Understanding Syrian Refugees in Turkey from an Environment of Insecurity and the Conflict Model of Migration Perspective

İnci Aksu Kargın (corresponding author), inci.kargin@usak.edu.tr, Public Administration, Uşak University, Türkiye

Ibrahim Sirkeci, sirkecii@gmail.com, Salford Business School, Salford University, United Kingdom

Abstract

Human mobility has been a topic of interest for migration scholars. Despite a growing literature, we are still far from clarity and consensus on motivations and mechanisms of migration. In this paper, we discuss the case of Syrian refugees in Turkey from a perspective of insecurities as proposed by one of the novel approaches to contemporary human mobility. This approach offers a better understanding of Syrian exodus and their experiences with strong references to the links between structural and agency level drivers. The model accounts for key drivers and root causes of migration while also highlighting the role of perception and the moderators in an attempt to cover both mobility and immobility. In this study, we apply this model in an attempt to understand the experiences of Syrian refugees settled in Gaziantep, a city in southern Turkey bordering Syria and with a majority Syrian population.

Keywords: Syrian Refugees, Turkey, Migration, Conflict Model of Migration, Insecurity

Introduction

The phenomenon of why people migrate from their homelands to other countries has been the subject of academic discussions for many years. It is commonly accepted that models developed often are patchy -i.e. focusing on certain aspects of human mobility while also being specific to academic disciplines. This is often interpreted as a necessity to understand the complex nature of human mobility too (De Haas, 2008; Gheasi, and Nijkamp, 2017; King, 2012; Massey et al., 1993). Conflict Model of Migration which is one of the new approaches to understand the nature of migration act, claims that the underlying reasons for human mobility are the conflicts and tensions at the macro, mezzo, and micro levels in the country of origin, by

placing emphasis on perceived (in)security as a key trigger for migration. This study aims to explain the migration motivations of Syrian refugees in Turkey with reference to the Conflict Model of Migration (CMM) as a conceptual framework.

When the civil war in Syria first broke out in 2011, the Turkish government announced that it would implement an open-door policy to Syrian refugees, since it assumed that the government in Damascus would not hold long (Kirişçi and Ferris, 2015). However, Assad's government has remained in power due to the support of both internal and external actors, and this has caused the number of Syrians seeking asylum in Turkey to grow (Aksu Kargın, 2018; Zisser, 2019). In the last nine years, the Syrian population in Turkey has gradually increased until it reached 3.6 million in 2020 (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2020b), which rendered Turkey the country hosting the largest refugee population in the world (Ferris and Donato, 2020). Since Turkey signed the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol with geographical limitation, Turkey grants refugee status only to those who come from Europe. According to the Article 91 of the Law No: 6458 regarding Foreigners and International Protection, Syrians were granted temporary protection status, however, since the Syrians fit the profile of refugee due to the well-founded fear, Syrians are identified as refugees in this research paper. Turkish government's relatively lax admission policy and geographical proximity allowed millions of Syrians to move to Turkey and as of 2021, there were over 3.6 million Syrian refugees in the country, representing about 90 percent of all hosted under international protection regime (https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-in-turkey). By 2021, over 97 per cent of the refugees were living outside the camps established by Turkish government.[i] In 2015, since the war in Syria had no end in sight and the number of asylum claims continued to escalate, the Turkish government announced that it had suspended

its open-door policy. Given the large number of displacement, a decade after the outbreak of the civil war, understanding Syrian exodus and their migration experiences are still important. Therefore new conceptual discussions going beyond mere descriptions and numbers are warranted. With this article, we aim to offer a modest contribution to this line of scholarship.

First of all, we explain the methodology and discuss the conceptual framework used in understanding migration motivations. Later in the paper, we present and interpret Syrian refugees' migration experiences with a particular emphasis on the key determinants of and motivations for Syrian refugees' ("forced") migration to Turkey.

Methodology

Gaziantep was selected for the fieldwork because a large segment of the Syrian refugee population is present in this southern province. The province is also both geographically and culturally close to Syria with its historically present Arabic and Kurdish speaking minority population (Sirkeci, 2017). At the outset of the research, we have secured ethical approval from the Uşak University Ethics Review Committee [Date: 13 February 2020, Number: 2020-13]. The interviewees were from diverse neighbourhoods, and varied in terms of their socioeconomic statuses, education levels, and ethnic backgrounds (Sunni Arabs, Turkmens, and Kurds). All interviews were conducted either in refugees' homes or workplaces.

The interview questions were prepared by the researchers to gather information about what kind of capabilities (e.g., financial capital, social capital, human capital, and physical capability) the refugees had that they decided to immigrate to Turkey, and to reveal how those capabilities affected their migration aspirations. First, pilot interviews were conducted with two Syrian refugees in Gaziantep to make sure that the questions were clear and fully understood by the interviewees. Then, initial participants were recruited via contacts in the community and

snowball technique was used to recruit further participants. Total of 26 Syrian refugees

participated in this study. All the semi-structured interviews were conducted either in Arabic or

Turkish, and typically lasted between 30 to 90 minutes. The researchers explained the details

of the study to the participants and only those who gave explicit verbal consent were

interviewed. All of the interviews were audio recorded by the researchers. For privacy reasons

and due to given vulnerability of the participant population, no photographs were taken, and in

order to achieve confidentiality, the real Arabic names of the participants were concealed

replaced with Arabic pseudonyms. The qualitative data collected was analysed using the

Dedoose digital qualitative analysis program. In these analyses, content analysis method was

adopted, and the codes were emerged from the data (Merriam, 2009). The coded data were

brought together under the relevant theme from four predetermined themes, namely financial

capital, social capital, human capital, and physical capability. Findings were obtained by

examining the data grouped in themes.

Understanding Dynamic Nature of Migration and Conflicts Underpinning Perceived

Insecurities

Ravenstein's well known work, "Laws of Migration" based on population data in England is

often considered as point zero for migration theory (1885; 1889). Motivation for migration was

economic according to Ravenstein. Furthermore, he argued that migrations often tend to be

over short distances; compared to women, men migrate longer distances; long-distance

migrations are generally directed towards trade and industrial centers; the settlements vacated

after migration to industrially developed regions will be filled by other migrants. Lee (1966),

building on Ravenstein's work, claimed that a number of push and pull factors determine

migration decisions: a) factors associated with the area of origin, b) factors associated with the

area of destination, c) intervening obstacles, and d) personal factors (p.50). Rather unusual for his time, William Petersen (1958) focused on the question of why some people do not migrate while others do, and separated the migration act into five categories: primitive, forced, impelled, free, and mass, and suggested that the aspiration level of migrants has a significant impact on the migration action.

Much earlier than Lee and Petersen, Stouffer (1940) studying the relationship between mobility and distance pointed that the opportunities in the destination country also play a role in individuals' migration decision. More recently, Carling (2014) argued that aspirations such as having a happy, wealthy, and safe life lie behind individuals' migration action, also underlined the importance of individuals' abilities, resources, networks, and work opportunities; the migration regulations of states are important as well.

Besides the above-mentioned approaches to the nature of the migration act, a wide variety of theoretical approaches have been developed on why people need to migrate. An example of these is neo-classical economics (macro theory), which argues that migration is carried out as a result of wage and employment differences between the sending country and the receiving country (Massey et al., 1993). For example, in some countries, while capital is high, labour reserves are low. This results in workers moving from low waged but labour-intensive countries to countries with high wages but low labour supply (de Haas, 2008; King, 2012). After migration, since the existing labour supply in capital-rich countries increases, the value of labour will gradually decrease, and in a country with a migration outflow that is weak in terms of capital, wages will increase as the supply of labour decreases (Massey et al., 1993). Therefore, international migration that occurs as a result of wage differences will stop under conditions in which this difference disappears (Massey et al., 1993).

According to neoclassical economics (micro theory), individuals make a rational decision to migrate and act by calculating the costs and benefits of migration (de Haas, 2008; Gheasi, and Nijkamp, 2017; King, 2012). Therefore, the act of migration does not take place as a natural outcome of wage differences but at the point at which individuals believe that they can value their human capital most effectively (Massey et al., 1993). The new economics of migration pushes for a shift in the unit of analysis and argues that the decision to migrate is made at the household level rather than by the individual (Gheasi, and Nijkamp, 2017; King, 2012; Massey, 1990; Massey, 2015; Massey, et al., 1993; Taylor, 1999). Accordingly, migration does not only aim to maximise income, but also to diversify income and reduce risks for the household (King, 2012; Massey, 1990). From a conflict model of migration perspective these can be considered as insecurities arising in wage differences and risks at individual, household and national levels. Insecurities are compensated in relative terms and are important for migration, remigration, and return decisions. Hence the CMM also reflects the arguments of the dual labour market theory.

According to Piore (1979), there are two types of labour market in host countries. While the primary labour market is reserved for local people, the secondary labour market, which still means 'relative insecurity', is for immigrants. In a wider sense, immigrants, in pursuit of avoiding insecurities at home, are often willing to accept the jobs which are not desirable for others.

In network theory, which focuses on personal relationships between migrant individuals and non-migrant individuals (de Haas, 2008), the immigration act materialises through shared roots between relatives, friends, and people who have migrated, and those who have not yet migrated, and these existing networks reduce both the costs and prospective risks of migration

(Massey, et al., 1993; Massey, and Aysa- Lastra, 2011). Thus, the motivation for the migration decision here is not the wage differences between countries, but the strength of social networks between those who have been able to migrate and those who plan to migrate. This argument further enriched by the cumulative causation (Fussell and Massey, 2004) and cultures of migration models (Cohen and Sirkeci, 2011; 2021) where an established practice of migration becomes part of the culture and then migration as an option to overcome insecurities and/or pursue aspirations becomes apparent.

The extant literature, while acknowledging the complex nature of migration decisions, often amplifies a single factor at the expense of the multifaceted socioeconomic, political and cultural dimensions of migration (Cohen and Sirkeci, 2011). It is also widely recognized in the literature that migration is a process but not a single event or a momentary decision. It is also a very difficult decision with many variables directing this process (Cohen and Sirkeci, 2016). We believe that the CMM acknowledges this dynamic nature of the process moderated and shaped by factors and characteristic at multiple levels and domains. Bearing this in mind, we are exploring the migration decisions of Syrians in Turkey, and how migration decisions are successfully transformed into migration act.

In explaining the reasons behind human mobility, there does not need to be a distinction such as compulsory versus voluntary, because different levels of conflicts, tensions, and disagreements lead to insecurities and initiate migration (Sirkeci et al., 2019; Tilbe, 2015). Individuals migrate either in pursuit of security or in the desire to escape from an unsafe environment (Cohen and Sirkeci, 2011; Sirkeci, 2008; 2009; Tilbe, 2015).

According to the CMM, the perceived level of human insecurity is the determinant of individuals' migration decision, and if and when the circumstances in the destination lead to

perception of human insecurity perhaps for different reasons, migrants may consider secondary migration acts (e.g. returning to their homeland or migrating to a third country) (Sirkeci, 2009). Hence migration is by definition an open-ended process dynamically driven by "conflicts" leading to perceived insecurities accounting for both structural factors and the role of the agency.

In the CMM, human security is a central concept. It means "a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met, and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be realized" (Thomas, 2001, p.161). In other words, human security not only includes material needs such as food, shelter, education, and health, but also non-material dimensions such as the freedom to participate in social life, to live in dignity, and to lead one's own life (Thomas, 2001).

According to the CMM, conflict occurs on three levels: macro (e.g. conditions in the migrant-sending and receiving countries, and tensions between states), mezzo (e.g. the situation in a society or household; the problems experienced by ethnic, religious, and sectarian minority groups in authoritarian states), and micro (e.g. tensions between family members) (Sirkeci, 2008; Sirkeci et al., 2019; Tilbe, 2015). The main sources of conflict, and therefore reasons for migration, can relate to political, economic, cultural, and private domains, and expressed in conflicts of interests, tensions, fights etc. Now we turn to describe the main sources of such conflicts with reference to the 3 Ds (development deficit, demographic deficit, democratic deficit) (Sirkeci et al., 2019), which are useful to understand some macro level factors behind the Syrian conflict and exodus.

The Three Deficits and the Case of Syrian Refugees

Macro level causes of conflict constitute sources of migration pressure. These are summarized into development deficit, demographic deficit, and democratic deficit (Sirkeci et al., 2019). These deficits are causes of perceived human insecurity and in turn they encourage or discourage migration. Now, bearing this framework in mind, let us examine the situation in Syria prior to the crisis broke in 2011.

Development deficit arises largely from inequalities and expressed in terms of deprivation, unemployment, lack of opportunities, income levels, etc. These could be relative between countries, regions within a country, population groups within a country, and between classes. Syria has been plaqued with inequalities and has been among the top sending countries in the Middle East (Mehchy, and Doko, 2011). For example, since the 1950s, many Syrians migrated to Lebanon to earn a living as temporary workers, primarily employed in construction and agriculture (Chalcraft, 2005). Many others migrated to work in oil rich Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (Seeberg, and Eyadat, 2013).

Bashar al-Assad came to power in 2000 and shifted the country from traditional statist policy to social-market economy promoting privatisation (Şen, 2013). While the burden of taxes on the majority of Syrian citizens became heavier (Hinnebusch, 2012), public purchasing power fell and local businesses collapsed, while a new capitalist class began to rise fuelling inequalities. Furthermore, government's failure in efficiently managing the country's natural resources coinciding with the severe drought between 2006 and 2010 had a negative impact on the household economies particularly in rural areas (De Châtel, 2014). As a result, the unemployment rate increased in rural areas and caused a wave of rural to urban migration resulting in squatting problem in cities (Karabat, 2013). Overall, economic insecurities in the country has grown and made survival increasingly difficult (De Châtel, 2014).

Demographic deficit emerges when the ratio of the youth to the general population is high and often this causes a rise in unemployment, eventually fuelling migration pressure (Göktuna Yaylacı, 2019; Yüceşahin and Sirkeci, 2017). Especially in the 1970s and 80s, Syria saw rapid population growth (Zisser, 2007). Such demographic profile has knock on effects on society and economy too such as high unemployment, poverty, and a decline in public services (Buckner, and Saba, 2010; Karabat, 2013). This was the case for Syrians and unsuprisingly, many educated and well-qualified Syrians moved abroad as they perceived that they could not achieve their expected living standards (Mehcky, and Doko, 2011). Other studies has also shown that there was a spike in population growth in Syria prior to the 2011 crisis (Yüceşahin and Sirkeci, 2017; Haddad, 2011). While those younger than 24 constituted 60% of the population, there was not enough job opportunities created and hence increasing economic insecurity along with demographic deficit. This eventually encouraged many to pursue jobs abroad (Mehcky, and Doko, 2011).

Democratic deficit is apparent when citizens are not satisfactorily represented or inequalities in representation is felt strongly by individuals and/or groups. Syria has been an example of such inequalities in representation (Göktuna Yaylacı, 2019). Since the beginning of Hafez al-Assad's reign, although administration of the state was shared with some Sunni factions, the top cadres in government and military consisted of Nusayri-Alawis, a minority group. Elections were held in the country, but they were allegedly manipulated to consolidate the power of the Assad family. After the death of Hafez al-Assad, the 82nd article of the constitution was amended to allow his son Bashar to become president: even the age at which one could be elected president was lowered from 40 to 34 and he was elected with 97% of the vote (Şen, 2013).

The Assads and Alawi minority's dominance in Syrian politics have frustrated Sunnis as well as other deprived minorities as they felt no room left for their representation in governance. A brief period called the "Damascus Spring" was declared to allow opponents of the regime voicing demands for political participation and freedom of expression, but it was short-lived and was followed by widespread arrests (Wikas, 2007).

Prior to the 2011 crisis, most Kurds were practically deprived of citizenship rights. After the official census held in Syria in 1962, the government claimed that many Kurds had entered Syria illegally. They were given identity cards even though these were not required, and 120,000 to 150,000 people were stripped of their citizenship and defined as *ajanib* (foreigner). Many Kurds who did not participate in the census and even some were registered in the country were defined as *maktuminn* (unregistered) (Allsoop, 2014). People with such statuses did not have the right to rent or purchase property, nor could they be employed in public sector. In April 2011, Bashar al-Assad's government published Decree 49 in order to keep the Kurds at bay, and promised them the right to citizenship. However, this move by the government has not prevented the Kurdish mobilisation and in fact was considered by some Kurds as a conspiracy for recruiting them into military service (Allsoop, 2014).

Events in Daraa in 2011 marks the beginning of the ongoing civil war in Syria. Macro-level factors we have defined above as democratic deficit, development deficit, and demographic deficit in Syria have been the key drivers of both domestic and international migration. These had already uprooted many long before the civil war, which only intensified the existing causes for insecurities to cause mass migration.

According to the CMM, in places where the perception of human insecurity grows, there are typically three strategic options for individuals. The first is to compromise and

maintain the status quo (i.e. stay put); the other options are to rebel against the regime or migrate (i.e. exit) (İçduygu, et al., 1999; Sirkeci, 2006a; 2006b; Sirkeci et al., 2019). In earlier stages of the civil war, most Alawis maintained their loyalty to the Syrian government (Hinnebusch, 2015). They were worried of the adverse consequences of a regime fall which may cause a backlash against them since the inhuman practices against Sunni rebels were carried out by Shabbiha units, who are dominantly Alawis (BBC, 2012), and would attract the Sunnis' revenge (Berti, and Paris, 2014). The Christian minority in the country were also concerned about the prospect of the Assad government being replaced with an Islamic regime (Hinnebusch, 2015), and some Sunni elites who had close ties with the regime were also concerned that they would be deprived of some of their gains if the regime fell (Karabat, 2013). These groups feeling relatively insecure have probably been reluctant allies of the Assad regime and stayed put.

Some other Syrians refused to compromise with the regime, and, as the CMM suggests, either joined political and military resistance or decided to emigrate (i.e. exit options). Our focus here is on those who opted to leave the country. Some moved within the country, while some moved to neighbouring countries and beyond. An interviewee in Gaziantep, stated why she decided to come to Turkey and what she had experienced prior to migration:

> Actually, we did not intend to come [here]. I had two brothers in Moscow. Luckily, they were sending money. At first, the war had not come to Aleppo [main city in northern Syria]. It came to Aleppo on the third day of Ramadan. I was very scared, but there was nothing to do. We started to flee to the villages. After we went to the village, we stayed in the village for a year. No water, no electricity. Life is very difficult in the village. So we had to return to Aleppo. We stayed in Aleppo for four months. Our house was bombed. Two of my brothers had come to Turkey… They told us "leave Syria and come to Turkey. Your life is in danger". We did not accept it at first. We had sent our sister as a bride to Turkey. When my brother also insisted, and when ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] came, frankly, we were frightened for our honor, and came. [Farah, 33, Female]

As evidenced in these narratives by Farah and many other Syrian interviewees, the main reason for Syrian refugees' internal displacement or international migration was their desire to escape from an unsafe place – i.e. human insecurity in the CMM (Sirkeci, et al., 2019; Sirkeci, 2009). Clearly "migration remains the exception, not the norm" (Spencer, 2011: 6) as only a very small percentage of the world engages in migration, and most of those who migrate prefer to do so within their home country. The Syrian crisis confirms this. The number of those internally displaced is estimated to be around 6.5 million (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2020), while the number of those who migrated internationally standing about 5.6 million (UNHCR, 2020a). However, as seen in the case above, migration is not a one-off act; individuals can engage in more than one migratory movement and there is an element of culture of migration (Cohen and Sirkeci, 2011; King, 2012). As the CMM underlines, the continuity of the act is directly related to the perception of human insecurity in the country of origin, and how severe is individuals' perception of insecurity. This is in a sense bridging the internal and international migration nexus, as people negotiate solution to the insecurities locally, and if not, internationally (Cohen and Sirkeci, 2011, 2011: 63). Many Syrians had made internal moves since the draught, and with the civil war impetus, mass outmigration began. Another Syrian interviewee, explained why she had migrated to Turkey:

> My elder brother had bought a house from there [Syria]; not long after, we got the news that he was dead. There was no electricity. He had asthma. He drowned until they took him to the hospital. He died on the way… We were in a difficult situation. No water, no electricity, no gas… What do we cook? One day, I visited nine bakeries. I could not bring a piece of bread home… My grandchildren were small. I came home. They ran over to me. They asked me: "Grandma, did you bring us bread?". I said: "My children, it did not pass into our hands…". No water, it rained. The tent was full upstairs. I said bring a big basin. I opened the tent and filled the basin. I finally said to my husband, this cannot happen anymore. Let's go, we go too…[Teslime, 44, Female]

Both Farah and Teslime's stories are illustrative of the risks, threats and death toll on a daily basis constituting a solid material environment of human insecurity prior to their migration to Turkey. Along with the increasing violent clashes, Syrians have been deprived of basic services such as electricity, water, and gas, and country's public services such as education and healthcare have collapsed due to the war. The Syrian civil war has claimed more than 500,000 lives (Euronews, 2018).

During the Syrian civil war, rape and sexual violence have also become frequent (UN Human Rights Council, 2019). This has also driven some Syrians to migrate. Our interviews have confirmed that rape has been used both as a weapon of war; driving them away and disrupting the ethnic and cultural composition of the population (Card, 1996; Farwell, 2004; Pittaway and Bartolomei, 2001). Conscription is also part of an environment of insecurity and has been one of the reasons for emigration in countries such as Turkey (Sirkeci, 2006b). Some of our participants also stated that they moved to Turkey to avoid compulsory military conscription of their sons to the army.

Irrespective of the sources of perceptions of human insecurity, migration decision is often a household matter (Castles, 2004; Cohen and Sirkeci, 2011, 2011). This was the case among Turkey's Kurds moving to Germany (Sirkeci, 2006b) and migration to Turkey was a family decision for many Syrians we have interviewed too. A Syrian refugee living in Gaziantep, told us about the drastic decision she had to make to ensure the safety of her young family:

> No work is left there [Syria]… No work, no life. There is no electricity, there is no water. It became a place that cannot be lived in. Diseases had become rife…Nothing to eat and drink. Then, I gave birth to my child. In spite of the odds, we wanted to stay. Too many people fled but we still wanted to stay. Then, when the war started [in their region], everywhere began to be ruined. My neighbour's daughter and friends of my husband, all of them died in front of my eyes… My child was small. Whenever a bomb

came, I hid somewhere, taking my child. Then, I said to my husband, let's go as well. At least until the events settle down a bit. Let's stay there [Turkey] for one or two months, then return to our homeland. Afterwards, we came to Turkey. After we came here, nobody remained in the region we lived, everybody left there and fled. Since there is no security left there…[Ecre, 28, Female]

The CMM model emphasises the dynamic nature of migration-insecurity nexus. People may perceive less or more (in)secure over time and this moderated by changes in the context as well as in their private lives. Rising conflict levels in Syria have forced some who were already feeling relatively insecure even prior to the crisis. Once the armed conflict started, the insecurity became greater, but like many, Ecre and her family at first stayed put. However, over time with intensifying armed clashes -i.e. growing material and non-material insecurity, they decided to move to Turkey.

Syria's development, demographic, and democratic deficits have already promoted emigration prior to the civil war. Syrians have been highly represented in migration to countries such as Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. The increasing intensity of conflict within the country has simply exacerbated Syrian citizens' perception of human insecurity and displaced millions within the country while forcing millions more to move abroad. Nevertheless, despite all the conflict and perception of insecurity, not everyone migrates. In the next section, we explain this in reference to 4Cs (i.e. Financial Capital, Social Capital, Human Capital and Physical Capability).

The 4 Cs of Migration: The Case of Syrian Refugees

Insecurities can arise from conflict(s) and inequalities at macro, mezzo, or micro levels. However, only those who perceive a strong insecurity and or with a strong will, desire and aspirations but also with means and capabilities can migrate. The "4Cs" are moderating or qualifying set of characteristics to explain the differential reactions to the 3Ds. Syrian

participants' narratives we have collected in Gaziantep, Turkey provide rich material to support this 4Cs model.

To migrate, one surely needs money or some liquid wealth (i.e. **financial capital**). Those with better financial status are more likely to migrate compared to those in poverty (Menjivar, 1993; Hydman, 2000; Sirkeci, 2006b; Van Hear, 2004). The poorest do not have the ability to cover the costs of migration, hence they often stay behind. For instance, migrants and their families generally have to pay thousands of dollars either for documents and tickets or to smugglers (Friebel and Guriev, 2006; Richmond, 1993). Stories of our respondents were in line with the financial capital argument:

> Since my family's financial situation was not very good, they could not come to Turkey. They stayed there. We paid [smugglers] $2000 per person and then we could pass this way. They could not come because my family had no financial situation. We came in difficult conditions. We have paid money, but even crossing those mountains and rocks is a torment, an ordeal. It's a separate war. Even on the way, the bullets of the cops never stopped. They constantly fired bullets on us. [Abdul, 32, Male]

As seen in this narrative, there are costs for individuals who want to migrate, especially for those who do so with the help of smugglers because of difficulty in reaching to the border in an ongoing civil war. The smugglers charge refugees for safe passage to the border or inside Turkey. These journeys are challenging due to the difficult geography and the dangers of the civil war as Abdul mentions above. Smugglers are often the only agents to reduce these risks in such circumstances.

Social capital (Coleman, 1988; Portes, 1998; Putnam, 2000) is another required source in order to convert a migration decision into action. Social capital is described as "the sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p.119). Thus, "Unlike all other forms of capital,

social capital is 'located' not in the actors but in their relations with other actors" (Adler and Kwon, 2009, p. 94).

In terms of the migration act, social networks, which are formed via kinship, friendship, and other social relations, are the ties that connect people who are migrants and non-migrants, and provide a flow of information between those who are able to migrate and those who plan to migrate (Boyd, 1989; Faist, 2000; Marger, 2001). Networks are significant not only in terms of whether or not refugees will migrate but also where they will migrate to (Bauer, et al., 2002; Koser and Pinkerton, 2002). The interviews that were conducted with Syrian refugees, as in the case of migration of Turkish Kurds to Germany (Sirkeci, 2006b), revealed that social capital is an important factor during the migration act. Two Syrian interviewees, both expressed the importance of social capital, both in taking the decision to migrate and afterwards:

> [Once my family had] prepared, packed, I looked and realised that I would be staying alone, then I said I'll come too. I still have relatives in Turkey. I have my uncles. My uncle has children. I said they can support us. God bless them. They helped a lot. Some gave duvets, some gave washing machines, some gave refrigerators. We have no shortcomings. [Farooq, 67, Male]

> Before we left Syria, three floors of the apartment that we live in fell down... Six floors in total. Then we decided to go. First of all, we sent my brother here. Here, he worked alongside brother Mehmet [a Turkish employee]. After, we decided to get out of Syria. We came here. After around five months, I met with brother Mehmet, I started to work as well. It has been four or five years that I have been working alongside brother Mehmet. [Zahra, 24, Female]

As can be understood from such narratives, the social networks encourage individuals to migrate since they believe even in the worst scenario they know someone in the host land (Sirkeci, 2006b). While the social capital, which is obtained via kinship and friendship ties, has a facilitating effect on migration (Cohen and Sirkeci, 2011; Faist, 2000; Hein, 1993; Massey and Zenteno, 1999; Sirkeci, et al., 2019), it also has a significant impact on accessing the services and culture of the host state (Gericke, et al., 2018). Social capital also has other

benefits for migrants, from covering the cost of migration to finding work and shelter in the new environment, as well as benefiting from public services such as education, healthcare, and social welfare in the new country.

Human capital has also emerged as crucial in our interviews explaining Syrian refugees' migration to Turkey. To be able to speak the main language of the host country, having education and skills that can be transferred (Lamba, 2003; Potocky-Tripodi, 2004), having an education level that can help with the procedures and operations regarding migration, all fall within the context of human capital (Sirkeci et al., 2019). It is one of the dynamics effective in migration decisions:

> I was the one responsible [for the migration decision] but we took the decision together, as a family… I knew that I would not starve in migrating to Turkey since I am a mechanical engineer. And I also have tailoring skills. I was doing tailoring when I was child. I studied engineering when I was in university. Therefore, I was saying to myself, I can earn a livelihood whatever the case. I came to Gaziantep with the idea that if I could not work in this place, I can work in another one… [Muhammed, 39, Male]

Syrian refugees we interviewed have acknowledged the importance of and benefited from qualifications, work experience, and language skills they had prior to their migrations as was the case for Muhammad. Human capital in a way also a decisive factor for destination choices. Our participants stated that they migrated to Turkey because they believed their skills would earn them some income in Turkey.

Along with financial, social, and human capital, physical capability is decisive in migration. Irregular or regular, migration often requires individuals to have the physical capacity to endure the travel (which is much harder in irregular moves) as well as mental capability and the courage to face the challenge (Sirkeci et al., 2019). Some of our participants were living in the regions close to Turkish border and they simply walked over. However,

disabled and elderly individuals (i.e. limited physical capability) were less likely to migrate as seen in the following cases:

> My family is here, my siblings are here [Turkey]. My father remained there [Syria], since he is old and there is no money [to pay for smugglers] to bring him here. I mean we could not bring him. My father cannot come by illegal ways [she means on his own]. He cannot come since these ways are hard to overcome. He remained. We collected money right and left in order to bring my father, but we could not. Since everything with dollars involves illegal ways, and too much money is needed, we could not bring my father. He is still in Syria… [Sarah, 41, Female]

> We climbed to a mountainous place. I was pregnant and I was put to it, especially climbing that slope. We wanted to get into a bus but since we did not have money, they did not let us to get in. Then, they hit my husband. The man who hit him was Turkish. After the fight an Arab came, he knew Turkish. In Turkish, he said "leave that man alone, let him get in, all his expenses belong to me, bring him to Turkey." [Rahima, 35, Female]

As Sarah's case shows, it is hard for elderly and sick people to migrate. Our participants have also reported that the smugglers who help people to migrate to Turkey would ask for more money from those who are elderly, sick, or disabled. For Sarah, it was too much money smugglers asked for bringing her father from Syria, and this was why Sarah's family was unable to bring him along.

Another example for physical capability is Rahima's migration; she was pregnant and she could hardly walk and so she wanted to migrate via vehicle. This shows particular importance of physical capability in irregular migration. Nevertheless, given availability of or access to required financial capital, limited physical capability can be compensated. Like in the case of Rahima and her husband, those who have no money and physical difficulty may face further risks. On their journey to Turkey, she and her husband were removed from the bus and subjected to violence. They only managed to migrate as another fellow passenger agreed to cover their expenses. In both Sarah's father and Rahima's case loose social networks stepped in to enable their migration by covering the smuggler fees.

Conclusion

Migration is a complicated and multifaceted and open-ended process shaped and reshaped by many moderating factors and at several stages the decision is subject to changes. The motivations driving human mobility have been of great interest to researchers over a century and this interest has just grown exponentially in recent decades. Therefore, our study aims at contributing to the conceptual debates by providing fresh evidence in support of the Conflict Model of Migration which emphasizes strongly the dynamic nature of the process and the role perceived insecurities play in decision making without ignoring the facilitating and/or enabling factors and characteristics. Conflicts or tensions in the place of origin and individuals' perception of the risks and threats arising from these conflicts (i.e. insecurities) are key to migration decisions. Aspirations and potential achievements in destinations only come into the frame once migration appears a clear strategic option to the individual who feels insecurities and face inequalities and conflicts that may appear unsurmountable if stayed put. In the cases of armed conflicts and civil wars, stakes are much higher and migration becomes a relatively easy decision as we witness mass movements such was in the case of Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, and more recently in Syria (Sirkeci, 2006b), Turkmens in Iraq (Sirkeci, 2006a) or Rohingya in Bangladesh and so on.

In this study, we used the lenses of the Conflict Model of Migration to understand how and why Syrians wanted to flee their homes for Turkey. We have framed their moves within the Three Deficits (3Ds) model and explored the ways in which 4Cs moderated these decisions and migration experiences.

The 3Ds (development deficit, demographic deficit, democratic deficit) practically underlines the importance of a series of factors creating emigration pressures at macro and mezzo levels.

We found abundance of evidence in the narratives of Syrians interviewed in Gaziantep, Turkey. Syria and Assad regime have created deeply rooted inequalities and disadvantaged large segments of populations while failing almost in all aspects catering their citizens. This created a country plagued with desire to migrate for so long. When the violence broke out with the incident in Daraa in 2011, it marked the beginning of nationwide displacement and mass exodus.

Human insecurity, a key concept in the CMM, has been commonplace for politically and/or economically disadvantaged groups includingSunni majority, Kurds, Christians, Turkmen, and other groups not allied with Assad regime. Some opted to remain and fight the regime whilst others voted by their feet and destined to other countries at the face of intensifying armed conflict and strengthening perception of human insecurity.

The migration act, if we separate from the decision, is moderated by availability of means and resources (i.e. 4Cs) and it is how we explain, despite a civil war and high risks, why not many more migrated from Syria. Our participants' stories clearly shows that their language skills, contacts, families and friends in Turkey, having cash and physical capability were crucial in their successful migrations. Four types of capital and capabilities (i.e. financial, social, human, and physical) play a central role in both decision making and migration process.However as some of our participants indicated these are operating in an interactive fashion as one capital may compensate another.

Human mobility in general and Syrian migration to Turkey in particular are very responsive to conflicts and the perceived insecurities arising from these conflicts. As explained elsewhere, these conflicts do not necessarily be as intensified as in the cases of civil wars. Even minor tensions, disagreements, discomforts may lead strong levels of perceived insecurity as it

is subjective and moderated by personal characteristics as well as the context. Therefore it is important to acknowledge that every migration is unique to an extend but yet we may see common patterns and principles at play in migration experiences across the board. The CMM offers a conceptual framework that is receptive to such flexibility and dynamism of both decision making and migration processes. Even in our small group of respondents in Gaziantep, Turkey, we see a variety of migration experiences but a common feature of high level perception of human insecurity that forced them to move. And yet, only those with appropriate means available were able to move and settle to the north of the border.

Acknowledgements

Biographical Notes

İnci Aksu Kargın received her BA in Public Administration from Gazi University, Ankara, and MA and PhD in Near Eastern Languages and Cultures from Indiana University Bloomington, the US. İnci currently works as an Assistant Professor at the Department of Public Administration in Uşak University, Turkey, and she is the founding director of the Migration Research Center of Uşak University. Her research interests include forced migration studies, migration theories, diaspora studies, and Middle Eastern politics. İnci has published journal articles and book chapters on Syrian refugees in Turkey, conducted several fieldworks on Syrian refugees in Turkey in the provinces bordering Syria, and participated in several prestigious conferences to present her studies.

Ibrahim Sirkeci received his BA in Political Science and Public Administration from Bilkent University, Ankara and PhD in Human Geography from the University of Sheffield. Prior to

joining University of Salford, he worked at University of Wales Trinity Saint David

and Regent's University London. Ibrahim Sirkeci has widely published on migration, ethnicity,

conflict, labour markets, and remittances. He is the author/editor of many books including

Handbook of Culture and Migration (2021), COVID-19 and Migration, Understanding the

Pandemic and Human Mobility (2020), Little Turkey in Great Britain (2016), Migration and

Remittances during the Global Financial Crisis and Beyond (2012) and Cultures of Migration,

the Global Nature of Contemporary Mobility (2012). He is also the editor of several journals

including Migration Letters, Transnational Marketing Journal, Remittances Review, Border

Crossing and Goc Dergisi.

Disclosure Statement

The authors do not have any conflicts of interest to declare.

ORCiDs
İnci Aksu Kargın, 0000-0002-3164-9764
Ibrahim Sirkeci, 0000-0002-2334-7424

References

Adler, P. and Kwon, S. (2009). Social capital: the good, the bad, and the ugly. In Lesser E. (Ed.). *Knowledge and social capital: foundations and applications*. Boston: Butterworth Heinemann, pp. 89-115.

Aksu Kargın, İ. (2016). *The Syrian refugees in Turkey: rheir living conditions and the ways in which their presence has affected Turkish society.* PhD thesis. Indiana University.

Aksu Kargın, İ. (2018). The unending Arab spring in Syria: the primary dynamics of the Syrian civil war as experienced by Syrian refugees. *Turkish Studies,* 13(3), 27-48. https://doi.org/10.7827/TurkishStudies.13158

Allsopp, H. (2014). *The Kurds of Syria: political parties and identity in the Middle East*. London, UK: I.B. Tauris.

Bauer, T., Epstein, G. and Gang, I. (2002). *Herd effects or migration networks? The location choice of Mexican immigrants in the U.S.*. Bonn, Germany: IZA Discussion Paper.

BBC. (2012). Syria unrest: who are the shabiha?. Retrieved 4 May 2020, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14482968.

Berti, B. and Paris, J. (2014). Beyond sectarianism: geopolitics, fragmentation, and the Syrian civil war. *Strategic Assessment*, 16(4), 21-34.

Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L. (1992). *An invitation to reflexive sociology*. Chicago, Il.: University of Chicago Press.

Boyd, M. (1989). Family and personal networks in international migration: recent developments and new agendas. *International Migration Review*, 23(3), 638-670. https://doi.org/10.2307/2546433

Card, C. (1996). Rape as a weapon of war. *Hypatia*, 11(4), 5-18. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1996.tb01031.x

Carling, J. (2014). *The role of aspirations in migration*. Paper presented at Determinants of International Migration, University of Oxford.

Castles, S. (2004). Why migration policies fail. *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 27(2), 205-227. https://doi.org/10.1080/0141987042000177306

Chalcraft, J. (2005). Of specters and disciplined commodities: Syrian migrant workers in Lebanon. *Middle East Report*, (236). https://doi.org/10.2307/30042459

Cohen, J. and Sirkeci, I. (2011). *Cultures of migration: the global nature of contemporary mobility*. University of Texas Press.

Cohen, J. and Sirkeci, I. (2016). Migration and insecurity: rethinking mobility in the neoliberal age. In Carrier, J. (Ed.) *After the crisis, anthropological thought, neoliberalism and the aftermath.* New York: Routledge, pp. 96-113.

Cohen, J. and Sirkeci, I. (Eds.) (2021). *Handbook of culture and migration*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Coleman, J. S. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. *American Journal of Sociology*, 94, 95–120. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2780243.

De Châtel, F. (2014). The role of drought and climate change in the Syrian uprising: untangling the triggers of the revolution. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 50(4), 521-535. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2013.850076

de Haas, H. (2008). Migration and development: a theoretical perspective. International Migration Institute, Working Paper 9. University of Oxford.

Euronews. (2018). Suriye'de 2011'den bu yana ölenlerin sayısı yarım milyonu geçti. *Euronews.* [Online]. 12 March 2018. Retrieved 4 May 2020, from https://tr.euronews.com/2018/03/12/-suriye-de-2011-den-bu-yana-olenlerin-say-s-yar-m-milyonu-gecti-.

Faist, T. (2000). *The volume and dynamics of international migration and transnational social spaces*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Farwell, N. (2004). War rape: new conceptualisations and responses. *Affilia*, 19(4), 389-403. https://doi.org/10.1177/0886109904268868

Ferris, E. and Donato, K. (2020). *Refugees, migration and global governance*. Abingdon: Oxon.

Ferris, E. and Kirişçi, K. (2015). *Not likely to go home: Syrian refugees and the challenges to Turkey— and the international community*. Center on the United States and Europe, Report no. 7. New York, NY: Brookings. Retrieved 29 December 2019, from https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Turkey-Policy-Paper-web.pdf.

Friebel, G. and Guriev, S. (2006). Smuggling humans: a theory of debt-financed migration. *Journal of the European Economic Association,* 4(6), 1085-1111. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40005238

Fussell, E. and Massey, D. S. (2004). The limits to cumulative causation: international migration from Mexican urban areas. *Demography*, 41(1), 151-171. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1515217

Gericke, D., Burmeister, A., Löwe, J., Deller, J. and Pundt, L. (2018). How do refugees use their social capital for successful labor market integration? An exploratory analysis in Germany. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 105, 46-61. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jvb.2017.12.002

Gheasi, M. and Nijkamp, P. (2017). A brief overview of international migration motives and impacts, with specific reference to FDI. *Economies*, 5(3), 31. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies5030031

Göktuna Yaylacı, F. (2019). *Kuramsal ve uygulama boyutları ile Türkiye'de sığınmacı, mülteci ve göçmenlerle sosyal hizmetler*. Transnational Press London.

Haddad, B. (2011). The political economy of Syria: realities and challenges. *Middle East Policy*, 18(2), 46-61. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2011.00484.x

Hein, J. (1993). Refugees, immigrants, and the state. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 19(1), 43-59. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.so.19.080193.000355

Hinnebusch, R. (2012). Syria: from 'authoritarian upgrading' to revolution?. *International Affairs*, 88(1), 95-113. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01059.x

Hinnebusch, R. (2015). Authoritarian resilience and the Arab uprising: Syria in comparative perspective. *Ortadoğu Etütleri*, 7(1), 16-36. Retrieved from https://www.orsam.org.tr//d_hbanaliz/2.raymondhinnebusch.pdf

Hyndman, J. (2000). Scripting humanitarianism: a geography of "refugee" and the respatialization of response. In Hyndman, J. (Ed.) *Managing displacement: refugees and the politics of humanitarianism.* University of Minnesota Press, pp. 1-28. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctttscf9.6

İçduygu, A., Romano, D., & Sirkeci, I. (1999). The ethnic question in an environment of insecurity: the Kurds in Turkey. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 22(6), 991-1010. https://doi.org/10.1080/014198799329215

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. (2020). *Syria*. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. Retrieved 11 May 2020, from https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/syria.

Karabat, A. (2013). *Suriye savaşları*. Istanbul: Timaş.

King, R. (2012). *Theories and typologies of migration: an overview and a primer*. Malmö: Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare.

Koser, K. and Pinkerton, C. (2002). *The social networks of asylum seekers and the dissemination of information about countries of asylum*. Great Britain Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate.

Lamba, N. K. (2003). The employment experiences of Canadian refugees: measuring the impact of human and social capital on quality of employment. *Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue Canadienne de Sociologie,* 40, 45-64. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-618X.2003.tb00235.x

Lee, E. (1966). A theory of migration. *Demography*, 3(1), 47-57. https://doi.org/10.2307/2060063

Marger, M. N. (2001). The use of social and human capital among Canadian business immigrants. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,* 27(3), 439-453. https://doi.org/10.1080/136918301200266167

Massey, D. (1990). The social and economic origins of immigration. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 510(1), 60-72. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716290510001005

Massey, D. (2015). A missing element in migration theories. *Migration Letters*, 12(3), 279-299. https://doi.org/10.33182/ml.v12i3.280

Massey, D. and Aysa-Lastra, M. (2011). Social capital and international migration from Latin America. *International Journal of Population Research*, 2011, 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1155/2011/834145

Massey, D. and Zenteno, R. (1999). The dynamics of mass migration. *Proceedings of The National Academy of Sciences*, 96(9), 5328-5335. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.96.9.5328

Massey, D., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A. and Taylor, J. (1993). Theories of international migration: a review and appraisal. *Population and Development Review*, 19(3), 431-466. https://doi.org/10.2307/2938462

Mehchy, Z. and Doko, A. (2011). *General overview of migration into, through and from Syria*. San Domenico di Fiesole: CARIM.

Menjívar, C. (1993). History, economy and politics: macro and micro-level factors in recent Salvadorean migration to the US. *Journal of Refugee Studies,* 6(4), 350-371. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/6.4.350

Merriam, S. B. (2009). *Qualitative research: a guide to design and implementation.* San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Petersen, W. (1958). A general typology of migration. *American Sociological Review*, 23(3), 256-266. https://doi.org/10.2307/2089239

Piore, M. (1979). *Birds of passage: migrant labor and industrial societies*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Pittaway, E. and Bartolomei, L. (2001). Refugees, race, and gender: the multiple discrimination against refugee women. *Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees,* 19(6), 21-32. https://doi.org/10.25071/1920-7336.21236

Portes, A. (1998). Social capital: Its origins and applications in modern sociology. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24(1), 1-24. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.1

Potocky-Tripodi, M. (2004). The role of social capital in immigrant and refugee economic adaptation. *Journal of Social Service Research,* 31(1), 59-91. https://doi.org/10.1300/J079v31n01_04

Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks.

Ravenstein, E. (1885). The laws of migration. *Journal of the Statistical Society of London*, 48(2), 167-235. Retrieved 4 May 2020, from http://www.jstor.orglstable/2979181.

Ravenstein, E. (1889). The laws of migration. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 52(2), 241-305. Retrieved 4 May 2020, from https://www.jstor.org/stable/2979333.

Richmond, A. (1993). Reactive migration: sociological perspectives on refugee movements. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 6(1), 7-24. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/6.1.7

Seeberg, P. and Eyadat, Z. (2013). *Migration, security, and citizenship in the Middle East: new perspectives*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Şen, Y. (2013). Suriye'de arap baharı. *Yasama Dergisi*, 23, 54-79.

Sirkeci, I. (2006a). Ethnic conflict, wars and international migration of Turkmen: evidence from Iraq. *Migration Letters*, 3(1), 31-42. https://doi.org/10.33182/ml.v3i1.29

Sirkeci, I. (2006b). *The environment of insecurity in Turkey and the emigration of Turkish Kurds to Germany*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.

Sirkeci, I. (2008). Human insecurity and streams of conflict for a re-conceptualization of international migration. *Population Review*, 46(2), 32-50. https://doi.org/10.1353/prv.2008.0003

Sirkeci, I. (2009). Transnational mobility and conflict. *Migration Letters*, 6(1), 3-14. https://doi.org/10.33182/ml.v6i1.82

Sirkeci, I. (2017). Turkey's refugees, Syrians and refugees from Turkey: a country of insecurity. *Migration Letters*, 14(1), 127-144. https://doi.org/10.33182/ml.v14i1.321

Sirkeci, I., Utku, D. and Yüceşahin, M. (2019). Göç çatışma modelinin katılım, kalkınma ve kitle açıkları üzerinden bir değerlendirmesi. *Journal of Economy Culture and Society*, 59(1), 199-226. https://doi.org/10.26650/JECS2019-0016

Spencer, S. (2011). *The migration debate*. Bristol: Policy Press.

Stouffer, S. (1940). Intervening opportunities: a theory relating mobility and distance. *American Sociological Review*, 5(6), 845-867. https://doi.org/10.2307/2084520

Taylor, E. (1999). The new economics of labour migration and the role of remittances in the migration process. *International Migration*, 37(1), 63-88. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2435.00066

Thomas, C. (2001). Global governance, development and human security: exploring the links. *Third World Quarterly*, 22(2), 159-175. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590120037018

Tilbe, A. (2015). Göç/göçer yazını incelemelerinde çatışma ve göç kültürü modeli. In Şeker, G., Tilbe, A., Ökmen, M. Yazgan, P., Eroğlu, D. and Sirkeci, I. (Eds.) *Turkish Migration Conference 2015*. London: Transnational Press London, pp. 458-466. Retrieved 4 May 2020, from https://www.tplondon.com/conferences/tmc2015book/.

UN Human Rights Council. (2019). *Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab republic (A/HRC/42/51).* Human Rights Council.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2020a). *Situation Syria regional refugee response*. Data2.unhcr.org. Retrieved 11 May 2020, from https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2020b, April 17). *Syria regional refugee response: Turkey*. Data2.unhcr.org. Retrieved 11 May 2020, from https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113.

Van Hear, N. (2004). *'I went as far as my money would take me': conflict, forced migration and class.* Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), Working Paper No. 6. Oxford, UK: COMPAS.

Wikas, S. (2007). *Battling the lion of Damascus: Syria's domestic opposition and the Asad regime*. Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Yüceşahin, M. M. and Sirkeci, I. (2017). Demographic gaps between Syrian and the European populations: what do they suggest?. *Border Crossing*, 7(2), 207-230. https://doi.org/10.33182/bc.v7i2.462.

Zisser, E. (2007). *Commanding Syria: Bashar al-Asad and the first years in power*. London, UK: I.B. Tauris.

Zisser, E. (2019). The Syrian refugees – left to their fate. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,* 46(2), 293-309. https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2019.1569306

[i] See https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638 [Accessed: 20/4/2021]