Ethics for things

Adam, AE

Abstract

This paper considers the ways that Information Ethics (IE) treats things. A number of critics have
focused on IE’s move away from anthropocentrism to include non-humans on an equal basis in moral thinking.
I enlist Actor Network Theory, Dennett’s views on ‘as if’ intentionality and Magnani’s characterization of
‘moral mediators’. Although they demonstrate different philosophical pedigrees, I argue that these three theories
can be pressed into service in defence of IE’s treatment of things. Indeed the support they lend to the
extension of moral status to non-human objects can be seen as part of a trend towards the accommodation of
non-humans into our moral and social networks. A number of parallels are drawn between philosophical
arguments over artificial intelligence and information ethics.

Citation

Adam, A. (2008). Ethics for things. Ethics and Information Technology, 10(2-3), 149-154. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-008-9169-3

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: Jan 1, 2008
• Deposit Date: Nov 4, 2011
• Journal: Ethics and Information Technology
• Print ISSN: 1388-1957
• Publisher: Springer Verlag
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 10
• Issue: 2-3
• Pages: 149-154
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-008-9169-3
• Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10676-008-9169-3