

# 1 Contractors' Perspectives on Delays in Healthcare Projects: 2 A Tale of Two Contrasting Provisions

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## 13 **Abstract:**

14 Many construction projects are delayed due to a range of factors, including the unique  
15 spatial and environmental context of every construction site, the challenges of maintaining  
16 quality, and the timing of decision making around design. In consequence, construction  
17 contracts include mechanisms to accommodate delay while maintaining enforceability.  
18 Different standard forms of contract (SFC) adopt different approaches to managing delay  
19 and lack consistency in accommodating delays of the same nature. This study selects two  
20 SFCs commonly used in UK construction projects, New Engineering Contract (NEC) and  
21 Joint Contracts Tribunal (JCT) suites, and proposes a common approach to managing  
22 delays, focusing particularly on the handling of the compensation event (CE) and Relevant  
23 Event (RE) mechanisms in those respective contracts. Using a qualitative methodology, a  
24 multi-case study analysis was conducted comprising four general contractors utilizing JCT  
25 and NEC SFCs. The case studies enabled the analytic comparison of delay-caused  
26 challenges as between different projects delivered using different SFCs. The findings reveal  
27 that while on JCT-based projects general contractors have typically suffered cash flow and  
28 programming issues caused by employer failures to adhere to contractual timescales for

29 assessing requests for extensions of time, on NEC-based projects general contractors have  
30 suffered CE-related issues associated with programming and administration. Further  
31 findings were that the common challenges of both CE and RE management processes  
32 were high volume, assessment and timescales of claims, as well as timing and collaboration.  
33 Developing from these findings, recommendations are made for additional clauses to be  
34 added to SFCs to achieve a consistent approach towards construction delays.

35 **Practical Applications:** By examining delay management under two widely used standard  
36 forms of contract in the UK—the New Engineering Contract (NEC) and the Joint  
37 Contract Tribunal (JCT) suites —this research not only identifies specific implementation  
38 challenges inherent in these contracts but also offers recommendations on how to address  
39 such challenges. Contractors using JCT contracts often face cash flow and scheduling  
40 issues due to employer delays in assessing extension of time requests, while those using  
41 NEC contracts encounter complexities with compensation events. To address these issues,  
42 the study proposes incorporation of additional clauses in contracts to standardize delay  
43 management, which can significantly enhance project outcomes. Furthermore, the  
44 research underscores the importance of collaborative contract management practices,  
45 particularly in NEC contracts, to mitigate delay-related challenges and promote timely  
46 project completion. These findings are crucial for industry professionals seeking to  
47 improve project efficiency, minimize disputes, and achieve successful project delivery. By  
48 adopting the recommended strategies, practitioners can enhance their approach to  
49 managing delays, ensuring smoother and more predictable project execution in the  
50 healthcare construction sector. The Institution of Civil Engineers and the Joint Contracts  
51 Tribunal, both responsible for publishing these contracts, and other institutions with  
52 similar provisions are also likely to find these recommendations useful when revising their  
53 contract documents.

54 **Keywords:** Compensation Events (CE), Contractors, Construction Industry, Extension of  
55 Time (EoT), Healthcare Projects, Standard forms of Contract (SFC).

## 56 Introduction

57 A time delay in construction projects has been simply viewed as the act of not completing  
58 the specific work item(s) or the whole project by the deadline set out in the initial contract (Alhyari  
59 and Al Ani, 2022; Kowalczyk *et al.*, 2018). Though industry stakeholders try their best to avoid  
60 delay, delays are common in most construction projects due to the uncertainty surrounding project  
61 implementation, hence the need for flexibility in contracts afforded by extension of time provisions  
62 (Farrell and Sunindijo, 2022; Burr, 2016). Nowadays, most construction projects are let using  
63 contracts based on one or other of a relatively small “pool” of Standard Forms of Contracts  
64 (SFCs), which varies geographically and jurisdictionally, but which help to set a common basis  
65 upon which projects can be implemented. Though all SFCs include mechanisms to meet common  
66 challenges of construction projects such as delay, each SFC has a unique way of dealing with delays.  
67 SFC delay and extension of time clauses typically provide ways to manage the cost and time  
68 consequences of complex and sometimes inter-related delaying circumstances. Keane and Caletka  
69 (2015) classify construction delays into four categories: excusable, non-excusable, compensable,  
70 and non-compensable, thus establishing a framework for analyzing how contracts may allocate  
71 delay risk events to the contractor and the employer. This framework for codifying the type of  
72 delay occurrence is a manifestation of the different ways in which delays can occur in construction  
73 projects, causing significant problems for both the employer and the contractor.

74 What makes delays problematic is not so much how to eliminate them but rather how to  
75 identify them early, and assess their nature and impact accurately (Keane & Caletka, 2015),  
76 particularly during the construction period. Because of this, many SFCs contain clauses which  
77 enable the originally agreed time for project completion to be extended in certain circumstances  
78 (Extension of Time clauses, EOT), thus allowing for schedule flexibility whilst also maintaining  
79 some control over the calculation and allocation of the financial impact of delay. For example,  
80 where a project runs late for reasons which are not contractually the responsibility of the contractor  
81 (i.e. excusable delays) EOTs clauses in SFCs will typically protect the contractor from liability for  
82 liquidated damages (Burr, 2016).

83 Unless properly dealt with, delays have the potential to cause disputes in construction  
84 projects (Satish *et al.*, 2020). Keane and Caletka (2015) highlighted the need to seek any remedies  
85 at the earliest opportunity to prevent such disputes. Though early remedies for delays have been  
86 proposed, in reality, contractors are confronted with difficulties in identifying the most suitable  
87 resolution mechanisms. Consequently, SFCs have standardized approaches for predetermined  
88 delay scenarios. For example, the Joint Contracts Tribunal (JCT) suite of contracts provides a  
89 retrospective approach to delays while considering the "time" dimension, whereas the New  
90 Engineering Contracts (NEC) suite deals with time and cost impacts as they arise, promoting a  
91 prospective approach. The JCT suite of contracts, which has been very widely used in the UK  
92 construction industry, now faces stiff competition as many Employers, including government  
93 departments and funding agencies, push for the adoption of the NEC alternatives (Besaiso, et al  
94 2018). Yet sections of the construction industry, which is largely characterized by its adversarial  
95 nature, continue to resist the adoption of the NEC suite which promotes collaborative approaches  
96 to contract administration (Lau *et al.*, 2019). Although studies have been undertaken to compare  
97 various provisions in standard forms of contracts (e.g., Besaiso *et al.*, 2018; Burr *et al.*, 2021; Lane  
98 and Pickavance 2015), to the best of authors' knowledge there has been no research published  
99 detailing a comparative analysis of the delay mechanisms in the JCT and NEC SFCs situated in an  
100 empirical case study context. Delays matter because they have not only been identified as leading  
101 causes of cost overruns and claims but they also lead to unnecessary construction disputes (Satish  
102 et al, 2020), thereby affecting project viability and business relationships. A comparative analysis  
103 of delay provisions would not only lead to better informed decisions on which SFC provides better  
104 protection mechanisms but may also suggest areas requiring improvement to inform revisions to  
105 the SFCs. Hence, this study identified the delay mechanisms in JCT and NEC as worthy of  
106 investigation in determining the challenges for implementation and thereby providing  
107 recommendations for the development of the investigated SFCs.

## 108 **Rationalization of Delay Events**

109 This section aims to establish the different ways in which NEC and JCT standard forms  
110 treat delay in construction projects, namely, the compensation event (CE) in NEC and REs in  
111 JCT. Following a critical literature synthesis on delay events and their similarities and differences,  
112 general challenges for contractors identified by the scholars were acknowledged to establish any  
113 gaps and criticisms within the current literature in order to establish what needs to be addressed  
114 by this study.

### 115 ***Explanation of Compensation Events and Relevant Events***

116 Although NEC does not provide an explicit definition for CE, the works of Robinson  
117 (2012) and Thomas *et al.* (2012) were found to reflect the contextual background for CE. Robinson  
118 (2012) acknowledged the potential of the CE mechanism in the NEC to manage all contractual  
119 claims within the limits of time and money. In furtherance to this, Thomas *et al.* (2012) described  
120 CE as a delay causing event which also triggers the reassessment of prices and the completion  
121 dates of milestone tasks. Meanwhile, NEC contracts promote the ethos of collaborative working  
122 to achieve NEC's main objectives: greater flexibility, clarity, and simplicity, and to stimulate good  
123 management (Broome, 2012; Wilmot-Smith, 2014). Consequently, the NEC clause related to CE  
124 embodies the principles behind the contract as the need to deal with CE through a prospective  
125 approach (Robinson, 2012), thus promoting timely management of the impact of delay. In light of  
126 this, Forward (2018) looked at the CE in NEC as the “magnum opus” of core clauses, highlighting  
127 CE’s criticality for NEC’s successful implementation. However, whilst CE-related clauses may be  
128 viewed as vital for the success of NEC contracts, they are not without problems. Eggleston (2006)  
129 highlighted the complexities that arise related to this clause in real-life contexts. This is evident in  
130 the transition from NEC3 to NEC4, where adaptability in the latter version requires parties to  
131 include additional CEs in the Contract Data, increasing the possibility of transferring more risks  
132 to the Employer (Forward, 2018). NEC3 and NEC4 refer to the third and fourth editions of the  
133 suite of NEC suite of contracts released by the Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE) in 2005 and  
134 2017, respectively.

135           On the other hand, JCT is an affiliation of a construction professional group that operates  
136 as a forum to determine the clauses of standard building contracts (Hughes, Champion, &  
137 Murdoch, 2015). Notably, within JCT contracts, RE clauses are utilized to facilitate the  
138 modification of project completion dates following the incidence of REs (Wilmot-Smith 2014).  
139 The Society of Construction Law (2017) acknowledged the JCT's approach to REs as benefiting  
140 both the contractor and employer by, on the one hand relieving the contractor from liability for  
141 damages in cases of excusable delay and on the other protecting the employer against time  
142 becoming "at large", which significantly complicates loss recovery. The JCT makes no reference  
143 to a delay notice of an event being a condition precedent for a contractor's entitlement to an  
144 extension of time (Knowles, 2012) which means that contractors only need to notify when the  
145 delay becomes "reasonably apparent" (Birkby, Ponte, & Alderson, 2008) and valid extension of  
146 time claims are routinely made long after the RE occurs.

#### 147 ***The Context of Delay Mechanisms in UK Healthcare Projects***

148           Government is a major player in construction procurement and different areas of activity  
149 are associated with different SFC adoption. An explanatory instance is the ProCure21+  
150 government framework, initiated by the UK Department of Health. This framework operates as a  
151 refined procurement mechanism uniquely designed for the procurement of healthcare  
152 construction capital projects within the National Health Service (NHS) and related healthcare  
153 entities. Notably, the ProCure21+ framework strategically employs the NEC contract suite, as  
154 indicated by the Department of Health (n.d.). Alongside, the other healthcare projects have been  
155 funded via private investment funding using the PFI mechanism (Eadie, Millar, & Grant, 2013),  
156 and these projects have tended to use JCT contracts (Hickman, 2000). These two alternative  
157 approaches to construction procurement of buildings in the same sector, health, provide an  
158 opportunity to examine whether there are differences in outcome or process around management  
159 of construction delays in the two different project types, one, ProCure 21+ using NEC contracts,  
160 and the other, PFI projects, using JCT contracts. This study seeks views from industry participants  
161 on whether and how the government's selection of NEC as the preferred SFC has affected delay-

162 resolving mechanisms in Procure 21+ projects as compared with the use of JCT in PFI procured  
163 healthcare projects.

164         The extra time and amounts claimed through REs and CEs can put healthcare projects  
165 under strain, considering the impact on completion dates and initial contract sums. Also, there is  
166 no consensus on how to deal with CEs and REs, and while there are contractual mechanisms to  
167 evaluate these events, their outcomes may differ depending on the employer. Such inconsistency  
168 may cause problems for all parties, particularly contractors, who need to adapt their approach  
169 depending on the outcome of CEs and REs. This study, therefore, focuses on the problems that  
170 delays and their mechanisms in the two main SFCs (NEC and JCT) can cause to the construction  
171 project and its stakeholders, and it aims to view them from the general contractor's viewpoint to  
172 gain a deeper understanding of the common issues and the ways those can be addressed.

### 173 **The Procedural Aspects of Compensation Events and Relevant Events**

#### 174 *The Procedure of Compensation Events*

175         The NEC's approach to events as they occur suggests a prospective approach in the CE  
176 process (Burr, 2016; Robinson, 2012), supporting the view that CEs should be pre-assessed to give  
177 the employer real-time knowledge of prices and dates, and also to give the contractor the  
178 confidence and motivation to beat the quote since there will be no review (Broome, 2012). The  
179 procedure laid down in Clause 61.3 requires the contractor to notify the employer of the event  
180 within 8 weeks of its occurrence (Knowles, 2012). Then, under Clauses 61.1 and 61.2, the employer  
181 must notify the contractor of the decision or instruction (Eggleston, 2006). Overall, the time frame  
182 for the whole process is five weeks, consisting of 3 weeks for the contractor to quote and two  
183 weeks for the employer to accept.

184         Broome (2012) explains that for the efficient agreement of CEs, the following information  
185 is needed: a sufficiently detailed, up-to-date program as a basis for the CE to be assessed, an  
186 effective early warning system, a capable quantity surveyor (QS) to understand the program and  
187 the contractual terms, and a collaborative attitude. The extent to which the completion date is  
188 delayed is assessed against the planned completion date, and upon acceptance, the CE cannot be

189 reassessed even if incorrect, in which case both the employer and contractor must accept the risk  
190 (Robinson, 2012). The only way CEs can be reassessed under Clause 63.4 is if, at the time of the  
191 event, there was insufficient information, so the quotation had to be based on assumptions, and  
192 these assumptions were incorrect (Robinson, 2012; Wilmot-Smith, 2014). The CE process was  
193 acknowledged by Forward (2018) as giving the ability to link the time and financial dimensions of  
194 a particular event and thereby correlate with contract documents to have a running final account  
195 and a predicted completion date.

### 196 ***The Procedure of Relevant Events***

197 The approach of JCT regarding REs is retrospective, as the claim assessment is carried out  
198 after the event has physically occurred (Burr, 2016). This approach places a duty on the contractor  
199 to notify the contract administrator (CA) of a RE when it becomes reasonably apparent that  
200 progress is likely to be affected (Chappell, 2017). Accordingly, Brawn (2012) described the three-  
201 stage process under JCT for delay event occurrences: (1) assessing whether the delay was caused  
202 by a RE, (2) determining whether it has caused a critical delay, and (3) granting a fair and reasonable  
203 additional time. However, before the additional time is granted, the contractor is obliged to prove  
204 a link between the RE(s) and the period of delay (for each event if it is a series of events) (Ndekugri  
205 and Rycroft, 2009). In addition, while additional time is claimed, Clause 2.28.6 requires the  
206 contractor to use their best endeavors in mitigating any potential delays resulting from the claimed  
207 event (and for each event if it is a series) (Birkby, Ponte, & Alderson, 2008). Once the information  
208 has been provided and assessed, additional time should be granted with a new completion date,  
209 discouraging the "wait and see" approach (Society of Construction Law, 2017). In addition,  
210 Chappell (2017) highlighted the 12-week time frame for the employer to assess and grant additional  
211 time upon the consideration of the occurrence of the event(s) and what is the likely delay to cause  
212 (for each event if there is a series of events).



## 213 **Challenges in the CE and Relevant Event Procedures**

### 214 *Timing/Volume of Variations or Events*

215 Many studies have revealed how difficult it is for contractors to manage the time and cost  
216 variations imposed by delay events and how SFCs' CE and RE mechanisms relate to them.  
217 Accordingly, Farrell and Sunindijo (2020) states that in complex larger projects, the number of  
218 CEs can mount up to become an onerous task for the contractor. Because having such a high  
219 number of CEs might require a professional to be fully committed to the identification,  
220 assessment, and documentation of respective claims on time (Yeung *et al.*, 2022), having an  
221 increased number of events may also make it difficult for the contractor to meet the contractual  
222 timescales (Brewer, 2007). Beezant (2012) recognized the suitability of NEC for projects that may  
223 have a modest number of CEs, thus it would be almost impossible or impractical for the contractor  
224 to administer the CE system in a larger or more complex project environment. Yet the provision  
225 for additional CEs to be included in the Contract Data under the NEC4 escalates the problem of  
226 dealing with an even higher number of CEs (Rowlinson, 2018). Despite the CE process being  
227 relatively simple, a high number of CEs can make it difficult to manage at once, which may lead  
228 the contractors and employers to abandon the procedure to sort out such issues upon completion  
229 of the project (Yeung *et al.*, 2022; Hklegal.co.uk., 2014). However, such a practice is not what the  
230 NEC primarily supports, as it proposes a prospective approach to delay events.

### 231 *Assessment of Relevant Events and CE*

232 As stated previously, the challenge of a delay event is not just its existence but also the  
233 complexity of determining the time and money impact of the event for the contractor and  
234 employer. Accordingly, Gibson (2008) recognized the significance of the assessment process for  
235 REs and CE as the most likely place for disputes between the contractor and employer. Eggleston  
236 (2006) reinforced the CA's or Project Manager's (PM's) power to assess the events if they perceive  
237 an inaccuracy in the contractor's initial claim. However, such an assessment can be the first cause  
238 of disagreements with the contractor if the contractor believes the assessed amount does not cover  
239 their costs or time for the events, eventually escalating into a dispute and causing further delays. To

240 avoid such issues, Furst et al. (2016) recommended the need for the PM or CA to perform the  
 241 assessment with a fair and reasonable judgement of the events and use a logical or methodological  
 242 analysis of the effect of the RE on completion. This is evident in Clause 2.28.1 of the JCT 2016  
 243 Standard Building Contract with Quantities (JCT 2016 SBC/Q), although the NEC4 Engineering  
 244 and Construction Contract (NEC4 ECC) does not contain a similar requirement. However,  
 245 Gibson (2008) cautioned employers to be mindful of the contractors' common practice of  
 246 evaluating each event using a "best guess" approach rather than a more analytical technique that  
 247 involves the examination of the programs and the critical path, making it almost impossible for  
 248 their claims to attain 100% accuracy.

249 ***Assessment of Concurrent Delays***

250 Concurrent delays are instances where two or more events/processes occur simultaneously  
 251 and delay the construction process. In the relevant literature for there to be a "concurrent delay"  
 252 it is necessary for at least one of the delaying events/processes to be a contractor risk and at least  
 253 one an employer/shared risk. The concurrent aspect of these events/processes may make it  
 254 difficult to form a judgement of by how much the contractual completion date should be extended  
 255 by operation of the extension of time process since the contractual completion date should only  
 256 be extended for employer/shared risk reasons (a RE or CE in the context of JCT and NEC  
 257 respectively)(Brawn, 2012; Wilmot-Smith, 2014; Ndekugri and Rycroft, 2009). With such  
 258 complexity, Ndekugri and Rycroft (2009) have summarised the legal analysis approaches  
 259 potentially available for assessing concurrent delays, as outlined in Table 1.

260 **Table 1.** Strategies for the assessment of the concurrent delays

<i>Assessment Strategies</i>	<i>Description</i>
<i>First line approach</i>	This approach assumes the liability of the first event to occur among two or many events for causing the whole delay. This could imply that if the initial occurrence is deemed significant, additional time will be granted regardless of whether the contractor caused the delay through their own actions. Alternatively, it could imply that no additional time will be granted if the contractor is at fault for the initial occurrence, even if the employer's activities make the delay severe.

<i>The 'but for' approach</i>	The delay is considered the fault of the contractor if it would not have occurred but for the occurrence of an event for which the contractor is responsible.
<i>The dominant cause approach</i>	Whichever cause of delay is the dominant one, is treated as the cause of the delay. This strategy is supported by Furst <i>et al.</i> (2016), identifying the contractor's entitlement to an additional time when the delay is brought on by an occurrence covered by the REs clause with equal causation to all other causes of delay.
<i>The apportionment approach</i>	This approach attempts to distribute delay among various contributing factors and has been questioned in courts of law as to whether this is the correct approach. There are arguments that JCT could support this approach, stating that the contractor must provide estimates of delay for each delaying event, albeit whether this is correct may depend on the applicable jurisdictional law. Also, the employer must state the time extensions associated with each delay upon granting the additional time.
<i>The Malmaison approach</i>	This approach stems from <i>Henry Boot Construction (UK) Ltd v. Malmaison Hotel (Manchester) Ltd</i> , where the judge stated: <p style="padding-left: 40px;">"It is agreed that if there are two concurrent causes of delay, one of which is a relevant event and the other is not, then the contractor is entitled to an extension of time for the period of delay caused by the relevant event, notwithstanding the concurrent effect of the other event."</p> This approach is supported by the Society of Construction Law Delay and Disruption Protocol (2017).

261 Source: Authors' own creation based on (Ndekugri and Rycroft, 2009).

262 More recently, the various approaches have been summarised by Furst *et al.* (2022) as indicated  
263 below, and this formulation has received judicial approval in *Thomas Barnes & Sons plc v Blackburn*  
264 *with Darwen Borough Council*:

265 In respect of claims under the contract:

266

267 (i) depending upon the precise wording of the contract a contractor is probably entitled  
268 to an extension of time if the event relied upon was an effective cause of delay even if  
269 there was another concurrent cause of the same delay in respect of which the contractor  
270 was contractually responsible; (para 118) and

271

272 (ii) depending upon the precise wording of the contract a contractor is only entitled to  
273 recover loss and expense where it satisfies the "but for" test. Thus, even if the event relied  
274 upon was the dominant cause of the loss, the contractor will fail if there was another  
275 cause of that loss for which the contractor was contractually responsible." (at 9-105)

276 Although there are various strategies for the assessment of concurrent delays, Knowles  
277 (2012) identified the real challenge behind concurrent delays as the fact that there is no exact rule

278 concerning which delay takes precedence and that there is inconsistency within the case law. While  
279 all methods have some support, the difficulty is that each case must be assessed individually, with  
280 the only common aspect being the need for the employer to act in a fair and reasonable manner  
281 in making delay assessments. Therefore, concurrent delays were found to be causing uncertainty  
282 for the contractor, as the approaches can differ from one project to another.


283 Overall, the literature review on both SFCs reveals issues with assessment, volume, and  
284 concurrent factors, laying the groundwork for further investigation in this study. Further, the  
285 control within the delay mechanisms in both SFCs is found to be more vested in the employer,  
286 leaving the general contractor exposed to being dependent on the employer. Although both SFCs  
287 are widely used in the construction industry, a consistent agreement among industry or academia  
288 on how to analyze delays was not found, with the management of the impact of delays potentially  
289 being subject to the judgement of the employer's representatives.

## 290 **Research Methodology**

291 Using a qualitative case study approach based on the exploratory aspect of the research problem,  
292 this study explored how the delay mechanisms in JCT and NEC SFCs facilitate or exacerbate  
293 challenges to contractors in healthcare projects. Yin (2014) recognized the value of employing case  
294 studies to investigate research questions that begin with "how" and "why," as well as in examining  
295 a contemporary issue in its actual setting where the researcher has no control over participants'  
296 behavioral actions in the concluded projects. Case studies are most suited for offering local (i.e.,  
297 accurate and realistic) interpretations of a phenomenon, which the researcher then frames inside a  
298 theoretical framework to provide the means for extending or advancing the current theory,  
299 according to Harrison and Corley (2011, p. 19). A case study approach was deemed appropriate as  
300 a result, as it would give a thorough grasp of the key issues and a broad awareness of associated  
301 issues (Knight & Ruddock, 2008). The case study approach provided for an in-depth study into  
302 the concept of delays in its real-world context, as it manifests in projects executed under the two  
303 SFCs (Yin, 2014).

304 ***Embedded Multiple Case Study Design***

305 In terms of the adopted case study design, this study followed the embedded multiple case study  
306 design (Fig 1.) identified by Yin (2014).



307  
308 **Fig 1.** Adopted multiple-case study design (Source: Authors' own creation based on Yin (2014))

309 The above design parameters were determined to systematically form the basis of the  
310 investigation. To study the challenges general contractors are experiencing with CEs, two  
311 healthcare projects utilizing NEC3 were chosen, whereas the challenges posed to general  
312 contractors by REs under JCT 2016 (SBC/Q), were explored in two other healthcare projects.  
313 Adopting two cases for each SFC facilitated the process of literal replication within the cases and  
314 theoretical replication of the findings across the two SFCs (Yin, 2014).

315 ***Background of the Case Studies and Study Participants***

316 According to Yin (2014), deploying multiple cases yields better findings, and the criteria for  
317 choosing a case study depends on practicality, judgement, time restrictions, and financial  
318 constraints. The purposive selection method (Maxwell, 2013) was employed to provide the  
319 competitive advantage of strategic case selection (Patton and Appelbaum 2003). Such purposive  
320 selection targeted cases that the research team could “establish the most productive relationships”  
321 with (Maxwell, 2013, p. 99) to compare the delay provisions in the two SFCs. Accordingly, four  
322 exemplifying projects consisting of NHS programs and private healthcare projects ranging in value  
323 from £3.5 million to £78.0 million were selected. The general contractors in all the selected

324 projects experienced problems because of the delay mechanisms of the respective SFCs used.  
 325 Table 2 summarizes characteristics of the case studies and profiles of the participants, and a  
 326 document survey under each case study for data collection. Each participant was coded serially  
 327 from P1 to P9 while each document was coded based on the project from which it was obtained  
 328 (as shown in brackets) in a manner that would make it easy to link the participant and document  
 329 back to each project and the SFC used.

330 Table 2: Characteristics of the cases, profiles of the Participants and collected documents.

	<i>Project Code</i>	<i>Used SFC</i>	<i>Contract sum</i>	<i>Roles of Participant and Participant Codes</i>	<i>Documents collected and Document Codes</i>
<i>Case Study A -NEC3</i>	Project 1 <b>(1-NEC)</b>	NEC 3	£78.0 m	Participant 1: Senior QS <b>(1-NEC-P1)</b>  Participant 5: Contracts Managing Surveyor <b>(1-NEC-P5)</b>	CE Tracker (1-NEC-D1)  Communication of CE's impact on completion date (1-NEC-D2)
	Project 2 <b>(2-NEC)</b>	NEC 3	£9.5 m	Participant 3: QS <b>(2-NEC-P3)</b>  Participant 6: Associate Director <b>(2-NEC-P6)</b>	Rev 09 program (2-NEC-D1)  Rev 20 program (2-NEC-D2)  Email with CE information (2-NEC-D3)
<i>Case Study B- JCT 2016 (SBC Q)</i>	Project 3 <b>(3-JCT)</b>	JCT 2016 (SBC/Q)	£12.0 m	Participant 4: Senior QS <b>(3-JCT-P4)</b>  Participant 2: Associate Director <b>(3-JCT-P2)</b>  Participant 9: QS <b>(3-JCT-P9)</b>	Executive delay program (3-JCT-D1)  Executive summary of delays (3-JCT-D2)  Delay communications 1, 1a & 1b (3-JCT-D3)  Contractors pour sequence (3-JCT-D4)
	Project 4 <b>(4-JCT)</b>	JCT 2016 (SBC/Q)	£3.5 m	Participant 7: Associate Director <b>(4-JCT-P7)</b>  Participant 8: Senior QS <b>(4-JCT-P8)</b>	

## 332 ***Data Collection***

333 In terms of data collection, semi-structured interviews provided an opportunity to simplify  
334 complex perspectives and make the questions as well as responses properly understood through  
335 repetition and rephrasing (Sekaran, 2016). As the acceptable sample size in qualitative research,  
336 Hennink and Kaiser (2022) recommended 9–17 interviews. Accordingly, in this study, nine top-,  
337 and middle-management level professionals who were directly involved in delay event  
338 identification, evaluation, assessment, and documentation aspects, were interviewed. In addition  
339 to semi-structured interviews, a document survey was integrated with each case study to  
340 complement interview data and add further contextual details to the delay events in the respective  
341 case studies. Both methods were adopted to collect data from multiple sources to achieve multiple  
342 lines of convergence, in line with good practices of case study research (Yin, 2014). Documents  
343 provided access to archival data for verifying information obtained from the interview participants,  
344 which enhanced reliability (Miles et al., 2014).

## 345 ***Data Analysis***

346 Content analysis was deployed to analyze the qualitative data collected. The content analysis helped  
347 to identify the critical areas within the delay processes of JCT and NEC that require further  
348 improvement. Accordingly, a three-stage approach like that used by Rathnasinghe *et al.* (2022) was  
349 adopted, in which firstly, key themes were identified in transcribed transcripts using open coding,  
350 then classified using axial coding, and finally supported by statements from the transcripts using a  
351 selective coding process. In addition, the analysis of the data was implemented in the form of  
352 cross-comparisons among the case studies, initially within the same contexts, to identify the themes  
353 through thematic analysis. This was followed by a cross-case synthesis of the contexts to show  
354 recurrent themes (Yin, 2014). Cross-case synthesis helped to identify and analyze similarities,  
355 differences, and patterns across cases (Goodrick, 2014). The purpose of the comparative case study  
356 was to provide an understanding of the implications of the problems facing the general contractors  
357 regarding the CEs and REs in healthcare projects. Finally, such analysis helped to establish

358 similarities and differences between SFCs and consequently enabled the development of  
359 propositions.

## 360 **Research Findings**

361 As previously mentioned, the authors assigned codes to the projects and the individuals  
362 interviewed to facilitate the identification of the selected Standard Form of Contract (SFC). This  
363 coding system aimed to enhance the clarity and readability during the analysis of findings in this  
364 section. Consequently, the initial two case studies (1-NEC and 2-NEC) have implemented the  
365 NEC as their chosen SFC, while the latter two case studies (3-JCT and 4-JCT) have opted for the  
366 JCT. Moreover, participants within each case study were assigned extended codes to above project  
367 codes, such as participant 2 from an NEC-deployed case study- 1 being identified as 1-NEC-P2.

## 368 ***Volume and Concurrency***

369 It was striking that the research identified that in respect of each of the NEC and JCT  
370 projects analyzed, there was one aspect of contract management which stood out as being  
371 particularly challenging, but that there was a difference between the NEC and JCT groups as to  
372 what that was. For NEC contracts, the key problem appeared to be the volume of CE (i.e., the  
373 number of CEs), whereas for JCT contracts the key problem was managing concurrent/multiple  
374 delaying factors via the EOT process. Though volume and concurrency are not necessarily  
375 identical, their consequences were found to be similar in the two SFCs. For this reason, delay  
376 events were compared around these themes. Both the volume of delay events and the challenges  
377 of dealing with concurrency of delays/multiple causes have a direct influence over the workload  
378 of contractors. Findings of this research suggest that both volume and concurrency of delay events  
379 are biggest issues for contractors undertaking projects based on both SFCs.

380 The two participants (i.e., 1-NEC-P1 and 1-NEC-P5) from 1-NEC project highlighted 571  
381 instances of CEs in their project as "*death by a thousand cuts*," stating the volume of CEs was the  
382 biggest issue they faced during the project's progression. In one instance, the general contractor  
383 had to send a notification document (1-NEC-D2) to the project manager (PM) stating that the  
384 assessment for these CEs could only be finalized after project completion. This was due to the



385 high volume of CEs received so close to the take-over date. Similarly, the data collected from  
386 Project 2-NEC showed that there were 95 instances of CEs by the time the project was 83%  
387 complete. Consequently, the CEs led to an eight percent increase in the gross maximum price of  
388 the project. The volume of CEs also caused the initial program duration of Project 2-NEC to be  
389 extended from two months, with the participant 2-NEC-P3 stating that CEs had created a "*big*  
390 *intensity*" to their workload. According to the participant 2-NEC-P6, the high volume of CEs in  
391 Project 2-NEC meant that "*most CEs are concerned with minor work items and thus difficult to administer*  
392 *because suddenly, you've got a lot of different things happening at the same time, which is what's causing the program*  
393 *delay.*"

394 The volume of CEs also caused difficulties for the general contractor on Project 2-NEC,  
395 who encountered multiple and extensive changes triggering significant cost and time overruns,  
396 which were not only difficult to manage but also time-consuming to resolve. The number of  
397 changes and the time taken to resolve them had an impact on the general contractor's cash flow,  
398 affecting profitability.

399 On the other hand, there were concerns about concurrent delay events in Project 2A  
400 because the general contractor had submitted six claims at once, some of which were clear-cut in  
401 their favor, yet others were not. The issue was that, to convey to the employer the delay caused by  
402 each alleged RE as required by JCT, the contractor had to look for a way to segregate the impact  
403 of each event on the overall schedule. This increased the amount of work required by the general  
404 contractor, who had to guarantee that the arguments made were clear and, if there were several  
405 arguments, that there was a timeline showing how the arguments interacted with one another.

## 406 ***Assessment***

### 407 *Timescales for Assessment*

408 On both the JCT and NEC contracts, there were issues with CAs and PMs not adhering  
409 to contract deadlines. In three out of four cases, contractors considered they had adhered to  
410 deadlines requiring notification of delay events from their end; however, CAs and PMs were found  
411 to frequently take longer than the period allowed under the contract to accept or reject the

412 contractor's claim or estimate. The assessment of orders by CAs and PMs in all four projects  
413 exhibited a substantial time frame, averaging between 14 to 20 weeks (i.e., in Project 1A, the  
414 assessment duration was 16 weeks, in Project 1-NEC it was 13 weeks, in Project 3-JCT it was 17  
415 weeks, and in Project 4-JCT it was 20 weeks).

416 Participant 1-NEC-P5 stated that "*in 50% of cases where timescales were not followed, something*  
417 *was wrong with that order,*" attributable to the lack of clarity from the contractor's perspective between  
418 CEs that had been instructed by the PM and CEs that only required a quotation. Such ambiguity  
419 made it difficult for the general contractor to update their program accurately, leaving them at risk  
420 of not becoming aware of the impact of the claimed CEs until later in the project. Participant 2-  
421 NEC-P3 added, "*It depends if it's a sensitive quote, because in such cases, they are going to spend more time on*  
422 *it,*" which led to a lack of clarity on what the employer required.

423 The general contractors' most serious issue in terms of REs was the CA's failure to adhere  
424 to the 12-week timeframes specified in the JCT contracts. Both projects 3-JCT and 4-JCT  
425 experienced a 'wait-and-see' approach in terms of the PM assessing claims, meaning that the 12-  
426 week deadlines were not met by the PM. For instance, participant 3-JCT-P4 argued that "*the 12-*  
427 *week timescales do not have a lot of teeth, so there is no mention that it is automatically accepted or rejected if you*  
428 *miss your 12 weeks or do not get awarded in 12 weeks.*" Participants 3-JCT-P4 and 4-JCT-P8 stated that  
429 it is in the PMs' best interest to wait and see how the work progresses, as this may allow the PM  
430 to go back to the general contractor arguing that the projects were no longer behind schedule and  
431 therefore did not require additional time. The participants from Project 3-JCT also raised the  
432 question of uncertainty surrounding the start of the 12-week period. They cited an instance in  
433 which the contractor would submit its claim and then, six weeks later, the CA would request  
434 additional information. In this situation, it was unclear for most contractors whether such a delay  
435 would extend the 12-week period.

436 Participant 4 (3-JCT-P4) from Project 3-JCT added that the CA's ability to reassess REs is  
437 a contributing factor to the wait-and-see approach, as the CA can go back and grant additional  
438 time if the general contractor has in fact encountered a delay. The issue led to a period of  
439 uncertainty as to how the general contractor should proceed with the works. Additionally, it was

440 discovered that Project 4-JCT's general contractor experienced profitability and cash flow issues  
441 because of the time taken to resolve RE claims.

#### 442 *Assessment Techniques*

443 Participants in Projects 2-NEC and 3-JCT revealed that their CE/REs were assessed analytically.  
444 However, assessments in Project 4-JCT were made on a "best guess" basis. Meanwhile, the data  
445 collected on the assessment of CEs showed that the basis of the analysis of quotes was a mix of  
446 analytical and "best guess" on Project 1-NEC.

447 Content analysis of documents revealed that the analytical approach to assessing REs in  
448 Project 3-JCT was due to the level of detail the general contractor was required to and did provide  
449 when submitting the claim to the contract administrator. Participant 3-JCT-P9 explained that to  
450 substantiate the EOT claim, a step-by-step process showing output per worker, fixing times (i.e.,  
451 for installing building components/ fixtures), and hook times (i.e., lifting and hoisting of  
452 components/ materials using cranes) was provided to the CA, who then made an analytical  
453 assessment. Additionally, an executive summary outlining the delay event and its potential impact  
454 on the overall construction schedule had also been submitted. However, participant 4-JCT-P7  
455 noted that *"it's viable, but most of the time, the employer representatives do not have the analytical skills to*  
456 *undertake a comprehensive review."*

457 Participant 1-NEC-P5 expressed the possibility of *"employer's representatives taking advantage*  
458 *of the fact that the contractor is entitled to some preliminary work and contingency within your pricing of your*  
459 *preliminary work, and quite often the employer will knock that out."* This would leave the contractor with  
460 no option other than going for adjudication, which is not practical with every change the employer  
461 makes to a CE. On Project 1B, however, all participants acknowledged the thorough and analytical  
462 nature of the PM's assessments, while having no experience with PM changing their quote based  
463 on a guess.

#### 464 *Timing*

465 The timing of claims for CEs and REs was identified by participants as a major issue. Accordingly,  
466 in NEC projects, the primary issue the general contractors encountered was that the PM did not

467 fully understand the implications of the CEs, whereas, in JCT projects, programming and  
468 sequencing issues of work were caused by the timing of the REs.

469         Considering Project 2-NEC, for example, the timing of CEs caused problems for the  
470 general contractor because initially simple CEs were introduced late, making them more complex  
471 to administer. For example, participant 2-NEC-P3 presented an instance where the employer  
472 needed more pattress boxes (i.e., conduit or socket boxes) in rooms, and by this time these rooms  
473 had already been completed. Therefore, the CE included costs for additional pattress boxes,  
474 reinstating the surfaces, and finishing, as well as a remobilization cost for the partition  
475 subcontractors. Such extra costs could have been avoided if these demands had been made prior  
476 to the completion of units. It is worth noting, of course, that this type of late design change is a  
477 routine feature of construction projects, regardless of the terms on which the parties are  
478 contracting. In addition, participant 1-NEC-P1 stated that "*when a CE is issued under Clause 61.1, the*  
479 *employer's party expects it to happen instantly, and what they do not understand is that there is a procurement*  
480 *process that takes place, a clarification process in terms of work information, and a leading period for the*  
481 *subcontractors and products.*" As a result, participant 1-NEC-P1 emphasized the importance of PMs  
482 appreciating the efficient impact that CE may have at an appropriate time rather than at a later  
483 stage.

484         The fact that Clause 2.28.6 of the JCT contract requires the contractor to use its best  
485 endeavors to mitigate delays also caused problems for the contractor in Project 3-JCT, considering  
486 the timing of the claim submission for the REs. Accordingly, the contractor was forced to begin  
487 work to mitigate additional delays without knowing whether the CA would grant the initial request  
488 for additional time. Meanwhile, the CA could look back and determine faults in what the general  
489 contractor had done, the same issue arose for the general contractor on Project 4-JCT. As a result,  
490 the contractor reported being forced to work out of sequence to mitigate the delay. Whilst this  
491 decision by the contractor appears to be a rational response to the way that the JCT allocates risk  
492 in such circumstances, it needs to be kept in mind that the only perspective which is being  
493 examined in this study is that of the contractor.

## 494 ***Collaboration***

495 Within the NEC projects, participants affirmed that collaboration was evident between the general  
496 contractors and employers. Participant 2-NEC-P3 stated, "*NEC is all about collaborative working, team*  
497 *working, like early visibility and keeping your employer informed, and I do think it does encourage being more aware*  
498 *of maintaining relationships.*" Participant 1-NEC-P5 also explained that NEC promotes collaboration  
499 in the way it pushes parties together to work through CE issues. The need to be collaborative was  
500 more evident in Project 1-NEC, where 467 of the 571 CEs were caused by the employer. In  
501 contrast, collaborative working was not visible in JCT projects. For example, as participant 3-JCT-  
502 P4 stated, "*With this job being traditional, it was much of us and them, so there's no collaboration.*" Participant  
503 3-JCT-P4 further explained that the JCT contract does not have clauses to encourage people to  
504 work together the same way NEC does and that JCT is a "*more aggressive form of contract.*"  
505 Additionally, in the two JCT projects, the employer hired the architect, placing the risk squarely  
506 on the employer's shoulders and hindering collaboration by fostering a more adversarial mentality.  
507 These findings underline how the collaborative or non-collaborative drafting of SFCs has, in these  
508 projects, set the tone for the nature of project relations.

## 509 **Discussion of Research Findings**

510 The empirical findings revealed the following challenges which need to be addressed to achieve  
511 overall stability and hence enhance the sector.

### 512 ***Volume and Concurrent Delays***

513 The most significant issue that general contractors faced in NEC projects is the volume of  
514 CEs. The issues arising from the volume of CEs were mostly related to administration difficulties  
515 and programming problems. Eggleston (2006) viewed the volume of CEs in terms of the inability  
516 to update the construction program promptly, noting that CEs should be rare events. However,  
517 case studies affirmed that CEs are not rare events, and this may be due to the CE clause within  
518 the NEC being designed in such a way that changes can be readily implemented. This research  
519 finding also supports Brewer (2007) who argued that the impact of the number of CEs may not  
520 become apparent until later in the program. This was seen as a challenge because NEC requires

521 the contractor to identify all CEs prospectively and determine their impact on the intended  
522 completion date.

523 Concurrent/multiple cause delays, like the volume of CEs, were the most significant  
524 problem for contractors in JCT projects. Data from JCT-implemented projects revealed that  
525 general contractors struggled to analyze concurrent/multiple cause delays, particularly in  
526 evaluating the individual impact of each delay event. Similarly, Brawn (2012) recognized the  
527 difficulty in evaluating concurrent delays. In addition, the lack of a precise process for analyzing  
528 concurrent delays adds to the difficulty of evaluating such claims. It may be argued that this  
529 difficulty increases the workload on contractors as they need to be thorough in submitting their  
530 claims. On the other hand, the case studies indicate that where more information is provided, the  
531 need for the CA to make a “best guess” on EOT is diminished. These challenges could explain  
532 why concurrent delays have been the subject of disputes in some of the cases determined by the  
533 courts, pointing to the difficulties experienced in assessing such claims during project execution.  
534 For instance, the case of *Thomas Barnes & Sons plc v Blackburn with Darwen Borough Council* was a first  
535 instance decision on a dispute arising from a project that involved the construction of a bus station  
536 based on the amended JCT SBC/Q 2011 edition. The court held that the contractor was entitled  
537 to an extension of time where the hub steel deflection (employer risk) and the roof coverings  
538 (contractor risk), both on the critical path, were concurrent causes of delay. The extension awarded  
539 by the court exceeded what the CA had granted but was less than the time claimed by the  
540 contractor. The judge observed in paragraph 144 of the ruling that while the problem with the hub  
541 structural steelwork started in October 2014 and was not resolved till January 2015, it was not the  
542 only cause of delay during that period because of other delays occasioned by roof coverings. The  
543 case is illustrative of the complexity of determining correct and appropriate extensions of time  
544 during a project. It may also be relevant to reflect that one factor which may contribute to some  
545 disputes around EOTs in JCT projects is that, as found above, the SFC itself does not promote  
546 collaborative behavior. It is tantalizing to speculate whether the *Thomas Barnes* case would have  
547 terminated as it did had the job been let on an NEC.

548 ***Assessment***

549 *Timescales of Assessments*

550           The failure of CAs and PMs to adhere to the prescribed timescales was identified as a  
551 significant issue for contractors on both SFCs. Birkby, Ponte, and Alderson (2008) derided the  
552 wait-and-see approach by project administrators, pointing out that it would make it difficult for  
553 contractors to maintain a healthy cash flow and program. Although Clause 2.28.2 of the JCT  
554 contract required a 12-week timeframe to communicate the decision on the award of an additional  
555 time from the date of receiving the required particulars, no penalty was specified for the employer  
556 if this timeframe is not met, creating uncertainty in the process of administering the contract. Study  
557 participants revealed that this was a caveat used by employers to justify the wait-and-see approach,  
558 stating that doing so was in their best interest. Unfortunately, the problems encountered by  
559 contractors because of such delays in communicating claim awards have not been adequately  
560 addressed in the empirical literature. However, this study has established uncertainty, cash flow  
561 problems, and unprofitability as the challenges faced by the contractor, making the JCT contract  
562 more prone to claims and disputes as contractors exploit such loopholes to compensate against  
563 losses.

564           Considering NEC projects, empirical data revealed that contractors experienced minor  
565 issues with PMs missing the prescribed contractual timeframes for assessment. Just like the JCT,  
566 it was discovered that existing literature does not adequately address the issues that general  
567 contractors may face if the PM fails to meet the timeframes. However, the current NEC4  
568 Engineering and Construction already includes clauses for the process if the PM timed out on the  
569 claim award. Clause 61.4 indicates that the contractor's notification is deemed to have been  
570 accepted as a CE if the PM fails to respond within two weeks after the contractor's notification  
571 reminding the PM of such failure. Such a clause ensured stricter adherence to the timescales in the  
572 NEC case studies, which faced fewer issues. Findings reveal that when deadlines were missed,  
573 both parties acknowledged this and took a collaborative approach to resolving the CE, minimizing  
574 the potential for a dispute. However, the lack of clarity for the contractor to proceed with work  
575 was a challenge in an instance where the employer failed to adhere to the specified timeframe.

576 One case that illustrates the gravity of Employers' failure to timely assess requests for  
577 additional time is *Walter Lilly & Company Ltd v McKay & Another*. The case arose from a project  
578 based on the amended JCT Standard Form of Building Contract 1998 Edition Private Without  
579 Quantities. The project involved the construction of a new building at No.3, Boltons Place,  
580 London SW5 over a period of 78 weeks running between 12 July 2004 to 23 January 2006. The  
581 project was characterized by substantial delays, with several requests for additional time. However,  
582 by the end of June 2008, the contract administrator had not responded to 196 out of 234  
583 notifications for extension of time. These notifications were eventually determined in favor of the  
584 contractor by the Technology and Construction Court (a specialist court dealing with small  
585 construction claims in the UK), albeit only after substantial dispute resolution costs had been  
586 incurred by the parties in a matter which would all have been avoided had REs been properly  
587 assessed within the contractual timescales. The precise factors which lead to the failure to assess  
588 on time cannot be known, but again the JCT contract does not include mechanisms which promote  
589 collaborative working.

#### 590 *Assessment of Events*

591 Regarding the assessment of events, Gibson (2008) revealed the need for the employers'  
592 agents to be analytical but stated that in practice, a "best guess" approach has been mostly adopted.  
593 However, findings of this study suggest inconsistencies in the approaches followed by employers'  
594 agents in assessing CE and RE claims. For instance, the claims in each case study were assessed in  
595 different ways: analytically, by best guess, or a mixture of the two. The literature on the evaluation  
596 of REs and CEs revealed a similar aspect: there is no unanimous understanding of how the  
597 employers' agents should evaluate the general contractor's claims or quotes. Under Clause 64.1 of  
598 the NEC contract, the PM has the right to reassess CE quotes that they believe are incorrect and  
599 has the power to strike out portions of the quotation. This, along with a lack of understanding of  
600 the implications of a CE, emerged as a problem for contractors in the process of assessing claims  
601 and quotes.

602 Meanwhile, the analytical approach taken by the employer in Project 3-JCT was described  
603 by the study participants as having been done in the "correct way," in that arguments had been put



604 forward with evidence. This approach is supported by Denny, Clay, and Hudson (2018), who  
605 viewed delay analysis as a forensic investigation. While the literature calls for an analytical  
606 approach, the JCT contract simply states the need for fair and reasonable judgement by the CA in  
607 assessing delays, creating ambiguity with no definitions on how this can be achieved in practice. It  
608 may be that such ambiguity arises from the fact the JCT contract has no requirement for a program  
609 as a contract document, making it difficult to compel the contractor to submit such a program for  
610 analysis of the REs (Lane & Pickavance, 2015). Despite these shortcomings there is a rich  
611 literature relating to how to prepare delay and disruption claims (e.g. Burr, 2016 and the Society of  
612 Construction Law's Delay and Disruption Protocol, 2017).

### 613 *Timing*

614 Findings indicate that the timing of events is a common issue for all contractors, irrespective of  
615 the type of SFC used. In NEC projects, contractors found the timing of CEs to be a major  
616 challenge in getting the CE quotation accepted because the PMs were found not to be fully  
617 knowledgeable about the likely implications of the CEs. In addition, it appears that the NEC  
618 contract allows CEs to be introduced at any point during construction, without acknowledging the  
619 issues arising out of the timing of CEs. The same is true about the literature surrounding the CE  
620 mechanism, with the majority focusing on how volume can cause issues with no mention of timing.

621 Findings from the JCT-related case studies, on the other hand, suggest that the timing of  
622 events leading to REs claims caused challenges for contractors in sequencing and programming  
623 their work, resulting in uncertainty. Chappell (2017) described the procedure to be followed if the  
624 RE occurs within 12 weeks of practical completion, and that the contractor must use their best  
625 efforts to mitigate delays. However, there is no clear definition of "best efforts," creating  
626 uncertainty for the contractor when programming works to mitigate the delay.

### 627 *Collaboration*

628 Findings confirmed the NEC's stance on promoting collaboration in the construction  
629 project environment. Promotion of collaboration is particularly important in healthcare projects,  
630 which have multiple stakeholders with competing priorities. A collaborative environment therefore

631 assists the parties to communicate and thereby foster innovation in these projects. The  
632 collaborative nature of NEC contracts has been recognized in previous studies, with Broome  
633 (2012) and Lau et al., (2019) identifying the need for parties to act in the spirit of mutual trust and  
634 collaboration in NEC-adopted projects. This non-adversarial approach has been found to foster  
635 better working relationships, thus minimizing potential disputes in construction projects (Besaiso,  
636 et al, 2018). In addition, findings revealed the need for contractors to submit monthly programs  
637 and keep a running final account in accordance with NEC clauses to avoid any potential disruption  
638 to the collaborative project environment.

639 Whilst some previous studies had found collaboration occurring on JCT based projects,  
640 that was not the finding here. None of the JCT projects operated in a particularly collaborative  
641 way. Gibson (2008) argued that it is only a requirement within the JCT contract that the parties  
642 work in such a way as not to impede performance, implying that collaboration is not encouraged  
643 to the same extent done in the NEC SFC.

#### 644 **Conclusions and Way Forward**

645 This study aimed to identify and compare the common issues faced by general contractors  
646 on healthcare projects regarding the delay processes within JCT and NEC standard forms. The  
647 main challenges identified for the general contractors were administration and programming issues  
648 caused by the volume of delay events and concurrent/multiple cause delays. The failure of the  
649 CAs and PMs to meet deadlines caused uncertainty, programming, and cash flow issues. The  
650 general contractors were also affected by a lack of consistency in the assessment of claims, which  
651 resulted in uncertainty and unfair assessments, and the timing of events hampered the  
652 programming and sequencing of work. The study also established that in most projects, delay  
653 provisions in the SFC were not strictly followed. Findings also suggest that the approach adopted  
654 in the NEC projects was collaborative, enabling parties to the contract to proactively identify and  
655 resolve any delay-related issues, compared to the adversarial approach adopted in the JCT projects.  
656 Thus, it can be concluded that the administration of delays was more problematic under the JCT

657 contract than the NEC contract. Additionally, provisions that spelt out consequences of failing to  
658 timely assess requests for additional time helped to instill discipline in administering the contract.

659         Due to the nature of healthcare projects, there are many stakeholders who influence design  
660 and construction, allowing opportunities for change throughout a project. Regardless of the SFC  
661 used, social infrastructure projects such as hospitals are bound to be influenced by multiple parties.  
662 As a result, involving various stakeholders early in the process is critical for limiting potential  
663 changes during the construction phase. Furthermore, healthcare projects should be designed with  
664 the understanding that change is unavoidable, and contractors and employers should be prepared  
665 for it. This could include both parties ensuring that a member of their project teams is solely  
666 responsible for dealing with change as it arises.

667         Additional SFC clauses may also improve the assessment of delay events. The inclusion of  
668 a clause stating that assessments must be made using a uniform analytical technique such as the  
669 Delay and Disruption Protocol (Society of Construction Law, 2017) would offer general  
670 contractors more confidence in submitting quotes or claims. Although it would require additional  
671 input of human resources from the contractors, this requirement is likely to reduce project  
672 disruptions while strengthening bonds between the employer and the general contractor.

673         The implementation of the CE and RE processes clearly causes the most problems for  
674 general contractors, as strict adherence to contract clauses varies depending on projects,  
675 employers, and relationships. One response to this finding would be to counsel that the frequency  
676 of issues encountered by general contractors would be reduced if the industry approached all  
677 projects with a serious commitment to abide by the letter of contract clauses, particularly regarding  
678 the delay processes. However, the many guidance documents which have been written to give this  
679 advice to industry over the course of decades without industry learning or being able to consistently  
680 follow it suggest that an alternative recommendation may be more effective. What the empirical  
681 evidence does suggest is that even in imperfect circumstances, for example where contractual  
682 processes have not been strictly followed, more positive outcomes are likely in collaborative as  
683 opposed to adversarial environments. The evidence also indicates that the absence of contractual  
684 encouragement of collaborative approaches in the JCT SFC does make collaborative environments

685 less likely. Accordingly, it is proposed that introducing a clause promoting a collaborative  
686 approach within the JCT SFC may be something worth exploring. Lastly, to improve the JCT and  
687 NEC delay processes, a shift in attitude toward delays is required. Improvements can be made,  
688 and healthcare projects will benefit from additional clauses, early involvement of contractors, and  
689 the acceptance that change is unavoidable. However, the JCT contract requires considerable  
690 changes to introduce provisions for mandatory and updated programs and consequences of the  
691 employers' failure to timely assess and respond to contractors' notifications and requests for  
692 additional time.

693         Because much of the existing literature is from the perspective of the employer, this study  
694 provides novel insights into the general contractor's perspective on the delay mechanisms. It also  
695 fills a gap in the literature by directly comparing JCT and NEC SFCs and their delay mechanisms;  
696 hitherto, this area had not been compared directly. The study reveals that there are common issues  
697 among the standard forms and that the problems may not be inherent in the contracts themselves  
698 but rather in the industry. Examined through the Transaction Cost Economics lens, the study  
699 contributes to the growing body of knowledge on how the parties may choose to address  
700 uncertainties arising from gaps inherent in the SFCs. Under this theory, incomplete contracts may  
701 lead to opportunistic behavior as one or more parties capitalizes on the ensuing uncertainty in the  
702 contract execution process (Williamson, 1998). While acknowledging that including additional  
703 clauses can potentially improve SFCs but not make them be 100 percent complete, an overall  
704 change in attitude that embraces parties' collaborative approaches to project implementation might  
705 be seen as a panacea to project success.

## 706 **Data Availability Statement**

707 Some or all data, models, or code generated or used during the study are proprietary or confidential  
708 in nature and may only be provided with restrictions.

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