**Vulnerability of energy firms to climate risk:   
Does fintech development help?**

**Abstract**

Energy firms, given their importance to overall economic activity, are increasingly seen as sources of systemic risk. Considering the relation of climate-change risk to energy sources, it is sensible to consider energy firms as vulnerable to climate-change. We investigate whether fintech development bolsters energy firms (valuations and dividends) as these firms face greater climate risk. Using an international sample of listed energy firms from 2016 to 2023 (2379 (1972) firm-year observations for our firm value (dividend) model) and ordinary least squares regression, we find that fintech development cushions the adverse impact of climate risk on energy firm values and dividends. Findings are robust to firm fixed effects and generalized method of moments models, additional control variables, and alternative measurements of value and dividends. Our results suggest that Fintechs may act as a channel for energy firms to withstand the negative repercussions of climate change, thereby supporting the efforts of regulators to promote Fintechs. Moreover, when confronted with high climate risk, our results suggest that managers could utilize Fintechs to increase firm value and dividends.

**Keywords:** Climate risk; Extreme weather; Fintech development; Energy enterprise; Dividends

1. Introduction

As a result of climate change, events such as extreme rainfall, severe heatwaves and unusually high/low temperatures are adversely affecting businesses, through adversely impacting production, destroying assets, and obstructing communication (Pankratz et al., 2023). Empirical evidence suggests that greater climate change risk deprecates firm value (Huang et al., 2017; He et al., 2024), with concomitant adverse impacts on dividends (Chen et al., 2023; Huang et al., 2017). With expected increases in the frequency and severity of extreme weather events (Benincasa et al., 2024), lessening vulnerability to climate risks is paramount for firms (Zhao & Lin, 2024). Climate change risk is of special concern for the energy sector (Shinwari et al., 2024), given that this sector is central to the overall economic health of a country (Lu et al., 2019; Ren et al., 2025), as well as being vulnerable to changing regulations and other transition risks, and being often highly centralized and so subject to systemic risks.

With an increase in availability of internet and individuals preferring speed and convenience, there has been a rapid growth in financial technology (Fintechs) over recent years (Abbasi et al., 2021; Li & Fu, 2022; Xu & Lin, 2024). Regulators, too, are showing increasing support towards development of Fintechs in the form of, for example, innovation hubs and regulatory sandboxes (Alaassar et al., 2021). Moreover, Fintechs are helping previously unbanked population to gain access to funds, thereby furthering firm growth and survival, which may be especially critical in emerging economies given their relatively unequal distribution of wealth and poor standard of living (Azmeh, 2025). Fintechs embodying innovative combinations of finance and technology, utilizes big data and algorithms to ascertain credit risk of firms, thereby facilitating access to finance (Lee & Shin, 2018). While traditional lenders such as banks may be reluctant to lend to firms affected by extreme weather events, fintechs may incorporate digital procedures to incorporate factors into credit assessment, layoff loan risk, and achieve broader social and geographic reach to borrowers of firms, thereby enabling firms with greater access to finance at the time of adverse climate events. This will contribute to firm value and increase the dividends of firms (Fu et al., 2024). Fintechs also offer a wide variety of services that facilitate operational efficiency (Abbasi et al., 2021). Insurance fintech incorporates big data from satellites, radar and ground stations and artificial intelligence to enable advanced modeling of climate risk (Hart, 2022). This helps firms withstand weather-related shocks that are increasingly unpredictable (Lin & Kwon, 2020).

While literature supports that fintech is of broad help to firms, in this paper we fill a research gap by investigating a more specific question: does the development of fintech at the country-level facilitate the financial and operational sturdiness of systemically important energy firms? Utilzing technology adoption theory which suggests that firms adopt technologies based on their perceived benefits stemming from implementing them in the operations (Bekkering et al., 2009) we find for a sample of systemically important energy firms from 51 countries (2016–2023) that society-wide fintech development positively moderate the association between climate risk and energy-firm values and dividends. Our findings are robust to fixed effects model and generalized method of moments (GMM). Moreover, results are robust to alternative specifications of determining firm value and dividends and to inclusion of further control variables. Analysis also reveals that fintech development is positively associated with higher energy-firm cash levels. We also evidence that our identified positive impact of fintech development on energy firm values is not due to a signaling effect from a positive impact on dividends.

Given the recent exponential growth in Fintechs and recent concerns towards climate change issues, there is scant literature examining the nexus of Fintechs-climate risk-corporate outcomes. As a result, this study contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, we contribute to the stream of literature investigating the impact of extreme weather events on corporate outcomes (such as Pankratz et al., 2023) by assessing whether Fintechs play a role in mitigating the impact of climate change in energy firms. Second, this study contributes to Fintech literature. In contrast to prior literature evidencing positive impact of Fintechs in terms of firm efficiency (Abbasi et al., 2021), environmental performance (Wang et al., 2024) and innovation (Kong et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2023), we investigate whether Fintechs affect the link between climate change and firm outcomes. Third, we contribute to the studies assessing determinants of firm value and dividend. Whereas studies such as Li et al. (2024) and Gregory (2022) (Zhu and Hou (2022) and Balachandran and Nguyen (2018)) analyse the impact of climate risk and firm value (dividends), we offer novel contribution to this strand of literature by investigating the impact of Fintechs on firm value and dividend when firms are confronted with high climate risk.

1. Methodology

We focus on all listed energy firms available on Thomson Reuters from 2016 to 2023, covering 51 countries. We included energy firms from all countries for which data was available on Eikon database. We utilize the industry classification of Thomson Reuters to determine energy firms. We collect fintech data from Crunchbase. We obtain firm value, dividend, corporate governance and financial characteristics from Thomson Reuters Eikon. Country-level climate risk is proxied by the Global Climate Physical Risk Index (GCPI) (Guo et al., 2024). This index measures the frequency of extreme weather events and is calculated by incorporating four components which include extreme rainfall, extreme high temperature, extreme low temperature and extreme drought (Guo et al., 2024). After incorporating missing data, our sample consists of 2,379 (1,972) firm-year observations. Appendix 1 shows the list of countries included in our sample.

Our two dependent variables are specifically firm-level log of the total market capitalization and dividend per share (Abdolmuhammadi, 2005; Ofori-Sasu et al., 2017). Our main independent variable involves an interaction term between country climate risk and fintechs. We measure country-level fintech development as the ratio of fintechs in a country to total fintechs in the world (Laidroo et al. 2021). Whereas studies such as Abbasi et al. (2021) utilize number of Fintechs in a country, we argue that our measure of proportion of country’s Fintechs to total Fintechs in the world captures the country’s relative contribution towards global Fintech landscape, thereby more appropriately encompassing Fintech development.

We include several control variables. We consider that better performing firms (return on equity) and more growing firms (ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity) are likely to be in a better position in terms of ability to increase firm value and dividend (Abbasi et al., 2021; Danbolt et al., 2011). Further, given their large resources, large firms (log of total assets) are expected to be positively associated with firm value and dividends (Likitwongkajona & Vithessonthi, 2020). Additionally, higher leverage (ratio of debt to assets) suggests greater financial capacity to allocate investments to increase firm value and to provide higher dividend (Ammann et al., 2011).

We also consider governance and pro-social controls. The presence of a CSR committee (1 if there is a CSR committee in a firm, otherwise 0) has been associated with an increase in firm value and higher dividend, as a separate CSR committee suggests greater consideration for environmental issues, with concomitant regard by investors (Albitar et al., 2024), allowing greater capacity to pay higher dividends (Salah & Amar, 2022). Additionally, an independent board (percentage of independent directors) resonates with higher monitoring of executive directors, resulting in greater firm value and higher dividends (Sharma, 2011). Further, female directors (percentage of female directors) have been identified as having a greater tendency to consider the interests of various stakeholders, which may translate into higher monitoring of board, resulting in a positive association with both firm value and dividends (Gull et al., 2018). Lastly, we control for year and industry effects. Variable definitions are presented in Table 1.

(Insert Table 1 about here)

The following ordinary least squares regression (OLS) models are adopted to test our research questions:

Firm valuei,t = B0 + B1 Fintechc,t \* Climate riskc,t + B2 Fintechsc,t + B3 Climate riskc,t + B4-n Control variablesi,t + Country effects + Year effects + ε (1)

Dividendi,t = B0 + B1 Fintechc,t \* Climate riskc,t + B2 Fintechc,t + B3 Climate riskc,t + B4-n Control variablesi,t + Country effects + Year effects + ε (2)

In the above models, the subscripts i, t and c represent firm, time and country respectively. To address multicollinearity concerns, we mean center Fintechs and climate risk variables before creating interaction terms. Standard errors are clustered at firm level to consider serial correlation and heteroscedasticity.

1. Results and analysis

Table 2 reports descriptive statistics. The high standard deviation of our interaction term implies varying levels of country’s fintech development and climate risk. As country-specific factors may affect Fintech startups and level of climate risk (Abbasi et al., 2021), such large variation in our sample from 51 countries could be expected. The mean value of female directors is 17.12, which shows the need to deploy policies to enhance gender diversity, while the average value of independent directors is 62.50, which reflects corporate governance regulations stipulating greater presence of independent directors. The mean value of CSR committee is 0.67 which reflects that firms are under increasing pressure to mitigate their impact on climate change.

(Insert Table 2 about here)

Table 3 presents our baseline regression results. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 show results without incorporating fintechs and the interaction term (the impact of climate risk on firm value and dividend). Results show an insignificant link between climate risk and either firm value or dividends, in contrast to Chen et al. (2023) and Huang et al. (2017). However, Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 present our main findings related to our research questions. Column 3 reports a positive moderating impact of fintech development on the relation between climate risk and firm value. This suggests that Fintechs may help reduce climate risk, which in turn enhances firm value. Fintechs, due to their big data technology, enhance availability of funds when firms face heightened climate risk, thereby increasing firm value. Column 4 of Table 3 reports results consistent with fintech development having a positive moderating association between climate risk and dividends, implying that Fintechs may mitigate climate risk and thereby leading to an increase in dividends. Fintechs help save operating expenses and have the potential to earn higher investment returns due to automated operations and robo-investment advisory with advanced big data technology respectively (Abbasi et al., 2021; Lee & Shin, 2018). This results in greater availability of cash resources to be able to pay dividends at the time of high climate risk. Our findings align with studies such as Wu (2024) and Tao et al. (2022), which evidence that Fintechs curtail climate risk. We, therefore, offer further insights by substantiating that such mitigation effect translates into a positive impact on corporate outcomes in terms of firm value and dividends.

(Insert Table 3 about here)

In relation to our control variables, we find that firm performance, firm growth, leverage and firm size are positively and significantly related to firm value and dividends, consistent with our expectations. Additionally, female directors are positively associated in the firm value model, consistent with expectations. CSR committee and board independence variables are insignificant, which suggests that they may be affected by specific characteristics of CSR committee and independent directors wherein positive aspects (such as greater experience) may have been mitigated by negative characteristics (such as limited meetings).

3.2. Endogeneity

Out of concern that omitted variable bias may drive our results, we employ endogeneity testing. We utilize fixed effects to account for time-invariant firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity (Bevan & Danbolt, 2004). Additionally, we employ generalized method of moments (GMM) testing, which considers both time-varying and time-unvarying firm related unobserved heterogeneity (thereby, addressing multiple endogenous concerns simultaneously) (Dong & Li, 2022). Even though instrumental variables (IVs) can be used to address the endogeneity problem, GMM estimation is more efficient and popular to do so (Worrall and Kovandzic, 2010). In a related study, Worrall (2008) added that GMM nests several estimations (OLS, 2SLS, IV) within a single framework. In addition, our diagnostic tests suggest suitability of applying GMM to our study, as AR (2) and Hansen J test are insignificant, consistent with the absence of second-order autocorrelation. This indicates validity of instruments (Wintoki et al., 2012). Our results, reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, suggest that our main findings persist with our fixed effects model, while Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 report that the findings are consistent with our GMM model. Overall, our findings are robust to endogenous concerns.

(Insert Table 4 about here)

3.3. Robustness tests


As a robustness check, we include other corporate governance variables and further financial characteristics namely, board size (number of board members), additional directorships of the board (average multiple directorships of board members), board tenure (average tenure of board members), quick ratio (ratio of current assets minus inventory to current liabilities) and cash balance (log of the total cash balance)) in our main models. Findings (Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5) are robust to inclusion of further control variables.

(Insert Table 5 about here)

Second, we measure firm value and dividends alternatively. In this case, firm value is the log of the ratio of market capitalization to total assets (Bai et al., 2016), while dividend is the log of total dividends (Lee et al., 2023). Our findings (Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5) show that the main findings are robust to alternative specifications of firm value and dividends.

3.4. Path analysis

Figure 1: path analysis



3.4.1 Dividend and firm value

As per signaling theory, higher dividends signal market participants about the high potential of a firm, resulting in increases in firm values. Given our findings that fintech development positively moderates the link between climate risk and firm value, it may be possible that this finding may stem from our result that fintech development increase dividends at the time of high climate risk.

To investigate this possibility, we include a three-way interaction term (wherein the interaction between fintech development and climate risk is interacted with dividends) in the firm value model. Results, reported in Column 1 of Table 6, show an insignificant association of this three-way interaction term. This suggests that our positive impact of fintech development on firm value (given higher climate risk) may be driven by higher growth potential (stemming from Fintechs helping firms attain greater access to funds) rather than an increase in dividends causing a rise in firm value.

3.4.2. Cash and dividends

Given that fintech development increases the cash balance of firms, it may be argued that this greater cash balance acts as a channel through which fintech development positively affects dividends during high climate risk exposure. Consequently, we test this proposition by including a three-way interaction term wherein we interact cash balance (log of the total cash balance) with the interaction of climate risk and fintech development. Results are reported in Column 2 of Table 6. The findings show a positive and significant association for the three-way interaction term, consistent with greater cash balance promotes dividends. Moreover, Figure 1 depicts our path analysis graphically.

(Insert Table 7 about here)

1. Conclusions

Firms are clearly affected adversely by extreme weather events. (Chen et al., 2023), with energy firms increasingly seen as being systemically risky. While energy firms are vulnerable to many factors, a significant concern is climate change risk. We investigate whether fintech development positively conditions the relation between climate risk and energy firm value and dividends. Using a cross-country sample, covering 51 countries, from 2016 to 2023, we find that fintech development positively conditions the impact of climate risk on energy firm value and dividends. We reason that fintech development brings capacity to consider big data, enhanced access, broader geographic reach, improved ability to distribute risks, and improved availability of financing for energy firms.

We recommend policymakers to introduce policies supportive of Fintech startups which may include regulatory sandboxes and green Fintech startups (which specifically focus on climate finance). We also suggest regulators to improve digital infrastructure (for example, investing in high-speed internet) for Fintech startups to develop. This is especially important in the context of emerging economies given their poor institutional quality. We recommend future researchers to analyse types of Fintechs to examine whether certain Fintechs offer relatively greater resilience towards climate change. Moreover, we suggest that institutional and cultural factors are investigated to assess whether our results are contingent on country-specific variables. Further, our measure of Fintechs (ratio of country’s Fintechs to global Fintechs) encompasses a limitation that it disregards the significant progress of smaller economies in terms of Fintech development which may be captured by measuring Fintech development through Fintechs per capita.

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**Table 1: Variable definitions**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |
| Variable | Definition | Source |
| FirmValue | Log of total market capitalization | Eikon |
| Dividend | Dividend per share | Eikon |
| Fintech development | Ratio of fintechs in a country to total fintechs in the world | Crunchbase |
| ClimateRisk | An index incorporating extreme rainfall, extreme high temperature, extreme low temperature and extreme drought in a country | Guo et al. (2024) |
| CSRcom | 1 if there is a CSR committee ina firm otherwise 0 | Eikon |
| IndBoard | Percentage of independent directors | Eikon |
| FemaleBoard | Percentage of female directors | Eikon |
| FirmGrow | Ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity | Eikon |
| ROE | Return on equity | Eikon |
| Leverage | Log of the proportion of debt to assets | Eikon |
| FirmSize | Log of total assets | Eikon |
| BoardSize | Number of board members | Eikon |
| BoardDirectorships | Average additional board seats held by board members | Eikon |
| QuickRatio | Ratio of current assets minus inventory to current liabilities | Eikon |
| Cash | Log of total cash balance | Eikon |

**Table 2: Descriptive statistics**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **Mean** | **Std. Dev.** | **Min** | **Max** |
| FirmValue | 21.41 | 2.00 | 14.91 | 28.39 |
| Dividend | 0.64 | 1.50 | 0.00 | 27.03 |
| Fintech\* ClimateRisk | -7.22 | 68.74 | -696.49 | 215.21 |
| CSRcom | 0.67 | 0.47 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| IndBoard | 62.50 | 24.17 | 0.00 | 100.00 |
| FemaleBoard | 17.12 | 13.41 | 0.00 | 66.67 |
| FirmGrow | 0.64 | 103.07 | -1000.62 | 4460.14 |
| ROE | 0.04 | 1.19 | -25.47 | 38.35 |
| Leverage | 2.92 | 3.63 | -8.49 | 19.01 |
| FirmSize | 18.36 | 3.01 | 4.09 | 26.65 |

*Sources: Authors’ calculation*

**Table 3: Main regression results**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **Firm Value** | **Dividend** | **Firm Value** | **Dividend** |
| ClimateRisk | -0.000 | 0.012 |  |  |
|  | (-0.004) | (1.086) |  |  |
| Fintech \* ClimateRisk |  |  | 0.127\*\*\* | 0.392\*\* |
|  |  |  | (2.736) | (2.062) |
| Fintech |  |  | 15.122\* | 2.596 |
|  |  |  | (1.753) | (0.207) |
| ClimateRisk |  |  | 2.377\*\*\* | 7.364\*\* |
|  |  |  | (2.743) | (2.064) |
| CSRcom | 0.155 | 0.042 | 0.153 | 0.044 |
|  | (1.596) | (0.411) | (1.576) | (0.430) |
| IndBoard | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.890) | (0.343) | (0.856) | (0.327) |
| FemaleBoard | 0.014\*\*\* | 0.006 | 0.014\*\*\* | 0.006 |
|  | (3.881) | (0.923) | (3.909) | (0.925) |
| FirmGrow | 0.001\*\*\* | 0.000\*\*\* | 0.001\*\*\* | 0.000\*\*\* |
|  | (4.886) | (3.086) | (4.860) | (3.207) |
| ROE | 0.098\*\* | 0.041\* | 0.098\*\* | 0.041\* |
|  | (2.273) | (1.651) | (2.285) | (1.684) |
| Leverage | 0.710\*\*\* | 0.192\*\*\* | 0.708\*\*\* | 0.192\*\*\* |
|  | (25.757) | (6.039) | (25.628) | (5.995) |
| FirmSize | 0.707\*\*\* | 0.199\*\*\* | 0.705\*\*\* | 0.200\*\*\* |
|  | (21.642) | (5.013) | (21.558) | (4.997) |
| Constant | 5.833\*\*\* | -4.982\*\*\* | 289.791\* | 43.942 |
|  | (7.837) | (-5.988) | (1.789) | (0.186) |
| Observations | 2,379 | 1,972 | 2,379 | 1,972 |
| Country effects | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year effects | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| R2 | 0.777 | 0.271 | 0.271 | 0.272 |
| F-test | 1.0e+12\*\*\* | 9.6e+06\*\*\* | 2.1e+09\*\*\* | 7.2e+09\*\*\* |

Table 1 defines the variables. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. t-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 4: Endogeneity testing**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Fixed effects** | | **GMM** | |
|  | **Firm value** | **Dividend** | **Firm value** | **Dividend** |
| One-year lagged FirmValue |  |  | 0.744\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  | (8.658) |  |
| One-year lagged Dividend |  |  |  | 0.552\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (4.246) |
| Fintech \* ClimateRisk | 0.055\* | 0.343\* | 0.102\*\* | 0.302\*\* |
|  | (1.857) | (1.937) | (2.178) | (1.983) |
| Fintech | 11.724\* | -8.281 | 0.607\*\* | 1.081\*\* |
|  | (1.934) | (-0.760) | (1.778) | (2.128) |
| ClimateRisk | 1.044\* | 6.430\* | 1.913\*\* | 5.676\*\* |
|  | (1.875) | (1.937) | (2.185) | (1.985) |
| CSRcom | 0.035 | -0.113 | -0.011 | 0.078 |
|  | (0.534) | (-0.910) | (-0.064) | (0.683) |
| IndBoard | -0.003 | 0.003 | -0.005 | 0.002 |
|  | (-1.414) | (1.171) | (-1.316) | (1.052) |
| FemaleBoard | -0.002 | 0.003 | 0.012\* | 0.002 |
|  | (-0.560) | (0.536) | (2.030) | (0.528) |
| FirmGrow | 0.000\*\*\* | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 |
|  | (9.530) | (0.310) | (0.907) | (0.109) |
| ROE | 0.045 | -0.061 | 0.206 | 0.253 |
|  | (1.332) | (-1.357) | (1.624) | (1.662) |
| Leverage | 0.212\*\*\* | 0.297\*\* | 0.194\*\* | 0.089\* |
|  | (3.505) | (1.986) | (2.451) | (1.813) |
| FirmSize | 0.197\*\*\* | 0.295\*\* | 0.195\*\* | 0.075 |
|  | (2.988) | (2.049) | (2.328) | (1.202) |
| Constant | 236.273\*\* | -160.435 | 12.838\*\* | 18.550\* |
|  | (2.091) | (-0.785) | (1.980) | (1.929) |
| Observations | 2,379 | 1,972 | 2,180 | 1,684 |
| Year effects | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| R2 | 0.238 | 0.045 | - | - |
| F-test | 30.33\*\*\* | 5.15\*\*\* | - | - |
| Hansen J test | - | - | 0.537 | 0.285 |
| AR (2) test | - | - | 0.392 | 0.164 |
| Table 1 defines the variables. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. t-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 | | | | |

**Table 5: Robustness testing**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Additional controls** | | **Alternative measure** | |
|  | **FirmValue** | **Dividend** | **FirmValue** | **Dividend** |
| Fintech \* ClimateRisk | 0.116\*\* | 0.406\*\* | 0.127\*\*\* | 0.646\* |
|  | (2.534) | (1.999) | (2.736) | (1.809) |
| Fintech | 17.818\*\* | 2.879 | 15.122\* | 35.628 |
|  | (2.143) | (0.211) | (1.753) | (0.685) |
| ClimateRisk | 2.183\*\* | 7.618\*\* | 2.377\*\*\* | 12.021\* |
|  | (2.550) | (2.001) | (2.743) | (1.797) |
| CSRcom | 0.045 | 0.068 | 0.153 | 0.303 |
|  | (0.507) | (0.593) | (1.576) | (0.481) |
| IndBoard | -0.002\*\*\* | 0.001 | 0.002 | -0.019 |
|  | (-0.802) | (0.277) | (0.860) | (-0.930) |
| FemaleBoard | 0.014\*\*\* | 0.005 | 0.014\*\*\* | 0.055\*\* |
|  | (4.772) | (0.840) | (3.909) | (2.420) |
| FirmGrow | 0.000\*\*\* | 0.000\*\* | 0.001\*\*\* | 0.001 |
|  | (5.060) | (2.044) | (4.860) | (0.990) |
| ROE | 0.077\*\* | 0.036 | 0.098\*\* | 0.475\*\* |
|  | (2.109) | (1.583) | (2.285) | (2.115) |
| Leverage | 0.608\*\*\* | 0.213\*\*\* | 0.708\*\*\* | 1.287\*\*\* |
|  | (21.059) | (4.939) | (25.628) | (7.588) |
| FirmSize | 0.606\*\*\* | 0.220\*\*\* | -0.295\*\*\* | 2.200\*\*\* |
|  | (18.970) | (4.183) | (-9.000) | (11.797) |
| BoardSize | 0.057\*\*\* | -0.012 |  |  |
|  | (3.711) | (-0.656) |  |  |
| BoardDirectorships | 0.181\*\*\* | -0.181\*\* |  |  |
|  | (3.177) | (-2.033) |  |  |
| BoardTenure | 0.006 | -0.008 |  |  |
|  | (0.555) | (-0.472) |  |  |
| QuickRatio | 0.051\*\*\* | 0.014\*\* |  |  |
|  | (5.799) | (2.108) |  |  |
| Cash | 0.168\*\*\* | 0.039 |  |  |
|  | (7.067) | (1.098) |  |  |
| Constant | 338.873\*\* | 48.236 | 289.791\* | 626.995 |
|  | (2.170) | (0.188) | (1.789) | (0.642) |
| Observations | 2,217 | 1,838 | 2,379 | 1,908 |
| Industry effects | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year effects | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| R2 | 0.834 | 0.256 | 0.928 | 0.383 |
| F-test | 1.1e+09\*\*\* | 1.9e+10\*\*\* | 1.7e+07\*\*\* | 2.5e+07\*\*\* |
| Table 1 defines the variables. Columns 1 and 2 include further control variables, while Columns 3 and 4 utilize different measures to ascertain firm value (log of ratio of market capitalization to assets) and dividends (log of total dividends). Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. t-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 | | | | |

**Table 6: Path analysis**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **FirmValue** | **Dividend** |
| Fintech \* ClimateRisk \* Dividend | 0.001 |  |
|  | (1.552) |  |
| Fintech \* ClimateRisk \* Cash |  | 0.001\*\* |
|  |  | (2.334) |
| Fintech \* ClimateRisk | 0.136\*\* | 0.382\* |
|  | (2.353) | (1.960) |
| Dividend | 0.160\*\*\* |  |
|  | (3.062) |  |
| Cash |  | 0.046 |
|  |  | (1.413) |
| Fintech | 13.584 | 1.424 |
|  | (1.522) | (0.111) |
| ClimateRisk | 2.340\*\* | 7.222\*\* |
|  | (2.268) | (1.968) |
| CSRcom | 0.006 | 0.042 |
|  | (0.064) | (0.401) |
| IndBoard | 0.003 | 0.001 |
|  | (1.100) | (0.250) |
| FemaleBoard | 0.015\*\*\* | 0.005 |
|  | (4.023) | (0.858) |
| FirmGrow | 0.001\*\*\* | 0.000\*\* |
|  | (4.954) | (2.460) |
| ROE | 0.096\* | 0.039 |
|  | (1.789) | (1.589) |
| Leverage | 0.688\*\*\* | 0.167\*\*\* |
|  | (20.030) | (4.594) |
| FirmSize | 0.694\*\*\* | 0.177\*\*\* |
|  | (17.732) | (3.890) |
| Constant | 264.167 | 22.223 |
|  | (1.576) | (0.092) |
| Observations | 1,972 | 1,899 |
| Industry effects | YES | YES |
| Year effects | YES | YES |
| R2 | 0.767 | 0.277 |
| F-test | 57143.13\*\*\* | 6.8e+09\*\*\* |
| Table 1 defines the variables. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. t-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 | | |

|  |
| --- |
| **Appendix 1 (List of countries in the sample)** |
| Argentina |
| Australia |
| Austria |
| Belgium |
| Bermuda |
| Brazil |
| Canada |
| Chile |
| China |
| Colombia |
| Cyprus |
| Denmark |
| Finland |
| France |
| Germany |
| Greece |
| Hungary |
| India |
| Indonesia |
| Ireland |
| Israel |
| Italy |
| Japan |
| Kazakhstan |
| Kuwait |
| Luxembourg |
| Malaysia |
| Mexico |
| Morocco |
| Netherlands |
| New Zealand |
| Nigeria |
| Norway |
| Pakistan |
| Philippines |
| Poland |
| Portugal |
| Qatar |
| Romania |
| Russia |
| Saudi Arabia |
| Singapore |
| South Africa |
| South Korea |
| Spain |
| Sweden |
| Switzerland |
| Thailand |
| Turkey |
| United Kingdom |
| United States |