"The Great Doctrine Disaster": Reform, Reaction, and Mechanization in the British Army, 1919-1939

Searle, DA

Abstract

Historians have argued that Britain lost its early lead in developing mechanized formations in the interwar period due to financial pressures, inter-arm rivalry, poor tank design, and the misjudgments of tank enthusiasts. A systematic examination of armor doctrine, however, demonstrates that British approaches were coherent and innovative until 1935. Progress was derailed by the suppression of the “Tank Training” (1935) manual and the decision to mechanize the cavalry rather than expand the Royal Tank Corps. Coordination between manuals of arms of service and the field service regulations was abandoned, moreover, in favor of multiple training pamphlets. The result was the “Great Doctrine Disaster” caused by fallacious assumptions about tank design, tactics, and the future battlefield.

Citation

Searle, D. (2023). "The Great Doctrine Disaster": Reform, Reaction, and Mechanization in the British Army, 1919-1939. Journal of Military History, 87(3), 599–632

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Oct 29, 2022
• Publication Date: 2023-07
• Deposit Date: Jan 13, 2023
• Journal: Journal of Military History
• Print ISSN: 0899-3718
• Electronic ISSN: 1543-7795
• Publisher: Society for Military History
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 87
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 599–632
• Publisher URL: https://www.smh-hq.org/jmh.html
• Related Public URLs: https://www.smh-hq.org/jmh.html
• Additional Information: Access Information : No version of any work published in The Journal of Military History may be posted on any open access website; Projects : Sabbatical