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Author's response to "*Labor History Symposium*: Ralph Darlington, *Labour Revolt in Britain, 1910-1914*"

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I'm very grateful to each of the three commentators for providing some insightful comments, as well as critical observations, on my *Labour Revolt in Britain 1910–14*. My response considers each in turn, hopefully further contributing to our understanding of this remarkable period in British labour history.

The government and industrial relations

First, Chris Wrigley usefully reflects on the ad hoc and pragmatic nature of the Liberal government's attempt to resolve the crisis in industrial relations, involving contrasting perspectives between individual figures such as Board of Trade advisors George Askwith and Sydney Buxton, and Cabinet members such as Henry Asquith (Prime Minister), William Churchill (Home Secretary), and David Lloyd George (Chancellor) and others. The analysis presented in my book – that the Liberal government had no settled approach for the prevention of strikes or regulation of industrial relations between workers and employers – both concurs with and attempts to extend Chris's own previous foundational work (along with other historians) on this matter (Davidson, 1974, 1978; Wrigley, 1976, 1979, 1982). But it is useful to draw out some additional related features of this overall assessment.

Significantly, Askwith's (1974, p. 351) scathing critique of the government's ignorance of labour affairs, with Ministers apparently having 'little or no labour policy' seems too harsh a judgement. In fact, if between 1908 and 1910 a total of 400 cabinet papers were produced, not one of which related to industrial relations – which instead was left entirely to the initiative of the Board of Trade (Moss, 1983, pp. 76–77) – in the period between June and September 1911 five papers were produced with titles such as 'The Present Unrest in the Labour World' and 'The Industrial Situation'. In other words, the sheer level and nature of the Labour Revolt forced the whole Cabinet to discuss the growing strike momentum with some real concern and expend a considerable amount of time and energy grappling with trying to develop an industrial relations policy to contain workers' militancy, even though this resulted in varying improvised approaches.

Chris's emphasis on the particularly significant personal role of Lloyd George in helping to end the 1911 railway and 1912 miners' strikes is more than justified. Hence, Lenin's (1978, pp. 291–2) scathing acknowledgement of his ability to twist and turn in any direction to defuse industrial conflict and disarm union leaders: 'a first-class bourgeois manipulator, an astute politician, a popular orator who will deliver any speeches you like, even r-r-revolutionary ones to a labour audience, and a man who . . . serves the bourgeoisie splendidly, and serves it *precisely* among the workers.'

At the same time, while government ministers on several occasions attempted to directly intervene in national strikes, the Board of Trade's consistent role during this period remained focused

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on solving (often successfully) increasing numbers of disputes without political intervention. Its approach was to a large degree premised on the notion that for industrial relations to run smoothly, the accredited representatives of both capital and labour needed to be strong and organised, not only in order to come to the bargaining table from a position of credibility, but also so that each side could police their own ranks and thus stand by agreements (Cronin, 1982, p. 87). This meant the Board sought to redress the imbalance in the position of labour by supporting union recognition and collective bargaining machinery through which industrial relations and disputes could be institutionalised, in the process cultivating amicable relations with 'responsible' trade union officials who could help them contain and limit conflict (Howell, 2005, p. 67).

It also attempted to strengthen moves towards the establishment of conciliation boards in different industries, with the employment of large numbers of union officials to civil service administrative positions, and provision of a state subsidy that involved union officials in operating the government's national insurance scheme. The engagement of the services of John Burns, one of the leaders of the 1889 London docks' strike, who subsequently became a Liberal Cabinet Minister and helped bring the 1911 London transport strike to an end, was emblematic of this approach. Yet the integration of union leaderships within an institutionalised framework was by no means a smooth approach. As Sydney Buxton reported to the Cabinet in April 1912: 'The leaders have lost influence and consequently self-confidence, and naturally are unwilling to take the same responsibility as they would gladly have taken, and did take, under former conditions. The newer leaders have little respect for agreements or for their own signatures' (Buxton, Memorandum to Cabinet 13 April 1912, TNA/CAB 37/110/62).

Thus overall, during the period 1910–14, far from simply acting as the mouthpiece of employers *per se*, the Board of Trade actively opposed the more provocative employers' tactics employed against trade unions – resulting in the shipping and docks companies and Port of London Authority chairman Lord Devonport during the 1912 London transport strike viewing the Board with intense distrust (Davidson, 1978, p. 590).

Nevertheless, there was an underlying identity between the apparent consensus objectives of the Board and the self-interests of employers and Liberal government generally: a concern to provide a safety valve that could reduce the threat to property and class relations and offer a means of social control (Davidson, 1978, pp. 590–1; Fox, 1985, p. 246).

Meanwhile, as Chris mentions, when industrial unrest appeared especially menacing in 1911, the government set up a joint committee of employers and union representatives, an Industrial Council chaired by Askwith that aimed at 'the substitution in the industrial sphere of co-operation for antagonism in relations between employers and employed' (Wrigley, 1979, p. 5). In the event, the Council failed for a variety of reasons: employers tended to view it as another attempt at state intervention in industry, while many trade unionists feared it would lead to compulsory arbitration, such that even Will Thorne, of the National Union of Gas Workers and General Labourers and chairman of the TUC's Parliamentary Committee, refused to serve because 'he thought such a scheme would tend to limit the power of the workers to strike' (Clegg, 1985 p. 99). The Industrial Council's consultative and quasi-judicial functions were irreconcilable; it was too unwieldy to undertake successful conciliation and in practice ended up essentially as a talking shop that faded away (Davidson, 1974 pp. 4–6; Wrigley, 1979, pp. 5–6), underlining the limitations of the government's industrial relations policy initiatives generally.

Gender and class

Karen Hunt's contribution emphasises the way in which, notwithstanding my attempt to document the central role of women in the Labour Revolt, I did not explore the difference between women's and men's actions that resulted from the pronounced gender segregation of the Edwardian labour market and labour movement. Such demarcation, it is argued, shaped both the experience of work

and opportunities for collective action, reflecting a 'sexual division of militancy' alongside the class struggle.

Unfortunately, my exploration of this dimension was subject to cutback arising from the publisher's final word count limitations (which had already been considerably breached), but it was partly integrated into two of my recent *Labor History* articles on the relationship between the British suffrage and labour revolts and on working-class women's active participation in the 1910–1914 strike wave (Darlington, 2020, 2023b). In this response it is also possible to briefly redress the relative neglect to some extent. But in doing so, I will simultaneously warn against the danger of 'throwing the baby out of the bathwater' by over duly emphasising the perceived negative differences between women's and men's actions and diminishing the positive and broad-reaching features of women's strikes and extent to which men were supportive.

To begin with, the 1911 Census graphically underlined the way in which, while nearly three-quarters of single women were in paid work, only just over 13 per cent of those aged 35–47 – who often accommodated the rival domestic demands on their time that came with motherhood – were employed. Where employment was relatively secure, regular and concentrated in large workplaces, notably the Lancashire cotton mills where 17.4 cent of all women were employed, they accounted by 1914 for nearly half the total number of women trade unionists. Outside cotton much of the growth of women's trade unionism occurred in the expanding semi-skilled factory trades and among shop assistants, telephonists, postal sorters, and elemental schoolteachers.

But the vast majority of working-class women were disproportionately concentrated in those sectors and workplaces that were much more difficult to organise, including domestic service (where 39 per cent of all women were employed), or clothing workshops (15.2 per cent) where many were employed in small workplaces on a part-time or seasonal basis. They were usually so poorly paid that the penny a week that men in skilled industries could afford for union membership was beyond their reach, and even if they could pay for it, the irregular and transitory (for women prior to marriage) nature of their employment made their subscriptions hard to collect.

At the same time, women's growing industrial presence was often viewed as threatening the male breadwinner's 'family wage' that should be sufficient to keep his wife and young children out of the labour market. Given these attitudes it is not surprising that women's pay rates and grade of work tended to be worse than men's. And as my book made clear, reflecting the deeply held male chauvinist view of women in the pre-war period, many trade unions displayed an indifference or even opposition to the inclusion of women as members of their own organisations.

There *were* some general unions who welcomed the recruitment and organisation of women workers (such as the mixed-sex Workers' Union), and there was a notable concentration of women union members in industries such as cotton and jute and in unions such as the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives. The National Federation of Women Workers (NFWW) – open to all women in unorganised trades or those women who were excluded from their appropriate trade union – also helped women overcome their fragmented and isolated position whilst-operating as far as it could with established unions with a view to joint organisation ([C.] Hunt, 2014). Yet even though there was a remarkable 54 per cent increase in women's union membership during 1910–1914 - arising primarily from women workers' increasing strike activity and the activities of some unions specifically orientated towards organising women – by 1914 less than 90 per cent of all trade unionists were men, and only 10 per cent of women workers were unionised.

In the process, as Karen points out (along with others), there were formidable obstacles to the development of female union activism. Thus, despite the way NFWW organisers were often able to help non-unionised women strikers win resounding victories in disputes with employers, resulting in the recruitment of many new members, numbers could quickly decline and union branches fall by the wayside unless there were activists to sustain organisation and build-up rank-and-file participation (de La Mare, 2008, p. 78; Gordon, 1991, p. 226; [C.] Hunt, 2011, pp. 171–184; Thom, 1986, pp. 276–277).

It should also be noted that, apart from the gender segregation of the labour market, insecure and enforced temporary nature of employment, and overwhelming male dominance of trade unionism, there were also internal barriers to the linking of gender with class. Ironically, even both Julia Varley, chief women's officer for the Workers' Union, and Mary Macarthur, leader of the NFWW, despite their ardent support for building trade union organisation among women workers, were wary of alienating male trade unionists (whose support was viewed as vital) by emphasising sex (or female suffrage) over class, and expressly objected to any attempt to create 'sex antagonism' between men and women ([C.] Hunt, 2012, pp. 87–88). In seeking the support of male trade unionists, the NFWW challenged neither the concept of the family wage nor the view that a women's primary role was that of motherhood.

Eleanor Gordon has highlighted the way that while Macarthur recognised the necessity of an organisational apparatus and propaganda directed specifically at women workers (albeit as a temporary expedient before they could be integrated into the wider union movement), she never acknowledged that women's work experiences differed from men's or that it required a special approach which took account of the manner in which (in Karen's words) 'the sexual division of labour in society patterned and conditioned both women's experience of waged labour and their response to exploitation'. Content to confine their concerns within the traditional boundaries of trade unionism, they made little attempt to raise demands, for example, around the questions of women's reproductive role such as birth control, maternity rights, and childcare (Gordon, 1991, p. 229, 23 4; Thom, 1986, p. 269).

Yet notwithstanding all the above, I think Karen's contribution is unduly dismissive of the significance of women's strike activity and its broader implications. On one level this can be seen in the way she focuses exclusively on the Gundry's 1912 strike to illustrate her critique, when in many respects this dispute (which I featured in my book) reflects an important but distinct *minority* trend of women workers' strikes, rather than the *wider* canvas (which I also attempted to explore). Thus, it involved merely 35 non-unionised women located in a very small isolated non-union town surrounded by swathes of unorganised agricultural labour.

But many women workers were also involved in important strikes in mixed-sex workplaces which tended to be in much larger-sized workplaces with steadier employment, and where there was some prior collective form of trade union organisation. This was the case in the Lancashire 1910 spinners' and 1911–12 weavers' lockouts, 1910 Neilstron textile workers' strike, 1911 Vale of Leven United Turkey Red strike, 1912 Garston bobbin workers' strikes, and 1913 Kilbirnie curtain net workers' strike. In such circumstances, some of the larger and more-established (mixed-sex) textile unionsfor example, in Lancashire and Scotland – as well as the Workers' Union among non-union metal engineering workers in numerous different factories across the West Midlands where unionism was more firmly established among male workers – appear to have had greater success in both recruiting and retaining new female members arising from strike activity and subsequently sustaining workplace union organisation (Hyman, 1971; Kenefick, 2012). Notwithstanding obstacles and limitations, the trend of female trade union membership overall was overwhelming in an upward and sustained direction.

More generally, Karen's attempt to downplay the significance of women's strike activity during 1910–14 as somehow deterministically cramped within merely narrow gender structured relations also appears exaggerated. Perhaps not surprisingly it was often very young unmarried women and 'girls' who were the driving force to strikes in which they were involved (for example, with a high proportion of the 1,700 women involved in the 1910 Neilston textile workers' strike aged between 15 and 18 years old). The 'effervescence' of young female (and male) workers generally (Kenefick, 2012) was displayed in the belligerent working-class self-confidence and vigorous and self-emancipatory nature of much strike activity with its underlying demand for dignity, self-respect and control over working lives – which for so long had been denied to women.

In the process, women often brought what has been termed 'specifically female characteristics' to their workplace resistance – spontaneity, lack of restraint, boisterousness – which differentiated

women's militancy from more formal male trade unionism. Strikes often displayed a 'sudden welling-up of confidence among women workers', with a carnival-type atmosphere with elements of street theatre being generated very different to the more 'sober and serious' aspect of demonstrations of male workers, and which could involve the subversion of patriarchal authority through 'ridicule and sexual innuendo' (Fraser, 1968, p. 120; Gordon, 1991, pp. 209–10; Hamish Fraser, 1999, p. 120).

But at the same time, they generated their own organic strike activists and leaders, with women playing a prominent role on many different strike committees in both female and male dominated workplaces (including equal representation alongside their male counterparts in the 1913 Kenrick's and United Hinge Company's West Midlands metal workers strikes), as well as sometimes forming part of the union negotiating teams alongside men with management (as in the 1911 Singer strike) (Darlington, 2023a, p. 215).

Significantly many women strikers appear to have been influenced and emboldened not only by the growing industrial militancy in which their predominately male counterparts in the trade unions were involved, but also by the militant women's suffrage movement of the period ([C.] Hunt, 2014, p. 49; Darlington, 2020, pp. 15–16), a feature which Karen ignores completely. Thus, they sometimes adopted 'suffrage tactics of propaganda and demonstration' to give maximum impact to their actions, with the production of leaflets, strike songs, banners, postcards, ribbons, and badges to publicise their struggles (Thom, 1986, p. 269;, 1998, p. 103). But the overall weakening of traditional respect for 'law and order' and constitutional behaviour that characterised the militancy of *both* the suffrage *and* labour struggles of the period, was reflected in the way in which, in a context in which philosophies based on the notion of militant 'direct action' had became widespread (Cole, 1948, p. 321; Darlington, 2023a, p. 215), many women workers engaged in similar forms of assertive, aggressive and violent behaviour so characteristic of male workers' militancy during the period. For example, during a six-month strike at the Bliss Tweed Mill in Chipping Norton, Oxfordshire in 1913 involving woollen-textile workers, strikers targeted the houses of the mill's general manager, smashing their windows, with assaults on foremen, 'scabs' and police (Richardson, 2008).

Again, while Karen acknowledges my attempt to highlight forms of solidarity beyond conventional industrial solidarity to community-based forms, she dismisses this as women attending to the 'housework of militancy', suggesting it was invariably 'organised and sustained by women' in a defined gender-structured fashion. But this one-sided portrayal fails to take into account the way in which during the course of many male workers' strikes (such as miners, dockers and railwaymen) there was a culture of community solidarity and self-defence that saw the wives, girlfriends and sisters of those directly involved in strikes often going far beyond merely helping to raise financial support and the day-to-day provision of food and other basic necessities to sustain strikes, or participating in huge numbers on local solidarity demonstrations.

For example, during the entirely male 1911 Horwich locomotive workers' strike, women attended the mass meetings, sometimes in large numbers, and even attempted to vote, with one male speaker at a mass meeting feeling it necessary to call on the women 'to be ladylike'. A riot occurred in September when a large crowd, including several hundred strikers' wives and female siblings, assembled at the work's main entrance to await the arrival of 'blacklegs', foremen and company officials, with fights breaking out with police (Whitehead, 1983, p. 21; pp. 18–19). And throughout the 1910–11 South Wales miners' strike women participated in the mass picketing aimed at stopping scabs, showering boiling water onto the heads of the police, and collecting stones in their aprons to provide relays of ammunition to pickets (Evans, 1911, pp. 90–95).

Gordon (1991, p. 254) has suggested that the widespread support which women's strikes elicited from the broader male-dominated labour movement derived from the image of women as helpless victims in need of protection against industrial capitalism. But as with Karen's comments, this belittles such solidarity. For example, during the 1913 Kilbirnie networkers' strike, many of the young women strikers' husbands worked in the iron mines and steel mills of nearby Glenganock and contributed to mobilising the considerable support of the wider trade union and labour movement in the locality (including the Scottish TUC, Independent Labour Party, and radical left),

buttressed by the network of family and community loyalties (Kenefick, 2015, pp. 52–53; p. 56). Similarly, a contributory feature of the initial impetus and subsequent solidarity generated for the strikes by 15,000 non-unionised women in 20 different food-processing factories in Bermondsey, London in 1911, was the simultaneous London-wide transport workers' strike that involved riverside male dock workers with a tradition of trade unionism stretching back to the 1889 dockers' strike, and many of whose wives and partners locally now joined the action.

Finally, with reference to the broader linking of gender and class issues, Karen ignores my attempt to draw out some important areas of dialogue, overlap and activity that highlighted the potential for cross-fertilisation between the suffrage and labour movements, even if at the time these were not always necessarily consciously recognised, pursued or developed. Arguably Sylvia Pankhurst and her East London Federation of Suffragettes played a key role in creating a tradition of struggle that linked female suffrage to trade union organisation to improve working women's wages and conditions as part of a wider struggle over poverty, housing, childcare, and other social issues (Connolly, 2013). Sylvia challenged both the suffragette leadership who insisted that social questions, class and workers' industrial struggles were irrelevant to the women's movement, as well as those in the labour and socialist movement who ignored questions of women's oppression. She highlighted the importance of *both* struggles by revealing the devastating interaction of oppression and exploitation on working women's lives. Significantly, the solidarity generated for the 1913–14 Dublin lockout by both Sylvia and by suffragists (including the socialist-feminist Dora Montefiore about whom Karen has written) also encapsulated the potential for links between the labour, socialist and suffrage movements (Darlington, 2023a, p. 218).

Yet even though there were some important interconnections between the labour and suffrage movements, contrary to Karen's apparent claim otherwise this did not fundamentally overcome the way in which they generally remained on separate parallel tracks (Darlington, 2020, pp. 8–9; p.18;, 2023a, pp. 37–38).

Syndicalism

Lewis Mates reiterates some of the issues he explored in his impressive study (Mates, 2016) of a rank-and-file movement inside the Durham coalfield. Alas, despite some generous complimentary comments on my *Labour Revolt*, he attempts to make broader political assessments about the role of the Independent Labour Party (ILP) and nature of syndicalism that are at the very least questionable.

As my book explores, a significant layer of left-wing ILP members became increasingly dissatisfied with the Labour Party's timid performance in Parliament and way in which any socialist aspirations were being sacrificed in the interests of an alliance with trade union officials and links with the Liberals. Many of them were active in unions and campaigned in support of strikes in different areas of the country, including the South Wales coalfield where more syndicalist-influenced ideas also took root in local ILP and South Wales Miners' Federation branches.

By contrast in Durham, as Lewis documents, although ILP activists adopted class-based industrial militancy rhetoric influenced by the syndicalist pamphlet *The Miners' Next Step* produced in South Wales (albeit rejecting its ultimate revolutionary objectives), and proved capable of galvanising widespread support in the Durham Miners Federation, they effectively occupied the political space where committed organised revolutionary syndicalists (like George Harvey and Will Lawther) might otherwise have prospered. This ensured that a distinctly syndicalist movement in Durham remained numerically comparatively small. As a result, instead of industrial unrest potentially challenging Labour's parliamentary political project and supporting syndicalist aims that the working class could only achieve its aims through action on the industrial sphere, the Durham rank-and-file movement that developed channelled political loyalties from the Liberals to Labour.

But there are certain conjectural factors that also need to be taken into account – including the specific local features of the Durham coalfield and the consequences of the implementation of the 8-hour day, its Liberal-dominated miners' union leadership, and the political significance locally of

Asquith's act of *force majeure* in bringing the 1912 national strike to an end by introducing the national minimum wage – that were not necessarily replicated elsewhere in quite the same way. In addition, the influence of the Durham coalfield revolutionary syndicalists, compared to South Wales, was stymied by political sectarianism and dogmatism (Mates, 2016, p. 276).

Second, Lewis acknowledges that the political dynamics of the Durham coalfield does not contradict my claim that like the broader Labour Party, the ILP as an organisation, as well as the bulk of its members, refused to break with their scrupulous commitment to parliamentarism and the fundamental electoral logic that either publicly eschewed the class war, or at the very least subordinated it to the political strategy of winning representation in local and national institutions (Darlington, 2023a, p. 254). And while it is likely the role of individual ILP activists and some branches varied in different contexts, it does not contradict my claim either that the ILP (and wider Labour Party) generally tended to act as a brake on the Labour Revolt and blunt the radical political horizons of many workers.

What of Lewis's broader suggestion that, contrary to the depiction of the Labour Revolt being one of impasse or retreat for the Labour Party as a political force, with extra-parliamentary direct action notions becoming more appealing, the distinctive political challenge mounted by the ILP towards Liberalism in the Durham coalfields provides some justification for those historians who have emphasised the class nature of the Labour Party's appeal and its increasing trade union affiliation before the war? Well, yes – but it still required the impact of significant political and social change and an internal split between Asquith and Lloyd George during the First World War before the Labour Party was able to supplant the Liberals as a parliamentary political party. Moreover, although there were undoubtedly factors encouraging the underlying so-called 'rise of Labour', its continued relative parliamentary electoral weakness pre-1914 (notwithstanding the vagaries of the Edwardian franchise) reflected the Liberals' ability to retain some working-class support and Labour's inability to pull away from their gravitational pull in parliament. In sum, there were uneven, varying and contradictory dimensions, so that although there were a significant layer of workers (no doubt primarily those involved in the strike wave) who appear to have been disaffected with the Labour Party's role as an adjunct of the Liberals, there were undoubtedly others (including some involved in industrial militancy like in the Durham coalfield influenced by the ILP) who viewed Labour as a credible and attractive alternative to the Liberals.

Meanwhile, Lewis objects to my argument in *Labour Revolt* that the syndicalists' focus on industrial struggles meant the subordination of ideological and political questions. Of course, it is true that whilst many syndicalists dismissed 'political action' they were (by adopting a narrow definition of political action) basically rejecting or minimising what they saw as the dead-end of electoral and parliamentary politics advocated by the ILP and Labour Party. This did not mean collaboration was necessarily ruled out between syndicalists and 'political socialists' in the radical left organisations. Moreover, syndicalists propagandised about a variety of directly political issues, despite their protestations to be 'non-political', and were inescapably 'political' in their commitment to the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism and its replacement by a collectivist society based on workers' control. However, they argued that the solution to all political problems could be found in the workplace where political differences were subordinated into the economic need for militant and class-wide forms of industrial unionism.

Consequently, they focused attention virtually exclusively on the industrial struggle of workers, with the subordination of wider political issues, for which I provide different examples, including women's suffrage and the question of Ireland, which Lewis does not refute. A related limitation of syndicalism's dismissal of political action was that it did not explicitly address the problem of how a revolutionary general strike to establish workers' control would overcome the state's monopoly of armed force in defence of the capitalist economic, social and political order, and need for a *political* as well as *economic* revolution (Darlington, 2013, pp. 247–60;, 2023a, pp. 267–69).

Elsewhere Lewis attempts to draw out a contradiction between my argument that the Industrial Syndicalist Education League was 'an essentially educational and propagandist body ... [that] did

not really develop a distinct centralised, national combat organisation or leadership that was capable of practically intervening in the strike wave (beyond merely a loose network of individual supporters'), and the way that leading figures like Tom Mann played a leadership role in the 1911 Liverpool general transport strike.

But in many respects the syndicalists were a victim of a hidden contradiction in their own thought and action. Clearly, they *did* provide a form of informal (organic) leadership to workers, particularly when they suggested initiatives that involved workers taking strike action, often independent of full-time union officials. But ideological considerations and experience of the trade union and Labour Party leaders led them to reject the idea of leadership focused within a formal (structured) organisation as reactionary. Yet arguably the lesson of the strikes in which they became involved, combined with the extreme concentration of economic and political power in the hands of the state, was that without some form of centralised organisation there was the danger of the movement wasting its strength and exerting its massive power to limited purpose. Their 'anti-leadership' convictions meant they effectively undermined the basis for effective co-ordinated action (Darlington, 2013, pp. 261–264;, 2023a, p. 269).

Finally, Lewis complains that I barely mention the influence of anarchism in the syndicalist movement. But as I have argued elsewhere (Darlington, 2009), while the international syndicalist movement generally represented a synthesis of three distinct ideological influences of revolutionary trade unionism, Marxism and anarchism, this was overlaid with a singular pattern in each respective country, and if the contribution of anarchists was significant in countries like France, Italy and Spain, it was negligible in Britain.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

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