arguing its importance. It did not need to look far to find reason to justify its survival, once it had initially moved beyond Fifth Column concerns, as can be seen in the early days of the intelligence apparatus of the State, particularly MI5 during the First World War.

A variety of topics were discussed throughout the first three months of the SIC's year-long tenure, often directly related to Fifth Column activities, including the discussion of internees, publicity and signaling. Here, some of the subject matter handled by the SIC was starting to move beyond the Fifth Column, such as communications and various special

[224] These marks could be made with a variety of mediums, such as chalk, paint or carvings, and were found in places such as on telephone poles the side of buildings. Examples of the types of marks can be found at CAB 93/5: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Security Intelligence Centre Paper 10', 25.07.1940.
[225] CAB 93/5: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Security Intelligence Centre: Meeting 4'. 24.06.1940.
[226] It was decided that due to the personal interest of Group Captain Blackford, who held the post of Director of the Directorate of Intelligence (Security) in the Air Ministry at the time, representatives of the Air Ministry and MI5 would examine the question of what was to be done going forward. The Royal Air Force, *The Air Force List, November 1942*, (1942), p16.
[227] CAB 93/5: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Security Intelligence Centre: Meeting 4'. 24.06.1940. It is reasonable to assume that this tendency to expand and discuss wider issues continued for the remainder of the lifespan of the SIC, however it is not possible to verify this at the current time, as only the minutes and papers of the SIC dating up to August 1940 have been released by the Cabinet Office. An FOI request has confirmed that the Cabinet Office does hold the minutes of these meetings, however the request was denied due to being concerned with the Security Services. Thus far, appeals have proved fruitless.

enquiries.[228] The SIC also discussed some topics that were about security in a broader sense, moving beyond concern with the Fifth Column. It was thought that many existing departmental security procedures were not performing as well as they could. The SIC discussed these in order to find ways to improve their performance. An example of this is the pass system, whereby individuals were required to hold identity cards demonstrating their security clearance which was considered weak in three particular areas:

> (a) There were too many different types of passes;
> (b) passes are at present issue only to individuals – there was no arrangement by which a party could pass under a single authorisiation;
> (c) there was no provision for allowing Officers and others on important Government business to pass through the streets during air raids.[229]

While undoubtedly concerned with 'security', such work clearly transcended any concern with Fifth Columnists.[230]

The development of the SIC offers many parallels to the HD(S)E as a whole, including a 'free reign' approach, a growth in remit, and branching out into subcommittees. The fate of the SIC, however, was very different to that of the HD(S)E. When the realisation dawned that there was no Fifth Column threat, the SIC was no longer viewed as necessary, while the HD(S)E – despite also being created to deal exclusively with Fifth Column issues – continued, albeit under a new name.[231] The demise of the subcommittee was noted in an official overview of the HD(S)E, written in early 1946, which noted that:

> By the middle of 1941 it was certain beyond doubt that Germany had not succeeded in organising any hostile activities in this country on the scale connoted by the term 'Fifth Column', and the separate existence of the Centre, such as it was, was ended by its absorption into the Executive.[232]

As well as providing a rough idea of when the SIC had been wound up, this also again confirms that there was an acknowledgement that the Fifth Column, which had caused so much concern that it sparked a complete change in the approach to security by the British State, had not

[228] CAB 93/5: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Security Intelligence Centre: Meetings 1-14'. 15.06.1940 - 26.09.1940.
[229] CAB 93/5: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Security Intelligence Centre: Meeting 2'. 19.06.1940.
[230] While complaints regarding the current system were put forward by MI5, it was agreed that the Inter-Services Security Board would endeavour to find some solution CAB 93/5: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Security Intelligence Centre: Meeting 2'. 19.06.1940.
[231] As with the previous chapter, this chapter will continue to use the title HD(S)E when discussing the subcommittees of the body, even though the body changed name in October 1941. This is because this thematic chapter crossing this timeline frequently. From the following chapter, the title used with be relevant to the period being discussed.
[232] CAB 125/182: 'The Security Executive: An outline of its course and functions'. February 1946.

materialised. A memorandum shows that the title 'SIC' was discontinued on 13 March 1942, some nine months after this acceptance that there was no Fifth Column threat.[233] Without the remaining file material, which remains withheld by the Cabinet Office, it is impossible to do anything more than speculate as to what the SIC did during its remaining months, if indeed anything at all. But the question of perhaps the greatest significance is: if the lack of a Fifth Column was acknowledged to the extent that the SIC was no longer required, why did its parent body, the HD(S)E, continue to exist?



Figure 3: *The Structure of the HD(S)E: October 1941*[234]

As noted earlier, shortly after its own creation the SIC created a further sub-organisation of its own: The Liaison Officers' Conference (LOC). The LOC held its first meeting on 13 July 1940. It began as an extension of the SIC and worked in tandem with it through representatives from various departments including MI6 and Military Intelligence, alongside attendance from

[233] CAB 21/3498: 'Security Executive: Office Memorandum No.65: Discontinuation of Title "Security Intelligence Centre"', 13.03.1942.
[234] This wiring diagram shows the structure of the HD(S)E in October 1941, when the name was changed from the Home Defence (Security) Executive to Security Executive.

representatives of departments who had permanent members on the SIC, including MI5 and the Ministry of Information. While one of the main functions of the LOC was to follow up on the recommendations that were made by the HD(S)E, the majority of the work conducted by the LOC was brought forward by the members themselves for either preliminary discussion or decision.[235] Liaison officers spent most of their time in their respective departments in order to ensure they were as proactive and up to date as possible within their departments, thus making them as useful as possible for liaising.[236] They were expected to meet regularly, with meetings held at least once a week.[237] Those individuals concerned included prominent figures from the intelligence and security community: the second meeting was attended by Captain T. A. Robertson, who was head of MI5's B Division, and I. S. Macadam, head of the Ministry of Information's Intelligence Division.[238] Attendance by individuals in these high-ranking roles at these meetings demonstrates that the issue of the Fifth Column was taken very seriously. It also shows the organisation, the LOC and thus the SIC and HD(S)E, to be important and confirms them as a powerful and influential apparatus of government from a very early stage. As well as having members who held significant roles in their respective departments, the LOC also had a significant individual as its first Chairman, Sir Joseph Ball, who is discussed in greater detail on page 36. After two months this role was taken by Herbert Creedy, who would later go on to become Chairman of the HD(S)E.[239]

The LOC played an important role in the practicalities of security. It both fed information to the SIC from various departments, raising issues as required, and fed information or instructions back to those departments. This can be seen in the case of civilian morale. In this case 'it was agreed that the Centre should pass on [to the] Ministry of Information any reports received about morale. The Ministry of Information agreed to let the Centre have any information suggesting organised [activity] to undermine civilian morale'.[240]

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[235] CAB 125/182: 'The Security Executive: An outline of its course and functions', February 1946.
[236] CAB 93/4: 'Security Intelligence Centre: Liaison Officers' Conference: Minutes of Meeting 1', 13.07.1940.
[237] At the first meeting of the LOC, it was stated that officers should meet under the Chairmanship of a principle officer of the Centre on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays each week, with any urgent matters that arrived between these meetings to be reported, which can be found at CAB 93/4: Security Intelligence Centre: Liaison Officers' Conference: Minutes of Meeting 1', 13.07.1940. In a post war summary report of the SE it was noted that the LOC initially met twice a week and later met weekly and existed for the duration of the war and beyond, see CAB 125/182: 'The Security Executive: An outline of its course and functions', February 1946.
[238] CAB 93/4: 'Security Intelligence Centre: Liaison Officers' Conference: Minutes of Meeting 2', 15.07.1940.
[239] For more information on Creedy see page 92.
[240] The document containing this information held at TNA is a photocopy which leaves the edge of the page illegible. The words within brackets have been added by the author as a reasonable assumption of the missing words given the context of the words provided. CAB 93/4: 'Security Intelligence Centre: Liaison Officers' Conference: Minutes of Meeting 2', 15.07.1940.

The post-war discussions about the future of security in Britain indicates that the individuals working at Liaison Officers tended to be junior officers, handling the lower level security concerns and freeing up the time of the main committee, which played host to much higher ranking department members.[241] Initially, the work of the LOC was focused around the Fifth Column. Topics discussed at early meetings included such Fifth Column related issues as the Oxford Group, wireless relay services, and possible means of communicating with the enemy.[242] By September 1940 Herbert Creedy had taken the Chairmanship of the LOC, and Churchill had claimed in Parliament that the threat from the Fifth Column had been exaggerated.[243] The LOC had, however, continued to discuss Fifth Column matters until this point and continued to do so, with topics arising such as telephone service in an emergency, but had also started to branch out into other areas of security much in the same way as the HD(S)E.[244] Topics that now came to occupy the attention of the LOC included the destruction of Naval mail in Post Offices near coastal towns, reports of German transport aircraft over London, and Gestapo agents in enemy bombers.[245] After the decision to change the name of the HD(S)E to simply the SE, the LOC moved from being a subsection of the SIC to operating under the HD(S)E directly.[246] The lack of material available on the later stages of the SIC makes it impossible to detail the exact reason why this occurred; a post-war account of the HD(S)E simply noted that 'by the middle of 1941… the separate existence of the Centre, such as it was, was ended by its absorption into the Executive'.[247] This was not the complete picture however, as the title of SIC was not fully discontinued until 1942, although it is plausible that by this point the SIC was only doing a limited amount of work and this is why the LOC ceased

[241] See page 129.
[242] The topics were all discussed at meeting 2 of the LOC, CAB 93/4: Security Intelligence Centre: Liaison Officers' Conference: Minutes of Meeting 2', 15.07.1940. The Oxford Group was a Christian organisation founded by American Frank Buchman. As with other religious groups, such as Jehovah's Witnesses, they were monitored to assess whether they posed a security risk. Given that in 1936 Buchman was quoted in the *New York World-Telegram* as claiming, 'I thank heaven for a man like Adolf Hitler, who built a front line of defence against the anti-Christ of Communism', it is unsurprising that this group would be monitored and be discussed as a potential Fifth Column threat. This quote can be found at 'Frank Buchman', *Oxford Essential Quotations*, www.-oxfordreference-com.salford.idm.oclc.org/view/10.1093/acref/9780191826719.001.0001/q-oro-ed4-00002218. The discussion was brief, simply agreeing that MI5 was to provide the LOC with details of any members of the group within Britain, and that MI6 would continue to provide reports of the group activities in other countries. CAB 93/4: 'Security Intelligence Centre: Liaison Officers' Conference: Minutes of Meeting 2', 15.07.1940.
[243] Creedy's first meeting as Chairman of the LOC was meeting 16. CAB 93/4: 'Security Intelligence Centre: Liaison Officers' Conference: Minutes of Meeting 16', 02.09.1940.
[244] CAB 93/4: 'Security Intelligence Centre: Liaison Officers' Conference: Minutes of Meeting 16', 02.09.1940.
[245] CAB 93/4: 'Security Intelligence Centre: Liaison Officers' Conference: Minutes of Meeting 16', 02.09.1940.
[246] Until meeting 94, the minutes of the LOC were headed with 'Security Intelligence Centre'. Following this, from 14 October 1941 they were headed with Security Executive. CAB 93/4: Security Intelligence Centre: Liaison Officers' Conference: Minutes of Meetings 93 & 94', 07.10.1941-14.10.1941.
[247] CAB 125/182: 'The Security Executive: An outline of its course and functions'. February 1946.

to be linked to the SIC.[248] However, as noted earlier in this chapter, it is not possible to account for the discrepancy between dates provided due to the retention of documents by the Cabinet Office.

As with the HD(S)E, one of the most noteworthy aspects of the LOC was its ability to endure. The LOC did not just survive beyond the end of the SIC, but also continued to operate, in broadly the same manner, after the end of the war as a subcommittee of the Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security (SSC), the body that replaced the SE in 1945. As this chapter will go on to demonstrate through discussion of the Committee on Control at Ports, the LOC also absorbed the work of other committees. It absorbed the Fifth Column work, such as it was, following the dissolution of the SIC, and following the end of hostilities it absorbed the work of the Committee on Control at Ports. In 1948 the SSC amalgamated with the Panel on Security Arrangements in Government Departments, and the LOC continued to serve the new body, the Inter-Departmental Committee on Security (SSC), and continued to exist even beyond this.[249] The LOC survived another evolution in 1947, combining with another body to create the Interdepartmental Committee on Security (ISC), and then again in 1954 when the body that had originally been the SE became the Committee on General Security Procedures (SGP), with a subcommittee called the Security Officers' Conference that was the direct successor to the LOC. This period saw a significant reframing of security in Britain so the LOC's ability to survive this time, albeit with a name change of its own, demonstrates a significant value being placed upon the LOC.[250] This shows the machinery of security that was built into the civil structure of government, originating with the Fifth Column panic but rapidly expanding and evolving into a system that could be deemed a Security State.

[248] CAB 21/3498: 'Security Executive: Office Memorandum No.65: Discontinuation of Title "Security Intelligence Centre"', 13.03.1942.
[249] CAB 134/154: 'Defence (Transition) Committee: Sub-committee on Security in a Future War: The Present Composition and Functions of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Security', 17.08.1949
[250] For more information see page 128.



Figure 4: *The Structure of the HD(S)E: March 1942*[251]

A further notable subcommittee to be discussed was the Committee on Communism. It was through this committee that the SE maintained observation of the security threat posed by communists, and in particular the CPGB. This committee held 116 meetings during the course of the war discussing general communist activities and policy alongside specific incidents.[252] The committee was Chaired by Alfred Wall, permanent member of the SE and trade unionist, with the first meeting being held on 24 February 1941.[253] It was described in the post-war overview of the SE as working on 'a very informal basis, and did not pretend to take any part in settling policy. This was primarily a matter for the Home Office in consultation with the Security Service. The need for such a Committee in any future war would depend upon the

[251] The structure of the SE in March 1942, when the title of SIC was officially disbanded.
[252] The minutes of meetings were not numbered until meeting number 69 on 14.04.1942, and were not titled as being the Committee on Communism until meeting 79 on 22.09.1942.
[253] CAB 93/5: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Untitled Committee Minutes', 24.02.1941.

actual circumstances.'[254] Rather than being involved in policy creation, the Committee on Communism discussed a range of topics, from individual persons of interest such as Ernest Woolley, publications such as the *Daily Worker*, and broader issues such as morale.[255]

The Committee on Communism provides an important insight into attitudes of the British Government towards communists, in particular that attitudes did not alter despite the emergence of an alliance between the USSR and Britain from June 1941. This can be seen by the view that 'there was no ground for any change in the attitude of the Departments concerned towards Communist activities'.[256] This aligns with the attitude of the SE towards the CPGB, which felt that:

> …however genuine might be the Party's desire for help to Russia, their hostility to the present Government and Labour leaders persisted, their mischievous criticisms and accusations would be maintained and they were ready to seize every opportunity to suggest that the Government's co-operation with the USSR was reluctant and half-hearted.[257]

The actual position of communists does not need to be examined for the purpose of this study, rather the issue of importance is the perception held by those in power. The SE still felt that the CPGB constituted the same level of threat as they did before the German invasion of Russia broke the pact held between the two countries, resulting in the Russian alliance with the Allied cause. The result of this concern was for the Committee on Communism to continue, with departments reporting to it weekly, in order for a weekly report to be provided to the SE, in order to monitor the situation.[258] This is the only element of Fifth Column activity that continued to be discussed throughout the duration of the war, which clearly illustrates that while the Second World War was one arguably of liberal democracy against fascism, concerns over the threat posed by communism never truly went away, as already mentioned in the previous chapter. While this committee did not proactively make significant changes, its very existence at this point in time is itself significant. It is evidence that the perceived threat from communism existed long before the Cold War, and that communists were already considered

[254] CAB 125/182: 'The Security Executive: An outline of its course and functions'. February 1946. A later Committee on Communism was created in 1949 in light of the Cold War, under the Chairmanship of Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the minutes of which can be found at CAB 134/53: 'Committee on Communism', 24.05.1949 – 21.12.1949.
[255] Ernest Woolley had been a factory worker whose dismissal had resulted in a short-lived 70 worker strike. The Committee on Communism discussed Woolley twice, first to note that attempts were being made to ensure Woolley did not regain employment in a factory engaged in essential war production, and then a follow up at the next meeting clarified that no further activity from Woolley had been noted, see CAB 93/5: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Untitled Committee Minutes', 24.02.1941 -
[256] CAB 93/5: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Untitled Committee Minutes', 23.07.1941.
[257] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 41', 09.07.1941.
[258] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 41', 09.07.1941.

a threat, despite the constraints on the SE and its ability to take any action beyond monitoring the situation.

The next Committee to be discussed will be the Committee on Control at Ports. The first meeting of this Committee was held on 14 March 1941. It was chaired by Sir Herbert Creedy, while the second and fourth meetings were taken by Lord Swinton. However, the regular chairman was Isaac Foot, permanent member of the SE and often considered the 'token liberal' on the Committee. The overwhelming majority of topics discussed centred around censorship, although they did also handle specific issues, such as female searches at ports. Over the course of nine months, the issue was resolved. The issue was raised at the third meeting of the Committee on Control of Ports where it was acknowledged that there was a security risk as female travelers were not being searched as often or as thoroughly as was necessary to ensure adequate security, or as often or thoroughly as male travelers. At this stage it was agreed to employ full time female searchers, no less than two at each port with 'substantial traffic'.[259] This increase in women's roles in the workplace is typical of wartime, which is shown by a reference to the ruling that the female searchers would be under the general control of the Home Office, much as they had during the First World War when women were recruited from the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, often referred to as the WAAC.[260] In reality, the actual number of female searchers employed was much smaller than the initial suggestion, with three appointments being reported covering seven named ports. Other solutions had been described for other ports, including calling in as required officers of the Women's Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF), female police officers, and the wife of one Deputy Airport Manager.[261] These arrangements were initially considered satisfactory.[262] At the following meeting two months later it was felt that in most areas the arrangements remained satisfactory, however there were some complaints. Specifically, the police were not happy to be providing searchers for the port at Liverpool, and that some searches were not taking place because no one was available to

[259] CAB 93/5: 'Committee on Control at Ports: Minutes of Meeting 3', 28.08.1941.
[260] The WAAC, later named the Queen Mary's Army Auxiliary Corps, was created during the First World War. The women of the WAAC did a wide range of war work both at home and on the frontline in France. Examples of research conducted regarding the WAAC include Elisabeth Shipton, 'The 100th Anniversary of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps', *The History Press* (2017); and Barbara Walsh, 'The Key Role Played by WAAC British Post Office Female Staff in Army Signal Units on the Western Front, 1917-1920', *Information & Culture*, (2020), pp. 75-97. An American organisation of the same name was also created during the Second World War.
[261] The Women's Auxiliary Air Force, or WAAF, was created in 1939 and lasted until 1949. Examples of research on the WAAF include Tessa Stone, 'Creating a (Gendered?) Military Identity: the Women's Auxiliary Air Force in Great Britain in the Second World War', *Women's History Review 8*(4) (1999) pp. 605-624, and Jeremy A. Crang, 'The Revival of the British Women's Auxiliary Services in the Late Nineteen-Thirties', *Historical Research 83*(220) (2010) pp. 343-357.
[262] CAB 93/5: 'Committee on Control at Ports: Minutes of Meeting 5', 06.11.1941.

conduct them. Despite this being an obvious security risk, it was felt that operations should carry on as they were.[263] However, a full-time searcher was eventually appointed at Liverpool.[264] It was also noted that there was another issue in that because only individual women were being employed, there was very often no one available to act as a witness to the searches. While this was acknowledged as a problem, no complaints had been received by the Home Office so it was felt that there was no need to act on the situation, and this could have been reassessed if difficulties arose.[265]

The Committee continued to meet throughout the course of the war. Meetings were held approximately every other month for the first 14 months, increasing to broadly one each month from July 1942 until July 1945. The most significant exception to this was in late 1944, when seven meetings were held between September and December 1944. The topics under consideration at these meetings ranged from discussions on accommodation for the control services at various bases, air services, and reviewing arrangements for the security control of air traffic and aircraft.[266] Many of these issues were also discussed frequently beyond this point, such as the matter of accommodation for the control services which was discussed in each of the seven meetings that happened following the late 1944 spike of meetings.[267] The Committee on Control at Ports met twice after the end of the war before concluding in September 1945 that meetings were no longer required and any issues would be brought before the Liaison Officers' Conference.[268]

[263] CAB 93/5: 'Committee on Control at Ports: Minutes of Meeting 6', 15.01.1942.
[264] In meeting 7, it was noted that a woman was being considered for the role, though the police were to continue providing this service until such a time as this was completed. CAB 93/5: 'Committee on Control at Ports: Minutes of Meeting 7', 19.03.1942. In meeting 8, it was noted that the appointment had been completed and was working well. CAB 93/5: 'Committee on Control at Ports: Minutes of Meeting 8', 29.05.1942.
[265] CAB 93/5: 'Committee on Control at Ports: Minutes of Meeting 8', 29.05.1942.
[266] CAB 93/5: 'Committee on Control at Ports: Minutes of Meetings 34-40', 06.09.1944-06.12.1944.
[267] CAB 93/5: 'Committee on Control at Ports: Minutes of Meetings 41-47', 03.01.1945-04.07.1945.
[268] CAB 93/8: 'Sub-committee on Control at Ports: Minutes of Meeting 2', 11.09.1945.



Figure 5: *The Structure of the HD(S)E: October 1942*[269]

Alongside these longer running, broader Committees 109 different conferences were held throughout the course of the war on a vast range of topics. They ranged in scale, with 59 of these conferences meeting on only one occasion.[270] Holding topic specific meetings in this ad-hoc manner would have prevented issues from taking up valuable time in full meetings of the SE and allow for the gathering of experts and representatives of directly related bodies.

[269] This wiring diagram shows the structure of the SE shortly into Cooper's time as Chairman, when Cooper commissioned a report outline the functions of the SE. CAB 21/3498: 'The Functions of the Security Executive', 26.10.1942.

[270] Information on one conference, simply titled 'NYT', has been retained by the Cabinet Office so it is not possible to say how many meetings were held. Similarly, the records held by TNA on the 'Conference on the Return of Evacuees from USA and Canada' does not contain the minutes of meetings, so the number of meetings is unknown. However, in this case, the papers of the conference are available and range from 26.11.1943 – 03.08.1944. The existence of multiple papers and the vast time range would strongly imply at least two meetings were held. CAB 93/6: 'Security Executive Conferences Meetings and Papers A – O', 22.02.1941 – 18.08.1945.

However, the result of this would have been a significant workload at times. For example, there were several occasions where two conferences met on the same day, such as 29 July 1943, which saw meetings of both the conference on enemy-operated pseudo-British broadcasting services, and of the conference on establishment questions in the secret services.[271] There were also periods where conferences would happen daily, such as a run-in late August 1942 which saw five conferences meet over four consecutive days.[272] The sheer number and frequency of these meetings demonstrates that 'security' in this era was not limited to the creation of a singular body to manage matters of security. Rather, following the creation of the core body with the SE, the machinery of security developed quickly.

These conferences tended to have a much narrower focus and dealt with individual issues to lessen the workload of the main body of the SE, or its larger subcommittees. One example is the Control of Missions. This conference held 16 meetings, which is many more than the average number of meetings for the subcommittees of the SE, over the course of around two and a half years. The meetings were attended by core members of the SE, such as Duff Cooper and Herbert Creedy. There were also appearances from other prominent individuals such as Desmond Morton, representing the Prime Ministers' Office, and Valentine Vivian, representing the SIS. In addition to these, there were also representatives from the Home Office, Foreign Office, Admiralty, MI5, and the War Office.[273] Th first meeting of this conference was heavily focused on deciding which type of mission should be referred to the Chairman of the SE for consideration for the security implications of the proposed visits. The conclusion of this meeting was that the security of missions from Russia and the USA should continue to be the responsibility of the department who invited them and MI5. Missions from neutral countries and Central and South American countries were to be referred to the Chairman of the SE, expected for very secret missions such as those organised by MI5/MI6.[274] Further meetings dealt with more specific questions, such as meeting two which discussed a request from the Portuguese Military Attaché for two officers to undergo a

[271] These two conferences were chaired by Duff Cooper and Herbert Creedy respectively. CAB 93/6: 'Security Executive Conferences Meetings and Papers A – O', 29.07.1943.
[272] The five meetings were as follows; 'French Subjects from Madagascar: Censorship of Correspondence – 25.08.1942', 'Publication of Coal Production Statistics – 26.08.1942', 'Security of Combined Operations Base – 26.08.1942', 'Security at Ports – 27.08.1942', and 'Jehovah's Witnesses – 28.08.1942'. These were not all chaired by the same individual, with the first two being Herbert Creedy, security of combined operations base being Lord Swinton, and the final two being Duff Cooper.
[273] CAB 93/6/2: 'Control of Missions: Minutes of Meetings 1-2', 04.09.1942 – 18.09.1942.
[274] CAB 93/6/2: 'Control of Missions: Visits of Foreign Missions and Journalists: Minutes of Meeting 1', 04.09.1942.

British Ordnance Engineering Course, which was rejected.[275] The later meetings were of similar requests, with varying conclusions. This demonstrates the role of such ad-hoc conferences, to answer specific questions which would have otherwise taken up the time of the SE.

Much as the focus of the SE in the early days was on matters of a Fifth Column nature before diluting into other areas, the same is true of the conferences. Early conferences were on issues such as internment and evacuees, although some of these continued beyond the end of the Fifth Column threat, for example the conference on 'Alien Evacuees from the Western Mediterranean Area', which had its final meeting in May 1943.[276] The opinions held in the conferences with a Fifth Column focus often mirrored the opinions held in the main body of the SE. For example, in late November 1941 a conference was held on 'Suspected Fifth Column Activities Among Frenchmen in the UK'. This was again an example of dealing with an issue of limited scope. The argument made in this meeting, of which there was only one, the general feeling was that the conference agreed with the idea that 'there was no direct evidence of fifth column activities among the French in this country…' but that the French were not observed closely enough to determine that there was no threat. [277] This viewpoint is much in line with the view posed following the law that there are had been no Fifth Column threat but this could not have been known without a body such as the SE, as discussed on page 103.

The Shipping Information and Home Shipping Committee was listed in a report created shortly after Duff Cooper became Chairman of the SE, alongside other committee discussed here such as the Committee on Communism. The decision to list this collection of individuals as a 'Committee' and to indicate it as similar standing as other committees is interesting, as with hindsight it was similar to the conferences. This may have been realised following the end of the war when the records of such groups were stored, as the minutes of the Shipping Information and Home Shipping Committee were not placed alongside the other Committees, but were included in the collections of papers and minutes of the conferences. The main ways in which it was similar to the conferences are that it was only in existence for a short period, around 10 months. The body met 14 times, 7 under the title of Shipping Information and Home Shipping Committee and 7 under the title of Shipping Information and Home Shipping Committee (Special Meeting). While this is admittedly more than the average amount of times

[275] CAB 93/6/2: 'Control of Missions: Minutes of Meeting 2', 18.09.1942.
[276] CAB 93/6/1: 'Alien Evacuees from the Western Mediterranean Area: Minutes of Meeting 5', 27.05.1943.
[277] CAB 93/7: 'Suspected Fifth Column Activities Among Frenchmen in the UK', 27.11.1941.

a conference would meet, it is much less than could be expected of a full committee. It also focused on quite specific questions relating to Shipping Information and Home Shipping, discussing individual issues, such as leakages of information in specific ports, Irish travel and the guarding of large transports in UK ports.[278]

A final body that is worthy of note is the Panel on Security Arrangements in Government Departments. A body of this nature was first suggested at a meeting of a SE Conference on Security Measures in Government Departments in June 1941. This meeting, chaired by Herbert Creedy, was attended by representatives of various government departments, including the Treasury, Home Office, Ministry of Works and Buildings and Ministry of Information among others, and it was unanimously felt that 'a standing committee should be set up to review periodically security measures taken by the various Departments and to discuss any problems of this nature which might arise'.[279] The Panel on Security Arrangements was approved by the Prime Minister in January 1942.[280] The Panel first met in February 1942 and continued throughout the war and beyond.[281]

This chapter has provided a greater overview of the machinery of security that was created during the early years of the Second World War, which evolved and continued beyond the war. This machinery centres around the nucleus of the SE, but also goes beyond the single body, spreading to have influence in all departments of government. This thesis will now go on to explore the work of the SE more centrally, discussing the evolution of the body throughout the course of the war, climaxing with the end of the war, but not the end of the SE.

[278] CAB 93/7: 'Shipping Information and Home Shipping Committee: Minutes of Meetings 1-7', 21.10.1942 – 16.06.1943
[279] CAB 93/6/4: 'Conference on Security Measures in Government Departments'.
[280] CAB 21/2726: 'War Cabinet: Security Arrangements in Government Departments', 24.01.1942.
[281] The earliest meeting that is referenced in the currently available TNA files is the 2nd meeting, which took place on 27.02.1942. This meeting date is referenced in a report by the War Cabinet. CAB 116/23: 'Security of Official Documents', 03.04.1942. For details of the fate of the Panel on Security Arrangements in Government Departments, see page 112.

Chapter Three

'Go to it'[282]

The First Incarnation of the Security Executive: The Swinton Committee, May 1940 – June 1942

For its first two years, the Security Executive was chaired by Lord Swinton, and quickly became known as the 'Swinton Committee'. In his memoirs, Swinton recalled Churchill's instruction upon his appointment: 'do not be circumscribed in your field. If you think there is a security problem anywhere which is not being covered, go to it'.[283] Providing Swinton with the confidence to take bold action, this 'blank cheque' approach resulted in a wide range of issues being discussed through the prism of security by the Executive under his leadership. Initially much of the focus, unsurprisingly, concerned the Fifth Column threat, as discussed earlier in the thesis. As time went on discussion turned to issues less directly concerned with the Fifth Column threat, providing a security focused perspective on wider issues, including discussions on sabotage, refugees, and vulnerable places, such as ports, factories, and significant places relating to the Post Office, and gas, power, and water systems. Discussions relating to sabotage were held on such issues as ensuring contractors working in Government departments were taking sufficient precautions, and attempting to identify the type of sabotage that was considered likely from German agents.[284] The issue of refugees raised a range of security-related issues, from the prospect of enemy agents hiding among groups of refugees, to more practical concerns such as finding appropriate accommodation, and the security risk of potentially dangerous people mixing with each other.[285] Vulnerable places were also discussed

[282] Winston Churchill, quoted in Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Lord Swinton, *I Remember*, (Essex, Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, 1948). p. 183.

[283] Winston Churchill, quoted in Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Lord Swinton, *I Remember*, (Essex, Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, 1948). p. 183.

[284] Contractors working in Government departments can be found in CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 14', 06.09.1940, and the sabotage that was considered likely from German agents can be found in CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 33', 23.04.1941. The result of this second discussion was for the creation of a Committee on Sabotage which met to compile a report on the risks of explosives being destroyed or stolen, review the systems of recording at military stores and ascertain whether any further controls were needed on selling of materials to the public which could be used to create explosive or incendiary devices. This report can be found at CAB 93/3: Home Defence (Security) Executive: Paper 86: Sabotage', 10.06.1941.

[285] The topic of refugees was discussed 21 times in the first 47 meetings. Refugees were often not considered as a singular subject, but rather were discussed in relation to individual groups. Key concerns included factors such as German agents infiltrating groups of refugees to enter Britain unnoticed. For example, this was a particular fear with potential refugees from Ireland should there have been a German invasion, as there were fears the IRA were working with Germany, as discussed in CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 12'. 29.08.1940. There was also more general discussion on the practical issue of evacuating refugees of Allied nationality from countries threatened by, or under the control of, the enemy. This idea was met with a significant amount of resistance from several avenues. MI5 felt that 'any influx of refugees would give the enemy an

in several contexts, such as the security of factories engaged in war work, and the residency of enemy aliens in vulnerable areas, which are areas of particular security concern as they hold the potential to provide opportunities for sabotage, invasion and the collection of information of value to the enemy.[286]

Some of these issues were discussed frequently, others less so. Concerns related to ports and seamen were discussed in over half of the meetings held during the first two years[287]. Other matters were discussed more infrequently, such as questions relating to Prisoners of War (tabled on the agenda 11 times), and the even less frequent discussions on vetting (tabled five times).[288] The SE was also called upon for its opinion on specific issues relating to security. For example, the Treasury asked whether Home Guard units were still necessary on Government buildings to protect them from Fifth Columnists and Parachutists, as some felt they could be better employed elsewhere. Despite the fact that the Fifth Column panic had abated by this point, the Committee disagreed. It was the view of the Chief of the Imperial

opportunity for introducing agents', which they 'would not fail to take'. The Home Office noted that, along with other departments, they had been actively trying prevent the arrival of any more refugees. They also noted that 'the security problem was inextricably linked with the problem of accommodation' and invited an expert from the Ministry of Health to report on this issue. The expert, Mr Farrow, noted that there had been significant accommodation losses through bombing and as a result the Government was struggling to provide for British citizens who had lost their homes. This created an environment where 'there were already signs that people resented the good treatment accorded to war refugees as compared with what was done for our own citizens'. An increase in the number of refugees would only have served to exacerbate this problem. The Foreign Office representative, Mr Snow, claimed that he did not believe any refugees would come to the UK following a declaration of support for this proposal and that it was simply a demonstration of obligation in principle to help, along with the rest of Europe. Swinton countered this by noting that if support was given to this proposal there was a real risk of refugees simply being brought to the UK and there being nothing the UK could do about it. Mr Brook of the Privy Council suggested that Britain could agree to the principle whilst simultaneously demonstrating that they had contributed by taking 20,000 refugees up until this point but were not able to take any more. This was concluded with a call for the Empire to assist and take on greater numbers of refugees as part of the 'common war effort'. This discussion can be found at CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 20'. 05.12.1940.

[286] The discussions on vulnerable areas were sporadic, and were concerned with subjects such as the security of factories producing military supplies (both key components and raw materials) as discussed in CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 3'. 29.05.1940. Other subjects included enemy aliens residing in vulnerable areas, mentioned in CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 2'. 28.05.1940 and CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 7'. 10.06.1940. Similar to vulnerable areas is the topic of 'protected places', both often referring to factories. Later meetings under Lord Swinton discussed protected places were discussed with regards to the distribution of literature, at meetings 58, 61, 62, 65, and 67, available at CAB 93/2: 'Home (Defence) Security Executive: Minutes of Meetings 58-67', 28.01.1942-06.05.1942.

[287] Various topics relating to ports and seamen were discussed at 39 out of the 70 meetings.

[288] Prisoners of War were discussed 11 times, and covered topics such as 'Italian Prisoners of War' for agricultural, forestry, and the Admiralty (various meetings between CAB 93/2: 'Home (Defence) Security Executive: Minutes of Meetings 23-70', 21.01.1941-17.06.1942. Vetting was discussed on five occasions. First, the vetting of U.S Civilians was discussed in CAB 93/2: 'Home (Defence) Security Executive: Minutes of Meeting 56', 31.12.1941, and again in CAB 93/2: 'Home (Defence) Security Executive: Minutes of Meeting 57', 21.01.1942. The next mention was in regard to assessing the vetting of members of the Allied Forces coming to the UK in meetings 57, 58, and 60. CAB 93/2: 'Home (Defence) Security Executive: Minutes of Meetings 57-60', 21.01.1942-18.02.1942.

General Staff, MI5, and MI6 that the threat was not any less.[289] In other areas, reports were presented to the SE solely for information, such as the case of the 'Control of Telephone Service in an Emergency', whereby a representative of the General Post Office explained that there was no great security threat to phone lines through sabotage due to the significant number of factors and pieces of information a saboteur would need to possess.[290] Swinton's time as Chairman saw the creation of several subcommittees under the SE. As shown by Appendix IV, there were nearly 100 conferences and subcommittees that began under his tenure. Some of these were short lived, such as the Committee on Sabotage which produced only one report after being tasked with further exploration of issues that had been raised in meetings of the Executive.[291] The Committee on Sabotage met on three occasions between 1 May 1941 and 12 June 1941 with Lord Swinton as Chairman. The issues were of largely physical security matters concerning sabotage, namely the destruction, theft, and manufacture of explosives by hostile persons.[292] Other subcommittees created were longer-lasting, with some committees lasting for the duration of the war, such as the Committee on Communism and the Committee on Control at Ports, as discussed in chapter two. There were also other committees that lasted for shorter lengths of time, such as the Conference on the Royal Patriotic School, which met ten times over the course of 1941, and the Conference on Security of Combined Operations Base, which met nine times between April 1942 and January 1943.[293]

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[289] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 16'. 24.10.1940.
[290] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 17'. 31.10.1940.
[291] The report was dated 10.06.1941 and was composed by Lord Swinton after meetings with representatives from the Home Office, the three Service Departments, the Ministry of Supply, and the Ministry of War Transport and Railway Executive Committee, among others. It can be found at CAB 93/3: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Paper 86: Sabotage', 10.06.1941.
[292] The destruction of explosives discussions found that there was a real risk of sabotage as it was relatively simple to detonate some types of explosive, such as TNT. The risks of explosives in storage and in transit were assessed. The theft of explosives discussions found that the most likely place that theft would occur was from quarries and registered premises where explosives were kept by retailers. There were far too many of these premises (3,000 quarry stores and 30,000 registered premises) to be able to continuously guard them. There was a suggestion that there were too many places storing explosives than was required, that security regulations could be more strictly enforced, and suggested a national specification might be drawn up for the construction of stores. The manufacture of explosives discussions found that there were concerns over enemy agent abilities to create explosives from regular chemists' stores. Due to previous dealings with the IRA, MI5 in particular had experience with this issue, as the key ingredient of concern, potassium chlorate, was the same. The strategy to combat this security threat was for the police to visit all shops that sold potassium chlorate and tell retailers that if any unknown persons were to try and purchase this product, they should be refused and their names reported to the police. Arrangements were also made in a similar manner to prevent purchase from wholesalers and importers. Cab 93/7: 'Security Executive Conferences Meetings and Papers P – Z: Minutes of Committee on Sabotage', 01.05.1941.
[293] CAB 93/7: 'Conference on the Royal Patriotic School: Minutes of Meetings 1-10', 01.04.1941 - -.-.1941. The dates of the final meeting are not visible of the minutes held by the National Archives. However, meeting 9 was held on 20.11.1941, and meetings occurred monthly, so it is a reasonable assumption that this final meeting occurred in December 1941. The Royal Patriotic School is discussed in greater detail on page 80. The minutes of the Conference on Security of Combined Operations Base can be found at CAB 93/7: 'Conference on Security of Combined Operations Base: Minutes of Meetings 1-9', 28.04-1942 – 13.01.1943.

Discussions on the treatment of alien seamen serve to demonstrate an early display of the power and influence of the SE. The general principle had been that alien seamen should be kept under 'effective control' when not at sea or in other employment, in conditions that were at least approximate to military discipline. There was little doubt that this was somewhat problematic given that there were concerns that these individuals could seek the redress of the Courts for unfair treatment. It was suggested that the Home Office should be given legal power to detain aliens by group.[294] The Executive sought to influence the creation of legal regulations to carry out any actions the Executive deemed necessary, or useful. The political implications of its decisions were often considered by the SE, but these were not often as pressing a concern when discussing 'aliens', particularly 'enemy aliens'. This discussion took place in the first month of the existence of the SE, suggesting that Swinton had taken Churchill's instructions to heart, and that the role of the Committee was to be one of substance, there to take bold, and what they considered necessary, actions.

The Committee also found itself dealing with concerns about the control of information that, under normal circumstances, would likely be considered harmless, but in the hands of an enemy agent in wartime could have serious ramifications, such as the seemingly innocuous issue of buildings insurance, which was now considered from a security point of view. While most of the factories created for war production work were Government-owned, the Government did not offer fire insurance and as such private insurers were often used. When arranging the insurance of these buildings, detailed information would have been collected, and potentially available to a significant number of people. The most concerning aspect of such information from a security perspective concerned factory plans. As such, it was felt a new scheme needed to be developed in order to manage the insurance necessary for these factories, while minimising the security threat it created.[295] More generally, the issue of publicly available information which could be of potential value to Germany, what would today be described as Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), was also addressed. Concerns were raised by the Security Service that the publication of accounts of factories engaged in war production could provide the enemy with information about any damages, which could be used to garner greater understanding of Britain's military position and capabilities, as well as guiding future

[294] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 8'. 26.06.1940.
[295] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 21', 19.12.1940. Following a conference on the matter with the interested departments under Ball, it was agreed that the risk of enemy agents accessing valuable information in this way was negligible. However, it was arranged that a letter would be distributed emphasising the need to limit access to this information as much as possible in CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 22', 09.01.1941.

attacks.[296] It was also felt the same approach should extend to public utility companies and any potential information that could be used similarly.[297] This could have allowed the enemy to both gather a greater knowledge about the British war effort, and to plan any future attacks by confirming when bombing raids had been effective. The security risk posed by the availability of such seemingly innocuous information that could be used to the benefit of the enemy was considered significant, and was discussed several times by the SE, which also saw the establishment of a subcommittee to develop a system to decide what information would be published and what would remain secret, before going on to extend the original recommendations to cover other types of companies such as those operating harbours, docks, canals, etc, as well as gas and electricity companies.[298] Related issues later arose regarding the publication of statistics, for example the National Savings Committee argued that some publication of population statistics was needed for 'arousing the competitive spirit in support of National Savings Campaigns'. The fear was that these statistics would be regional and would serve to illustrate how some areas had seen a marked increase in their population, which would suggest that war industries had been established there, thereby creating a target for enemy air attack.[299] Swinton concluded discussions on this matter by acknowledging the difficulty in balancing the potential security risks with the advantages as described by the National Savings Committee. He concluded that, in this instance, there was no great security risk arising from the proposal by the National Savings Committee.[300] The Registrar-General requested some relaxation to the restrictions that had been placed upon publication of population statistics.[301] However, Group Captain P.L Plant of the Air Ministry counselled caution, explaining this publication could provide a large amount of intelligence to the enemy which they would not otherwise have access to. The type of information that could be gleaned, and the value of it, would be heavily dependent upon the strategy adopted by the enemy, however there was no doubt that there was a risk. As a result, it was decided that before any decisions were made, the information proposed for publication would be given to MI5, which would assess the

[296] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 21', 19.12.1940; CAB 93/3: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Publication of Accounts etc. of Companies Engaged in War Industries', 18.02.1941.
[297] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 26', 20.02.1941.
[298] The findings of the first subcommittee can be found at CAB 93/3: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Publication of Accounts etc. of Companies Engaged in War Industries', 18.02.1941. The second meeting of this subcommittee can be found at CAB 93/3: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Publication of Accounts etc. of Companies Engaged in War Industries and Public Utility Undertakings', 04.03.1941.
[299] CAB 93/3: 'Security Executive: The Publication of Population Statistics', 18.10.1941.
[300] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 51', 22.10.1941.
[301] This request can be found in CAB 93/3: 'Security Executive: The Publication of Population Statistics', 24.12.1941.

information in the same manner it did with the enemy information it had experience with. This would give a clear idea as to the value of the information and allow for an informed decision to be made as to what information could be published and in what format. Following this, some three months later, a compromise was reached deciding what could be published and in what format.[302]

Despite its own clear focus on security, the Executive recognised that other factors, be they political, economic, or practical, needed to be considered when taking decisions. It also indicated that the SE possessed a sense of perspective and an acceptance of its own limitations, it understood that blanket bans on activities were not always possible and that sometimes it was necessary to simply make the best out of a situation while mitigating the threat to security as much as possible. This can be seen during discussions over the collection of information on air-raid damage. While it was acknowledged that a collection of such information was of legitimate interest to some parties, such as building societies, the *collation* of such information presented a significant security risk, as it meant that a large volume information being potentially made available to the enemy, as opposed to snippets of information that would otherwise be more likely transmitted.[303] After a meeting of various departments, it was decided that the Home Office would be responsible for the control of the collection of such information.[304] By assigning this task to one department, it limited the risk of this collated information being acquired by the enemy. It was also noted that individuals had been recording incidents of bomb damage, for example by taking photographs. It was felt that any formal ruling that might be made to attempt to restrict photographs being taken in would have so many exceptions and complications that it was not viable. Instead, it was agreed that a cautionary notice should be issued to the public, emphasising the security risk posed by this information should it end up in enemy hands and as such people may have made themselves liable to proceedings under Defence Regulation 3.[305] This is an example of how security managed by

[302] The solution was presented in CAB 93/3: 'Security Executive: The Publication of Population Statistics', 23.01.1942, and agreed upon in CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 58', 28.01.1942.
[303] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 15'. 09.10.1940.
[304] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 16'. 24.10.1940.
[305] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 19'. 21.11.1940. The British version of this act has proven difficult to acquire but versions are available for Colonial countries and it is reasonable to assume that directions related to security would be highly similar. The example used here is from Barbados and Part 3 of these Defence Regulations 1939 related to the 'movements and activities of persons'. One section that is particularly applicable to this point is Section 17.1 which states that 'No person shall do any act having reasonable cause to believe that it will be likely to prevent or interfere with the performance of then duties by members of His Majesty's forces or the carrying on of their work by persons engaged in the performance of essential services…' Refusal to provide an Identity Card could be construed as obstructing police or military

the state could be difficult to enforce in some situations and was reliant upon the actions of the general public who, especially during this period, would likely have been unaware of the risks or threat posed simply seemingly innocuous pieces of information as the concept of 'security' would not have been as widely understood as it is today.

The challenges posed when dealing with security measures that involved the general public can also be seen in relation to the issue of National Registration Identity Cards. This system was proposed by MI5, which argued that it had three key benefits.[306] Firstly, Identity Cards would allow for the resident population to be checked easily. Secondly, it made it harder for enemy agents to penetrate any areas where the scheme was in effect. Finally, it would make it easier for the Police and armed forces to check identities. MI6 argued it would be of value particularly in relation to the second point and emphasised that a good understanding of the system of checks was vitally important for an enemy agent. They argued emphatically that anything that made it more difficult for enemy agents to learn the systems would be of great value to the security of the country. While there were some broader concerns over the practicability of the system, it was decided by the SE that actions should be taken to prepare the proposal to be enacted.[307] Yet despite the enthusiasm for the idea from MI5 and MI6, and certainty that it would achieve its intended purpose of increasing security, the system proved to be impossible to put into effect because;

> The great mass of respectable citizens did not feel morally obliged to comply with the requirements of the National Registration system.

Trials of the Identity Card system suggested strong reluctance among the general population to carry identification created more work for police and military authorities, in terms of differentiating between suspicious persons and the very large number of innocent defaulters.[308] The idea was raised again a month later as an emergency measure upon imminent threat of invasion. The same problem still existed with many people not carrying ID. They were used so infrequently that many people had lost their cards, or had failed to update their details, for example when changing address. It took a minimum of two weeks for new cards to be delivered, so upon enactment of a Defence Regulation making card carrying compulsory there would be a significant delay before it would be an effective means of securing vulnerable areas.

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offices from performing their duties required for security purposes. E John Waddington, *Defence Regulations, 1939.* (1939), p. 15.

[306] According to the diaries of Guy Liddell, the scheme was the brainchild of former barrister H. L. A. Hart, who joined MI5 during the war, and 'seemed to find favour with most of those present' at meeting 40 of the SE. KV/4/188: 'Liddell Diaries: Volume 4'. 02.07.1941.

[307] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 40'. 02.07.1941.

[308] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 49'. 01.10.1941.

Despite this it was 'recommended that the Home Office should prepare a procedure whereby on the imminence of invasion it should be made compulsory for all civilians to carry their Identity Card, power being given to the police to arrest anyone who failed to produce it on demand'. It was 'recommended that all steps should be taken... to increase the habit of card-carrying among the general public'.[309] The scheme was later discussed again during Duff Cooper's time as Chairman.[310]

Another demonstration of the securitising influence of the SE, and thus justification of the term 'Security State', can be found in the case of Czech refugees. MI5 held particular anxieties about the security risk posed by Czech refugees, primarily because many individuals who had obtained Czech nationality, and thus a Czech interim passport, were originally from Germany or Austria. As such, MI5 wished to classify people with a Czech interim passport as enemy aliens. However, when this proposal was put before the SE it was rejected as being unlawful.[311] This demonstrates another role being played by the SE, which was to provide oversight to the separate departments represented on the body. The reason for the fears held by MI5 was that many of these people allegedly of German origin were apparently members of the German Communist Party and were 'paid and trained international agitators and were known to be hostile to Britain'. It was argued that 'a further most disquieting feature was that a number of these people were said to be employed in the administration of the Czech Refugee Trust Fund and of the Hostels'. This was considered to be a serious situation, and MI5 put forward a list of suggestions to deal with it. Firstly, that the hostels and the headquarters of the Czech Refugee Trust should be staffed by MI5-approved British staff and that no Czech, or other alien, staff to whom MI5 took exception should be employed. Secondly, hostels should be moved out of protected areas, and finally, MI5 provided a list of names suggested for internment. The Home Office objected to general internment, arguing that whole groups of people, such as Communists, could not be interned en masse. This was countered with the argument that Central Eastern European communists were different to, and more dangerous than, English communists. It was decided that MI5 would have to demonstrate past actions of the individuals concerned to justify internment.[312] There were also concerns about the proposed restrictions to prevent the spread of propaganda and the potentially serious political

[309] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 52'. 29.10.1941.
[310] See page 90.
[311] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minute of Meeting 6'. 26.06.1940.
[312] It was later noted that some of the names on the list provided by MI5 had already been interned as Category B Germans and the others were still to be assessed. CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 8'. 26.06.1940.

repercussions that could occur if restrictions were put on some groups of aliens and not others. As such, the proposal was rejected.[313] Czech refugees were discussed further at a meeting three weeks later, where a finalised list of arrangements was reported by the Chairman.[314] While this was clearly a matter of importance that had been handled by the SE, what is more illuminating about the role of the body occurred some six months later. The subject of Czech refugees arose again, as the recommendations made at the prior meeting were not being carried out, and in particular hostel supervisors had been failing to keep in touch with Regional Security Liaison Officers'. There were also reports of Czech refugees engaging in political activity which was not allowed when in receipt of the Czech Refugee Trust Fund. The first conclusion to this point was simply that the previous conclusions should be put into practice. Secondly, as the Director of the Czech Refugee Trust Fund had resigned, a new appointment was required. The SE noted that the man given this role should be one 'enjoying the confidence of the Police, the Home Office, the Security Services and the Czech Provisional Government'. A list of suitable candidates was to be drafted by the Security Service and submitted to the Home Secretary.[315] While the SE did not have any executive functions (despite the name of the body) and took its actions in the form of recommendations to various departments and groups, there was an expectation that these were to be followed, and the body would follow up on them taking further action when necessary.

The issue of control of entry to the UK provides a clear example of the need for a body in the role of the SE, centred around the question of whether visas should be required for British subjects returning to Britain. Visas come in many forms, and are in essence 'an entry or note on a passport, certificate, or other official document signifying that it has been examined and found correct'.[316] In this case, the purpose of a visa would be to confirm that the bearer of the visa was a British subject, and not an agent of the enemy posing as one. This issue arose owing to a number of blank numbered British passports being captured from the Consulate at Bergen, and potentially at other abandoned Consulates, such as Oslo. Additionally, many passports had been left behind by British subjects fleeing the Continent. There was a fear that the enemy would be able to use these in preparation of passports for agents posing as British subjects.[317]

[313] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 6'. 05.06.1940.
[314] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 8'. 26.06.1940.
[315] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 21'. 19.12.1940.
[316] OED, 'visa', 2020.
[317] This issue was originally discussed in a meeting of the HDSE, on 19 August 1940, and after much discussion it was decided that a list of the serial numbers of passport blanks which had been lost should be supplied to MI5 by the Passport & Permit Office. Visas were also recommended initially, and it was agreed that the Foreign Office,

The issue of introducing a visa system took a great deal of discussion and a conclusion was not easily reached. However, without the forum of the SE it is highly likely that it would have taken much longer to communicate through all the necessary bodies, and to alter and refine the proposal to one that was at least agreeable to all involved. By bringing representatives together in this manner regularly, the opinions of the bodies could be discussed together, and by requiring reports to be created together by representatives of the concerned bodies, the Executive was instrumental in the creation of this policy. The topic was discussed at the 15th meeting of the SE, during which the extent of the disagreement between different departments was made clear. While MI5 argued for the introduction of a visa in an attempt to lower the threat of agents entering this country using British passports, the Foreign Office voiced reservations. While willing to act in whatever way they were instructed through the introduction of a Defence Regulation, the Foreign Office was critical of the proposal, expressing concern that such a visa would cast doubts on the validity of the British passport.[318] Swinton proceeded to point out that a similar scheme had operated during the previous war, and asked the Foreign Office to provide the Executive with a considered view of the merits of the proposed scheme. The Home Office agreed that they would be willing to make the necessary Defence Regulation, however they were reluctant to impose additional restrictions on British subjects if there was little to no benefit, as suggested by the Foreign Office. In conclusion it was decided that a further meeting of the Departments concerned should be held in order to present the Executive with a detailed report, outlining the merits of the proposed system and the suggested action.[319] Once this report was put before the Executive further discussion was held over the merits of the proposed visa system. The Chairman noted that while this question had arisen due to the specific issue of lost passports and blank passports in enemy occupied territory, the fear of these being used by enemy agents had lessened. However, the risk of agents using forged passports was still present and as such it was still felt necessary that measures should be put into place to safeguard against this risk. The Foreign Office was not the only body to voice concerns over the proposed visa system. The message from the Home Secretary, reported by Permanent Under-Secretary of State to the Home Office Frank

Home Office, Security Services and Passport Office should come together to agree on the steps that were required, and the Dominions Office should be advised of the new action being taken and the reasons why it was felt necessary. CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 13'. 19.08.1940.

[318] They also argued that in almost every case, the British Consul would not possess any information about the owner of the passport that he was required to viser. CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 15'. 09.10.1940.

[319] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 15'. 09.10.1940. A copy of this report can be found at CAB 93/3: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Paper 24'. 22.10.1940.

Newsam, was that he was not convinced that the system was necessary. Specific departure points were noted as being of particular risk, namely Lisbon and certain South American ports, and the Home Secretary argued that if specific danger spots could be identified, then extra caution could be taken regarding supposed British subjects arriving from those areas. However, Valentine Vivian, representing SIS, did not feel that this proposal would be sufficient. The Executive requested the relevant Departments meet again and report back with an agreed proposal that would suit all concerned parties.[320]

At the next meeting of the SE the requested report was presented.[321] It was clear that the Home Office and the Foreign Office both remained unconvinced of the necessity of a visa system, although both acknowledged they would approve the decision if that was the suggested action, albeit with some amendments. The Home Office insisted on the clarification that Immigration Officers could not detain a British subject simply because their passport did not have a Consular endorsement. MI5 agreed, claiming that this was never the intention of introducing the additional measures[322]. The Executive was happy with the proposal and recommended its adoption and asked that approval be granted by the Home Secretary as soon as possible.[323] The issue was finally settled at the 20th meeting of the SE. British subjects travelling to the UK from foreign countries would be advised to obtain endorsement from the nearest British Consul in advance of travel, in order to expedite their entry into the country as failure to receive this endorsement may result in delays at the port of landing.[324]

While several particular aspects of the issue were discussed the most significant of these concerned the Royal Patriotic School.[325] Later known as the London Reception Centre, the

[320] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 16'. 24.10.1940.

[321] The report stated that while 'some consular endorsement system was indispensable', there were other factors that was essential to the success of this scheme. For example, the system would have to be applied universally to avoid administrative problems. Also, the system should be rolled out to the Dominion and Indian Governments to ensure all British subjects were treated equally. CAB 93/3: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Paper 29'. 30.10.1940.

[322] Guy Liddell seemed largely dismissive of the idea, unless there was the introduction of some sort of secret mark on a passport which would indicate that there is something wrong with the holder. He noted that with the proposed system individuals would not be stopped unless there were significant grounds to think the individual was not entitled to the papers they possessed. KV 4/186: 'Liddell Diaries: Volume 2', 26.09.1940.

[323] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 17'. 31.10.1940. A week later, at the following meeting of the HDSE, the Executive reported that the Home Secretary had agreed to the proposals in principle, and as such the Dominions should be consulted and the administrative details of the scheme could begin being prepared. CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 18'. 07.11.1940.

[324] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 20'. 05.12.1940.

[325] At meeting 16, 'Collection of Intelligence from Arrivals to the UK' was discussed. This meeting discussed proposals put forward by MI6 concerning 'the machinery for obtaining information from persons newly arrived in the United Kingdom'. Several conclusions were reached, covering issues such as the Security Services and the Home Office offering guidance to Immigration Officers and Security Control Officers, what should have been done with individuals detained as a result of these instructions, that persons should have been examined not just

Royal Patriotic School, Wandsworth was a centre for arrivals to the UK to pass through where individuals were interviewed for security purposes, specifically to identify enemy agents and to gather any possible intelligence. The initial suggestion to rebrand the School as a reception centre came from the SE, in an effort to make it appear less problematic to Allied Governments.[326] It was agreed that the Royal Patriotic School should be used for all cases of arrivals to the UK that were not expected, however there were fears that Allied Governments may view the School as an internment or detention centre. In an effort to combat this and assuage any concerns held by the Allied Governments, it was felt that amenities should have been improved. As well as deciding that the Royal Patriotic School would be the singular site for this aspect of war work, there were several other points that required general decisions from the SE, with the details being handled by a subcommittee. The conclusions reached were for Sir Joseph Ball to work with representatives of the Home Office, the Security Services and other Departments as necessary to put into effect a variety of principles, and for the Director-General of the Security Service, and select others, to decide on the size and establishment of the military guard. [327] The Royal Patriotic School was a significant venture, and another example of the significance and power of the SE, which served to negotiate the different departments of Government concerned.

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from a security point of view but also to ascertain whether that person had any information the Security Services may have been interested in, and finally how to handle situations when a non-suspect individual possessed such information. CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 16'. 24.10.1940. The proposal can be found at CAB 93/3: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Paper 23'. 18.10.1940. At meeting 25, 'Aliens of Allied Nationality Arriving in the United Kingdom' again came before the HDSE, this time concerning complaints from Allied Governments in the UK about communication issues when nationals were arriving in the UK to serve in their armed forces or mercantile marines. A new procedure was developed to attempt to resolve the issue. CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 25'. 13.02.1941. These tensions had risen previously, specifically from the perspective of the French General de Gaulle in relation to French Refugees. CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 22'. 09.01.1941. Meeting 28 saw discussion on 'Persons Arriving from Enemy or Foreign Territory'. This focused around discussing a draft circular to Chief Officers of Police, created by the Home Office with advice from the HDSE, MI5 and MI6, which can be found at CAB 93/3: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Paper 54'. 03.03.1941. At the meeting, several points were raised about the proposed draft, such as grammatical issues, missed possible situations, clarification of certain points, and noting that some suggestions were already in operation at least partly. Some of these suggestions were implemented from this point, and the others were to be referred to the Security Service to investigate and implement if appropriate. CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 28'. 05.03.1941.

[326]CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 30'.26.03.1941. A significant amount of material is available on the Royal Patriotic School at The National Archives, Kew. Many of them are contained in the files of the War Office, with a subseries of file WO 208: 'Royal Patriotic School: interrogation of civilians arriving in UK from abroad'. 01.05.1941-31.06.1945. However, mentions of the School can be found in a variety of department archives, such as the Foreign Office (FO 371/42309: 'Conditions of the "Royal Patriotic Schools". Code 64 file 314'. 1944), the Home Office (HO 213/1981: 'MI5 memoranda on searching aliens and escorting them to Royal Patriotic School'. 1941-1942), and the Security Service (KV 4/341: 'Policy and procedure re detention of aliens at the Royal Patriotic Schools'. 01.01.1941-31.12.1941).

[327] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 30'. 26.03.1941.

As touched upon above, another issue faced by the SE was dealing with tensions with Allied administrations due to arrests of their nationals in the UK. The main concern was due to individuals who had diplomatic immunity. There had been complaints from the Allied administrations that no warning was being given before the arrest of individuals, but this was argued as impossible to provide from the perspective of the Security Service as it would potentially grant the individuals concerned time to either flee or to destroy valuable evidence. The proposed solution to this was for the Foreign Secretary to draft a letter for the head of each Allied Government. It would be requested that the Allied Government would accept this letter and send it to the Foreign Secretary as an agreement of the terms, which would be that the head of the Allied administration would waive forthwith the immunity of any of his nationals who had been granted immunity through the Diplomatic Privileges (Extension) Bill, following a request due to the National interest by the Foreign Secretary. This would not apply to Ministers and Heads of Department.[328] These arrangements were agreed by all Allied administrations except the Dutch, who requested that they be given time to decide themselves whether waiving immunity was necessary. This was considered but ultimately it was felt that this was not possible and the Foreign Office should insist on the initial proposal and explain its necessity to the Dutch Minister or Prime Minister. The Executive also made a point to 'record their opinion that it was from the security point of view essential that in special cases of the kind referred to the waiver of immunity should be granted by the Allied Government immediately upon request'.[329] This clearly demonstrates at the very least a perceived sense of importance, with a view that the opinion of the Executive would carry a significant level of weight, potentially even over the administrations of other countries. This also demonstrates a benefit to the existence of the SE, as it was able to tease out solutions to tricky problems.

The security threat of careless talk also arose during Swinton's time as chair. The 'careless talk costs lives' campaign, run by the Ministry of Information, was considered necessary as reports were being received of sensitive information being seemingly common knowledge. [330] A key part of the suggestions by the SE to combat the threat of careless talk, both to outsiders but also amongst officers, was already in hand by the Ministry of Information and the SE simply noted

[328] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 19'. 21.11.1940. It was noted shortly afterwards that the Executive were happy with the letter that had been drafted, following one alteration the body had suggested in CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 20'. 05.12.1940.

[329] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 30'. 26.03.1941. The discussion of the Diplomatic Priviledges (Extension) Bill continues in the next time frame discussed by this thesis, and the conclusions of this discussion will discussed in the next chapter.

[330] The Imperial War Museum holds a large collection of such propaganda posters, see Imperial War Museum, 2020.

its approval of these actions. They did also suggest that the issue should be referred to in a speech by the Prime Minister if possible, or by the Home Secretary.[331] Often matters of security are conducted in the upmost secrecy, and the only way to resolve this crack in British security was to spread the message as widely as possible and demonstrate how serious it was by employing the services of the most powerful and impactful person possible. As well as these general measures, individual investigation was to be made into cases that had been reported. Specifically, Swansea was discussed as it had been mentioned to the Chairman by the Prime Minister as there was 'an allegation that information about the arrival and departure of convoys was common knowledge… and that details of the air defences could be overheard from the conversations of R.A.F. personnel'.[332] A report from this investigation was described as 'on the whole reassuring' and the Ministry of Information continued its work on the matter more generally.[333]

One of the most significant organisational developments during the tenure of Lord Swinton as Chairman was the decision to change the name of the committee from the 'Home Defence (Security) Executive' to the 'Security Executive'.[334] Officially, this decision was made as an attempt to avoid confusion with other government organisations, in particular the Home Defence Executive, which was responsible for the organisation of defence in case of an invasion and the Ministry of Home Security, which was responsible for national civil defence.[335] This could simply be due to the similarities between the names, especially considering there are examples of correspondence in which a number of different names have been used, presumably due to human error.[336] There may also have been other reasons for the decision. The SE had been dealing increasingly in matters that were not concerned with fighting the Fifth Column. As the role they were undertaking was evolving and expanding, it is plausible that they desired to have a new name in order to distance the body, as it now existed, from the original HD(S)E that Chamberlain had established.

Even if the decision was as simple as an attempt to avoid people using the wrong name for the body, the decision to remove the words 'home' and 'defence' is significant. No reason

[331] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 27'. 27.02.1941.
[332] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 27'. 27.02.1941.
[333] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 30'. 26.03.1941.
[334] CAB 93/2: 'Security Executive: Minutes of Meeting 49'. 01.10.1941
[335] The Home Defence Executive were linked to the SE by a common staff, but was a separate department with responsibility for preparations in case of invasion. CAB 66/8/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Memorandum by the Lord President of the Council'. 27.05.1940.
[336] One example of the incorrect name being used, but clearly referring to the HD(S)E, was a letter from the Bank of England requesting the names of the members of the 'Home Security Executive (Swinton) Committee'.[336] CAB 21/3498: 'Letter from Rickatson-Hatt to Barlow'. 12.12.1941.

for the removal of the word 'defence' was explicitly stated, but it may have been due to the tendency for the words 'defence' and 'security' to be used interchangeably. If it is to be taken that the word 'defence' in this context was intended to mean the same as 'security', it does not add anything to the understanding of the role of the committee, and as such may have been removed due to its redundancy. However, one possible argument regarding the difference between the two words is that 'security may be considered in its political, environmental, social and economic variant, while defence is essentially limited to military security matters'.[337] As this chapter has demonstrated, the 'security' issues that the SE was concerned with, as noted in the definition they provided, encompassed issues far beyond the armed forces. Given that they were not concerned with military matters, the word 'defence' may not have been considered appropriate.

Of equal if not greater significance was the removal of the word 'home'. Two months before the decision to change the name occurred, at the 43rd meeting of the SE, the Committee discussed security coordination in West Africa, inviting Swinton to meet with representatives of relevant departments, including the Colonial Office, the Ministry of War Transport, MI5 and MI6, to discuss whether the existing security arrangements were adequate, and what measures would be required, if any.[338] The topic of security in West Africa came up again three months later in relation to a proposed Censorship Station at Bathurst.[339] Security in Canada was discussed in the 47th meeting regarding the decision to establish a Security Service there, and again at the 70th meeting where the details of this decision were finalised.[340] After a meeting with Colonel Ralston, Canadian Minister of Defence, Guy Liddell was critical of the security measures of ports in Canada, and particularly of the suggestion that civilians would be employed with no obligation to remain employed by the service. In addition to this he felt the powers held by port security officers were 'totally inadequate to meet the situation'. Ralston

[337] Sturt Croft, *Britain and Defence 1945 – 2000,* (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2001) p. 5.
[338] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 43', 30.07.1941.
[339] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 52', 29.10.1941.
[340] The purpose of this discussion was to receive a report that, following a trip to Canada by Sir Connop Guthrie and Colonel Stratton, a Security Service was to be established in Canada as part of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, with MI5 assisting by providing two officers to instruct in the creation of port security arrangements. The first acknowledgement of this report can be found in CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 47', 03.09.1941. The decision was confirmed and detailed in CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 70', 17.06.1942. Similar discussions were held over the security arrangements, or lack thereof, in Newfoundland. At this time, Newfoundland was not part of Canada. It became a province of the confederation in 1949. The existing security arrangements were of significant concern to the SE, with Sir Connop Guthrie and Colonel Stratton visiting Newfoundland to assess the situation. The result of this visit was successful, with the authorities being convinced that arrangements were needed. As with the situation in Canada, MI5 were once again to send representatives to assist with the preparations. CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meetings 65-70', 22.04.1942 – 17.06.1942. CAB 93/3: 'Security Executive: Security in Newfoundland', 01.06.1942).

agreed to investigate the situation.[341] This expansion into security overseas suggests that 'home' no longer applied to the work of the SE. The name change occurred just two months after these discussions, and the change in name can be considered to represent an accurate reflection of the change in the role of the Executive. The body had developed an Imperial dimension, demonstrating both the scale of the security work being undertaken, and its reach. The work of the SE in other countries only increased in frequency during Swinton's tenure. This began with discussion on British Guiana nine meetings later, and continued two meetings after this with discussion on Portuguese East Africa.[342] The next meeting saw discussion on South Africa, India and Ceylon.[343] Other later discussions include Cuba and the Caribbean.[344]

This chapter has demonstrated that the SE grew rapidly in terms of scope and influence under Lord Swinton's lead. While the body achieved its primary aim during this time, securing Britain against the threat of a Fifth Column, it also achieved much more than that. It identified a gap in the existing operation of British governance, and filled that gap in an effective manner. The examples provided demonstrate that the body held a significant amount of influence and power throughout the operations of Whitehall. In this period, the birth of the British Security State is clear. This thesis will continue to discuss the work of the SE under Lord Swinton's wartime successors, Duff Cooper and Sir Herbert Creedy.

[341] KV/4/190: 'Liddell Diaries: Volume 6'. 15.10.1942.

[342] British Guiana was discussed in relation to the security of bauxite supplies in CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 58', 28.01.1942. Portuguese East Africa was discussed in relation to anti-sabotage precautions and port security in CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 60', 18.02.1942.

[343] It was reported that a Security Liaison Officer would be appointed in South Africa due to the presence of a 'serious situation' there as reported by the Security Services. It was noted that, while it was important to ensure all Intelligence on enemy sabotage methods and security technique was regularly sent on to the relevant Indian authorities, the port security in India was operating well. It was noted that it would be of use to have someone visit Ceylon to review the security situation there. CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 61', 11.03.1942.

[344] The Executive noted that serious reports had been received in relation to the control of enemy aliens in Cuba and the Chairman was to take the matter to the appropriate departments, as noted in CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 65', (no date). The Executive received a report that it was likely a combined Naval Intelligence and Security Centre would be established in Jamaica in CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 64', 08.04.1942.

Chapter Four

'Considerable Changes'[345]

The Later Years of the Security Executive, June 1942 – August 1945

This chapter will discuss the development of the SE from the middle of 1942 to the end of the war in 1945. This period differs from the first two years of the SE as the body had become more established, subcommittees had been created to deal with continuous issues and conferences were used frequently to handle individual security concerns as they arose. The subcommittees having been discussed in chapter two, this chapter will focus on the development of the core body of the SE throughout this period, and the differences under the second Chair, Duff Cooper, and the third and final wartime Chair, Herbert Creedy. It will also discuss the end of the war, and show how the SE was able to continue to evolve and survive despite the assumption that its task was complete.

Concerns over the composition of the SE emerged again in June 1942, when Lord Swinton became Resident Minister in West Africa and was replaced as Chair by Alfred 'Duff' Cooper.[346] A prominent Conservative who had held notable offices within the Government, including First Lord of the Admiralty and Minister of Information, Cooper was suggested for Swinton's replacement as Chairman of the SE by Brendan Bracken, Cooper's successor as Minister of Information, on 22 May 1942. [347] He reasoned that Cooper wished to continue to work, and that 'he knows the world very well and he has served in many great offices'.[348] At the time of taking over as Chairman of the SE, Cooper was also the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, having returned from serving as Minister Resident in Singapore some six months earlier. Criticism over the Chairman of the SE being a member of the Government and questions over Cooper's pay both arose, although not until nearly a year after his

[345] A report from February 1946 noted that 'the work of the Executive underwent considerable changes, both in nature and in volume, during the course of the war; its volume, in particular, reacted at once to any outstanding change in the war situation'. CAB 125/182: 'The Security Executive: An outline of its course and functions', February 1946.

[346] Cooper was welcomed into the role at Swinton's last meeting, in CAB 93/2: 'Security Executive: Minutes of Meeting 70'. 17.06.1942. The decision that Cooper would take over was formally announced the previous day in War Paper (42) 258, located in CAB 66/25/38: 'War Cabinet: The Security Executive', 16.06.1942.

[347] Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 'Cooper, (Alfred) Duff, first Viscount Norwich' (2011). Cooper began his political career as an MP in October 1924; and served briefly as Financial Secretary to the War Office until the Conservative Party loss in 1929, where he also lost his seat. After being re-elected in 1931 he retook the role, before moving on to becoming Financial Secretary to the Treasury. In 1935 he was promoted to Secretary of State for War, then First Lord of the Admiralty in 1937. He became Minister of Information in 1940, then Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. He was sent to Singapore as Minister Resident, and after returning became the Chairman of the SE.

[348] PREM 3/418/3: Bracken to Churchill, 22.05.1942.

appointment.[349] Criticisms were extended to the SE as a whole, with the *Sunday Pictorial* going so far as to dub the committee the 'Prime Minister's Gestapo'.[350] This name stuck, presumably to the chagrin of those in the highest offices, and later resurfaced during a debate in the House of Commons in 1944, when Aneurin Bevan used the term when questioning Duff Cooper's expenses:

> Why is he kept in the Government—because he made a report on Singapore which they did not want to hear? When he came home, he was appointed to another job, in charge of the Prime Minister's Gestapo. He was made chairman of the Swinton Committee. You cannot ask how the money is spent without the Prime Minister becoming apoplectic. He got £5,000 a year for being in charge of the Swinton Committee—spying—not in charge of military intelligence but of civil intelligence. There are men in uniforms, thousands of them, drawing funds from this country and Members have not the remotest idea how much money is being spent or who is getting it.[351]

This outburst was unsurprisingly picked up by a number of newspapers, causing the moniker to be repeated, and stirring up even more resistance to an already controversial body, due to the nature of secrecy and security.[352]

Cooper held the position of Chair for sixteen months, before being appointed the British Representative on the Free French Committee of National Liberation.[353] During his time as Chair the SE held 23 meetings. Compared with the 70 held in almost 25 months of Swinton's tenure, this suggests a significant dip in the volume of work being conducted. However, when viewed in a wider context the drop in frequency of meetings is understandable. The majority of meetings under Swinton took place in the early days of the war, with half of them occurring in the first 12 months of the existence of the SE, meaning that there had been a gradual decline in the number of meetings rather than a sudden drop.[354] Given that at the time of the creation of the SE there was a great deal of panic regarding the Fifth Column, and no existing civil security structure, this is perhaps unsurprising. By the time Cooper took over, the initial Fifth Column panic had long passed, many other pressing security concerns had been dealt with, and

[349] For criticism over Chairman being a member of the Government see CAB 21/3498: 'Extract from *The Tribune*'. 30.04.1943. For questions over pay see Hansard HC Deb. Vol 388, Col 1535/36. 20.04.1943.
[350] CAB 21/3498: 'Sunday Pictorial'. 21.04.1943.
[351] Hansard HC Deb, Vol 396, Col 1971-2002. 10.03.1944.
[352] The following newspapers quoted the title of 'Prime Minister's Gestapo', Daily Herald, 1944; Aberdeen Press and Journal, 1944; Northern Whig, 1944.
[353] He was later to become British Ambassador to France, a post well suited to him given his Francophilia. His aptitude to the role of Ambassador to France is evidenced by the decision of Ernest Bevin to allow him to remain in this role after the Labour victory at the 1945 General Election, see P. M. H. Bell, *France and Britain, 1940-1944: The Long Separation*, (Oxon: Routledge, 1997) p. 72.
[354] This can be seen in the graph found in Appendix I.

subcommittees had been established to monitor ongoing situations, including the Committee on Communism and the Control at Ports Committee.[355]

One of the defining characteristics of the SE was the devolution of discussion and the proposals for action to its various subcommittees. As demonstrated in chapter two, this happened on numerous occasions in the form of both ad-hoc single or limited meeting committees and long-standing reoccurring committees. Unfortunately for Cooper, Churchill had a distaste for a heavily committee-led approach to Government, claiming that:

> the Committee system has been allowed to run riot, and that what should be a useful time-saving device is in danger not only of wasting the time of officials and of delaying action, but of sapping the responsibility of those called upon to take decisions and to direct action[356]

Just two months after Cooper had taken charge of the SE, Churchill instructed committees must be reduced as much as possible, and that a report must be submitted a little over a month later by each department, detailing the number of committees for which each department was responsible, and explaining what reduction had occurred since the issuing of these instructions.[357] Cooper was new to the SE when he took over, he had been in attendance at Swinton's final meeting in order to be introduced and to hand over responsibility, but was not yet familiar with the activities and operations of the body.[358] The report compiled by Cooper listed the six existing committees, claiming that their 'usefulness has been fully proved', and explaining there was no intention of creating any more.[359]

Cooper took the opportunity offered by Churchill's request to prepare a second paper.[360] This outlined the role and functions of the SE and clarified the purpose of the body, following reports that several departments would find such a document useful.[361] Given that Cooper was new to the Committee when he took control, it is likely that its confusing and secretive nature

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[355] See chapter two for discussion on these subcommittees.
[356] CAB 67/9/34: War Cabinet Memoranda: Committee', 14.05.1941.
[357] CAB 66/28/49: 'W.P. (42) 419: War Cabinet: Administrative Arrangements', 21.09.1942.
[358] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 70', 7.06.1942.
[359] The six named committees are the SE, Liaison Officers' Conference, the Seamen and Overseas Shipping Committee, the Control at Ports Committee, the Shipping Information and Home Shipping Committee, and the Committee on Communism. CAB 21/3498: 'Security Executive: Committee Procedure', 31.10.1942.
[360] CAB 21/3498: 'The Functions of the Security Executive', 26.10.1942.
[361] The document was sent the following departments; Admiralty, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Air Ministry, Ministry of Aircraft Production, Board of Trade, Colonial Office, Board of Customs and Excise, Dominions Office, Ministry of Economic Warfare, Board of Education, Ministry of Food, Foreign Office, Ministry of Health, Home Office, Ministry of Home Security, India and Burma Office, Ministry of Information, Board of Inland Revenue, Ministry of Labour and National Service, Ministry of Pensions, General Post Office, Department of Public Prosecutions, Scottish Office, Ministry of Supply, H.M. Treasury, H.M. Procurator General and Treasury Solicitor, War Office, Ministry of War Transport, Ministry of Works and Planning, Ministry of Fuel and Power, H.M. Stationary Office, Department of Overseas Trade, Ministry of Production. This was stated in CAB 21/3498: 'Letter from Creedy to Bridges', 26.10.1942.

was more apparent to him than it may have been to longstanding members of the body. To begin, the paper offered a definition of security from the perspective of the SE for the first time. This read:

> By "security" is meant the defence of national interests against hostile elements other than the armed forces of the enemy; in practice, against espionage, sabotage and attempts to procure defeat by subversive political activity. "Security" in this sense is not confined to the United Kingdom. It extends to the Colonies, the Dominions and India, and covers such British interests abroad as the security of British ships and cargoes in foreign ports.

The decision to provide a definition is significant, demonstrating acceptance and acknowledgement of the much expanded remit of the SE, although the definition offered is vague and somewhat sweeping. The SE dealt with a great many disparate security issues, as this thesis has demonstrated. As such, any definition provided would need to be suitably open to interpretation as to cover each of these many areas.

The report also gave details about how issues were raised with the SE, and how that procedure had changed over time. Crucially, it pointed out that 'as the usefulness of the machinery afforded by the Executive became apparent', departments increasingly brought up issues themselves when necessary. The ability to identify issues that were of a security concern and the gradual change in this and the manner in which departments responded to these issues demonstrates a change in the attitudes, approaches, and proficiency, orchestrated by the SE, which relates to a secondary element of the Security State. There was a noticeable tangible Security State that was embodied primarily by the SE, but there was also a development into a continuous awareness of security as a concern throughout the existing structure of Whitehall. The terminology of the report also gives credibility to the idea of the existence of a Security State following the creation of the SE. The notion of a Security State is characterised by a 'machinery of security', and this report acknowledges that the Executive created a 'machinery'.

The remainder of this report briefly covered the practicalities of the SE, such as the staff of the body who worked under Sir Herbert Creedy, and listed the Committees that operated under it.[362] The functions of the Liaison Officers Conference (LOC) were explained in greater detail, listing the Departments that had specially appointed officers who met regularly under Creedy as Chairman.[363] This was described as 'daily contact…between the Security Executive and these Departments'. That such close contact was considered necessary was testament to

[362] Before serving as Chair, one of Creedy's many roles within the SE was heading the staff of the body, such as the secretaries.

[363] These departments were the Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry, Home Office, G.H.Q (Home Forces), Ministry of Information, Postal and Telegraph Censorship, M.I.6, Security Service and Metropolitan Police.

the high level of power and influence held by the SE. Indeed, the report followed this with the claim that, by this point, the SE had;

> covered every aspect of security in Great Britain, and many questions of security overseas. In so doing, it has aimed at assessing the true importance of each apprehended danger, and at maintaining a just balance between security and other vital interests.

The final element of the report was to provide a list of examples of subjects covered by the SE, its Committees and Conferences, and the LOC.[364]

In many ways the work of the SE under Cooper remained unchanged from Swinton's time. Swinton biographer J. A. Cross claims that the work conducted by the SE was 'seemingly unaffected by the advent of a new Chairman', taking this as evidence of Swinton's success as Chairman as Cooper was 'of markedly inferior administrative ability and powers of application'.[365] There was relatively little change in the nature of subjects discussed. While the feared Fifth Column threat had been well and truly debunked, the CPGB was still under discussion by the Committee on Communism and was discussed again in two meetings of the SE.[366] Much as the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union and the subsequent alliance between the Soviet Union and Great Britain did not impact on the SE's view of security and the CPGB, neither did the dissolution of the Comintern in May 1943. Cooper felt that 'no material change had taken place' and that it 'did not suggest that the policy of world revolution had been abolished'. It was felt that the CPGB would still be taking orders from Stalin's Russia, and its loyalty would not be to Great Britain.[367]

The topic of the publication of population statistics was raised under Cooper, as it had been during Swinton's time as Chair. A question had been posed in the House of Commons regarding how many people had left London since the outbreak of war and how the population at that time compared with before the war. Once again, it was decided that it would not be in public interest to release information of this nature.[368] The National Savings Committee,

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[364] While the list was not exhaustive, nor did it reveal anything that had not been covered elsewhere, a significant point of note about this list is that it is one of the few pieces of information available in the secondary literature on the SE, having been reproduced in Hinsley and Simkin's Official History, in Harry Hinsley and C. A. G. Simkins, *British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume Four: Security and Counter-Intelligence* (London: HMSO, 1990), pp. 315-318. Indeed, a large amount of the chapter dedicated to the SE in this work closely echoes this report, see Harry Hinsley and C. A. G. Simkins, *British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume Four: Security and Counter-Intelligence* (London: HMSO, 1990), pp. 47-64.

[365] John Cross, *Lord Swinton*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 231.

[366] There was also isolated discussions discussing Jehovah's Witnesses, the Protestant Truth Society and Anti-Semitic propaganda, but these were a more tenuous link to Fifth Column activities, and were each only discussed on one occasion, at meeting 88. CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 88', 26.05.1943.

[367] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 89', 02.06.1943.

[368] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 73', 22.07.1942.

previously discussed in the context of the release of information relating to population, came under discussion again in this period, concerning the disclosure of factory addresses in the War Savings Review. The SE arranged for a list of the addresses that were to be kept secret to be sent to the National Savings Committee, who agreed to submit their material to the Ministry of Information for censorship before any publication.[369]

The previously controversial National Registration Identity Card scheme was also raised again for discussion. A draft was presented of a Defence Regulation to be put into practice in case of invasion. The main alteration was the citizens would be allowed 48 hours to produce their identity cards at a Police Station of their choice. Police officers would be able to question people in order to satisfy themselves of a person's character, and if they were not satisfied, they would have the power to detain individuals. The SE approved the draft with minor changes and emphasised it should be announced in a way that would strongly encourage people to start carrying identification immediately, not just if the regulation became applicable.[370] There were also arguments over when the order could be used, as it had been suggested that it should be available to apply to specific areas for other reasons. However, the Legislation Committee felt it was too drastic to be used except for the extreme circumstance of imminent invasion. GHQ (Home Forces) strongly disagreed with this view and requested permission to prepare a memorandum with the Home Office and other concerned departments to argue the need for this power. The SE allowed work on the memorandum to go ahead.[371] Following this, the opinion of GHQ remained unchanged but GHQ conceded as the War Office felt the case was not strong enough to push for extra powers, thus the Defence Regulation would state that it was to be used only in areas that were in imminent danger of invasion.[372] Other issues that were discussed that had also been discussed previously included Prisoners of War, censorship, and overseas security.[373]

One practical issue that was discussed in this period was raised by the Security Service and called for a standardisation of terms used to describe sabotage. This was felt necessary due

[369] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 86', 21.04.1943.
[370] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 77', 30.09.1942.
[371] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 80', 18.11.1942.
[372] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 82', 20.01.1943.
[373] Italian Prisoners of War were discussed six times between meeting 78 and meeting 91, in CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meetings 78-91', 14.10.1942-22.07.1943. Censorship was discussed in a variety of contexts. Some examples include a review of a previously suggested trial of a mobile censorship unit operating in ports; the censorship of technical publications, and telephone censorship, available at CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meetings 74-87', 05.08.1942-05.05.1943. Examples of overseas security issues include security in Canada, censorship and security in the Caribbean area, and a transit censorship as at Dakar, available at CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meetings 71-84', 08.07.1942-03.03.1943.

to the common use of the term 'petty', which was felt to be misleading. The terms that the Security Service proposed to be used in future were; Armed Sabotage, Secret Sabotage, and Malicious Damage.[374] While the SE did accept the proposed terms and definitions and recommended they should be used by all Services and Departments, there was some slight hesitancy over whether confusion may occur in some cases over whether 'Secret Sabotage' or 'Malicious Damage' was the most appropriate term to use.[375]

Cooper chaired his last meeting of the SE in November 1943, and in December 1943, he was appointed the British Representative on the Free French Committee of National Liberation, before becoming British Ambassador to France. While Churchill was not enthusiastic about the appointment, he was swayed by Cooper who had the benefit of being a well-known Francophile and of having held offices of repute, making the appointment both desirable to Cooper and complimentary to the French Government.[376] The final 18 months of the wartime existence of the SE were led by Herbert Creedy as Chairman. This appointment was a stark contrast to the previous decision to appoint Cooper to the role. The characters of the two men were wildly different. Cooper wrote extensively, keeping extensive memoirs and publishing several books. Creedy, however, did not write any memoirs, and has been described as 'a man of monumental discretion'. He was experienced in roles that required a high level of secrecy, having served in prominent roles in the War Office for 36 years, the last 19 of which were spent as the sole Permanent Under-secretary of State for War. [377] Creedy was also already a very familiar face on the SE, having attended the meetings of the SE since August 1940, representing the SIC.[378] He had further responsibilities in the SE prior to becoming Chair, most prominently as Chair of the LOC, as well as being acting Chair for some of the meetings of the Committee on Control at Ports.[379]

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[374] There terms were defined as follows. 'Armed Sabotage: This is attack by a body of enemy troops for the purpose of destroying or putting out of action factories, public utilities, or in other words, a small armed raid. Secret Sabotage: This term covers all the activities of enemy agents who proceed by stealth. This, of course, if the type of activity that is particularly the concern of the Security Service. Malicious Damage: This describes that actions of disgruntled persons, etc. It is not sabotage and should never be referred to as such'. at CAB 93/3: Home Defence (Security) Executive: Paper 254: Standardisation of Terms used to Describe Sabotage', 15.03.1943.
[375] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 88', 26.05.1943.
[376] PREM 3/273/1: 'WSC to DC' 14.10.1943. For more information see John Charmley, 'Duff Cooper and Western European union 1944-47' *Review of International Studies,* 11 (1985) pp. 53-64.
[377] *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, 'Creedy, Sir Herbert James', (2008).
[378] Creedy first attended the 13th meeting of the SE, which can be found at CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 13', 19.08.1940. He joined the SIC and first appeared at a meeting 12, which can be found at CAB 93/5: 'Security Intelligence Centre: Minutes of Meeting 12', 23.08.1940.
[379] Creedy chaired the meetings of the Committee on Control at Ports that were not attended by the usual Chairman, Isaac Foot. He did this on seven occasions through this time period. CAB 93/5: 'Committee on Control at Ports: Minutes of Meetings 1 – 21', 14.03.1941 – 09.09.1943.

Creedy had been involved in the SE in various capacities for long enough to have experienced the developments and changes the body underwent through the course of the Second World War. It was no different after he became Chairman, with the dawning of what could be considered the 'winding down' of the wartime concerns of the SE beginning almost immediately. The first such example took place in the 95th meeting, with discussion of the proposed relaxation of the camping restrictions order.[380] However, while this demonstrates that the end of the war was on the minds of some individuals and thus issues were raised with the SE, the position of the SE was cautious.[381] The SE felt that, despite the security risk of camping, the prohibition on camping should not have been extended to include further restricted areas due to practical difficulties. These difficulties were related to the decision that had been previously made by the War Office 'that no more OVERLORD restrictions should be publicly announced' and that there would subsequently have been objections if a further Camping (Restrictions) Order had been issued.[382] However, the SE decided that it was 'undesirable' to allow the particular relaxation proposed, or any other relaxations or alterations, on the grounds of operational security.[383]

The relaxation of further restrictions was discussed at the 97th meeting of the SE, this time focused on the Aliens Protected Areas Order.[384] The discussion here displays a substantial change to the previously highly cautious approach of the SE, demonstrating a growing confidence in an eventual victorious conclusion to hostilities. This confidence was not simply held by the SE, it had been agreed by the Chiefs of Staff that there was no longer any need to retain any civil measures to prepare for invasion. Given that the vast majority of the restrictions on aliens were based on invasion risk, it is logical that these measures would be removed at this point, and they were subject to the imposition of restrictions to be applied to individual cases. It could easily be argued that this system would have been sufficient all along, given the extremely low figures of individuals who were considered unreliable that were presented when

[380] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 95', 10.05.1944.
[381] The issue was raised by the Ministry of Home Security following a question by the Chief Constable of Lincolnshire regarding relaxation of the Camping (Restrictions) Orders at the discretion of the police. CAB 93/3: 'Security Executive: Paper 304: Proposed Relaxation of the Camping (Restrictions) Order', 05.05.1944.
[382] Operation OVERLORD was the codename for D-Day, and the start of the Battle of Normandy. Given the importance of the event there is unsurprisingly a significant wealth of literature available on various aspects of the operation. One article that provides a broad overview of events is John Keegan, 'Normandy Invasion' *Encyclopedia Britannica*, (2021).
[383] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 95', 10.05.1944.
[384] The issue of restrictions on aliens has been discussed regularly throughout the existence of the SE.

discussing whether these measures could be removed.[385] The restrictions on the movement of aliens were revoked on 17 November 1944.[386] Discussions on the relaxation of measures continued three months later with a review of the expiration of Defence Regulation 2A.[387] In contrast to the previously discussed relaxation of powers, this matter demonstrated that the SE still remained cautious in its attitude towards Fifth Columnists, agreeing with a Home Office suggestion to delay the expiration of measures until a later point.[388] Postponing decisions to ease security measures until a later stage also occurred with other subjects, such as those relating to the measures for the security of merchant shipping, and the pass systems for government departments and protected places.[389] However, there were examples of restrictions on specific Fifth Column threats being lifted, such as restrictions on Jehovah's Witnesses.[390]

Alongside these discussions regarding the winding down of security measures due to the anticipated ending of hostilities, new business was still being brought before the SE. One example was 'Economy in the use of Manpower'. This issue was considered to be so significance that a meeting was held that focused solely on the subject, at which a report prepared by MI5 investigating ways in which to achieve saving in manpower on security duties at vulnerable points and in protected places.[391] The report stated that the 'logical approach' to the problem required three key stages. These were 'to define the present-day risks against

[385] It was stated that of 150,000 individuals, only around 1,500 were under the additional Aliens (Movement Restriction) Order, and around half of these individuals were restricted for reasons of public order rather than for security reasons. The individuals who were of a real concern only made up around 1.5% of the people affected by the Aliens Protected Areas Order. CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 97', 04.10.1944.

[386] CAB 93/3: 'Security Executive: Revocation of the Aliens (Protected Areas) Orders and the Aliens (Movement Restriction) Orders', 18.12.1944.

[387] Part of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939, Defence Regulation 2A stated that 'if, with intent to assist the enemy, any person does any act which is likely to assist the enemy or to prejudice the public safety, the defence of the realm or the efficient prosecution of the war, he shall be liable to penal servitude for life'. This regulation essentially made it an offence to a member of a Fifth Column, and was clarified by the newly appointed Homme Secretary Herbert Morrison in November 1940 during a House of Commons debate, when answering a question related to the punishment for people who deliberate intended to help the enemy. (Hansard HC Deb. Vol 365, Col 2003. 20/11/1940)

[388] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 102', 10.301.1945.

[389] It was decided that the anti-sabotage watches that had been in operation should not be relaxed at this point and the matter would be discussed again at a later point. CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 104', 29.01.1945. The topic had also been discussed earlier, at CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 100', [no date]. There were differences of opinion over whether pass systems could be relaxed, but the Executive as a whole concluded that the time was 'not yet ripe for any general modification of existing pass systems'. CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 102', 10.011.1945.

[390] Restrictions had earlier been imposed on the import of literature of Jehovah's Witnesses from the US at CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 93', 17.11.1943. These restrictions were lifted at CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 105', 14.02.1945.

[391] The discussion can be found at CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 103', 24.01.1945. The report by MI5 can be found at CAB 93/3: 'Security Executive: Economy in the use of Manpower on Protective and Security Duties', 18.01.1945.

which we need to insure', 'to prepare an up-to-date Directive which will guide all authorities concerned in adjusting manpower to a new standard', and finally 'to implement this new policy after it has been fully discussed and agreed by Departments concerned'. This report was regarded with such a high level of importance that it was discussed again at a later meeting of the SE. This second meeting contained alterations to the conclusions of the previous meeting, which included very minor changes to specific words or phrases, and this type of change would generally be seen as a corrigenda added to the end of the minutes of the meeting where it was first discussed. Including these minor changes in the main discussion of the meeting shows a thoroughness when handling this issue, emphasising the importance. There were further comments on the second draft, which concluded with agreement that the document, including the alterations discussed in this meeting, be distributed as necessary.[392] Another meeting of the SE was held a month later, and once again had only this one issue on the agenda. This time the subject of discussion was related to the distribution of the report that had been created, specifically to 'factories, shipyards and other establishments employing security personnel'.[393] It was noted at the following meeting that this action had been taken.[394]

As well as dealing with new issues surrounding the winding down of some the security measures that had been created throughout the war, the SE continued to cover many of the issues that had been occurring throughout the course of the war, including Prisoners of War, censorship and protected places.[395] Issues of security overseas continued to emerge in the later years of the SE. The first instance of Creedy dealing with such an issue was related to the appointment of a Consular Security Officer at Beira, in modern-day Mozambique.[396] This was another example of the need to balance security against other concerns. In this instance, there was an issue of diplomacy to consider due to a fear of causing offence to the Portuguese shipping authorities, but the Foreign Office feared the Consul may not have appreciated the possibility that the movement of ships, and of people, could have increased. A compromise

[392] The discussion can be found at CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 104', 29.01.1945. The second draft of the report can be found at CAB 93/3: 'Security Executive: Economy in the use of Manpower on Protective and Security Duties', 26.01.1945.
[393] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 106', 21.02.1945.
[394] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 107', 21.03.1945.
[395] In terms of Prisoners of War, the discussion focused on Italian Prisoners of War and German Prisoners of War in meetings 94 and 107 respectively. In terms of censorship, the discussion was about a gradual winding down of telephone censorship in meetings 97 and 107, and an acknowledgment of an ongoing investigation by the Ministry of Economic Warfare into whether German forces had been able to gather any worthwhile intelligence from technical documents and whether further censorship should have been taken in meeting 108. Protected Places were discussed in meetings 95, 97, and 99. CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meetings 94 – 108', 12.01.1944-18.14.1945.
[396] At the time, this was referred to as Portuguese East Africa.

was reached that, it was hoped, would manage to balance the two concerns.[397] However, a question over security at ports in this part of the world saw tensions of diplomacy and security came to light again some seven months later. As well as the appointment of a Consular Security Officer at Beira, it was decided to fence off the docks, an action which had by this point been implemented. However, there was disagreement over the introduction of a pass and guard system, which would work in tandem with the fencing. A system had initially been promised, but the Portuguese Governor General had objected, deeming it unnecessary. The General's perseverance was such that the system was never actually put into place, despite the SE agreeing with the Admiralty that fencing off the area served little use without a guard and pass system but there was nothing further that could be done. That the SE accepted the situation reluctantly can clearly be seen through the language used to record the conclusions of this discussion, where it was stated 'the views of the authorities at Beira that a guard and pass system was unnecessary must be accepted'. Generally speaking, the conclusions of the Executive were direct, with the Executive taking ownership of their decisions. Yet in this instance it was made clear that this was not their decision, leaving no doubt that the SE did not think this was the correct decision for the security of the area but this conclusion 'must' be accepted.[398] This was likely frustrating as the SE was used to holding a high level of authority, generally able to dictate any measures it chose in the name of security. There were some further relaxations of security overseas in the Caribbean area, though these were much less controversial. Some Field Security Officers were removed in November 1944, with the remaining officers being removed in July 1945.[399]

Another issue that had been discussed throughout the course of the war concerned the publication of information and statistics. These discussions continued to occur regularly throughout the final months of the war. One of the most significant shifts in the approach to this period can be seen in the discussion on the publication of public utility accounts. While the question of what should and should not have been released can demonstrate that the attitude of the SE was becoming more open, the discussion around the release of information about war production illustrated a new approach to security that was more suited to a body moving into peacetime rather than wartime. Specifically, the onus had changed from needing to justify why

[397] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 94', 12.01.1944.
[398] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 96', 23.08.1944.
[399] The first relaxation took place at CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 99', 22.11.1944. The second relaxation took place at CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 109, 26.07.1945.

something *should* be released to needing to prove why something *should not* be released.[400] This encapsulates the shift from a high level of secrecy, of putting security as the highest priority to such an extent that any slight risk was justification enough to remain closed to a much more complex grey area of decision making where security was still an important consideration but where there was also an acceptance that other factors mattered as much as security did, and possibly even more. It is worth noting that this transition happened while the war was still ongoing. While there had been major breakthroughs in the months leading up to this discussion which suggested that the war would soon be over, and its Allies victorious, this was not yet the case.[401] There was still much to be done and yet security was already no longer the most dominant factor in all scenarios.[402]

A strong reluctance to relax too much too quickly did, however, remain and some requests to release information were denied, such as that concerning the publication of railway statistics. This was denied as a security risk, with the reasoning being that if Germany were to release equivalent information, the Ministry of Economic Warfare would find it of significant value, and thus must expect that the same would be true for enemy intelligence gathering if Britain were to do the same.[403] However, there were other circumstances that made the risk of releasing information that may have been of use to Germany worthwhile. For example, it was decided that some restrictions would be lifted on information about air raid damage. It was thought that even though it would be of use to both sides in terms of propaganda, it would be of greater use to Britain and on balance it would be worth releasing some of these statistics.[404] This is a clear example of the value and necessity of the intelligence-security relationship, as discussed in the Introduction of this thesis on page 18. Without the expert knowledge of offensive intelligence gathering, it is much more difficult to pre-emptively prevent the release of information that holds intelligence value to an enemy. In this way, intelligence gathering methods inform the decisions for information security. Further requests were made related to the release of statistics, specifically employment statistics. In this instance it was decided that there would be no general release of these statistics as they could indicate the number of people in the Armed Forces. However, the SE saw no objection to the publication of some specific

[400] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 98', 18.10.1944.
[401] Most notably the Normandy Invasion and subsequent liberation of Paris.
[402] This is not to say that security had suddenly become unimportant. The change in attitudes to security was irrevocable and, despite this post-war 'dip', has continued to grow in importance ever since.
[403] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 95', 10.05.1944.
[404] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 100', [no date].

information as desired by the Ministry of Labour.[405] The Executive recommended that in future each case should be viewed on an individual risk/reward basis.[406] There were other situations where complete bans were removed, and cases would be handled by appropriate departments as they arose, such as with statistics relating to industrial employment, Egyptian trade statistics, and production figures of both war equipment and non-secret items.[407]

Another overseas issue that was considered, which was quite different to those so far discussed, concerned overseas news agencies, and the procedure Britain had for making press releases to such organisations. A question had arisen due to a German news agency reporting on a British travel ban before that news had been released in Britain. A comprehensive overview of the existing arrangements had been provided by the Chief Press Censor from the Ministry of Information, Rear-Admiral George Thomson, who was also in attendance at the meeting. A strength of the interdepartmental nature of the SE is evident in this case. A lack of expertise gave rise to suggestions that everything should simply be sent out under the strictest guidelines, known as a modified security embargo, that would prevent any such incidents taking place in the future. As the expert in this area, Admiral Thomson was able to explain why this idea would not work, that there had been a simple misunderstanding and the publication involved had not acted maliciously or committed any offence, and as such no action should be taken against them. As he attended this meeting, he was able to address this question immediately, eliminating any unnecessary waste of time or effort in trying to communicate between departments. The SE accepted and agreed that while this had been an unfortunate incident, the system itself was satisfactory, and encouraged all departments to ensure this procedure was understood.[408]

The final meeting of the SE took place on 26 July 1945. However, the most significant element to the final 'closure' of the SE had already taken place a few months earlier. On 25

[405] The Ministry of Labour wanted to publish the catering industry statistics on a national level. CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 96', 23.08.1944.
[406] After being suggested in meeting 96, this was agreed by meeting 99. CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 99', 22.11.1944.
[407] Issues relating to industrial employment would be directed to post-war planning as decided in CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 101', 20.12.1944. The SE were fine with the publication of Egyptian trade statistics but referred the question first to the Security Intelligence Middle East, as shown in CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 105', 14.02.1945. It was decided individual firms would be allowed to mention specific items of war equipment they had produced in their advertisements provided they were checked by Censorship, who were instructed to focus in particular on any information which might disclose operational plans, in CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 99', 22.11.1944. Censorship was also to check upon plans to publish figures of production of non-secret items of equipment by individual firms. CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 101', 20.12.1944.
[408] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 95', 10.05.1944.

May, Herbert Creedy was sent letters from the permanent members of the SE, Isaac Foot and Alfred Wall. These letters clearly demonstrated that both men believed that due to the end of hostilities in Europe the SE would be imminently disbanded. Foot wrote:

> Now that hostilities in Europe have ceased, I assume that the special work on which I have been engaged is practically completed. In these circumstances, I suggest that, after the next meeting of the Ports Control Committee, I should relinquish the position I have held as a member of the Security Executive.[409]

Similarly, Wall's letter read:

> Now that the war in Europe is happily and victoriously ended, I presume that the work of the Security Executive will be brought to a close in the very near future. In these circumstances, I hope you will consider it proper to accept my resignation from the Committee.[410]

They were not alone in this assumption. Secretary to the War Cabinet Edward Bridges wrote to Churchill's principle private secretary, John Miller Martin, requesting Churchill sign letters of thanks for the service of the two men on the Committee. Bridges confirmed that there was an understandable consensus that the work of the SE was complete, with his letter reading;

> Now that the war in Europe is over, there is no need for a body of this kind, which in any case would have required some overhaul now that the Coalition has broken up. Mr Wall and Mr Foot have tendered their resignations, and I have arranged with Sir Herbert Creedy that the Security Executive will be wound up, the staff being dispersed and the premises vacated by the 31st July next.[411]

The work of the SE was directly related to the war, and as such were reasonably expected to be treated the same as the many other wartime bodies and be disbanded now that the war was over. However, despite the fact that Churchill did indeed sign letters thanking Foot and Wall for their service, his feelings can be seen quite clearly from his annotation on the note he received asking him to do so. Upon receiving this note which explained that 'now that the war in Europe is over this body has been wound up'. He scribbled '!?!?'.[412] While the letters Churchill sent made reference to the notion that 'the work of the Security Executive can now be carried on at the departmental level', very little time was wasted in resolving what Churchill appears to have considered to be a mistake, and created a new body, in many ways identical to the SE, to carry on the work they had been conducting: the Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security (SSC).

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[409] PREM 3/418/4: 'Winding up of Home Defence Security Executive: Letter from Foot to Creedy', 25.05.1945.
[410] PREM 3/418/4: 'Winding up of Home Defence Security Executive: Letter from Wall to Creedy', 25.05.1945
[411] PREM 3/418/4: 'Winding up of Home Defence Security Executive: Letter from Bridges to Martin', 28.05.1945.
[412] PREM 3/418/4: 'Winding up of Home Defence Security Executive: Note to Churchill', 30.05.1945.

The first draft of the terms of reference of this new committee was issued for the attention of the SE on 13 July, with some slight amendments being offered in the final meeting of the SE on 26 July.[413] The body was formally announced by the Cabinet on 27 September, following a request by W.S. Murrie, Deputy Under Secretary of State at the Home Office, to Edward Bridges to circulate a note through the Panel on Security Arrangements in Government Departments.[414] However, Bridges had some comments to make on the draft terms of reference before this was to be distributed. Significantly, he queried 'ought not the notice to say that this body takes the place of the (old) Security Executive?' This amendment was made.[415] Clearly, then, the SSC was not truly a new organisation, it more accurately was a rebranding of the SE for use in peacetime. The terms of reference provided something that the SE had lacked, a defined explanation of the role of the SSC. This was:

> To co-ordinate the planning, organisation and execution of security measures which affect Civil Departments, and to advise on such other security questions as may be referred to them by the Service Departments.[416]

When the terms of reference were discussed in the final meeting of the SE, one small but significant change was made. Mr C. Robinson of the Home Office suggested that, for the purpose of clarity, the terms of reference be amended to read:

> To advise on the co-ordination of the planning, organisation and execution of security measures which affect Civil Departments, and to advise on such other security questions as may be referred to them by the Service Departments.[417]

While this change was a minor one, it emphasises the point that, much like the SE, the SSC did not hold any Executive functions and its conclusions would be delivered in the form of 'recommendations' or 'invitations'. However, as this thesis has already demonstrated, despite being presented in this matter there was no real choice in whether the organisations involved followed these recommendations or not, which would be better described as instructions.[418] The SSC was to differ from the SE in that there was a group of government departments which would have formal membership on the Committee. Membership was to be given to

[413] The terms of reference for the SSC can be found at CAB 93/3: 'Security Executive: Terms of Reference and Constitution of the Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security', 13.07.1945. The amendments discussed by the SE can be found at CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 109', 26.07.1945.
[414] There was a slight delay to the SSC beginning their work, with the first meeting taking place on 17 December 1945. The decision to share this information through the Panel on Security Arrangements in Government Departments is logical, given that the Panel was a body that worked alongside the SE, and as this thesis will show the two bodies later combined in a further evolution of the SE. This is discussed on page 112.
[415] CAB 116/49: 'Establishment of Standing Inter-departmental Committee on Security: Letter from Murrie to Bridges', 21.09.1945.
[416] CAB 116/49: 'Terms of Reference and Constitution of the Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security'. 13.07.1945
[417] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 109', 26.07.1945.
[418] This refers to the issue of Czech Refugees and can be found on page 77.

representatives of the Home Office, the Scottish Office, the Admiralty, the War Office, the Air Ministry and the Security Service.[419] Despite this difference, the SSC still operated in a similar manner in terms of attendance with representatives from different departments being invited to attend meetings depending on the subject matter involved.

Another significant similarity between the wartime body and its post-war successor was described in point five of the proposed terms of reference of the SSE. This read that:

> It is suggested that the functions of the Committee, like those of the Security Executive, should be understood to extend throughout the British Empire, and that similarly it should afford a means by which British security interests in foreign countries can be co-ordinated.[420]

As well as confirming that the SE was an Imperial body, it also clarified that this international element was to continue. This is particularly interesting, as there was some level of scepticism over the overseas work of the SE when later recorded. In February 1946 a report was prepared outlining the course and functions of the SE at the end of the war. This report discussed various elements of the work of the SE, including its overseas work. As well as briefly explaining what work was conducted overseas, it noted that;

> The overseas organisations originally fell to the Security Executive because foreign countries were outside the ambit of the Security Service, and security measures, as distinct from the gathering of intelligence, outside that of S.I.S. The work was carried out in very close, and day to day, contact with these bodies and with the Admiralty and Ministry of War Transport, and great care was taken to eliminate overlapping as far as possible. But some duplication, especially in the field of security-intelligence, was inevitable, and there is no doubt that on any future occasions such work should be assigned either to the Security Service or to S.I.S., or to a joint organisation.[421]

There are two key elements to take away from this. First, the acknowledgement once again that the SE was not faced with a challenge to justify its existence. It had again identified a gap in the existing structure, in this instance overseas security work. Simply, MI5 did not cover issues overseas and SIS did not cover issues of security. While this offers justification for why the SE took on this role, the further point that this solution still resulted in duplication and that in future this should not be used as a solution, does raise a question as to why the SSC took over overseas work from the SE.[422]

This report also discussed the creation of the SSC. It explained that;

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[419] These bodies were all regularly represented on the SE and as such their inclusion as members it not surprising, except in the case of the Scottish Office, who between April 1943-August 1945 only had a representative at one of the 25 meetings (see Appendix III)

[420] CAB 116/49: 'Terms of Reference and Constitution of the Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security'. 13.07.1945.

[421] CAB 125/182: 'The Security Executive: An outline of its course and functions', February 1946.

[422] CAB 125/182: 'The Security Executive: An outline of its course and functions', February 1946.

> The whole experience of the Executive demonstrated the need for maintaining in peace-time a recognised body to which Departments could bring major questions of security policy; and in which there should be vested a responsibility for seeing that war preparations in the field of security are effectively worked out with full regard to the fact that under modern conditions security has ceased to be primarily a Service problem, and affects sooner or later nearly every Department of government.[423]

This clearly summarises a new understanding of security. It had moved out of the realm of being a subsection of intelligence work, the concern of organisations such as MI5, MI6, GC&CS and the JIC, to being a subject that all departments would need to always consider and be aware of. As such, a body that specialised in civil security that could provide the knowledge and experience to help manage any security issues as they arose was vital. At the outbreak of the Second World War, the fear of a Fifth Column was significant, and there was no suitable government infrastructure to manage the situation and as such a new body was created to deal with it. It was felt that it was 'very unlikely that the confusion which occurred in the summer of 1940, and which the Executive was set up to remedy, would have taken place if such a body had existed before the war. The formation of the Inter-departmental Committee meets this need'.[424] Simply, if the SE had existed before the war, they would have known that there was not actually any significant Fifth Column threat and the SE would not have been needed. This is at least faintly paradoxical, but was reason enough for the government, and as the evidence suggests particularly Churchill, to want to retain the powers that had been created by a body of this nature. There is no evidence to suggest whether a re-branding would have occurred had the SE not been officially disbanded in the rather hasty way it was, or whether the body would simply have remained the SE, but by creating a new body it allowed the wartime association to be removed. It also provided an opportunity to cast off the shadow of negativity that was held towards the SE, and no longer be the 'Prime Ministers' Gestapo'. Lastly, it allowed the SSC a deal less attention than had been afforded the SE, particularly in its early years, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter.

In conclusion, this chapter has demonstrated the evolution of the SE during the later years of the war. There are many ways in which it is possible to measure the success of a committee of this nature, each with its benefits and drawbacks. However, arguably the ultimate measure of success is survival. The SE's ability to continue is one of its defining factors. After first managing to outlast the Fifth Column panic that instigated its creation, it then survived a change in leadership, apparently seamlessly. Although meetings became less frequent, Cooper

[423] CAB 125/182: 'The Security Executive: An outline of its course and functions', February 1946.
[424] CAB 125/182: 'The Security Executive: An outline of its course and functions', February 1946.

managed to take over a body that was heavily associated with its chair, often being referred to as the Swinton Committee, and retain its power and influence before handing control over to civil servant and long-time SE member Herbert Creedy. After Creedy took over, the frequency of meetings increased again when 'winding down' began, alongside continuing the work that the SE had been engaged in throughout the war.[425] Once again, despite the end of the war and steps being taken to dissolve the SE, the body was still able to persevere and transform into a new post-war incarnation of the body. The expansion of its work and the continuation of the body in the form of the SSC clearly shows that, by the end of the war, security had become so intertwined in the everyday work of all departments that it is fitting to describe the end of the war as the true beginning of the 'Security State' in Britain.

[425] Another possible argument that the SE had been successful can be found in the diaries of Guy Liddell. Liddell was speaking about MI5 and the success of MI5 when he claimed, 'what had really counted in this war was civil security which we had covered for the 3 Services in this country and on the continent as members of the CI staff.' However, as this thesis has shown the SE was at the heart of the work of civil security in Britain during the war, although MI5 were heavily involved with the body. As such, it is fair to say that this exaltation of the work of MI5 offered here by Liddell can also extend to the SE. See KV/4/196: 'Liddell Diaries', 01.06.1945.

Chapter Five

'The planning, organisation and execution of security measures which affect Civil Departments'[426]

The Post-war Creation of the Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security, 1945-1947.

Having demonstrated that the Security State had been created throughout the course of the war, culminating with the continuation of the SE beyond the end of hostilities, this thesis will now discuss the development of the Security State through the work of the Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security (SSC).[427] Following the end of hostilities, many organisations created specifically to deal with questions arising because of the war were disbanded, including the Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Economic Warfare.[428] As the previous chapter has shown, this was not the case for the SE. This chapter will assess how the nature of the work of the body changed from the previous wartime activity that, while sometimes unpopular, was easy to brand as necessary security work, to the context of peacetime, which lacked the justification of an immediate threat. It[429] This will be achieved by analysing the work of the SSC, broken down by year, to show that while the *quantity* of meetings had decreased, the *content* of these meetings was much the same as during the war. The introduction to this thesis has demonstrated that there is very little secondary available relating to the SE and the possible reasons for this. This is even more pronounced in the case of the SSC. There are no references to the body in any of the places one might expect to find them. Despite the significant involvement of MI5 in the SSC, the SSC is not mentioned in the official history of that organisation, nor in the large store of academic research that exists on

[426] CAB 93/2: 'Home Defence (Security) Executive: Minutes of Meeting 109', 26.07.1945.
[427] The standard abbreviation used in the records of the body use the acronym SSC, and as such this thesis has done the same. The Inter-Departmental Committee on Security should not be confused with a committee of 1926 of the same name, who convened to discuss safeguarding arrangements of government departments holding secret documents outside of office hours, which can be found at IR 40/3146: 'Security recommendation contained in report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Security', 01.11.1926.
[428] The Ministry of Information did survive briefly beyond VE Day, before being disbanded in 1946. Some examples of literature on the Ministry of Information include Henry Irving, 'Towards "A New Kind of Book": Publishing and the Ministry of Information, 1939-46' *Publishing History* Vol 75(53), (2016), pp. 53-75; Joe Spencer-Bennet, 'The Ministry of Information and the linguistic design of Britain's World War II propaganda: What archival documents can tell us about political discourse', *Discourse and Society Vol 31*(3), (2019), pp. 329-347 and Katherine Margaret Howells, 'Imagining Self, Nation and History Through the Wartime Propaganda Posters of the Ministry of Information', *The International Journal of the Image Vol 10*(1), (2019).
[429] Not to be confused with a committee of 1926 of the same name, who convened to discuss safeguarding arrangements of government departments holding secret documents outside of office hours, which can be found at IR 40/3146: 'Security recommendation contained in report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Security', 01.11.1926.

the history of MI5.[430] The body was able to operate in a great deal of secrecy, and yet still held a significant level of authority.

From December 1945 to December 1947 the SSC met on seven occasions. Only one meeting was held in 1945, four meetings in 1946, and two meetings in 1947. The first meeting of the SSC was held on 17 December 1945, chaired by Herbert Creedy. The only topic to be discussed was a memorandum by MI5 regarding the treatment of German scientists and technicians brought to the United Kingdom. The reasons for bringing German scientists were threefold; defence research, civil industry, and interrogation by British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee (BIOS)[431]. For defence research, it was noted that 'the Security authorities should take any practicable measures to watch the activities of Germans brought here, perhaps only temporarily or intermittently'. A meeting had been held by the Lord President's Committee on this matter, where the Home Secretary, James Chuter Ede, was quoted as saying that 'while he was in general agreement with the proposals made by the Board of Trade, he hoped that adequate regard would be paid to considerations of security, and that he would not be pressed to give experts from Germany unreasonably favourable treatment'. Security risks were discussed, such as a risk of leakage of information or kidnap if these scientists were allowed to return to Germany on leave, and proposals were discussed that would mitigate the risks. For example, it was proposed that while they would not be granted leave to visit Germany, any individual who would be retained for over six months would have permission to bring their families to Britain. There were also concerns over housing, as there was already difficulty in finding suitable housing for British citizens, and there was an expectation that most Local Authorities would refuse to co-operate with the Ministry of Health on this matter.[432] Although only one meeting was held, other work was conducted behind the scenes. Five memoranda were prepared, including one on the treatment of German scientists and technicians brought to the UK. Some of these issues had been discussed previously by the SE, such as the

[430] Searches of the British Library Newspapers Archive, The Times Digital Archive, and The Sunday Times Archive have found no mention of the SSC. Similarly, searches of Hansard also produce no references to the body.

[431] Interrogation by BIOS was a short term reason for bringing German scientists, whereas defence research and civil industry were long term aims. CAB 134/699: Treatment of German Scientists and Technicians brought to the United Kingdom' 13.12.1945. The terms of the BIOS were re-established in 1946 and its constitution read that the BIOS would 'continue to function as a central agency for the procurement and dissemination of technical and industrial intelligence from Germany and Japan'. CAB 176/12: 'Future of British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee' 28.08.1946.

[432] CAB 134/699: 'Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting (45)1', 17.12.1945.

topic of disclosure of information through fire insurance procedures.[433] Others were discussed for the first time, specifically the publication of Colonial Empire Statistics.[434] Through the course of 1946, the SSC held meetings as required, when specific issues arose. The first of these was a continuation of the earlier discussion on the employment of German sciences and technicians. A draft memorandum, which had been drafted through the previous meeting of the SSC on this issue, was examined. It was felt by MI5 that this memorandum listed the minimum requirements to ensure security. The SSC offered several relatively minor amendments, requesting the full details of all possible individuals to be brought to this country be supplied to MI5, and noting that postal arrangements were not satisfactory at this point but would be addressed later following the planned creation of a civil postal service, amongst other, similarly minor points.[435]

The second and third meetings of 1946, held three and a half months apart, were both concerned with control of the distribution of aerial photographs. A substantial collection of photographs had been accrued, and their value was considered to hold great potential. As had often been the case during the war, a judgement would have been required regarding balancing other potential factors with that of security. In this case, the potential benefits of using the photographs as compared with the security risk of them being publicly available. Examples were provided of circumstances where these photographs would be needed, such as the Ministry of Town and Country Planning which provided photographs to local authorities on occasion for planning purposes. A further example was the Ministry of Transport which stated that they would require photographs for highway development, going so far as to state that, if they were withheld for reasons of security, the department would consider commissioning a private firm to take photographs for this purpose. Group Captain Edwards of the Air Ministry explained the security risks that aerial photographs presented. He noted that the potential

[433] As noted earlier in this thesis, arrangements had been made to prevent the creation of floorplans of factories that would usually be required for insurance purposes. The Security Service agreed to a request that these measures would no longer be required, although they were also clear that these restrictions may be reinstated if required. CAB 134/699: 'Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: War Industries: Disclosure of Information Through Fire Insurance Procedure', 27.12.1945.

[434] A significant amount of information was published each year covering a wide range of subjects, such as defence, hospitals, sanitation, and trade. Many of these publications had ceased for the duration of the war. As well as the usual information it had been proposed that further information from the Colonies would be required. The SSC was requested to suggest an order of significance and advise on how best to minimise the possible value to any potential enemy. The final memorandum were both on the subject of Control of Entry to the UK. CAB 134/699: 'Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Publication of Colonial Empire Statistics', 25.10.1945.

[435] CAB 134/699: 'Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting (46)1', 18.02.1946.

intelligence source was much greater than simply the obvious ability to pinpoint places of national importance, and that:

> …by expert interpretation, it was often possible to determine, for example, the capacity of a factory, the type of goods produced, the state or production and similar information.[436]

Despite this, it was noted that advancing technologies were resulting in the possibility of photographs of similar value being taken by civilian aircrafts, and that there were many cases where the threat was sufficiently small, or the need sufficiently great, that these photographs would be required. The SSC felt that no general restriction was needed on the distribution of aerial photographs to Government departments for purely official uses, and requested the Air Ministry, working alongside other relevant departments, collate a list of secret establishments and installations which should not be included in photographs that were distributed beyond Government departments.[437]

The fourth meeting in 1946 was titled 'acquisition of technical information by the Russians'. This issue was an example of a wider political concern. Security liaison between states is a long-standing tradition, particularly in times of war when alliances are formed. While there are many benefits to sharing information with other state actors, there is a risk of vulnerability once these alliances have broken down. Sometimes a wartime alliance can lead to a longstanding agreement to mutual benefit, such as the 'special relationship' between the UK and the USA. However, once the shared threat, or mutual enemy, is removed, tensions between former allies can rise to the forefront. This was case with Russia and the UK. While the two countries were never natural bedfellows, the threat of the Axis powers and of Hitler's Germany had united them. Following the defeat of the Axis powers, the most significant threat to the UK was the communist threat from the East. However, the USSR, while considered a threat, was not an active enemy in the same way. The speed of which these tensions rose can be seen as the oncoming storm clouds of the Cold War. Political and diplomatic factors had to be considered alongside the questions of security. The acquisition of technical information is one area that demonstrates this. There had been an existing agreement concerning the reciprocal sharing of such information due to the war, and the JIC requested advice from the SSC on how best to prevent any attempt by the Russians to circumvent this arrangement.[438]

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[436] CAB 134/699: 'Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting (46)2', 27.05.1946.
[437] CAB 134/699: 'Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting (46)2', 27.05.1946. This was far from the end of discussions of security issues concerning air photographs. The issue was also discussed in the early 1950s, by individuals in the Ministry of Defence, Board of Trade, Air Ministry and individual businesses, among others. See CAB 21/3984: 'Security of economic and industrial information about the UK: requests for security advice from manufacturers and others', 1951-1956.
[438] CAB 134/699: 'Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting (46)4', 21.10.1946.

To do this, the first step taken by the SSC was to assess the amount of contact between Russian delegations and firms and institutions in the UK. The overwhelming opinion from various departments was that it was possible to limit the opportunity of Russians to glean valuable information, either because firms were engaged in government contracts and thus would report to the appropriate departments if a Russian visit was to take place, or because other departments were able to easily refuse access requests from Russia. One example of a department in this position was the Ministry of Fuel and Power, which reported that, while no attempt had been made to interact with the oil industry, there would be no problems refusing any access requests that were to come in as this department did not have any information sources from Russia. After discussions with representatives of various departments, the SSC concluded that, from a security perspective, there was no special action required for visits to firms solely engaged in civil work. For visits to factories and establishments who were conducting defence, or secret, work, there would be a protocol in place to make decisions regarding individual Russian Service officers. The SSC also felt it would be advantageous to have visa applications from members of Russian Service be referred in the first instance to appropriate Service Departments in London, though they acknowledged that it may not have been possible to provide findings to the Foreign Office within the required 14 days.[439]

At the beginning of the 1947 Herbert Creedy was replaced as Chairman by W.S Murrie. No explanation is provided for this decision, especially given Creedy's predilection towards secrecy and a lack of record keeping. However, Creedy was nearing 69 years old, had served in Whitehall for a great number of years and a deal of other commitments so it is likely that this was Creedy's choice.[440] Murrie would go on to become Deputy Under Secretary of State at the Home Office from 1948 to 1952, and before this worked under Norman Brook, as number two in the Cabinet Office.[441] There were two meetings in this year, the first being held in January on the subject of the leakage of information to the press. This topic arose due to a number of leakages occurring, however it was emphasised that the role of the SSC would be to

[439] CAB 134/699: 'Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting (46)4', 21.10.1946.
[440] Details of Creedy's life can be found at *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, 'Creedy, Sir Herbert James', (2008).
[441] An overview of Murrie's various roles, and commendation as a highly effective civil servant, is available in his obituary by Tam Dalyell, 'Obituary: Sir William Murrie', *Independent*, (1994). Murrie was still working as Deputy Secretary of the Cabinet at the end of August 1948, as can be seen by a note he issued detailing the composition and terms of reference of a new committee, titled the Ministerial Committee on Civil Defence, available at CAB 129/29/20: 'Ministerial Committee on Civil Defence: Composition and Terms of Reference', 28.08.1948. Murrie continued to chair other bodies after his time on the SSC, such as the Interdepartmental Committee on Colonial People in the UK, as noted in Ian Spencer, *British Immigration Policy Since 1939*, (1997) pp. 21-81.

discuss preventative measures going forward, rather than any investigation into previous incidents. The subject was brought before the SSC by the JIC, who wished to know if the proposals it had created were practicable.[442] The SSC was performing a different function here, acting in an advisory capacity utilising its now extensive experience in making decisions on security practices, rather than developing full recommendations of its own.

The JIC presented three proposals. The first was that there should be an examination of Departments and Service to ascertain whether there was an excess amount of people who had access to classified material, and to question whether it would be possible to limit the circulation of classified material and have stricter vetting of staff. This proposal was critiqued on a number of fronts. Firstly, Lt. Colonel Furnival Jones of MI5 pointed out that all Departments should be continuously monitoring the circulation of, and access to, confidential documents. The representative of the Scottish Office, Mr. W. Lewis, also argued that circulation had inevitably increased as there 'were many more Committees nowadays than before, or even perhaps during, the war…'.[443] After discussions a summary was reached that it was unlikely that it was possible to limit the access or circulation of confidential documents without having a detrimental effect on efficiency. It was also felt that stricter vetting processes would not serve to prevent leakages to the press, as the process was not designed to identify those 'with a propensity to careless talk'.[444] The second proposal was to issue a reminder to all Departments of the importance of security in peace time. While this was a seemingly innocent suggestion, it nevertheless resulted in some discussion over what wording would be used and potential risks. The main argument that was discussed was whether to include reference to the press in the reminder, with Commander Whitestone of the Admiralty pointing out that the press has an 'excellent "intelligence service"' and suggesting that officers should be warned of the dangers of mentioning confidential matters in conversation with representatives of the press. This was countered by the Cabinet Office representative, who felt that a specific warning concerning the press may result in people not exercising appropriate caution in conversation with friends who were not members of the press. It was eventually concluded that a general reminder against careless talk and the continued need for security would be useful.

The final suggestion made by the JIC was to increase the use of 'D notices'. A 'D notice' was an advisory note, given by the government to the press, stating that certain issues

[442] The JIC was created in 1947 and initially operated under the title Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, before its name was changed to the Joint Intelligence Committee in 1948. For clarity, the title Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) is used throughout this thesis.
[443] CAB 134/699: 'Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting (47)1', 27.01.1947.
[444] CAB 134/699: 'Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting (47)1', 27.01.1947.

should not be published due to potential damage to national security.[445] It is a complex, peculiar arrangement, attempting to balance the vital element of democracy that is freedom of the press with the necessity of secrecy to ensure security in some circumstances. While the 'D notice' plays an important role in both British government and British journalism, it is a fine balancing act and as such can only be used sparingly, especially in peacetime. There was a unanimous feeling that extending the use of 'D notices' would not aid the attempt to prevent leakages of information to the press. There were multiple reasons for this, including that a large amount of information would be given away through the circulation of the notice, as well as causing strain with members of the press as D notices were, understandably, highly unpopular.[446]

The second meeting held in 1947 came 10 months later and was concerned with the control of the distribution of air photographs. There were several different avenues once again that were discussed throughout the course of the meeting. The first was the discussion of a report prepared by the Working Party on the Control of the Distribution of Air Photographs.[447] The suggestions of the Working Party were each discussed in turn. The first was that Government Departments should have been invited to suggest any practical steps regarding the control of the distribution of air photographs they desired to the SSC periodically, which was agreed. While it is not a particularly revolutionary step, it does demonstrate that there was an assumption that the SSC was there to stay for the foreseeable future.[448] This meeting then went on to discuss the related topics of; security of official maps, charts and plans, the publication in the U.S.A of air photographs of Britain, the communication of recommendations to the Dominions and Colonies, and the National Print Library. On the issue of official maps, charts and plans, the Working Party had noted the need to update instructions relating to the security of these items as the instructions that were being followed at this point were 20 years old. This suggestion was agreed, particularly due to a planned large scale re-survey of the country, and was a task designated to the Joint Advisory Survey Board. Concerning air photographs of Britain held by the USA, it was agreed that the US government would be asked to request the permission of the British Government before selling or publishing any such photographs. It was agreed that the recommendations would be passed on to the Colonial Office with the hope

[445] For more information on the D notice system see Nicholas Wilkinson, *Secrecy and the Media: The Official History of the United Kingdom's D-Notice System*, 2009.
[446] CAB 134/699: 'Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting (47)1', 27.01.1947.
[447] Report is available at CAB 134/699: 'Report of the Working Party on the Control of the Distribution of Air Production', 08.11.1947.
[448] The recommendations were focused on informing different groups of the need for preventing the distribution of air photographs particularly of protected areas. These groups included the press, companies likely to have been involved in aerial photographs such as the BBC and aerial survey firms, and airmen. CAB 134/699: 'Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting (47)2', 12.11.1947.

of developing a uniform system throughout the Empire. This demonstrates that the SSC was still playing a role in influencing security overseas, despite that criticism that was put forward on this matter following the end of hostilities. The final discussion concerned a proposed National Print Library. The notion had been under discussion since 1945, however there was acknowledgement that this was still a long way from being finalised. It was argued that the idea of a National Print Library would serve little purpose as such an establishment would not be able to allow the public free access due to the significant security risk. With public access severely limited, and Government departments already having access to any official air photographs as required, the minutes indicate a clear lack of enthusiasm for the idea.[449]

Following the end of the war, the SE underwent a transformative process, having established its necessity to the British government system as a theatre to discuss issues of security that had previously not been dealt with. By filling this void in the security structure of the state, the SE had proven itself to be of sufficient importance that it continued to exist in a largely similar manner following the end of hostilities despite it being a created for a specific wartime context. While meetings became less frequent, and the number of topics discussed was much fewer than during the war, the body continued. It had outlasted the end of the war, the departure of its long-term representatives in Foot and Wall, and it continued to outlast the departure of its third chairman Herbert Creedy after many years serving on the body in a variety of high level positions. Its influence on security history in Britain cannot be overstated, it influenced security measures throughout the civil departures of government for many years and was the focal point of the now thriving Security State.

[449] CAB 134/699: 'Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting (47)2', 12.11.1947.

Chapter Six

'Review the Whole Field of Security'[450]

The Inter-Departmental Committee on Security, 1948 – 1953.

Having covered the immediate post-war period in the previous chapter, this chapter will now examine the following five years, where there was a different political climate both domestically and internationally. It will do so by discussing a further evolution of the body, with yet another new name, in 1948, analysing the work of the body until 1953, at which point the Tripartite Security Working Group will be discussed, a collaborative security review conducted by Britain, America and France to try and collectively improve security procedures in each country. The result of the report created by this group was a large scale reframing of the security structure in Britain. This thesis will end with this reframing, but will offer a brief overview of the structure that was created at this point, demonstrating that this one government committee, originally called the Home Defence (Security) Executive, can be clearly tracked from its creation in 1940 to well into the 1950s and beyond.

By 1948, the machinery of security had become well established in Whitehall. In a document concerning the 'security of economic and industrial information about the United Kingdom', the JIC noted that:

> Machinery for further consideration of these matters appears to us to exist in the Inter-Departmental Committee on Security, advised by the Joint Intelligence Committee, wherever the defence intelligence value of published material is in question.[451]

While clearly a reference to one specific issue, that of published material, the machinery of security now covered a myriad of different topics that concerned all aspects of civil security. As had happened many times previously, the body was once again able to evolve and adapt to survive, largely due to the fact that it had been able to solidify its place at the heart of the machinery of security in Britain. The Standing Inter-Departmental Committee of Security evolved further in 1948, at which point it combined with the Panel on Security Arrangements in Government Departments. This chapter will discuss this change and demonstrate that while the subject matter being discussed had developed and changed, echoes of the previous work of the Committee remained. The new body, renamed the Inter-Departmental Committee on Security (ISC) did not meet regularly, but the feat of surviving in yet another new guise is once again testament to the spirit of adaptability of the original HD(S)E to change according to the

[450] FO: 936/633: 'Interdepartmental Committee on Security: Terms of Reference and Composition', 21.08.1948.
[451] FO 1093/366: 'Security of Economic and Industrial Information about the United Kingdom', 03.11.1948.

external environment it found itself in. This chapter will go on to discuss the eventual end of the ISC following a report from the Tripartite Security Working Group, although it will conclude by showing that once again change and adaptation took place, and the 'Security State' would continue to thrive, albeit in another new guise.

While this thesis has been focused on SE and its various incarnations, there were other bodies concerned with matters of security. As well as the well documented organisations such as MI5 and the JIC, there were other smaller bodies that dealt with specific issues. As noted on page 68, one such body was the Panel on Security Arrangements in Government Departments. In 1948, it was decided that the SSC would combine with the Panel as the functions of the two 'could be conveniently discharged by a single Committee'. This suggestion was first put forward by Cabinet Secretary Norman Brook in his capacity as Chairman of the Panel on Security in Governments Departments.[452] Just over a fortnight after this note, the first meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee on Security (ISC) took place.[453]

The first topic to be discussed was the terms of reference of the new Committee, which was suggested in the first paper as:

> To keep under review the whole field of security in Government Departments and to advise on the co-ordination of the planning, organisation and execution of security measures affecting them and of other security questions which may be referred to the Committee by Government Departments.[454]

Consideration of the terms was deferred until the second meeting of the ISC.[455] The primary concern with the creation of the terms of reference of the ISC was to avoid any overlap with the work of the Security Sub-Committee of the Joint Intelligence Committee. As such, the Security Sub-Committee reconsidered its own terms of reference so as to 'exclude security matters affecting all Government Departments, Service and civil, which would be examined by the Interdepartmental Committee on Security'.[456] Similarly, the ISC was to make it clear they did not handle security matters of purely Service interest. If security matters affected both the Service and civil departments, they would be handled by the ISC.

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[452] In his note proposing this amalgamation, Brook noted that the combining of the SSC and the Panel had been suggested but did not state who this had been suggested by. CAB 134/699: 'Amalgamation of the Panel on Security Arrangements in Government Departments and the Standing Interdepartmental Committee on Security', 05.08.1948.

[453] The abbreviation used on the minutes of this body is ISC, and as such that is the abbreviation used in this thesis.

[454] FO 936/633: 'Interdepartmental Committee on Security: Terms of Reference and Composition', 21.08.1948.

[455] FCO 936/632: 'Interdepartmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 1', 27.08.1948.

[456] FCO 936/632: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 2', 07.09.1948.

The representative of MI5, Martin Furnival Jones, reported that his Director-General, Percy Sillitoe, had requested he make two points. The first was to ensure that the ISC did not simply advise, but 'should also secure Departmental agreement to the execution of its conclusions'.[457] This may be considered to be equivalent to the level of authority previously seen demonstrated by the SE; that while actions were offered as recommendations, there was an expectation that these would be followed, and were effectively orders.[458] There was general agreement to this request, and a suggestion to include the phrase 'to secure Departmental agreement' (to measures recommended by the Committee) was to be presented to Sir Norman Brook, who was to become the Chairman of the ISC.[459] Acting Chairman George Carey-Foster, who was also head of the Foreign Office Security Department, stated that he was hopeful that, after Christmas, regular members would be in attendance who were of such prominent positions that this itself would compel departments to act upon any recommendations. Examples of such high-ranking representatives included Roger Hollis and Group Captain Ian Brodie.[460] When Brook addressed this issue at the following meeting, he noted that it was essential that departments retained their autonomy, so while an addition would be made demonstrating there was an expectation that recommendations be followed, it was not possible to be firmer than this. If a department did wish to go against the recommendation of the ISC, it needed to be able to justify this under high levels of scrutiny, possibly from Brook himself. The way to manage the matter, in Brook's opinion, was that the recommendations should simply be so sound and well-judged that departments would have no reservations towards carrying them out.[461]

The second question raised by MI5 was whether the intention was for the ISC to develop into a body similar to the SE of the late war in the event of an emergency. The purpose of this question was to note if this was the intention, 'consideration should be given to the level of Departmental representation on it'. This suggests that, while the ISC was a direct successor of the SE, it was considered to have undergone substantial changes during its transition to a peace time organisation. Given the lack of formal terms of reference of the SE it is difficult to

[457] FCO 936/632: 'Interdepartmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 2', 07.09.1948.
[458] See, for example, discussion on page 77 regarding Czech refugees.
[459] Brook took up his role of Chairman of the ISC at the 3rd meeting, as seen in FCO/936/632: Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 3', 24.11.1948. The first two meetings of the ISC in 1948 were chaired by George Carey-Foster of the Foreign Office.
[460] During the period this chapter covers, these individuals held the following ranks. Hollis – Head of F division (MI5); Carey-Foster – Head of Q (Foreign Office); Brodie – Deputy Director of Intelligence (Security) (Air Ministry).
[461] FCO 936/632: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 3', 24.11.1948.

clearly define the change and identity the differences between the SE and the ISC. However, this itself is one differing factor. During the war, the SE was not confined within a particular scope and was able to evolve and expand wherever it felt it was required. Within the first few meetings, the ISC had already shown that its approach was much more defined and structured. Following the war, criticism of the lack of formality associated with the SE was made by Denis Capel-Dunn, secretary of the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, who noted:

> …how unsatisfactory it is for small, or indeed large, independent organisations to grow up with indeterminate responsibility, e.g. S.O.E., the Security Executive, with all its ramifications[462]

Simply put, bodies that were left free to expand and evolve would inevitably do so, with all the associated advantages and disadvantages. In response to the query by MI5, it was stated that the ISC could not decide on this matter, and it should be left for the Cabinet Office to explore.[463] At the next meeting, W.R. Cornish of the Home Office reported that the question of security in a future war was already under consideration by the War Book Sub-Committee and the Defence (Transition) Committee.

The future of the Liaison Officers' Conference (LOC) was decided at the second ISC meeting of 1948. Much like the SE, the LOC persevered, surviving despite the dissolution of its sister body – the SIC – and the end of the war. Details of its post-war work are difficult to come by, but several successful FOI requests have resulted in the release of several files. These files revealed details on the handling of classified information by Germans employed by the British Army of the Rhine (B.A.O.R.) with the creation of a document for German employees to sign specifically noting that they are forbidden from sharing any information they learn through their employment with anyone else.[464] The role of the LOC remained unchanged from its wartime function, with three items being listed in the ISC minutes as the LOC terms of reference. These stated that the LOC was a Standing Sub-Committee of the ISC that would examine problems referred to it by the Committee, deal with less important security matters that fell within the scope of the ISC and to report to the ISC on their two roles as necessary. Meetings would take place regularly, with the LOC deciding how frequently they were

[462] Keith Jeffrey, *MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949*, p. 597.
[463] FCO 936/632: 'Interdepartmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 2', 07.09.1948.
[464] FO 936/636: 'Security liaison: officers committee minutes of standing committee', 1948.

required.[465] The continuation of the LOC from the early days of the war into the 1950s and beyond shows that it provides a key function within the machinery of security.

The ISC had many discussions that were either the same as topics that had already been discussed by the SE, such as the publication of statistics and the control of distribution of air photographs, or were topics that were similar in nature to the previous work of the SE, such as official documents coming into the hands of the police and the carriage of official documents by officers travelling overseas.[466] Additionally, many of the subjects discussed by the ISC were questions on practical issues, similar to those that would have previously been handled by the Panel on Security Arrangements. One example of a recurrent topic concerned Protection of Government Buildings in an Emergency. This was discussed in all three ISC meetings in 1948 and once in the three meetings held in 1949. Discussion on the subject halted at this point, but the work continued in 1951.[467] The reach of security work is visible in this topic, much as had been seen previously through the work of the SE. These discussions did not just focus on government departments traditionally associated with security and secret documents, such as the Foreign Office, but all government-owned buildings, including museums and art galleries.[468] Beyond this, another related topic that was discussed frequently was the drafting of a 'Booklet on "Security in Government Departments"', which covered topics such as security of documents, security in buildings, and actions in case of breaches of security.[469]

[465] The records of the LOC after the end of the war are limited and FOI requests have had limited success, although one file was released by the Foreign Office in this way. This related to Germans employed by Military Government, and the security risk involved concerning the spreading of information. There were concerns around the existing legal regulations, as there would be a need to prove 'possible danger to security or the prejudice of good order or Allied interest'. In order to mitigate this risk, a notice was produced that would be presented to each employee, both in English and in German, that must be signed. This notice stated that the disclose of any information without written authority was forbidden. FO 936/636: 'Security liaison: officers committee; minutes of standing committee', 30.08.1948.

[466] The publication of figures of oil imports was discussed in meeting 2 (1948). The control of the distribution of air photographs was discussed in meeting 2 (1950). Official documents coming into the hands of the police was discussed in meeting 2 (1951). The carriage of official documents by officers travelling overseas was discussed in meeting 1 (1952). FCO 936/632: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meetings', 07.09.1948 – 23.04.1952.

[467] FCO 158/92: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security', 1951.

[468] Museums and art galleries were discussed in the 2nd meeting in 1949, with a note from the Ministry of Works reported that two such buildings would require special measures on security grounds. FCO 936/632: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 2 (1949)', 01.06.1949.

[469] The 'Booklet on "Security in Government Departments"' was mentioned 7 times during this 5 year period, with multiple drafts and amendments being discussed, along with one discussion on the booklet as it related to the Official Secrets Act 1911 – 1939, which was discussed in FCO 936/632: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 1 (1951)', 11.04.1951. Security in Government Buildings was also discussed in FCO 158/92: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security', 01.01.1951 – 31.12.1951.

Other examples include equipment for housing classified documents and the security of Ordinance Survey documents.[470]

During the Second World War and immediate post-war period, the SE had operated with a singular focus – security from the threat posed by the war, albeit in a variety of guises. However, by this period there were more factors influencing the work of the ISC. This can be seen in relation to the Arab-Israeli Conflict of 1948. This conflict led to the declaration of martial law in Egypt, which would last until 1950.[471] This resulted in concerns over security of information, and the ISC discussed documents destined for or passing through Egypt on three occasions.[472] As well as demonstrating the expanded scope of threats in the post-war world, it also illustrates the continued overseas element to the ISC's work, similar to the wartime work of the SE. A second threat to security in the post-war period, and perhaps the most infamous threat within the scope of intelligence and security, was the Cold War. While the Cold War had increasingly become considered a war of intelligence, there were also security considerations handled by the ISC in a similar manner to the wartime work of the SE.[473] The most prominent example of this is the discussion on restriction on travel to Iron Curtain countries. This discussion was concerned with the risks of departmental staff who had access to highly secret work travelling to Iron Curtain countries. The initial recommendation was to ban these individuals from travel to these countries without obtaining permission from their department beforehand, however this would be an infringement upon their civil liberties. Instead, this action could only be encouraged. [474]

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[470] FCO 936/632: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 1 (1951)', 11.04.1951. The Booklet on Security in Government Departments was essentially the *magnum opus* of the ISC, continuing to be discussed for many years to come. This was a document that was provided to relevant departments instructing them on how to handle matters of security, covering topics such as the classification of official documents, code words and nicknames, keys, staff recruitment and cyber security among others A later copy of the work can be found at CAB 21/3947: 'Booklet on "Security in Government Departments"', 01.12.1949.

[471] The history of relations in the Middle East is highly complex, and tensions have existed between the two sides unrelentingly for years. This thesis does not have the word count or focus to be able to pass comment on the situation, or Britain's role in the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, which was largely triggered by Britain's withdrawal from Palestine. A deal of material has been written about the conflict. One example is Avi Shlaim, 'Britain and the Arab-Israeli War of 1948', *Journal of Palestine Studies Vol 16*(4), (1987) pp. 50-76.

[472] The initial mention of this topic was brief, stating that the diplomatic bag should be used instead of individuals carrying classified documents unless they were using service aircrafts from service airfields. FCO 936/633: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 1 (1949).', 11.05.1949. This was reiterated 6 months later at FCO 936/632: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 3 (1949)', 09.11.1949. The final mention of this topic was to note that, although the state of martial law had been lifted in Egypt, the situation was still not fully resolved and as such the security measures and censorship that had been introduced should continue to be used at this time. FCO 936/632: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 1 (1950)', 22.02.1950.

[473] Richard Aldrich, *British Intelligence, Strategy, and the Cold War, 1945-51.* (1992).

[474] FCO 936/632: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 1 (1951)', 11.04.1951.

Another related event that occurred during this period was the disappearance of Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean. Burgess and Maclean were members of a collection of Cold War Spies known as the 'Cambridge Five', along with Kim Philby, Guy Burgess, and John Cairncross.[475] Following their disappearance, Burgess and Maclean fled to the Soviet Union. This action had an impact throughout the British Government, with questions arising particularly over the vetting of individuals engaged in secret work. Problems in the vetting procedure were obvious with the benefit of hindsight, but during this time a culture of 'gentlemanly behaviour' prevailed. This was summarised by Gladwyn Jebb, at this time British ambassador to the United Nations, who stated that 'one never wants to blacken somebody's character if one can help it and to say nothing is often the line of least resistance'.[476] Following the disappearance, many came forward with stories of questionable behaviour, excessive drinking and volatile behaviour, but these were not raised as issues of concern. In June 1951, the *Daily Express* ran the headline 'Who Screened Burgess? His Red leaning were known'.[477] Despite this ongoing situation raising significant questions over vetting with many implications for MI5 and the Foreign Office in particular, the ISC were recommending *less* vetting, due to MI5 becoming overwhelmed by the amount of individuals being put forward. MI5 reported to the ISC that it was receiving 4,500 vetting requests a week and could not complete these at the speed desired by Departments. The recommendation from the ISC in response to this was for 'Departments to exercise discretion in submitting names to the Security Service for vetting'.[478] Instead, Departments were encouraged to mitigate security risks through other methods, such as ensuring no classified papers where left where custodial staff could access them, and thus removing the need to vet staff such as cleaners.[479] MI5 noted that they would be putting forward suggestions towards revising the whole vetting procedure, although this overhaul would only take place in case of national emergency such as another war.[480] The related issue of character references in recruitment and screening procedure was also discussed by the ISC. The major point to this discussion was to recommend the adoption of a standard questionnaire. While this was acceptable in theory, there were some issues with the draft questionnaire originally suggested. A question was included directly relating to Communist or Fascist activities. There was resistance to this, particularly from the representative from the Treasury, who argued that

[475] For references relating to the Cambridge Five, see footnotes 36 and 60.
[476] FO B42: 'Gladwyn Jebb to William Strang', 22.06.1951.
[477] Daily Express, ''Who Screened Burgess? His Red leaning were known', 14.06.1951.
[478] FCO 936/632: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 2 (1951), 11.07.1951.
[479] FCO 936/632: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 1 (1951), 11.04.1951.
[480] FCO 936/632: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 1 (1952), 23.04.1952.

this would be interpreted as an extension of the 'purge procedure', which was a process for ensuring that individuals who had links to communism or fascism were not engaged in secret work.[481] If a candidate were to be revealed as a Communist and then not selected for a job, the assumption would be seen as the Government refusing to employ individuals due to political beliefs even for non-secret work, and that there would be a good chance that this was at least partially true. However, some departments felt that this scrutiny was necessary and as such no resolution was reached before the disbanding of the ISC.[482] Despite these larger, sometimes dramatic, situations occurring both in Britain directly and in the wider world, the ISC remained focused on the mundane yet important security questions that required evaluation and resolution. One of the most frequently discussed topics that had previously been handled by the Panel on Security Arrangements was security classifications. This discussion stemmed from the problems that existed due to classification differences between the UK and the USA. Given the strong intelligence relationship between the UK and the USA, disparity between security classifications could cause issues, especially as many of the terms being used were similar but with different meanings. This issue had come up before, and was discussed in a Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet in 1943. The difference between the two countries was that the UK had an extra classification, 'Most Secret', as well as the three classifications that were the same 'Secret', 'Confidential' and 'Restricted'. The US Chiefs of Staff refused to introduce a new classification and, as a compromise, changes were made so that from late 1943 the comparable classifications were;

> British 'Most Secret' and 'Secret' equals American 'Secret'
> British 'Confidential' equals American 'Confidential'
> British 'Restricted' equals American 'Restricted'[483]

[481] The "purge procedure" was announced in 1948. Interestingly, this notion was allegedly put forward by Duff Cooper during his tenure as Chair of the SE. This is discussed in K. D. Ewing, Joan Mahoney and Andrew Moretta. *MI5, the Cold War, and the Rule of Law.* (2020). pp. 232 – 268. However, as mentioned on page 18, this book does contain factual errors regarding the SE, alongside other criticisms, which does result in a lack of confidence in the findings presented in this work.

[482] FCO 936/632: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 1 (1952)', 2304.1952.

[483] CAB 80/41/4: 'Chiefs of Staff Committee: Classification of Secret Documents', 22.09.1943. There was another discussion held several years later in 1948 by the Panel on Security Arrangements. This later discussion was concerned with the use of the word 'confidential' on telegrams, and the security risk of the word being used in different contexts meaning different things. The recommendation from this discussion was that 'confidential' should only be used in its security sense and another term, such as 'in confidence', should be used in the less serious situations when telegrams should not be seen during transmission. It would the choice of individual departments whether this recommendation would be followed. For more information see CAB 134/666: 'Panel on Security Arrangements in Government Departments: Suggested Abolition of "Confidential" Security Classification', 24.02.1948.

Regardless of the authority held by the ISC in Britain, the 'compromise' reached here was actually Britain agreeing to do things the American way, as America refused to change to Britain's system but the systems being different created potential issues as allies.

The related subject of marking of British classified documents was also discussed, with the pros and cons of altering the British system for marking classified documents to match the American system discussed. The JIC had made this change, and had invited the Ministry of Defence, the Service Departments, the Ministry of Supply, and the Cypher Policy Board to do likewise. This resulted in two very strong differing opinions. The Service Departments, Security Service and Cypher Policy Board were in favour of the change, primarily because a uniform system would increase the standard of security. It would also reduce work in a case of emergency where a British/United States Headquarters would be required, where documents would all need to conform to the American system. This would have been taken as a serious possibility, given the growing tensions of the Cold War. However, the majority of representatives on the ISC were opposed to the idea. They believed that, while these positives were valid, the benefits offered by changing to the American system did not outweigh the administrative difficulties such a change would incur. It was felt that civil departments would be unwilling to make the proposed changes, and as such the ISC did not recommend the general adoption of this system.[484] This attitude shows that while security was taken very seriously and had become a part of everyday life throughout the whole of Whitehall, it was perhaps still not the priority of most departments, or at least those represented on the ISC. The departments that were the most experienced and knowledgeable about matters of security believed this to be the correct move as it would grant a higher level of security were essentially dismissed by the other departments due to the workload increase this would cause. Some six months later, a summary of the decision was provided by Norman Brook, who explained that the Ministry of Defence, the Service Departments and the Ministry of supply would adopt the American system, while the civilian Departments would retain the original systems. There was a begrudging admittance that the Departments most likely to need to work closely with the USA would have the same system while the other Departments were not as likely to encounter an issue from the system being different. It did result, however, in two separate systems being in place within the

[484] FCO 936/632: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 3 (1948)', 17.11.1948.

Whitehall. However, this was unavoidable as it seemed impossible that the other Departments would be convinced to make the change and it was not possible to enforce it.[485]

Security classifications became a frequent topic of discussion, with the LOC being tasked with conducting a review into the matter, with the focus remaining on the different classifications used by the UK and the USA. The US definition of the word 'confidential' suffered from the same problem as discussed above, with this applying to matters that were confidential in the security sense but also confidential in the more commonplace dictionary definition of the term. However, the solution provided by the ISC to use a term such as 'in confidence' had not widely been adopted, and thus the security problem posed by this dual-meaning still remained. In the minutes of the first meeting in 1949, greater explanation was provided by the Cypher Policy Board of the security threat posed by the dual meanings of the word. They stated that some Departments were more likely to focus on the non-security sense of the word, and by doing so took less stringent measures than would actually have been required. The result of this could eventually lead, through transmissions from department to department and repetition of messages, that plain-language text of cyphered telegrams would be more likely to fall into enemy agent hands. This would not only breach the confidentiality of the document in question, but also compromise the entire cypher in which the document had been written. It was noted that:

> If that happened only once a year it would be a very serious matter for the security of our cyphers. In fact it happened more often.[486]

The Cypher Policy Board believed that if the double meaning was to be eliminated, this would resolve the issue, and that the introduction of the use of 'In Confidence' would not constitute a new security classification as it would have no security meaning itself, and could even be used in conjunction with existing security classifications. While the seriousness of this issue was accepted, there were concerns that people would struggle to adapt to the use of a term. However, the most likely way the term would be misused would be items being listed as a security matter (i.e. confidential) when this was not necessary, resulting in items being cyphered unnecessarily. Following this, the LOC were issued four instructions. These were;

> (a) In light of the latest United States decisions to consider whether any modifications should be made in the definitions of the four security classifications applied in the United Kingdom Government Service.

[485] FCO 936/632: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 1 (1949)', 11.05.1949.
[486] FCO 936/632: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 1 (1949)', 11.05.1949.

(b) To produce examples illustrating the definitions which, while keeping as closely as possible to the revised American definitions, should be duly related to United Kingdom conditions.
(c) To consider at what stage any modifications proposed for the United Kingdom should be discussed with other Commonwealth Governments.
(d) In performing these tasks to pay particular attention to the cypher security risks arising out of the double meaning for 'Confidential', to make proposals for a remedy and to suggest a suitable prefix for the purpose.[487]

The scale of power of the ISC, and the LOC by extension, is clear by the fact that while it was unable to dictate to departments, it was continuing to discuss the situation and gather more information in order to achieve the outcome desired by the security-focused arms of government such as the Service Departments and the JIC. Furthermore, as point three demonstrates, this change would not only impact upon the British system at home but also overseas throughout the commonwealth, reflecting a degree of continuity with the earlier oversees work of the SE.

As a result of this, the LOC drafted an 8-sided report on the matter. This began by looking at the definition of each security classification, comparing the differences between the UK and USA definitions.[488] The first was the definition of 'Top Secret', which had a very small inconsequential difference.[489] The next term was a more complex challenge, the term 'Confidential'. As demonstrated, the term was already a cause for concern for security within the UK government, and the additional consideration of the US definition complicated matters further. To avoid exacerbating the situation, it was recommended by the LOC to omit the phrase offered in the American definition stating reference to items that 'would cause unwarranted injury to an individual', as it was felt this was more fitting to the non-security usage of the term confidential. There was also a recommendation to include a phrase that was not present in the American definition, which was to add material that 'would cause administrative embarrassment or difficulty'. It was felt that this would never be agreed upon by the Americans, due to what was called 'a real difference in tradition, and in approach to the theory of government', meaning that public opinion in the USA would never allow for 'administrative embarrassment as a ground for avoiding publicity'. A final change made to all classifications

[487] FCO 936/632: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 1 (1949)', 11.05.1949.
[488] A full list of the four security classification definitions side by side is available at FO 936/633: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Paper 9 (1949): Annex A – Definitions', 08.04.1949.
[489] The US version included the phrase 'the security aspect of which is paramount, and', which was felt unnecessary as this did not provide any greater detail or understanding, and would be very unlikely to cause any difficulties regarding potential cooperative working between the two nations.

was to alter them to read 'material' instead of 'material matter'. The reason given for this change was, rather pompously, that:

> the word proposed to be left out adds nothing and looks ugly. 'Material' is clearly the better word from the point of view of the Services, since it covers equipment as well as documents.[490]

Given the context of this meeting, and this being an official report drawn up to be read by high-ranking representatives of government Departments, this language and attitude is very casual, and arguably unprofessional. Very little was mentioned regarding the third aspect for LOC consideration. The LOC, following consultation with the Commonwealth Relations Office, recommended that consultation with Commonwealth Governments was not necessary, and that rather said Governments should simply be informed of the decisions made for the United Kingdom. The LOC were also asked to provide a recommendation for an alternative term for the non-security use of confidential. The original suggestion to combat this – 'in confidence' – had not proved to be an adequate solution. The suggestion provided by the LOC was to use the term 'Staff' for messages that should be coded as they related to staff and personnel questions, rather than security issues that required cyphering. It was emphasised that such a change would only be successful if it fully enacted by all departments.[491]

When this report was discussed at the following meeting of the ISC, further complications arose. Due to the delay in making a decision in the United Kingdom regarding definitions, a document had already been drafted for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) regarding security procedures. The representative for the United Kingdom, Roger Hollis, had felt that the UK was unable to argue against the decision on NATOs security classifications as a final call had not been made regarding whether, or more likely how, the security classification system in Britain was going to change. During this meeting, however, the LOC accepted the adoption of the definitions provided in the LOC report, and requested the Secretary of the ISC, along with a Security Service representative, approach the US authorities and request some of the minor changes as outlined by the LOC, given that the US definitions would be accepted in all other aspects.[492] While the question over UK/USA security

[490] FO 936/633: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Paper 15 (1949)', 22.07.1949.
[491] FO 936/633: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Paper 15 (1949)', 22.07.1949.
[492] There was a later discussion regarding US security classifications as in 1950 the US Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed the inclusion of a new definition of 'Top Secret' be adopted by NATO. The new definition had two key flaws which the ISC was strongly opposed to. The first was the definition given was only applicable to military matters, and it was incapable of amendment. The JIC reported that these two factors were not acceptable, and that no amendment to this new definition would result in any improvement on the definition that was already in use. This discussion can be found at FCO 936/632: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 2 (1950)', 10.05.1950.

classifications was settled, the contentious issue surrounding the term 'confidential' remained unresolved. The LOC had suggested the introduction of the new prefix 'Staff' for use on matters that were non-security related confidential. However, the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office were opposed to the introduction of any new prefixes, as this would further complicate an already complicated system. It would also increase the risk of errors being made by individuals who did not frequently engage in classifying documents and create a greater risk of security lapses. The solution they offered was to place more emphasis on ensuring that the existing procedure was carried out correctly. Yet another suggestion was made to attempt to prevent the security issues arising out of the dual definition of confidential, which was introduce different branches of confidential to be named 'Confidential A' and 'Confidential B'. 'Confidential A' would be used for security related matters and 'Confidential B' would be used for private matters. The ISC requested feedback from Departments as to whether this solution would be acceptable.[493] When the issue was brought up at the following meeting, it was noted that discussions on the problem had been ongoing for three years. The situation had proven very difficult to resolve and had gone on for so long that a note was created by the chairman summarising the previous activities of the body. This also included the response to the suggestion of using 'Confidential A' and 'Confidential B', which was also rejected as being unsuitable. Of the 13 departments whose responses were listed, six agreed to the change, six rejected the change, and one (MI5) said they would be willing to accept if applied universally but did not think this solution would resolve the threat to cypher security.[494]

A topic of this nature is a prime example of the work of the SE, and now the ISC. It provided a theatre for difficult issues to be discussed by affected departments, that they could work closely to attempt to find a resolution and allowed the chance to explain why certain approaches that work for one branch of government would be unsuitable for another in ways that may not have been considered. One example of this is that the Cypher Policy Board wanted to introduce the use of the word 'Private' to indicate material that was to be kept secret but for non-security reasons. While this would work in many Departments, this could not have been applied to the War Office, as the term 'Private' already had a completely different meaning in the Army.[495] However, this issue does also highlight a core problem of the bureaucratic nature of committees, with this single issue requiring so much attention and going back and forth in

[493] FCO 936/632: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 3 (1949)', 09.11.1949.
[494] FO 936/633: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Paper 2 (1950)', 28.01.1950.
[495] The term was also used for correspondence to distinguish from official or semi-official business, along with the term 'personal'.

order to try and find a solution that appeased everyone involved while resolving the ongoing issue, in this case one of cypher security. At this meeting, the Chairman stated that, since a prefix was clearly not going to be an acceptable solution regardless of the wording chosen, there were two options. The first was to continue with the system as it had been, despite the ongoing risk to cypher security, or to insist that all telegrams bearing a security classification be encrypted, a move that would have overloaded the existing cypher facilities. The Chairman requested that a small Working Party, made up of representatives from the Foreign Office, Colonial Office, Commonwealth Relations Office and the Cypher Policy Board, carried out an enquiry as to whether 'instructions could be given to posts abroad about repeated telegrams which, without disrupting current Departmental practices, would limit the scope of risk to cypher security'. If this was possible, it could then be considered whether the mitigating effect was enough to result in the security risk being at an acceptable level.[496] At the following meeting of the ISC it was agreed that the risk to cypher security was sufficiently mitigated, following the dissemination of instructions on how to prevent the issue of plain-text and cyphered copies of the same documents being in circulation. Any further classifications or prefixes, such as 'Staff' would be individual to each department and applicable only to themselves.[497]

Much has been written about the 'special relationship' and the Anglo-American intelligence sharing relationship, as well as the strain put upon that relationship by the revelations of various spies, such as Klaus Fuchs and the Guy Burgess and Donal Maclean disappearance. The ministerial response to these incidents was handled well by the British Government, as demonstrated by Daniel Lomas in his study of intelligence and security under Clement Attlee. However, America still had concerns about the British, and particularly MI5s, approach to security. Due to America's dominance in the intelligence world, particularly in the field of signals intelligence (SIGINT), Britain was forced to accept 'positive vetting'. In addition to this, the Tripartite Security Working Group demonstrates that American influence on British security went beyond this, pushing through a restructure of th British 'Security State' this thesis has outlined up to this point. While the machinery of security changed from this point in several ways, this thesis will go on to show there were still many similarities and that the machinery of security in Britain continued.

[496] FCO 936/632: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 1 (1950)', 22.02.1950.
[497] FCO 936/632: 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Security: Minutes of Meeting 2 (1950)', 10.05.1950.

While the scope of this thesis covers the years 1940-1952, the Security State continued to develop beyond these parameters, as did the ISC. A significant reframing of security happened after a critical report of the Tripartite Security Working Group was published in June 1951. The reorganisation of security in Britain in the early 1950s was triggered by a critical report from the Tripartite Security Working Groups. This venture was a collaborative effort between the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France to review the state of security in each country. Originally, this idea was born out of France having a weak security structure and wanting the advice of the other states to improve their security, as well as the USA and UK wanting France to have a more robust system due to international cooperation and the risk to their own security if France did not have a solid security structure in place.[498] However, this expanded to be a review of all three countries, largely encouraged by the USA.[499] The tone of the British departments implied that they were less happy about the arrangements, particularly about the later meeting of the Tripartite Security Working Group, most notably the Treasury and MI5.[500] However, on the whole the UK were fairly confident with their security structure, and there was no way they could realistically refuse to participate. The Working Group visited each country in turn to assess the security structure, after having worked together to list what factors they agreed were required for a country to have the best possible security structure. During these visits the host country would take the delegates to different Departments and explain the security structure in the country generally. When the UK first hosted, the ISC were the first body to present to the delegates on the first day. This took the form of a presentation by Sir Norman Brook, who covered topics on security in general, terms of reference and composition of the committee, the booklet on 'Security in Government Departments' and examples of subjects dealt with by the Committee.[501] As well as this verbal explanation, a document was provided to the delegates outlining the structure of security coordination at this first meeting.[502] Comments were then made for each country by the representative of the other two countries. The comments that are of particular relevance to this study concern 'Inter-Departmental Co-ordination on Security', and were;

> While there are committees engaged in the internal security field, we are not aware of any overall co-ordinating committees to provide for

[498] CAB 21/3247: 'Joint Intelligence Committee: Brief for discussion on the security of a certain country', 24.10.1950.
[499] The USA was particularly interested in the subject of vetting, and a fierce proponent of positive vetting.
[500] CAB 21/4258: 'Official Committee on Security: General Correspondence', 08.03.1954.
[501] CAB 21/3247: 'Brief for talk by Sir Norman Brook – Thursday, 3rd May, 1951, 3.15pm', 01.05.1951.
[502] This document is available in Appendix IX.

> the integration and co-ordination of all policies and procedures affecting investigations and other internal security matters.[503]

These comments are similar to those offered two years earlier by a subcommittee of the defence (transition) committee (DTC), concerned with security in a future war. This subcommittee compiled a report on the work of the SE from 1939-1945, with an aim to have a plan in place in case of a future war. The key points this report found was that before the war 'there was no comprehensive body dealing with security generally'. It also acknowledged the rapid growth beyond Fifth Column activities, stating 'it did, in fact, deal effectively with a large number of security problems affecting civil Departments or the Services and civil Departments together'.[504] The key criticism made was that there were two notable issues that were not handled by the SE. The first was the co-ordination of security arrangements in Government Departments. This was handled by the Panel on Security Arrangements in Government Departments.[505] The second was that the SE was not involved in some of the major questions affecting civil Departments which related to the security of operation OVERLORD. These were handled by the Home Defence Executive in conjunction with the Inter-Services Security Board.

The initial report of the Tripartite Security Working Group was followed by a second meeting of the Group in early 1953, which subsequently produced a further report which reviewed how well recommendations had been put into place. Following this, the ISC met on 12 February 1953 to discuss the comments received in this report. This resulted in the creation of a Working Party on Co-ordination of Security Policies and Procedures (ISC-CO) which was again chaired by Sir Norman Brook, and recommended the reorganisation of security resulting in the creation of the Official Committee on Security, with three subcommittees – namely the Committee on General Security Procedures, the Committee on Personnel Security, and the Committee on the Security of Economic and Industrial Information about the United Kingdom, with oversight being provided by a new Ministerial Committee on Security.[506] Given that this meant the ISC was essentially deciding its own fate, it is not surprising that it found a place for itself in the future security structure it recommended. The ISC was to further evolve and become the Sub-Committee on General Security Procedures (SGP). This change afforded the opportunity for relevant individuals to discuss some of the criticisms they had about the ISC.

[503] CAB 21/3248: 'Report of the Tripartite Security Working Group', 1952.
[504] CAB 21/4002: 'Report by the Sub-Committee on Security in a Future War', 11.09.1950.
[505] As noted above, the SE was involved in the establishment of this Panel but operated separately during the war and in the immediate post-war period, until the amalgamation of the two in 1948.
[506] This is demonstrated in the diagram in Appendix X.

Primary amongst these was a sense that far too many people were attending ISC meetings by the end of the body in 1953. It was felt by A. R. Jabez Smith that the core reason for the 'swollen attendance' was that 'the Service Departments seem to find it necessary to attend in duplicate or even triplicate'. Despite these concerns over the high attendance at the ISC, Jabez Smith felt that relatively little could be done to lower the number of attendees as if they tried to discourage attendance they may be 'accused of discouraging active interest in the work of the Committee even though some departments regularly attending were not members'. However, it was noted they may try and discourage Service Departments from sending multiple representatives.[507] Interestingly, this same complaint was made of the SGP in 1957, when Martin Furnival Jones of MI5 wrote to W Cornish of the Home Office that one of his officers 'regarded the Committee as an unwieldy body'. This was still blamed largely on the Service Departments, as they sent representatives from both the civilian and service side.[508]

The result of the criticisms by the Tripartite Security Working Group was the decision to reframe the civil security structure. The ISC evolved to become the SGP following a meeting of the ISC in February 1953.[509] The terms of reference of the SGP were;

> To keep under review the whole field of security in relation to documents, buildings and office procedures.

This is very similar to the role being played by the ISC, and largely seems to be simply a change of name to identify the role of the body more accurately. The first meeting of the SGP took place on 5 January 1954.[510] Over the course of the next couple of years, the SGP covered topics such as departmental passes, regarding of classified documents, the destruction of documents in an emergency, and, unsurprisingly, the Booklet on Security in Government Departments.[511] The SG also had a subcommittee, which was a continuation of the LOC, but with a change of name. The subcommittee was now called the Security Officers' Conference. This name change occurred after a review of the work of the LOC found that

> It thus does some useful preliminary and preparatory work on various topics. Another of its advantages is that it brings together junior security officers and emphasises the fact that problems with which they are faced are shared by other departments. In the interests of co-ordination, I feel there is a strong case for retaining this body but I think

[507] CAB 21/3989: 'Letter from Jabez Smith to Allen', 26.11.1953.
[508] CAB 21/4258: 'Committee on General Security Procedures: Various communications', 15.03.1957 – 03.04.1957.
[509] CAB 21/4002: 'Re-organisation of Civil Security Committees', 10.11.1953.
[510] CAB 21/4258: 'Committee on General Security Procedures: Minutes of Meeting 1 (1954)', 05.01.1954.
[511] CAB 21/4258: 'Committee on General Security Procedures: Minutes of Meetings', 1954-1955.

> it is high time that its name was changed to 'The Security Officers' Conference.

These comments came from the same letter referenced above that criticised the high attendance of the ISC.[512] This clearly shows that the SE continues well into the 1950s, and likely beyond, through the eventual guise of the SGP.[513] However, another body was also established that sat above the SG in the security committee structure that was created when this latest evolution took place, the Official Committee on Security (SO).

The SO was established to oversee the coordination of security throughout the civil departments, and matters that affect both Service and civil departments. Its terms of reference were;

> (a) Under the Ministerial Committee, to formulate policies on all aspects of security, except matters of purely Service interest
> (b) To co-ordinate and pursue the application of security policies
> (c) In collaboration with the Defence (Transition) Committee and the Home Defence Committee to supervise the planning of security measures in war.[514]

While these terms are wider reaching and more formalised, this largely summaries much of the work of the SE. The core criticism of the SE was that some subjects were handled by other groups, which was not the intention here. While there will inevitably have been growth and development based on the learned experienced, the SE was the forerunner to the SO. In this way, the SE truly did continue well beyond the Second World War, as did the Security State that developed through this body. The National Archives holds records for this committee for the next several decades, even as recently as 1999.[515] Beyond this, the committee was still active in 2014, with the late Sir Jeremy Heywood listed as Chair of the Official Committee on

[512] CAB 21/3989: 'Letter from Jabez Smith to Allen', 26.11.1953.
[513] While it goes well beyond the focus area of this thesis, it is worth noting the SGP underwent a further transformation in 1957, when the SGP was disbanded, and a new committee was created, named the Committee on Security Policy and Methods with the terms of reference: 'To keep under review all security policy and methods, except in the fields allotted to the Personnel Security Committee, the London Communications Security Board, the London Signals Intelligence Board and the Committee on the Security of Economics and Industrial Information', CAB 21/5336: 'Security Policy and Methods Committee: Terms of Reference and Composition', 11/10/1957. Other files related to this further body include; CAB 134/2468: 'Security Policy and Methods Committee: Meetings 1-5; Papers 1-31', 11.10-1957 – 13.12.1957, CAB 21/4523: 'Security Policy and Methods Committee: general correspondence', 1953-1960, and CAB 21/6002: 'Security Policy and Methods Committee: chairman's briefs', 1962-1965.
[514] CAB 21/4002: 'Re-Organisation of Civil Security Committees', 10.11.1953.
[515] Unsurprisingly, these records are still closed and retained by the Cabinet Office. The records from the 1950s up until the end of the 1990s are listed, with the latest being dated November 1999. CAB 134/6301: 'Official Committee on Security: meeting 1, papers 1-11'. 06.04.1999 – 29.11.1999.

Security in a policy paper titled ‘Security policy framework’.[516] Clearly, the Security State that originated with the creation of the SE, and developed throughout the course of the Second World War, continues to thrive.

[516] This document was first published in April 2014 and was last updated in December 2022. Gov.uk, ‘Security policy framework’, (2022). No later references to the body are readily available, however given how long the body had survived by this point it is highly possible that it is still operational today but working in the secrecy that often accompanies security work.

Conclusion

This examination of the machinery of security created and developed by the British state has clearly revealed an aspect of the machinery of government that has previously been overlooked, and this thesis will conclude by returning to the questions posed in the Introduction and addressing each of these in turn, as well as answering any questions that have risen through the course of the research. Finally, suggestions will be made for possible future research that could follow this piece.

The HD(S)E was created in 1940 due to fears that a Fifth Column existed in Britain, hidden away and waiting to support the Axis cause in any way it could, particularly in case of invasion. There were several reasons the British Government held these fears, such as the paranoia held by significant members of MI5, particularly Vernon Kell, as well as from the general public. These fears would likely have been validated in the very early days of the HD(S)E, due to receiving reports of Fifth Column activities in other countries, such as Poland and Roumania.

As this thesis has also demonstrated the HD(S)E's role expanded dramatically and almost immediately. This leads to a separate, and perhaps more interesting, question concerning the survival of the organisation: what factors led to the decision to expand the HD(S)E into this more diverse and influential role? The main answer to this, as indicated by this research, was the realisation that there was no formal system for addressing the security work of the Government outside the work of MI5 and MI6. This omission became apparent and unacceptable following the onset of the Second World War. The HD(S)E was able to outlast the Fifth Column threat because from an early stage it began to fill a previously unidentified gap in the security apparatus in the United Kingdom. Prior to the HD(S)E, each government department handled security separately on an ad-hoc basis, resulting in omissions, repetition of work, and conflicting instructions. Having a centralised coordinating body with representatives from a wide range of government departments helped mitigate these issues. The HD(S)E also covered the areas that sat outside the remit of MI5 and MI6, which is unsurprising given the intelligence focus of these organisations. This role has been shown to have been of such significance to the British Government that not only did the HD(S)E manage to outlast the Fifth Column threat, but also continued to grow throughout the course of the war and survive into post-war Britain.

As this thesis has demonstrated, the key contribution made by the HD(S)E concerned its cross-departmental nature. Before the creation of the HD(S)E, security was not centralised, and such matters were handled on a case by case basis by individual departments as they arose. Due to the national emergency of the advent of the Second World War, the need for an effective and efficient approach to security became clear. The HD(S)E filled this role and was clearly viewed as being successful and making a worthwhile contribution which is evidenced by the continuation of the body through various guises and changed throughout the course of the Second World War and beyond into the post-war period, despite several opportunities for the body to logically come to an end, such as the end of the Fifth Column panic or the departure of Lord Swinton.

As noted in the Introduction, 'success' in this context may be taken to mean the SE's ability to pinpoint security threats and address them through effective cross-departmental cooperation. In matters of security, as with intelligence, it is much easier to identify failures than it is success. A success for security is, simply put, that nothing bad happens. As previously noted, perhaps the biggest indicator of success was the survival of the SE, beyond the Fifth Column threat, beyond the war, and beyond the post-war reframing of security. While the body was not free from criticism or potential issues, it was able to remain flexible enough to survive. It was able to vary meeting frequency and attendance to fulfil what was required of the body at any given time. This ability to adapt, survive, and grow is the SE's key defining feature and a clear indication of success. An entire structure of machinery of civil security grew following the creation of the SE, with the SE remaining at its core, reaching throughout Whitehall.

As has already been noted, one of the defining factors of the SE is its ability to adapt and survive, regardless of the changing political environment in which it resides. Perhaps the clearest examples of this is the survival of the SE, rebranded as the SSC, beyond the end of the war. As this thesis has demonstrated, this was a surprise even to the long term members of the SE, who assumed the body would end and thus tendered their resignations. However, the SE had identified a gap in the structure of security and had filled that gap, and thus proven its value. Churchill in particular was reluctant to lose the body that had proven useful for the state. The SE had grown to create a machinery of security that played a vital role in the security structure of the state that would be valuable in peacetime as well in wartime.

This thesis has demonstrated a continuous example of the 'poacher turned gamekeeper' role of MI5. Throughout the various guises of the SE, MI5 has been a significant contributor

to discussions. It has achieved this in a number of ways. From providing advice on information of value from an intelligence perspective, to providing direct intelligence on the significance of threats, this thesis provides further evidence to the argument of Michael Herman that there is a particular arrangement between information security and intelligence, and that intelligence supports security in this context in a variety of ways. Similarly, information security is necessary to ensure effective and secure intelligence, such as with the development of vetting procedures.

This thesis has demonstrated that the SE did not simply survive throughout the period discussed. It frequently changed and developed. While this manner of bureaucratic drift can be viewed negatively, such as indicated by the comments made by the JIC as discussed on page 116, this flexibility allows organisations such as the SE to easily adapt to fill gaps in the structure than are often previously unknown and lacks the complications of creating new organisations. One potential risk of having body that evolve in this manner is that they can move away from their original purpose, as was the case with the SE. This can result in creating a new gap in the structure that had previously been filled, meaning that a new organisation is needed. This is what happened resulting in the creation of the Official Committee on Security. While this duplication could be seen as a criticism of bureaucratic drift, it means that any problems or issues that arose in the original body can be resolved.

As the literature review has shown, there is a complete dearth of research in this area. This thesis has provided a foundation to the study of the SE and the wider 'Security State' in Britain during the Second World War and the post-war period. This can be used as a building block for a number of further research possibilities. These could include a further deep dive into the individual topics handled by the SE, placed in the broader context of these issues, which may include the work of other Whitehall departments. Another area that would benefit from further exploration is that of the role the SE played in the 'security education' of Government departments. Through actions such as providing reports on Communists and the creation of the Booklet on Security in Government Departments, the SE and its successors played a key role in informing various departments about security threats, as well as suggesting actions to mitigate them. How far this role went, further examples of the body educating departments and using this lens to view later actions such as the report on 'Treachery is their Trade', all warrant a greater level of analysis. Further research could also be conducted into the subcommittees of the SE, particularly the LOC as this subcommittee reached throughout Whitehall and existed for a significant length of time, even beyond the parameters of this thesis.

The future of the machinery of security is also an area that requires further research but falls outside the necessary parameters of this thesis. Preliminary searches of the files available through the National Archives indicated that the machinery of security continues through the 1960s and 1970s and even as far as the 1980s. This thesis provides an essential foundation to the study of the 'machinery of security' that was created following the creation of the Home Defence (Security) Executive and continued to develop throughout each iteration of the body resulting in Britain becoming what can be described as a 'Security State', with a vast number of possibilities available for further research to develop understanding of these concepts.

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Appendix I: Meeting frequency per month of the SE.



Appendix II: Number of attendees at meetings of SE.

Meeting No.		Meeting No.		Meeting No.		Meeting No.		Meeting No.	
1	13	23	18	45	30	67	33	89	35
2	13	24	27	46	27	68	24	90	42
3	17	25	26	47	44	69	37	91	44
4	17	26	30	48	35	70	42	92	33
5	15	27	32	49	20	71	32	93	40
6	12	28	30	50	24	72	29	94	44
7	17	29	26	51	32	73	40	95	39
8	19	30	33	52	29	74	44	96	32
9	25	31	25	53	39	75	38	97	42
10	22	32	37	54	38	76	33	98	37
11	14	33	37	55	38	77	35	99	28
12	22	34	32	56	24	78	44	100	31
13	27	35	35	57	41	79	33	101	29
14	29	36	28	58	38	80	36	102	37
15	27	37	39	59	30	81	42	103	32
16	38	38	32	60	39	82	41	104	23
17	35	39	33	61	40	83	34	105	33
18	28	40	42	62	44	84	45	106	27
19	30	41	36	63	36	85	39	107	54
20	25	42	43	64	22	86	41	108	33
21	32	43	42	65	53	87	27	109	57
22	30	44	36	66	36	88	43		



Appendix III: Bodies represented at meetings of the SE.

BODY[517]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	TOTAL
Number of meetings in period	-	16	18	14	14	8	7	3	2	11	2	95[518]
Admiralty	-	15	18	14	13	8	7	3	2	11	2	93
Air Ministry	-	13	18	13	13	7	7	3	2	10	2	88
Board of Education	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Board of Trade	-	3	-	-	1	1	3	2	-	4	1	15
British Broadcasting Corporation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2
British Security Coordination	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Cabinet Office	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Colonial Office	-	-	5	3	5	3	3	1	-	3	1	24
Customs & Excise	-	1	4	-	3	2	3	1	1	-	2	17
Department of Agriculture for Scotland	-	-	-	3	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	6
Department of Director of Public Prosecutions	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Department of Health, Scotland	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Department of Overseas Trade	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	3
Directorate of Labour	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Dominions Office	-	1	4	2	6	-	1	-	1	3	-	18
Electricity Commission	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	2	2	7
Foreign Office	-	9	11	9	11	3	4	1	1	6	2	57
General Post Office	-	1	4	-	3	1	2	-	-	2	-	13
GHQ/ GHQ Home Forces	-	15	15	14	13	8	6	3	2	8	1	85
HM Stationary Office	-	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	1	5
Home Defence Committee	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Home Defence Executive	-	-	5	-	6	7	2	-	1	4	-	25
Home Office	-	16	18	13	14	8	7	3	2	11	2	94
HQ 21st Army Group	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	3
HQ Scottish Command	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
India Office	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	2
Inter Services Research Bureau	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1	5
Lord Advocate's Department	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	3
MI5	-	16	18	14	14	8	7	3	2	11	2	95
MI6	-	10	12	4	9	4	2	1	1	2	-	45
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries	-	1	4	3	-	2	2	3	1	2	-	18
Ministry of Aircraft Production	-	2	11	8	9	2	5	2	2	8	1	50
Ministry of Economic Warfare	-	-	2	-	7	2	3	1	2	3	1	21
Ministry of Food	-	-	1	-	-	2	1	1	-	2	1	8
Ministry of Fuel and Power	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	3	-	2	1	8
Ministry of Health	-	2	4	2	-	2	2	-	1	1	1	15
Ministry of Home Security	-	1	1	-	1	1	2	1	1	3	1	12
Ministry of Information	-	9	9	7	6	3	4	3	2	10	2	55
Ministry of Labour /(and National Service)	-	4	7	5	2	2	3	2	2	2	1	30
Ministry of Pensions	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Ministry of Production	-	-	-	-	-	-	6		1	4	1	12

[517] Some bodies had multiple representatives at meeting, however as the purpose of this table is to demonstrate the variety of bodies, each body has only been counted once per meeting.

Ministry of Shipping	-	4	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
Ministry of Supply	-	1	4	10	5	3	6	2	2	9	2	44
Ministry of Town and Country Planning	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	-	1	5
Ministry of War Transport	-	-	5	7	8	2	3	2	2	11	2	42
Ministry of Works and Buildings/Planning	-	-	1	2	-	1	2	2	1	2	-	11
National Fire Service	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
National Savings Committee	-	-	-	1	1	2	1	-	-	-	-	5
National Union of Seamen	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
New Scotland Yard	-	16	18	13	10	7	4	2	1	2	2	93
Postal & Telegraph Censorship	-	12	17	14	14	8	7	3	2	10	1	88
Passport & Permit Office / Passport Control	-	2	3	1	4	1	3	1	-	-	-	15
Prime Ministers' Office	-	6	13	14	9	7	4	1	2	7	2	65
Privy Council Office	-	7	9	9	12	4	1	-	-	-	-	42
Radio Security Service	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Registrar-General / General Register Office	-	-	1	5	1	2	-	-	-	2	1	12
Royal Air Force	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Security Coordination	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Security Liaison Officer	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Scottish Home Department	-	-	-	1	-	-	6	2	1	8	1	19
Scottish Office	-	1	4	5	10	7	-	-	1	-	-	28
Shipowners' Federation	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Security Intelligence Centre	-	16	18	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	48
Special Operations Executive	-	1	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	4
Spears Mission	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Trading with the Enemy Branch	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Treasury	-	3	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
Treasury Solicitor's Office	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Vulnerable Points Advisor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	4
War Cabinet Office	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	3	-	5
War Department Constabulary	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
War Office	-	16	17	12	14	8	6	3	2	11	2	91
War-Time Communications	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1

#	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Date	05.1940-09.1940	10.1940-03.1941	04.1941-09.1941	10.1941-03.1942	04.1942-09.1942	10.1942-03.1943	04.1943-09.1943	10.1943-03.1944	04.1944-09.1944	10.1944-03.1945	04.1945-08.1945

[518] There was a total of 109 meetings, but the first six months of meetings did not list the departments that individuals were representing and thus, in order to avoid any potential misrepresentation of data, have been omitted from this analysis.

Appendix IV: Timeline of Conferences of the SE.[519]



[519] These meetings can be found in CAB 93/6: 'Security Executive Conferences: meetings and papers A – O', 22.02.1941 – 18.08.1945 and CAB 93/7: 'Security Executive Conferences: meetings and paper P – Z', 13.05.1941 – 25.07.1945. This table does not include meetings that do not have a specified date for any reason. This is approximately 10 meetings, spread across various conferences.


The Disposal of Refugees from Ireland
18.06.1941 - Meeting #5
Disclosure of Information by labour recruiting agents in Ireland (later known as Control of Irish labour)
23.06.1941 - Meeting #2
Immobilisation of Printing Presses
19.06.1941 - Meeting #1
B.O.A.C Service from Foynes
27.06.1941 - Meeting #1
July 1941
National Registration Identity Cards
27.06.1941 - Meeting #1
Extension of No 1. Protected Place
17.07.1941 - Meeting #2
The Protected Places Bye-Laws 1939
24.07.1941 - Meeting #4
Conference on Prohibition of the Sale by Private Firms of Army Emblems, etc.
29.07.1941 - Meeting #1
Enemy traffic on neutral ships
07.08.1941 - Meeting #1
B.O.A.C Service from Foynes
12.08.1941 - Meeting #3
The Protected Places Bye-Laws 1939
25.08.1941 - Meeting #6
Press References to Agents and Security Measures
28.08.1941 - Meeting #1
Arrival of Party of Norwegians
05.09.1941 - Meeting #1
Canadian Security
11.09.1941 - Meeting #1
Royal Patriotic School
12.09.1941 - Meeting #7
Security in West Africa
30.09.1941 - Meeting #2
B.O.A.C Service from Foynes
15.07.1941 - Meeting #2
Security in South American Ports
23.07.1941 - Meeting #1
Royal Patriotic School
25.07.1941 - Meeting #6
National Registration Identity Cards
06.08.1941 - Meeting #2
Security in West Africa
08.08.1941 - Meeting #1
The Protected Places Bye-Laws 1939
18.08.1941 - Meeting #5
Embarkation of Civilians at Convoy Ports
26.08.1941 - Meeting #1
The Issue of "Soviet War News" to Service Establishments, etc.
29.08.1941 - Meeting #1
The Disclosure of the Destination of Convoys through Customs Arrangements
10.09.1941 - Meeting #1
Conference on Prohibition of the Sale by Private Firms of Army Emblems, etc.
12.09.1941 - Meeting #2
Security in the Caribbean Area
15.09.1941 - Meeting #1
The Treatment of Subjects under Defence Regulations
30.09.1941 - Meeting #1
October 1941
Censorship of Internees Mail
09.10.1941 - Meeting #1
Royal Patriotic School
16.10.1941 - Meeting #8
Italian Prisoners of War for Agriculture
24.10.1941 - Meeting #1
R. S. S. Mobile Units
12.11.1941 - Meeting #1
The Disposal of Refugees from Ireland
13.10.1941 - Meeting #6
Enemy traffic on neutral ships
22.10.1941 - Meeting #2
Alien Evacuees from the Western Mediterranean Area
27.10.1941 - Meeting #1
The Disclosure of Information to Neutral Governments
13.11.1941 - Meeting #1


Royal Patriotic School
20.11.1941 - Meeting #9
Alien Evacuees from the Western Mediterranean Area
03.12.1941 - Meeting #2
The Staff of the Royal Patriotic School
08.12.1941 - Meeting #1
Italian Prisoners of War for Agriculture
17.12.1941 - Meeting #2
Security in Neutral Ports
23.12.1941 - Meeting #1
Suspected Fifth Column Activities among Frenchmen in the UK
27.11.1941 - Meeting #1
War Industries: Disclosure of Information through Fire Insurance Procedure
04.12.1941 - Meeting #1
The Interrogation of Arrivals from Abroad
12.12.1941 - Meeting #1
The International Youth Council
18.12.1941 - Meeting #1
The Vetting of US Civilian Personnel in the UK
30.12.1941 - Meeting #1
January 1942
Security in the Caribbean Area
07.01.1942 - Meeting #2
Security in Neutral Ports
16.01.1942 - Meeting #2
Alien Evacuees from the Western Mediterranean Area
26.01.1942 - Meeting #3
Immobilisation of Printing Presses
09.02.1942 - Meeting #3
Security in the Caribbean Area
25.02.1942 - Meeting #3
Communists in Government Departments
05.03.1942 - Meeting #1
The Protected Places Bye-Laws 1939
10.03.1942 - Meeting #8
Parole for Prisoners of War
25.03.1942 - Meeting #1
Public Utilities Accounts
27.03.1942 - Meeting #1
The Publication of Population Statistics
09.01.1942 - Meeting #1
Revision of No.1 Protected Area
22.01.1942 - Meeting #2
Security in South Africa
27.01.1942 - Meeting #1
The Protected Places Bye-Laws 1939
20.02.1942 - Meeting #7
Enquiries received from Argentine Consuls about cattle stocks in this country
02.03.1942 - Meeting #1
Security Co-Ordination (New York)
05.03.1942 - Meeting #1
Security of Public Utility Undertakings
20.03.1942 - Meeting #1
Security of Public Utility Undertakings
27.03.1942 - Meeting #2
April 1942
Security of Combined Operations Base
28.04.1942 - Meeting #1
Security of Combined Operations Base
08.05.1942 - Meeting #2
Security of Combined Operations Base
19.05.1942 - Meeting #4
Security of Combined Operations Base
01.06.1942 - Meeting #5
Transatlantic Air Services: Censorship, Security and Intelligence
06.05.1942 - Meeting #1
Security of Combined Operations Base
11.05.1942 - Meeting #3
The Security of Radio Telephone Conversations
22.05.1942 - Meeting #1
Security of Combined Operations Base
18.06.1942 - Meeting #6


July 1942
Immobilisation of Printing Presses
02.07.1942 - Meeting #4
Security of Combined Operations Base
10.07.1942 - Meeting #7
Disclosure of Information by labour recruiting agents in Ireland (later known as Control of Irish labour)
30.07.1941 - Meeting #3
Security of Oil Installations at Abadan, Persia
19.08.1942 - Meeting #1
Publication of Coal Production Statistics
26.08.1942 - Meeting #1
Security at Ports
27.08.1942 - Meeting #1
Control of Missions
04.09.1942 - Meeting #1
Control of Missions
18.09.1942 - Meeting #2
The Protected Places Bye-Laws 1939
03.07.1942 - Meeting #9
The Protected Places Bye-Laws 1939
15.07.1942 - Meeting #10
Security in the Caribbean Area
06.08.1942 - Meeting #4
French Subjects from Madagascar: Censorship of Correspondence
25.08.1942 - Meeting #1
Security of Combined Operations Base
26.08.1942 - Meeting #8
Jehovah's Witnesses
28.08.1942 - Meeting #1
Marking of Cargo Shipped from USA
15.09.1942 - Meeting #1
Leakage of Operational Information via Eire
21.09.1942 - Meeting #1
October 1942
Control of Missions
05.10.1942 - Meeting #3
Control of Portuguese Colonial Mails
09.10.1942 - Meeting #1
Transfer of Persons Detained in the Dominions to the United Kingdom
19.10.1942 - Meeting #1
Temporary Cessation of Telephone Service
02.11.1942 - Meeting #1
Shipping Information and Home Shipping Committee (Special Meeting)
06.11.1942 - Meeting #1
Shipping Information and Home Shipping Committee
23.11.1942 - Meeting #2
Establishment Questions in the Secret Service
24.11.1942 - Meeting #1
Transfer of Persons Detained in the Dominions to the United Kingdom
14.12.1942 - Meeting #2
The Arming of Works' Police
21.12.1942 - Meeting #1
Security at Ports
07.10.1942 - Meeting #2
Jehovah's Witnesses
12.10.1942 - Meeting #2
Control of Missions
26.10.1942 - Meeting #4
Shipping Information and Home Shipping Committee
03.11.1942 - Meeting #1
Security of Ships and Commodities Overseas
17.11.1942 - Meeting #1
Seamen on U.S. Ships Coming to the UK Welfare Arrangements
20.11.1942 - Meeting #1
Enemy-operated Pseudo-British Broadcasting Stations
26.11.1942 - Meeting #1
Shipping Information and Home Shipping Committee
16.12.1942 - Meeting #3
The Loss of Government Stores
23.12.1942 - Meeting #1


January 1943
Communications of Axis Representatives in Eire
04.01.1943 - Meeting #1
Security of Combined Operations Base
13.01.1943 - Meeting #9
Establishment Questions in the Secret Service
04.02.1943 - Meeting #3
American Service Aircraft
08.02.1943 - Meeting #1
American Service Aircraft
15.02.1943 - Meeting #2
The Exclusion of Factory and Other Addresses from Overseas Correspondence
01.03.1943 - Meeting #1
French Seamen on Giraud Ships
08.03.1943 - Meeting #1
Shipping Information and Home Shipping Committee (Special Meeting)
11.03.1943 - Meeting #4
Security of Offensive Operations
19.03.1943 - Meeting #1
Shipping Information and Home Shipping Committee (Special Meeting)
12.01.1942 - Meeting #3
Establishment Questions in the Secret Service
21.01.1943 - Meeting #2
The Protected Places Bye-Laws 1939
05.02.1942 - Meeting #11
Shipping Information and Home Shipping Committee
10.02.1943 - Meeting #4
Alien Evacuees from the Western Mediterranean Area
20.02.1943 - Meeting #4
Establishment Questions in the Secret Service
04.03.1943 - Meeting #4
Control of Photography
08.03.1943 - Meeting #1
Applications for Exit Permits
19.03.1943 - Meeting #1
Shipping Information and Home Shipping Committee (Special Meeting)
31.03.1943 - Meeting #5
April 1943
Establishment Questions in the Secret Service
08.04.1943 - Meeting #5
Shipping Information and Home Shipping Committee
05.05.1943 - Meeting #6
Fire Guard Sector Maps
12.05.1943 - Meeting #1
Alien Evacuees from the Western Mediterranean Area
27.05.1943 - Meeting #5
Proposed Call by Swedish Ship at Port in Eire
09.06.1943 - Meeting #1
Control of Missions
19.04.1943 - Meeting #5
Establishment Questions in the Secret Service
06.05.1943 - Meeting #6
Shipping Information and Home Shipping Committee (Special Meeting)
19.05.1943 - Meeting #6
Establishment Questions in the Secret Service
03.06.1943 - Meeting #7
July 1943
Shipping Information and Home Shipping Committee
16.07.1943 - Meeting #7
Enemy-operated Pseudo-British Broadcasting Stations
29.07.1943 - Meeting #2
Proposed Establishment of German Theological Training College
11.08.1943 - Meeting #1
Control of Missions
28.07.1943 - Meeting #6
Establishment Questions in the Secret Service
29.07.1943 - Meeting #8
Review of Emergency Legislation
18.08.1943 - Meeting #1


Control of Missions
31.08.1943 - Meeting #7
Radio Security Committee
14.09.1943 - Meeting #2
Shipping Information and Home Shipping Committee (Special Meeting)
16.09.1943 - Meeting #7
The Employment of Technically Qualified Aliens other than in Government Service
24.09.1943 - Meeting #1
Control of Visits to Ports
10.09.1943 - Meeting #1
Internment: Segregation of Special Cases
15.09.1943 - Meeting #4
Control of Neutral Vessels
17.09.1943 - Meeting #1
October 1943
Security of Offensive Operations
06.12.1943 - Meeting #2
Firewatching by Irish and Alien Labour with access to "secret" and "most secret" work
20.12.1943 - Meeting #1
Security Training of Members of the Civil Defence Services
17.11.1943 - Meeting #1
Security of Ships and Commodities Overseas
17.12.1943 - Meeting #2
January 1944
Internment of Deserters from the Enemy Armed Forces
14.01.1944 - Meeting #1
Security of Ships and Commodities Overseas
26.01.1944 - Meeting #3
Control of Missions
14.02.1944 - Meeting #8
BBC talks on British Industry
18.02.1944 - Meeting #1
Security Training of Members of the Civil Defence Services
10.01.1944 - Meeting #2
Restrictions of Travel to the Isle of Wight
25.01.1944 - Meeting #1
Revision of No.1 Protected Area
09.02.1944 - Meeting #3
Control of Missions
17.02.1944 - Meeting #9
Publication of Export Figures
18.02.1944 - Meeting #1
April 1944
Government Sponsored Travel
17.04.1944 - Meeting #1
Control of Missions
12.05.1944 - Meeting #10
Control of Photography
26.05.1944 - Meeting #3
Security in the Caribbean Area
28.06.1944 - Meeting #5
Allied Service Personnel Coming to this Country from the USA and Canada
17.04.1944 - Meeting #1
Control of Photography
19.05.1944 - Meeting #2
Publication of Statistics
23.06.1944 - Meeting #1
July 1944
The Swedish A.B. Aero Transport Service
02.08.1944 - Meeting #1
The Swedish A.B. Aero Transport Service
21.08.1944 - Meeting #2
The Employment of German and Italian Prisoners of War
24.07.1944 - Meeting #1
Cease-Fire (Europe) Book
15.08.1944 - Meeting #1


Cease-Fire (Europe) Book
29.08.1944 - Meeting #3
Publication of Statistics
06.09.1944 - Meeting #2
Cease-Fire (Europe) Book
22.08.1944 - Meeting #2
Cease-Fire (Europe) Book
06.09.1944 - Meeting #4
Cease-Fire (Europe) Book
29.09.1944 - Meeting #5
October 1944
Cease-Fire (Europe) Book
05.10.1944 - Meeting #6
Visit to the United Kingdom of a mission from the US Joint Army and Navy Ammunition Storage Board
23.10.1944 - Meeting #1
Control of Missions
09.11.1944 - Meeting #11
Control of Missions
17.11.1944 - Meeting #12
Control of Missions
14.12.1944 - Meeting #14
The Employment of German and Italian Prisoners of War
13.10.1944 - Meeting #2
Security in the Caribbean Area
01.11.1944 - Meeting #6
Spanish Civil Airline between Madrid and the Canary Islands
16.11.1944 - Meeting #1
Control of Missions
28.11.1944 - Meeting #13
January 1945
Leave in North West Europe for Allied Personnel Serving in the UK
09.02.1945 - Meeting #1
Leave in North West Europe for Allied Personnel Serving in the UK
16.02.1945 - Meeting #2
The Employment of German and Italian Prisoners of War
23.02.1945 - Meeting #3
Publication of Statistics
02.03.1945 - Meeting #3
The Employment of German and Italian Prisoners of War
26.03.1945 - Meeting #5
Evacuation from German Occupied Territory
08.02.1945 - Meeting #1
Enemy Aliens in the Colonial Empire
15.02.1945 - Meeting #1
Control of Air Traffic
22.02.1945 - Meeting #1
The Employment of German and Italian Prisoners of War
02.03.1945 - Meeting #4
Control of Missions
06.03.1945 - Meeting #15
Control of Missions
28.03.1945 - Meeting #16
April 1945
Evacuation from German Occupied Territory
16.04.1945 - Meeting #2
Evacuation from German Occupied Territory
03.05.1945 - Meeting #3
Evacuation from German Occupied Territory
07.05.1945 - Meeting #4
The Employment of German and Italian Prisoners of War
22.05.1945 - Meeting #6
Cease-Fire (Europe) Book
06.06.1945 - Meeting #8
Enemy Aliens in the Colonial Empire
20.04.1945 - Meeting #2
Control of Neutral Vessels
04.05.1945 - Meeting #2
Cease-Fire (Europe) Book
17.05.1945 - Meeting #7
Spanish Civil Airline between Madrid and the Canary Islands
22.05.1945 - Meeting #2
Cease-Fire (Europe) Book
08.06.1945 - Meeting #9


Publication of Statistics
08.06.1945 - Meeting #4
Cease-Fire (Europe) Book
15.06.1945 - Meeting #10
Radio Security Committee
13.06.1945 - Meeting #3
Cease-Fire (Europe) Book
27.06.1945 - Meeting #11
July 1945
The Employment of German and Italian Prisoners of War
04.07.1945 - Meeting #7
Cease-Fire (Europe) Book
27.07.1945 - Meeting #12

Appendix V: Meeting frequency per year of the SSC; 1945-1947.



Number of attendees at meetings of SSC.

Meeting No.	
1945 – Meeting 1	22
1946 – Meeting 1	15
1946 – Meeting 2	27
1946 – Meeting 3	19
1946 – Meeting 4	23
1947 – Meeting 1	18
1947 – Meeting 2	17



Appendix VI: Bodies represented at meetings of the SSC, 1945-1947.

BODY[520]	1945 - 1947
Admiralty	7
Air Ministry	7
Board of Trade	5
Cabinet Office	2
Central Office of Information	1
Colonial Office	1
Control Office for Germany and Austria	1
Department of Health for Scotland	1
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research	5
Foreign Office	2
F.O.S.H. Germany	1
General Post Office	1
Geological Survey	1
HM Stationary Office	2
Home Office	6
Key Points Intelligence Directorate	1
MI5	6
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries	1
Ministry of Civil Aviation	4
Ministry of Defence	2
Ministry of Education	1
Ministry of Food	1
Ministry of Fuel and Power	1
Ministry of Health	2
Ministry of Labour (and National Service)	2
Ministry of Supply (and Aircraft Production)	6
Ministry of Town and Country Planning	2
Ministry of Transport	2
Ministry of Works	2
Ordnance Survey Department	2
Scottish Office	1
Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security	7
War Office	6

[520] Some bodies had multiple representatives at meeting, however as the purpose of this table is to demonstrate the variety of bodies, each body has only been counted once per meeting.

Appendix VII: Meeting frequency per year of the ISC.



Number of attendees at meetings of ISC.

Meeting No.	
1948 – Meeting 1	22
1948 – Meeting 2	15
1948 – Meeting 3	22
1949 – Meeting 1	24
1949 – Meeting 2	23
1949 – Meeting 3	18
1950 – Meeting 1	28
1950 – Meeting 2	25
1951 – Meeting 1	27
1951 – Meeting 2	26
1952 – Meeting 1	27



Appendix VIII: Bodies represented at meetings of the ISC.

BODY[521]	1948 – 1952
Admiralty	11
Air Ministry	10
Board of Customs and Excise	1
Cabinet Office	9
Colonial Office	11
Commonwealth Relations Office	9
Cypher Policy Board	5
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research	7
Foreign Office	11
General Post Office	3
HM Stationary Office	1
Home Office	11
MI5	11
Ministry of Civil Aviation	4
Ministry of Defence	8
Ministry of Education	1
Ministry of Fuel and Power	2
Ministry of Supply	11
Ministry of Transport	3
Ministry of Works	10
Ordnance Survey Department	1
Scottish Office	10
Treasury	10
Treasury Solicitor's Office	2
War Office	11

[521] Some bodies had multiple representatives at meeting, however as the purpose of this table is to demonstrate the variety of bodies, each body has only been counted once per meeting.

Appendix IX: Re-organisation of Civil Security Committees.[522]

ANNEX

RE-ORGANISATION OF CIVIL SECURITY COMMITTEES

The Security Committee (Ministerial)

Chairman - The Home Secretary
Secretary - Mr. P. Allen
Asst. Secretary - Hon. J.L. Vernon

The Official Committee on Security

(a) Oversea Defence Committee

Chairman - Rt.Hon. Sir Norman Brook
Jt. Secretaries - Hon. J.L. Vernon
- Miss C.J. Felton

(b) Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Censorship

(c) Press Censorship Committee

Committee on General Security Procedures

Chairman - Mr. P. Allen
Jt. Secretaries - Hon. J.L. Vernon
- W/Cdr. Alldis
- Miss C.J. Felton

Committee on Personnel Security

Chairman - Mr. A.J.D.Winnifrith
Jt. Secretaries - Miss E.L. Smart
- Hon. J.L. Vernon

Committee on the Security of Economic and Industrial Information about the United Kingdom

Chairman - Mr.P. Allen
Jt. - Hon.J.L.Vernon
Secretaries - Miss C.J. Felton

(d) Key Points Sub-Committee of the Defence (Transition) Committee

consult the Official Committee on Security on general security policies and procedures arising out of their work.

Security Officers' Conference

Chairman - Mr. A.R. Jaboz-Smith
Jt. Secretaries - W/Cdr. Alldis
- Miss C.J. Felton

[522] This document is available in multiple file locations. One example is CAB 21/4258: 'Committee on General Security Procedures: Minutes of Meeting 1 (1953)', 05.12.1953.

Appendix X: Security Organisation in United Kingdom.[523]



[523] CAB 21/3248: 'Security Organisation in United Kingdom', no date.