Characterising the Italian parliament: legislative change in longitudinal perspective

Newell, JL

Abstract

Despite the emergence of a bipolar party system following the introduction of a new electoral law in 1993, the Italian parliament remains an exception to the rule that legislatures have little influence over policy. It was reasonable to think that party competition, based on two coalitions each competing for overall majorities, would allow governments after 1993 to subordinate the legislature to their will through cohesive majorities. That this has not happened is to be attributed to the timing of the 1993 reform, the consequent persistence, in parliament, of large numbers of veto players, and hence the absence of legal rules and structures allowing straightforward majority decision-making. Faced, since the early 1990s, with pressure to act more decisively, governments have sought to bypass parliament through an increasing recourse to laws of delegation. Parliament has sought to compensate for its diminished role in governance by heightened activity in the area of oversight.

Citation

Newell, J. (2006). Characterising the Italian parliament: legislative change in longitudinal perspective. Journal of Legislative Studies, 12(3-4), 386-483. https://doi.org/10.1080/13572330600877437

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: Dec 1, 2006
• Deposit Date: Jan 22, 2009
• Journal: The Journal of Legislative Studies
• Print ISSN: 1357-2334
• Publisher: Routledge
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 12
• Issue: 3-4
• Pages: 386-483
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13572330600877437
• Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13572330600877437